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Collection Indologie - 122

An Enquiry into the Nature of Liberation

Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, a commentary on Sadyojyotiḥ's refutation of twenty conceptions of the liberated state (*mokṣa*)



for the first time critically edited, translated into English and annotated

by

Alex Watson
Dominic Goodall
S.L.P. Anjaneya Sarma

Alex Watson is the Sanskrit Preceptor at Harvard University, and author of *The Self's Awareness of Itself. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Arguments Against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self* (Vienna, 2006). After a BA in European Philosophy and Psychology (University of Oxford), he switched to Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit, completing an MA (SOAS, University of London), MPhil, DPhil and JRF (University of Oxford). He has held research fellowships at the EFEO (Pondicherry), a JSPS fellowship at Kyushu University, and has taught at the University of Vienna.

Alex Watson est Maître de conférences (« Sanskrit Preceptor ») à l'Université de Harvard et auteur de The Self's Awareness of Itself. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Arguments Against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self *(Vienne, 2006). Après ses études en philosophie européenne et psychologie à l'Université d'Oxford, il s'est consacré à l'étude de la philosophie indienne et du sanskrit, avec un MA à la School of Oriental and African Studies à Londres, suivi par un MPhil, un doctorat et un « Junior Research Fellowship » (études post doctorales) à l'Université d'Oxford. Il a obtenu des bourses de recherche de l'EFEO (Pondichéry), une bourse JSPS à l'Université de Kyushu, et a également enseigné à l'Université de Vienne.*

After studies in Oxford and in Hamburg, Dominic Goodall passed several years working in Pondicherry, where he was head of the Pondicherry Centre of the École française d'Extrême-Orient from 2002 to 2011. He has published critical editions of Śaiva works and of classical Sanskrit poetry (most recently, with Csaba Dezső, the eighth-century *Kuṭṭanīmata* of Dāmodaragupta). He is currently based in Paris, where he gives lectures on Indian and Cambodian Sanskrit literature at the École pratique des hautes études (section des sciences religieuses).

Après avoir étudié à Oxford et à Hambourg, Dominic Goodall a travaillé pendant plusieurs années à Pondichéry, où il était responsable du Centre EFEO de 2002 à 2011. Il a publié plusieurs éditions critiques d'ouvrages shivaïtes et poétiques en sanskrit, dont le plus récent est une édition et traduction anglaise d'un roman sanskrit en vers du VIIIe siècle, le Kuṭṭanīmata *de Dāmodaragupta, en collaboration avec Csaba Dezső. Affecté actuellement à Paris, il anime des séminaires à l'EPHE (V^e section) sur la littérature sanskrite indienne et cambodgienne.*

After receiving a traditional education under his father and paternal uncle, S.L.P. Anjaneya Sarma took MA and PhD degrees in Sanskrit poetry and grammar from Andhra University in Vishakhapatanam. From 1972 to 1987 he was Assistant Professor at Matrushri Oriental College in Andhra Pradesh and since 1987 he has been working as a Senior Research Fellow at the École française d'Extrême-Orient in Pondicherry. He has penned two monographs in the field of Sanskrit grammar, one dealing with the *Guruprasādaparišīlana* and the other with commentaries on a *sūtra* of Pāṇini (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.3.67), as well as several articles. He participates in traditional Indian scholastic debates (*sadas*), but also teaches and works with Western students of Sanskrit.

Après une éducation traditionnelle auprès de son père et de son oncle paternel, S.L.P. Anjaneya Sarma a obtenu un MA et un doctorat en poésie et en grammaire sanskrites de l'Andhra University à Vishakhapatanam. Il fut Assistant Professor au Matrushri Oriental College en Andhra Pradesh entre 1972 et 1987, et, depuis 1987, il travaille en tant que Chargé de Recherche (Senior) au Centre EFEO de Pondichéry. Il est l'auteur de deux monographies sur la grammaire sanskrite : l'une se consacre au Guruprasādaparišīlana *et l'autre à tous les commentaires jusqu'ici inédits sur un* sūtra *de Pāṇini (*Aṣṭādhyāyī *1.3.67). S.L.P. Anjaneya Sarma a également publié de nombreux articles. Il participe souvent aux débats traditionnels de pandits (*sadas*), mais il enseigne et collabore aussi avec des sanskritistes occidentaux.*

An Enquiry into the Nature of Liberation

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École française d'Extrême-Orient,
22, avenue du Président Wilson,
75116 Paris, France.
Tel: (33) 1 53 70 18 60
Website: http://www.efeo.fr/

Pondicherry Centre of the EFEO
16 & 19, Dumas Street,
Pondicherry – 605 001, India.
Tel: (91) (413) 2334539/2332504
Email: administration@efeo-pondicherry.org

COLLECTION INDOLOGIE – 122

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Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti, a commentary on Sadyojyotiḥ's refutation of twenty conceptions of the liberated state (mokṣa), for the first time critically edited, translated into English and annotated

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PREFACE

Three names are credited with the production of this book. The idea that developed into this project was first mooted by Alex WATSON. In his doctoral thesis he had re-edited much of the Buddhist section of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* on the basis of two Devanāgarī manuscripts and parallel passages in others of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts, and in 2002 he suggested to Dominic GOODALL that they work together on a critical edition and first translation of the whole Buddhist section. Dominic GOODALL was immediately enthusiastic about covering not just this one section, but the whole text. From our first reading sessions together in the Pondicherry Centre of the École française d'Extrême-Orient, S. L. P. ANJANEYA SARMA not only took part, but took the rôle of the expounder of the text as it was then constituted, drawing attention to anomalies of style, grammatical difficulties and resolutions, and to parallel discussions in other branches of literature.

Dominic GOODALL took up the task of collating the readings of the various sources and furnishing a preliminary edition to serve as the basis for discussion.

It was to Alex WATSON that the lion's share of the work fell, for he logged our vigorous discussions and, for most passages of the work, drafted out the first translation. The majority of the annotation too is his, as is the introduction (except for the section entitled 'Sources').

Over the years, various people too numerous to remember, let alone list, participated in our reading sessions and offered suggestions. To these should be added the participants of the various sessions of the "International Intensive Sanskrit Summer Retreats" (co-organised by the EFEO and the Indo-European Studies department of Eötvös-Loránd University, Budapest) at which parts of the text were studied. Their emendations and comments are recorded from time to time in our apparatus and notes. Four individuals made an especially important contribution and their names will be found rather frequently. The first is Professor MANI DRAVIDA, who kindly came to Pondicherry on several occasions to expound particularly rich sections of

the text that baffled us. He did so with his characteristic magisterial ease and clarity, invariably leading us to reconsider our interpretations of several points. The second, Professor Alexis SANDERSON, attended no reading session, but generously furnished us with his annotated photocopy of the Devakōṭṭai edition. His jottings led us to important parallels and pointed up a number of corruptions in the transmission of the text. The third, Professor Harunaga ISAACSON, discussed many tricky passages with us through e-mails, Skype and on his visits to Pondicherry. The fourth is Professor Kei KATAOKA, who not only furnished us with crucial photographs at the beginning of the project, but also sent us lists of corrections in its final hours. To each of them we owe a considerable debt of gratitude.

We are grateful too to the two anonymous readers for their suggestions and to the following libraries for allowing us to consult and to photograph or copy manuscripts used for our work: the French Institute of Pondicherry; the Oriental Research Insitute, Mysore; the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras; the Adyar Library; the Dharmapuram Adheenam; and the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune. We benefitted too, of course (as does almost every manuscript-related indological project in this day and age), from the use of microfilms made by the Nepal-German Manuscripts Preservation Project, for even though no manuscript transmitting our text survives in Nepal, our annotation draws upon other works that are transmitted there.

A word about the style of the translation is perhaps expected. It will at once be obvious that it does not read as an independent text in smooth English, but that it is intended as a tool to enable the reader to follow the Sanskrit text. Accompanying the translation is a very considerable body of annotation, some of it devoted to laying bare doubts about the constitution of the text, about how to interpret the syntax, about the author's idioms, word-choice, and particle-use, and about details of Śaiva theology that are alluded to, but most of it intended to help the reader follow each step of argumentation. This style of translation—more like the Pompidou Centre, with all its pipes and ducts and cables picked out in bright colours and exposed to view, than the Musée du Quai Branly, clothed in a "living wall" of leafy green naturalness—will not appeal to all. But it is perhaps most suited to this sort of text, a fascinatingly rich, but rather tough piece of exegetical writing, the study of which casts light not only on the history of Śaiva thought, but on a number of theological and philosophical doctrines for which little other testimony survives.

INTRODUCTION

1 Preliminary Remarks

The *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*[1] of Sadyojyotiḥ (675–725 CE)[2] is a text of 59 verses that lists and then refutes twenty positions regarding the nature of liberation (*mokṣa*). Its commentary by Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) expounds the twenty positions, not necessarily in the way Sadyojyotiḥ understood them, and then refutes them, occasionally just by elaborating Sadyojyotiḥ's refutation, but frequently by adding long digressions and new arguments.

The twenty positions are listed in the left-hand column of Figure 1. They are given there in the order in which they are listed by Sadyojyotiḥ, and expounded by Rāmakaṇṭha (which happens to be different from the order in which they are refuted).

The proponents of these positions are never named by Sadyojyotiḥ, and only very occasionally by Rāmakaṇṭha. But enough evidence can be garnered to propose identifications of the proponents in almost all cases. These are listed in the right hand column.[3]

---

[1]The 'Verses that Refute the Conceptions of Liberation Advanced by Others'.

[2]For this date, see SANDERSON (2006a) and WATSON (2006: 111–114).

[3]A question mark indicates that the evidence is weak. That Rāmakaṇṭha took view 1 to be that of both Sāṅkhya and Yoga is clear from a remark he makes in section 2.10. The evidence that view 2 was a Sāṅkhya and Yoga view is given in notes 114 and 84 respectively. For view 3 see section 2 of the Introduction, and section 2.3 of the translation. For the attribution of view 4 to the Pāñcarātrikas, see note 146. For the attribution of views 5 and 6 to the Tauṣṭikas, see section 2.5 and note 163. For the attribution of view 7 to the Paurāṇikas and Pāśupatas, see note 167. For the attribution of views 8, 11 and 13, see section 5.2 of the Introduction. The evidence to connect the Somasiddhāntins with view 9 is given in note 200. For the attribution of view 10, see notes 201 and 203. The evidence to connect view 12 with the Vaimalas is given on pp. 65–67. For the attribution of view 15, see notes 223 and 224. That Rāmakaṇṭha took Sadyojyotiḥ's words 'Cessation of everything' (*sarvanāśaḥ*) to refer to the liberation doctrines of both the Buddhists and Cārvākas is clear from his commentary on verses 5d and 43–46; that Sadyojyotiḥ intended them in that way is clear from his refutation of the position in verses 43–46. The evidence

VIEW OF LIBERATION	PROPONENT
1) Isolation (*kaivalyam*)	Sāṅkhya and Yoga
2) Enjoyment of Sattva (*sattvasambhogaḥ*)	Sāṅkhya and Yoga?
3) Dissolution into the supreme self (*vilayaḥ paramātmani*)	Advaita Vedānta
4) Dissolution into the supreme material cause	Pāñcarātrikas
5) Dissolution into Prakṛti	Tauṣṭikas
6) Dissolution into Ahaṅkāra	Tauṣṭikas
7) Becoming a great attendant of God (*mahāgaṇo maheśasya*)	Paurāṇikas / Pāśupatas
8) Being omniscient but lacking agency (*akartā sarvavedyavit*)	Followers of the Pramāṇa Scriptures (Mahāvratas)
9) Being an agent yet subject to the control of God (*kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam*)	Somasiddhāntins?
10) Becoming the same as 'The Treasury of Light', i.e. the sun or fire (*samatvaṃ tejasāṃ nidheḥ*)	Sauras, Āgneyas, Vaiṣṇavas
11) Becoming superior to God (*ādhikyaṃ parameśānāt*)	Lākulas? Saiddhāntikas? Śāktas? Pātañjalas?
12) Becoming devoid of Impurity (*nirmalatvam*)	Vaimalas?
13) Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, then retiring to a state of indifference (*audāsīnyam*)	Pravāhanityeśvaravādins
14) Going to a world in the stars (*tārakābhuvana*) having acquired a refined body and faculties (*satkāryakaraṇopetas tārakābhuvane sthitaḥ*)	
15) Cessation of cognition and agency (*jñānakartṛtvayor nāśaḥ*)	Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas
16) Cessation of everything (*sarvanāśaḥ*)	Buddhists (Pradīpanirvāṇavādins)
17) Cessation of everything (*sarvanāśaḥ*)	Cārvākas (Bhūtacaitanyavādins)
18) The rise (*utpatti*) of omniscience and omnipotence	Kālamukhas
19) The transference (*saṅkrānti*) from God of omniscience and omnipotence	Pāśupatas
20) Possession (*āveśa*) by omnipotence and omniscience	Kāpālikas?

Figure 1: The Views Refuted in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and their Proponents

The texts thus give us a view outwards on to what traditions Saiddhāntikas (= those belonging to Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's tradition, the Śaiva Siddhānta) in the final centuries of the first millennium saw surrounding their own, whom they regarded as their rivals, and which doctrines and arguments of these opponents they considered to require refutation. Of Rāmakaṇṭha's nine surviving texts[4] five have up to now been partially translated into a Western language[5] and one completely.[6] This publication adds a second complete translation.

This is one of the most interesting of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts for Indologists who are not specifically concerned with Śaiva Siddhānta, because of the snapshot it provides of the religio-philosophical landscape of tenth-century India. About half of the twenty positions are well known from other sources, but the other half have left little trace elsewhere in Sanskrit literature. The text thus offers a unique glimpse of certain forgotten conceptions that came to be swamped by those of the classical traditions. Some of them seem to be unknown even to Rāmakaṇṭha, having presumably been pushed into obscurity in the centuries between Sadyojyotiḥ's time and his own.[7] The value, for the historian of ideas, of this record of archaic views is not only that it provides a fuller picture of the variety of conceptions of liberation, but also that it helps to explain the genesis of some of the more well-known classical views.[8]

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concerning the attributions of views 18, 19 and 20 is given in notes 234, 235 and 238 respectively. We have included a question mark in the last case, since the only evidence we know of regarding its proponents comes from the sixteenth century.

[4](1) *Mataṅgavṛtti*, (2) *Kiraṇavṛtti*, (3) *Sārdhatriśatikālottaravṛtti* (which includes the *Nādakārikā*), (4) *Vyomavyāpistava*, (5) *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, (6) *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*, (7) *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti*, (8) *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, (9) *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*.

[5]The twenty-five verses of the *Nādakārikā* have been translated by FILLIOZAT (1984), the first six chapters of the *Kiraṇavṛtti* by GOODALL (1998), the first eleven (out of twenty-three) verses of the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* by GOODALL (1998: xxii–xxv), four sections of the first chapter of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* by WATSON (2006: 125–346), and one section of the sixth chapter of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, *vidyāpāda*, by WATSON (2006: 349–382).

[6]The *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* has been translated by GOODALL, KATAOKA, ACHARYA and YOKOCHI (2008).

[7]Unless the explanation of Rāmakaṇṭha's not being acquainted with them is that they were not known in Kashmir, while being familiar in other parts of India. Which part of India Sadyojyotiḥ came from is not known. See SANDERSON (1990: 158) and WATSON (2006: 111–112). Rāmakaṇṭha regarded himself as Kashmirian, but, as his concluding verses to the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* and *Kiraṇavṛtti* suggest, his usual working area may have been Dārvābhisāra, an area often subject to Kashmir that lay to the South West between the Vitastā and the Candrabhāgā rivers: see GOODALL, KATAOKA, ACHARYA and YOKOCHI 2008: 312, quoting BISSCHOP.

[8]Thus we can see, for example, that the Sāṅkhya and Yoga view that liberation involves

The verses and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary contain sections only for the twenty positions that are refuted, having no separate section giving the authors' own Saiddhāntika view. This is presented in Sadyojyotiḥ's *Mokṣakārikā* and its commentary by Rāmakaṇṭha, the *Mokṣakārikā* being considered to some extent a separate text, and to some extent part of a larger text encompassing it, the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and others.[9] It should not be thought, though, that our texts are of no value to those seeking to understand the philosophy and theology of Śaiva Siddhānta. We get insights into Saiddhāntika thinking at every stage of the refutations, for in refuting rival traditions Sadyojyotiḥ's and Rāmakaṇṭha's own presuppositions are brought to bear, and we see what separates their own thinking from that of their opponents. The Saiddhāntika view of liberation, furthermore, is expounded in passing at several points in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary (ad verses 6–7, 27, 31–32, 37–42).

The Saiddhāntika view is that liberation consists in the manifestation of the soul's innate qualities of omniscience and omnipotence. The soul is then the same as God (*īśvarasama*), where 'same' means qualitatively identical but numerically distinct. This is very close to views 18, 19 and 20, which also hold that the liberated soul is the same as God, being omniscient and omnipotent. They differ from each other and from the Saiddhāntika view in their explanations of how omniscience and omnipotence become associated with the liberated soul. In view 18 those two qualities arise from scratch (Utpattivāda); in view 19 they are transferred from God (Saṅkrāntivāda); in view 20 the soul is possessed by them, as one can be possessed by a spirit (Āveśavāda); in the Saiddhāntika view, omniscience and omnipotence already exist in souls prior to liberation in an unmanifest state, and at liberation they become manifest as a result of the removal of the soul's Impurity (Abhivyaktivāda). Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha divide views 18, 19 and 20 off from the rest (see verses 6 and 7). Rāmakaṇṭha describes the proponents of these three views as 'belonging to our own religion' (*samānatāntrikas*), meaning not that they are quite Saiddhāntikas but that, unlike the proponents of all the other seventeen positions, they belong to the same wider (Śaiva) religion.

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going beyond the three *guṇas* followed on from, and transcended, view 2 in our text, according to which liberation involves experiencing *sattva* alone, without any *rajas* and *tamas*. See also SANDERSON's view (2006b: 197–199) that the Saiddhāntika liberation doctrine arose out of view 13.

[9]For the relation of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and the *Mokṣakārikā*, see section 6 below.

The twenty views are not classified by our authors in any way other than by this dividing off of the last three, and the aligning of them with the Śaiva Siddhānta. But here are two ways in which they could be arranged thematically.

(1) The views can be differentiated through the following sequence of dichotomies (see Figure 2). First there are those that are theistic and those that are non-theistic, a 'theistic' view being one according to which the liberated soul exists alongside, below or, in one case, above God. Those which are non-theistic can then be subdivided into those according to which not only is there no God, but there is also no self, and those for whom what exists in the liberated state is a self. Into the former category fall the Buddhist and Cārvāka views. Finally, those which accept a self can be subdivided into those for whom individuality is preserved in liberation, and those for whom liberation consists in the dissolution of the individual self. In the first camp the principal proponents are Sāṅkhya and Nyāya; in the second they are Advaita Vedānta and Pāñcarātra.

(2) Liberation has been contrasted with another goal of Indian religion, the acquisition of supernatural powers (*siddhi*s), by regarding the pursuit of the former as a search for 'freedom from', and the pursuit of the latter as a search for 'freedom to'.[10] There is no denying that the liberated states of the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhyas and Advaita Vedāntins, involving as they do a complete lack of cognition and action, are strongly marked by a propensity for 'freedom from'. But this tendency was rejected, and indeed ridiculed,[11] by other traditions, for example the theistic ones. In many of these we find a pronounced predilection for 'freedom to' in the omniscience and omnipotence that they claim to be the culmination of the path they teach. Once the diversity of liberation doctrines is taken into account, the dichotomy of the two kinds of freedom becomes useful not because we can equate one kind with liberation, but because we see how the two kinds are differentially present within the various liberation doctrines. The twenty views can be laid out on a continuum, the two poles of which are the two types of freedom.

At one extreme we have the Buddhist view according to which liberation consists not just in freedom from suffering but freedom from existence itself. Here there is clearly no 'freedom to' know or do anything. This was not

[10] Gelblum (1965).

[11] See *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:66 and Watson (2006: 96).



Figure 2: Thematic classification of the twenty views

the only Buddhist view,[12] but it is the one that is given in our text (view 16). With the Buddhists fall the Cārvākas. They too maintain (view 17) that the individual completely ceases to exist, though for them this 'liberation' happens to everyone at death, and is not an achievement accruing only to the enlightened. To the right of these two come the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. They do maintain (view 15) that the individual continues to exist in liberation, but without any consciousness or agency. Here we have freedom from knowing and doing, but not freedom from existence. Next come the Sāṅkhyas (view 1), Advaita Vedāntins (view 3) and Pāñcarātrikas (view 4). Consciousness continues in liberation for these, but it is a consciousness that is completely devoid of objects of experience. The light of consciousness is switched on in the liberated souls of these traditions, unlike in liberated Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, but it is a light that, as it were, shines out into empty space without illuminating anything.

So all of these conceptions of liberation deny the presence of any changing states of consciousness, something that attracted comment from André BAREAU. Having said of Buddhist *nirvāṇa* (1973: 94) that it either must be pure nothingness in which nothing of the person remains, or 'must have resembled a profound and dreamless sleep, a complete unconsciousness', he goes on to write:

> To people who, like all Indians,[13] believed themselves to pass without ceasing, without rest, immediately, from one existence to another, that is to say from one series of states of consciousness to another, that eternal and complete peace of psychic nothingness must have seemed desirable, whereas it has always terrified people in the West.[14]

This is an important reflection on the question of why a complete lack of experience was promoted by some as the highest aspiration and the upper

[12] See WATSON and KATAOKA (2010: 323, note 82).

[13] It hardly needs to be stated that this is an exaggeration: it was certainly not the case that all Indians believed in reincarnation.

[14] We cite here COLLINS' (1982: 11) translation. BAREAU's own words were (1973: 94–95): 'À des gens qui, comme tous les indiens, croyaient passer sans cesse, sans repos, immédiatement, d'une existence à l'autre, c'est-à-dire d'une série d'états de conscience à une autre, cette paix éternelle, définitive, du néant psychique devait sembler désirable alors qu'elle a toujours terrifié les hommes d'Occident.'

limit of human achievement.[15] But as we continue along the continuum, we will see that such a contentless liberation was desirable neither to all Indians, nor even to all of those who believed themselves to pass ceaselessly from one incarnation to another.

Next comes view 12 in our text, according to which liberation consists just in freedom from impurity (*mala*). Here we reach the first view that postulates knowing and doing in the liberated state. Then in views 8, 11 and 13, which are examined in some detail in section 5.2 of this Introduction, the power of knowing becomes expanded in liberation into omniscience, though the power of action is not found. In the views dealt with before this paragraph, the goal of freedom from suffering is taken to necessitate freedom from all cognitive experience, including that which is either pleasurable or neutral. In the views so far mentioned in this paragraph, cognitive activity continues, but it is not clear whether pleasure is present. Pleasure may have been regarded as only possible if alternating with suffering, its nature and existence deriving from a contrast with the latter. But in view 2 we find an explicit rejection of the presupposition that freedom from suffering requires also freedom from pleasure; the upholders of this view maintain that in liberation souls experience pure, uninterrupted, unexcelled and unbounded (*śuddhanirantaraniratiśayānavacchinna*) pleasure.

With the postulation of this kind of pleasure and of omniscience, we have arrived at views according to which liberation entails not just the removal of life's possibilities (such as suffering), but the addition of things not possible in the life of the unliberated. In other words we have arrived at conceptions of liberation that involve an element of 'freedom to'. This becomes more pronounced as we continue through the remaining views. These last two views still deny any action on the part of the liberated; though cognitive powers may increase, agency decreases. That changes at this point of the continuum.

Liberation as conceived of by the proponents of view 7 involves becoming one of God's principle attendants (*mahāgaṇa*), with all the extra powers and privileges that this promotion involves. This and view 14 are the only two of the twenty that conceive of liberation as an embodied state. According

[15] An additional point is that freedom from suffering was considered by many to be impossible while cognition continued. If the latter is inevitably imbued with suffering, to continue to desire cognitive experience is arguably akin to continuing to desire milk, in spite of knowing that it contains poison (a Naiyāyika comparison). Given that the imbibing of one without the other is not possible, it is better to renounce both.

to the latter, the liberated soul sheds its saṃsāric body and sense faculties, but takes on new, highly elevated (*prakṛṣṭatara*) ones. This new body and sense faculties, which unlike the previous ones are not caused by karma and not characterised by pain, allow a liberated existence on another planet (*tārakābhuvane*, literally 'in a world in the stars').

We are nearing the end of the continuum, and the advocates of all of the remaining four views claim that the liberated soul is omnipotent. For these proponents, to leave behind one's body and sense faculties as one enters the liberated state is not to leave behind the possibility of action; rather it is to expand its potential range. It is not the body that acts, nor is the body a necessary instrument of agency. It is the agent, i.e. the soul, that acts; and its agency consists not in moving, but in causing movement, as a magnet causes movement in iron-filings without itself moving.[16] Having thrown off the bonds that limit the full expression of its power of action, and without a spatially limited body to restrict its sphere of operation (its 'magnetic field'), this sphere becomes equal in extent to that of the soul itself, i.e. all-pervading.

The difference between the four views (9, 18, 19 and 20) is just that, though they all postulate omnipotence and omniscience, in view 9 the operation of this omnipotence is subject to God's instigation, so that such souls lack complete autonomy.[17]

We now introduce more detail about those views whose treatment by Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha is of most philosophical or historical interest.

2 Vedānta

There is a difference between the kind of Advaita Vedānta expounded and refuted in the verses by Sadyojyotiḥ, and the kind of Advaita Vedānta expounded and refuted in the commentary. This difference is acknowledged by Rāmakaṇṭha (end of section 2.3), who labels the two kinds *pariṇāmavāda* or *pariṇativedānta* ('transformationism') and *vivartavāda* or *māyāvāda* ('illusionism').

The former is not widely known about, since it was superseded by the

[16] See section 2.8 (of the Edition and Translation).

[17] Three views have not been placed on this continuum—5, 6 and 10: any specific location for them would be controversial. On the first two see section 2.5. On one interpretation of view 10, it involves omniscience and omnipotence (see section 3.2); in that case it would fall with 18, 19 and 20 at the very end.

māyāvāda of Maṇḍanamiśra and Śaṅkara, after which it soon became obscure. Whose was this *pariṇāmavāda*? On which author was Sadyojyotiḥ basing his account? SANDERSON (2006a: 70–71) has argued that the *pariṇāmavāda* outlined and refuted by Sadyojyotiḥ corresponds exactly with the doctrine put forward by Bhartṛprapañca in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat*, composed according to NAKAMURA in the middle of the sixth century (see SANDERSON 2006a: 71, note 42). That text does not survive, but Ānandagiri cites fragments of it, which HIRIYANNA (1924) has collected; SANDERSON demonstrates their close correspondence with the Vedānta known to Sadyojyotiḥ.

What were the differences between *pariṇāmavāda* and *māyāvāda*? For *pariṇāmavāda brahman* evolves into the world of plurality; for *māyāvāda* it does not, all plurality being simply a product of ignorance. This means we can isolate four kinds of difference between the two views.

(1) Difference in the status of *brahman*: For *pariṇāmavāda brahman* undergoes transformation (*pariṇāmin*); for *māyāvāda* it does not. For *pariṇāmavāda brahman* is the Material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the world; for *māyāvāda* it is not.

(2) Difference in the status of the world: For *pariṇāmavāda* the world is not unreal; it is of the nature of *brahman*. For *māyāvāda* the world *is* unreal: it is a dream-like illusion (*māyā*) resulting from our ignorance, and at liberation it simply disappears, as a dreamworld disappears on waking.

(3) Difference regarding individual souls (*jīvas*): For *pariṇāmavāda* the relation between *brahman* and individual souls is (material-)cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*); an individual soul is one part (*ekadeśa*) of *brahman*, as the clay in a pot is one part of the larger lump from which it was derived. For *māyāvāda* the relation is not *kāryakāraṇabhāva* or *ekadeśatva*, but *aikya*, complete identity.

(4) Difference in the nature of liberation: For *pariṇāmavāda* liberation consists in the dissolution of the individual soul into *brahman*; for *māyāvāda* it consists in the realisation that one has never been different from *brahman*. No merging into *brahman* takes place; rather simply the ignorance that causes us to see a world of plurality ceases.

Pariṇāmavāda, incidentally, avoids a problem that arises for *māyāvāda* as a result of the latter's combining of non-dualism with illusionism: If everything is of the nature of *brahman*, then surely the reality of *brahman* guarantees the reality of everything. In other words, a tension results if one holds that X is not different from Y, yet also claims: Y is real, X is not. (In the case in hand, X = the world; Y = *brahman*.) This tension does not arise for *pariṇāmavāda*, since it does not make the second claim.

* * *

That these two views are different, that Sadyojyotiḥ was familiar with only *pariṇāmavāda*, and that Rāmakaṇṭha prefers to expound Vedānta in terms of *māyāvāda*, since by his time *māyāvāda* had become the predominant kind of Vedānta—none of these claims are new: all have been pointed out by SANDERSON (1985: 210, note 41; 2006a: 68–73) and used by him as evidence for an early date for Sadyojyotiḥ.

But a new point to be made here is that the kind of Vedānta that Rāmakaṇṭha expounds is not precisely the *māyāvāda* of Maṇḍanamiśra and Śaṅkara, differing from it in not insignificant ways. The purpose of the rest of this section is to clarify the difference and to show how the Vedānta outlined by Rāmakaṇṭha is in many respects a third kind.

Rāmakaṇṭha's account of Vedānta (section 2.3) begins with standard *māyāvāda*, drawing on Maṇḍanamiśra through both paraphrase and direct citation.[18] But his characterisation of the status of individual selves (*jīva*s) differs from that of *māyāvāda*; he grants *jīva*s less reality and less permanence. He compares them to illusory figments of a dream experience and states that liberation consists of their dissolution. The *jīva*, then, is neither real nor eternal. He denies, furthermore, that it can attain true awakening knowledge. It is not the *jīva* that is compared to a person waking up, but rather the supreme soul; the *jīva*s are elements within the dream of the supreme soul and cease to exist when the supreme soul wakes up.

Rāmakaṇṭha's assertion that individual souls are dissolved is more characteristic of *pariṇāmavāda* than *māyāvāda*. But in *pariṇāmavāda* the dissolution is in the manner of effects being dissolved into their Material cause, pots into an undifferentiated lump of clay. In Rāmakaṇṭha's Vedānta, by

[18] Rāmakaṇṭha seems to have no knowledge of Śaṅkara, another thing that has been pointed out by SANDERSON (1985: 210, note 41).



Figure 3: Three kinds of Vedānta (1)

contrast, the dissolution is in the manner of illusory figments of a dream dissolving when the dreamer wakes up.

In order to summarise how the kind of Vedānta outlined by Rāmakaṇṭha differs not only from *pariṇāmavāda*, but also from standard *māyāvāda*, we can consider them from the point of view of what are often said to be the three constituents of *māyāvāda*. These three constituents are the claims that: *brahman* is real, the world is unreal, and *jīvas* are not different from *brahman*. All three, then, are assented to by *māyāvāda*. *Pariṇāmavāda* makes the first claim, but not the second. How about the third? Yes, for it *jīvas* are non-different from *brahman*, 'non-different' at least in the sense that a pot is non-different from the clay that constitutes its Material cause. As for Rāmakaṇṭha's Vedānta, it follows *māyāvāda* in making the first two claims, but it rejects the third: see Figure 3.

It is not clear whether Rāmakaṇṭha's Vedānta reflects a doctrine put forward by Vedāntins known to him or whether it was made up by him. If the latter, then the most plausible explanation is as follows. He wanted to expound *māyāvāda* but also to combine it with the claim that individual souls dissolve, since that is what is stated in the verse by Sadyojyotiḥ on which he is commenting. See Figure 4.

But in order to give 'dissolution' a māyāvādic rather than a pariṇāmavādic flavour, he characterises it not as the dissolution of an effect into its Material cause, but as the dissolution of a dreamworld on waking. Once he has made the claim that the *jīva* dissolves in *that* sense, he has arrived at a view shared neither by *pariṇāmavāda* nor by *māyāvāda*: the unreality of the *jīva* and its fundamental difference from *brahman*.

Figure 4: Three kinds of Vedānta (2)

3 Pāñcarātra

The Pāñcarātrika opponent begins by mentioning one of the Sāṅkhya proofs of the existence of *pradhāna* as the Material cause of bodies and sense-faculties. We know, so the argument goes, that clay pots and other objects made of clay, which have *anvaya*[19] with clay, all have clay as their Material cause (i.e. they are effects, in the sense of transformations, of clay). So this suggests a general principle that anything that has *anvaya* with X has X as its Material cause.

> **Observation:** Things that have *anvaya* with clay all have clay as their Material cause.
>
> **General Principle:** Things that have *anvaya* with X all have X as their Material cause.

Anvaya, then, can be used to determine that a group of things all have one common Material cause. The argument is often briefly stated as: 'All Ys have *anvaya*' (the conclusion being that all Ys share the same Material cause).[20] To 'have *anvaya*' here is shorthand for 'have *anvaya* with the same thing (X)',[21] from which it follows that Ys all have that thing (X) as their material cause.

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[19]The precise meaning of *anvaya* here is discussed below.

[20]Cf. *asti pradhānam, bhedānām anvayadarśanāt*, 'Because we find that [all] differentiated objects have *anvaya*, *pradhāna* exists [as their Material cause]' (*Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇya, p. 264 of FRAUWALLNER 1958); and *ekaprakṛtīdaṃ vyaktam, vikārāṇām anvayadarśanāt*, 'Because its transformations are seen to have *anvaya*, this [whole] manifest world has a single Material cause' (*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 5.2.23, paraphrased by Dharmakīrti at *Vādanyāya* p. 65,13–14).

[21]For an example of the fuller formulation, see *bhedānām ekajātisamanvayo dṛṣṭaḥ*, 'We find that differentiated things have *samanvaya* with the same type' (from an unknown commentary on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha*, the first fragment of which has been edited and translated by HARIMOTO and KANO 2008; see p. 16).

What is the meaning of *anvaya* here, for which we also find the synonym *samanvaya*? The most common usage of *anvaya* in philosophical Sanskrit is to refer to the necessary co-occurrence (*avinābhāva*) of two things (such that whenever one occurs, the other must also occur) or to the logical concomitance (such that one can be inferred from the other) that results from that necessary co-occurrence. That is not the meaning of *anvaya* in the Sāṅkhya argument. First, *anvaya* in the sense of necessary co-occurrence or logical concomitance is a relation possessed by *two* things. *Anvaya* in the Sāṅkhya argument is a more complex relation that is possessed by a plurality of Ys and one X. Secondly, if two things have *anvaya* in the sense of necessary co-occurrence or logical concomitance, no conclusion is entailed about their material cause. From the fact that wherever person A goes, person B also goes, it does not follow that A's going and B's going share the same material cause, or that one is the material cause of the other. Or from the fact that 'being produced' (*kṛtakatva*) is logically concomitant with 'being liable to destruction' (*vināśitva*), it does not follow that these share the same material cause, or that one is the material cause of the other.

Anvaya in the Sāṅkhya argument, which yields a conclusion concerning the material cause of the things that possess *anvaya*, can provisionally be translated as 'common nature'. Pots all have *anvaya* with clay (*mṛdanvaya*), i.e. have clay as their common nature, therefore they have clay as their material cause. So similarly, argues the Sāṅkhya, bodies and sense-faculties, i.e. all that comprises sentient beings apart from their immaterial souls, have *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha* (pleasure, pain and delusion) as their common nature (*sukhādyanvaya*), therefore they have something characterised by *sukha* etc. as their material cause (that something being *pradhāna*). So the argument moves here from the general principle mentioned above, to a particular instantiation of that general principle:

> **Observation:** Things that have *anvaya* with clay all have clay as their material cause
>
> **General Principle:** Things that have *anvaya* with X all have X as their material cause.
>
> **Particular instantiation:** Bodies and sense-faculties have *anvaya* with *sukha* etc., therefore they have something characterised by *sukha* etc. as their material cause.



Figure 5: The observation that forms the basis of the Sāṅkhya argument

The particular instantiation is analogous to the observation that forms the basis of the argument, as can be seen by the common structure of Figures 5 and 6.

We will not pause here to consider why, or in what way, all bodies and sense-faculties have pleasure, pain and delusion as their common nature, because our aim is not to investigate the Sāṅkhya argument, but to understand the use to which the Pāñcarātrika speaker puts it.

The Sāṅkhya argument is accepted as valid not only by the Pāñcarātrika speaker, but also by Rāmakaṇṭha, whose ontology derives much from the Sāṅkhyas. So the Pāñcarātrika speaker addresses Rāmakaṇṭha, saying: since you accept this argument as valid, you should apply it also to souls and *pradhāna*. They all have *anvaya* with *existence*, therefore they should all have the same material cause—something characterised by existence.[22] By

[22]It may seem far-fetched to talk of *anvaya* with existence; after all existence is not something material like clay or gold. But *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha* would not be understood by many to be material, yet both the Sāṅkhyas and Rāmakaṇṭha think that it is valid to argue that bodies and sense-faculties have *anvaya* with *sukha* etc. and hence have something of the nature of *sukha* etc. as their material cause. So it is perhaps not inconsistent of the Pāñcarātrika to argue that if that is accepted as valid, it should also



Figure 6: The particular instantiation of the general principle in the Sāṅkhya argument

starting with a Sāṅkhya / Śaiva Siddhānta argument, the Pāñcarātrikas thus reach the conclusion that souls and *pradhāna* both emerge from a greater material cause, and will subsequently return to it (as pots return to clay)—a conclusion which is completely at odds with the strict dualism of mind and matter, and the irreducible plurality of souls, that characterise the thought of Sāṅkhya and the Śaiva Siddhānta. The Pāñcarātrikas name this supreme material cause Parā Prakṛti or Mahāvibhūti; and they identify it with Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa. See Figure 7.

It is the source of everything in the universe: both sentient souls and insentient matter. Hence souls are temporary transformations of Parā Prakṛti: they arise from it and they disappear back into it at liberation. The search for liberation is thus, on this view, a search for a return to one's source, something that is not true of any of the other twenty positions apart from that of Transformationist Vedānta.

Indeed the closeness of this position to the *pariṇāmavāda* outlined in the previous section will be apparent. Rāmakaṇṭha actually maintains that the

be accepted that souls and *pradhāna*, both having *anvaya* with existence, have something of the nature of existence as their single material cause.



Figure 7: The Pāñcarātrika position

two views are identical in holding that selves emerge out of a Supreme Cause (*paramakāraṇa*) and dissolve into it at liberation, the only difference being that Transformationist Vedānta names this Supreme Cause *brahman*, and Pāñcarātra names it Nārāyaṇa (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* 1:54, p. 91).

We have not classified this as a theistic view, even though it was the view of the Pāñcarātra Vaiṣṇavas. It could be argued to be theistic to the extent that Parā Prakṛti or Mahāvibhūti is personfied by being identified with Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa. But Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa on this view is not anything other than the stuff out of which the created universe is composed. We do not have here, as in the other theistic views in the text, two separate things, an efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*), namely God, and a separate material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) upon which God acts.

That is the way the Pāñcarātrika position is laid out in the *pūrvapakṣa* section (2.4). (Note that this Pāñcarātra doctrine known to Rāmakaṇṭha is strikingly different from that of the surviving Saṃhitās or of Yāmunācārya.) When it comes to be refuted, Rāmakaṇṭha confronts it with his own view of mind-matter dualism and soul-pluralism: material causes (*upādānakāraṇa*) are all insentient and anything that emerges from a material cause must be insentient; sentient things (souls / selves), on the other hand, are eternally separate monads, which cannot disappear into a larger whole, losing their individual identities.

We deal here with a question that will always be relevant so long as the suspicion persists that we may consist of more than just a body and its attributes. If we do, and some part of us survives the death and disintegration of the body, then the question arises as to whether we will continue as an individual or will merge into something greater. Are we like clay objects, destined someday to lose our individuality and our separateness from each other, as we merge back into a common source? Or do the boundaries of our individual selves always remain constant?[23]

How to decide this question? For the Pāñcarātrika, the fact that selves all have *anvaya* with existence means that they must all arise from and subsequently dissolve into a single existent thing. Rāmakaṇṭha accepts that if selves did have *anvaya* with existence, then they would indeed arise from and return to a single existent thing. So he argues (section 3.13.5) that they do not have *anvaya* with existence. Only thus can he retain his view that selves always have been, and always will be, separate. Does the passage leave us with any means of determining who is right? In other words, does it leave us with means of determining whether selves have *anvaya*?

Before answering that question we need to focus on the meaning of *anvaya*. We have said earlier that *anvaya* could provisionally be translated as 'common nature'. In fact, although this is the meaning in which the Pāñcarātrika uses the term, Rāmakaṇṭha uses it in a narrower sense. The fact that 'common nature' is how the Pāñcarātrika is understanding the term can be seen from the following two points that he makes. (1) If selves did not have *anvaya*, they would not have anything in common and hence we would not be able to use one word to refer to all of them (section 3.13.5.6). (2) If selves did not have *anvaya* with existence, it would follow that they did not exist (section 3.13.5.5). The first point clearly only makes sense if *anvaya* just means common nature. Similarly the second only makes sense if selves' 'having *anvaya* with existence' means their having existence as their nature.

[23]Brian MAGEE in his article 'What I Believe' (2002) considers that there are three possibilities for what happens to us at death: complete annihilation, continuation of individuality, or merging into something greater. To illustrate the last possibility he gives the example of rivers, destined to enter the ocean, spread out into it, mingle with the water that is already there, and thereby lose their separate identities. The river example is slightly different from the chosen example of the Pāñcarātrika, that of clay objects, in that part of the point of the latter is that they, and hence we, have all emerged from an undifferentiated source. But this difference could be lessened by maintaining that the source of rivers can be traced back to rainfall, which comes from clouds, which come from the ocean.

But for Rāmakaṇṭha selves do not have *anvaya* and yet they are qualitatively identical to each other: all fundamental aspects of their nature they have in common with all other selves. And despite not having *anvaya* with existence, they do of course exist in his view. So we can conclude that Rāmakaṇṭha conceptualises *anvaya* differently. Furthermore, we can probably concur that he is right to do so. For if the argument from possession of *anvaya* to possession of a single material cause is indeed valid, as both sides of this debate agree, then *anvaya* cannot simply mean 'common nature'. There are many things which share a common nature and yet do not have that as their common material cause. A brown pot and a brown butterfly both have brownness as a common nature, but they do not have the same brown thing as their common material cause. Cows all have cowness as their common universal, but that universal is not their material cause. And if merely to exist, i.e. to have existence as part of one's nature, were equivalent to having *anvaya* with existence, then problems would result for the Pāñcarātrika. Parā Prakṛti exists for the Pāñcarātrika, yet if it had *anvaya* with existence it could not be the Supreme Cause: it and all other things that had *anvaya* with existence would have to emerge from some greater material cause. There would thus be an infinite regress if to exist were equivalent to having *anvaya* with existence.

So Rāmakaṇṭha seems to be correct not only that *anvaya* must be more narrowly conceived than 'common nature', but also that the Pāñcarātrikas themselves require it to be more narrowly conceived. For only then can it follow that a group of things that have *anvaya* with one thing all have that one thing as their common material cause; so only then can the Pāñcarātrikas use *anvaya* either to infer that bodies and sense-faculties have a common material cause or to infer that selves and *pradhāna* have a common material cause.

Rāmakaṇṭha does at one point state explicitly what his narrowed down conception of *anvaya* is (section 3.13.5.6.2). He defines *anvaya* as 'the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) of a thing (e.g. clay) in an effect (e.g. a pot) and in each of its parts (e.g. the neck and bottom of a pot), [and] elsewhere even in quite dissimilar objects (e.g. clay dishes), in every case in that very form (i.e. in the form of clay)' (*yā tv arthasya kārye pratyavayavaṃ cānyatra visadṛśatare 'pi vastuni tenaiva rūpeṇa sarvatraivānuvṛttiḥ, so 'nvaya ucyate*). The contents of the brackets in the translation are supplied from the surrounding context.

Anvaya, then, is for him continuity, the continuous existence of something in its effects, and in every single part of those effects. Rāmakaṇṭha gives this

definition as part of an attempt to distinguish *anvaya* from 'being of the same type' (*samānajātīyatva*), whether the latter is unpacked in a Naiyāyika manner as possession of the same universal (*sāmānya*), or in Rāmakaṇṭha's Śaiva manner as simply the similarity (*sādṛśya*) of individuals to each other. From the definition it can be seen that certain things that are not of the same type, for example different parts of a pot such as the neck and the bottom, do have *anvaya*: they have continuity with clay. (That they are not of the same type can be seen from their thoroughly dissimilar shape, from the fact that we do not have the same cognition in response to them, and from the way that we do not use the same word to refer to them.) Conversely certain things that do not have *anvaya* according to this definition, such as a golden pot, a silver pot and a clay pot, are clearly of the same type.

If a group of things have *anvaya*, they arise from the same material cause, but they are not necessarily of the same type, and one word cannot necessarily be used of all of them. If a group of things are of the same type (*jāti*), then one word can be used of all of them, but they do not necessarily have *anvaya* and they do not necessarily arise from the same material cause.

So Rāmakaṇṭha has arrived at a narrower conception of *anvaya*, such that possession of *anvaya* now validly entails possession of a common material cause. *Anvaya* for him is not just any kind of common nature, but the particular kind of common nature that is shared by derivatives of the same material cause. The Pāñcarātrika was employing the concept as though it meant any kind of common nature, including sameness of type (hence his assumption that things denoted by one word must have *anvaya*), but Rāmakaṇṭha has been able to differentiate coherently *anvaya* from sameness of type.

To return to the question of whether the passage leaves us with any means of determining who is right about whether selves are eternally separate monads or temporary transformations of a greater material cause: the question is now whether on this narrowed down conception of *anvaya* selves have *anvaya*. If they do, the Pāñcarātrika wins; if they do not, Rāmakaṇṭha wins.

If *anvaya* just meant common nature, then the Pāñcarātrika would have been right that selves had *anvaya*, for both sides agree that selves have the kind of common nature that consists in belonging to the same type. But this no longer follows. Rāmakaṇṭha has successfully shown that possession of a common nature is not equivalent to possession of *anvaya*, and is not sufficient to conclude possession of a single material cause.

Rāmakaṇṭha has thus been successful in undermining the Pāñcarātrika's arguments in favour of selves' possession of *anvaya*. The Pāñcarātrika can no longer point to possession of the same type (*jāti*), or denotability by the same word, as evidence of *anvaya*. But that does not mean that selves do not have *anvaya*, it just means that the considerations the Pāñcarātrika puts forward as indicating their possession of *anvaya* are inconclusive. Selves share the same type, and not all things that share the same type have *anvaya*, but some do: clay pots for example. So although selves' possession of *anvaya* is not entailed by their possession of the same type, it is not precluded by it either. Rāmakaṇṭha overstates his case: he satisfactorily shows that there is no conclusive evidence that selves have *anvaya*, but he takes that to mean that they definitely do not have *anvaya*, which does not follow.

Could the narrower definition of *anvaya* not rule out selves as suitable *anvaya*-possessors? The definition evokes clay objects as a paradigm, and effectively defines *anvaya* as that particular relation that unites things like clay objects. When the kind of relation that unites clay objects such as pots, dishes, pot-necks, pot-bottoms etc. is found in another group, that group has *anvaya*. But this cannot serve as a criterion for settling a dispute over whether selves have *anvaya*: those who think that they do will say that they have the kind of relation that clay objects have; those who think they do not will deny that they have the kind of relation that clay objects have (and maintain, like Rāmakaṇṭha, that they just have sameness of type).

The definition also particularises *anvaya* by describing it as the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) of a thing (*artha*) in effects (*kāryas*). But that means that we need to know whether things are effects in order to know whether they have *anvaya*. Yet that is exactly what we do not know and what we want to find out. What we need, but what Rāmakaṇṭha has not supplied, is a non-circular definition of *anvaya* that can allow us to know whether things have *anvaya* even if we do not know whether they are effects of one material cause.

Rāmakaṇṭha has achieved a definition that establishes the pervasion between possession of *anvaya* and possession of a single material cause; the *hetu* is no longer inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). But we cannot know whether it is established (*siddha*) in a particular proof-subject (*pakṣa*) unless we already know that the things in question are effects of a single material cause; and in that case the inference is redundant.

4 Buddhists and Cārvākas

Both the Buddhists and Cārvākas are said to hold the position of 'cessation of everything'. There is an intended contrast here with the view immediately preceding this in the text: that of 'cessation of cognition and agency'. For the proponents of that view, the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, there is at least *something* that in liberation survives this cessation of cognition and agency, namely an unconscious soul. But in the liberated state of the Buddhists and Cārvākas there is no self, no perceiver, no consciousness: nothing at all remains of the individual.[24]

Rāmakaṇṭha's treatment of 'cessation of everything' is divided into two sections—Buddhist and Cārvāka—but they form a continuum for various reasons: his refutation of Buddhism is not complete until he has reached the end of the Cārvāka section; his Cārvāka opponent employs Buddhist arguments;[25] and at the end of the Cārvāka section Rāmakaṇṭha cites part of a Buddhist verse, which suggests that he is still addressing Buddhists.

4.1 Buddhists

Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist gives the following argument for liberation being 'cessation of everything'. (1) Consciousness is by nature a perceiver (*grāhaka*). (2) A perceiver depends on perceived objects (*grāhyas*). (3) Perceived objects are unreal (*avasturūpa*). (4) Therefore the perceiver is unreal, false (*bhrānta*). (5) Hence the cessation of both perceiver (i.e. consciousness) and perceived objects is brought about by a correct cognition that apprehends their falsity.[26]

Rāmakaṇṭha's refutation of this position consists primarily in arguing for the reality and permanence of the perceiver. His target is the Buddhist idea of a stream of momentary perceivers. The Buddhist opponent proceeds in the following way (section 3.10.2). He first shows that the stream of consciousness is plural, then argues that there is no self or perceiver beyond that. For such a thing can neither be perceived nor inferred. The only way it could be inferred would be if all we were aware of were objects of cognition (*grāhya*, *prakāśya*) and not the perceiver (*grāhaka*, *prakāśaka*) of these objects. Then

[24] See note 12 for the point that this was not the only Buddhist view.

[25] He uses the Dharmakīrtian inference of momentariness.

[26] See note 226 for the point that Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist is taking a Yogācāra argument and twisting it in order to derive a Vaibhāṣika conclusion.

something imperceptible would arguably have to be postulated as the perceiver of these objects (section 3.10.2.2.6). But Rāmakaṇṭha agrees with the Buddhist that we perceive not only objects of cognition, but also the cognition itself that perceives those objects. Hence there can certainly be no grounds for inferring an imperceptible self as the perceiver: something perceptible, namely cognition, is ready to hand to fill the role of perceiver. What needs to be determined—the precise issue that separates the Buddhist and the Śaiva—is whether this perceiving cognition is permanent or momentary.

Rāmakaṇṭha's way of arriving at the former conclusion is to give a line of argument that occurs also in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:5). It has been described, analysed and reflected on at length in WATSON (2006: 209–255), (2010a: 298–303) and (forthcoming); so we will not repeat here what has been said there.

4.2 Cārvākas

By the end of the Buddhist section, Rāmakaṇṭha believes he has established the permanence of the perceiver only from birth to death. Thus he has to overcome the Cārvāka view that sentience arises from the body and neither pre-exists nor outlasts it. He argues that memory of past lives can be both directly perceived (in the case of those rare individuals who can directly remember some of their previous incarnations) and inferred. Two arguments are given to elaborate the latter claim, both based on the behaviour of newborn babies.

(1) The argument from *Nyāyasūtra* 3.1.21: The fact that newborn babies act in order to get the mother's breast milk implies a desire for that milk, which implies knowledge that the milk is there and will bring a desired result. Since this knowledge cannot be acquired in the very brief time since this life begun, it must have been acquired in a previous life.

(2) The argument from the *Vākyapadīya* (1:130) that the baby would not be able to cry without knowledge of how to do so from a past life. For the production of sound in crying requires the placing of the instruments of articulation in the appropriate place, the timely impelling of breath upwards, and the striking of this breath against one of the points of articulation from the chest up to the nose.

The Cārvāka responds by pointing to such involuntary actions as yawning, sneezing, falling asleep; if these can occur in newborn children without requiring memories from past lives, why can't the two kinds of action just

mentioned. In order to illustrate that the latter two kinds of action are different from the involuntary ones, Rāmakaṇṭha examines what is involved in the child's drinking of milk. It involves drawing in milk until one's mouth is full, not vomiting it out, and swallowing—swallowing, moreover, in such a way that the baby at that time arranges its breath so as not to choke. This is different from yawning, sneezing and the like in that it is preceded by a conscious intention. That is indicated by the fact that unlike those involuntary actions, it is aimed at getting what is desired (the cessation of one's hunger) and avoiding what is not desired (choking).

From the fact that in each life children exhibit this kind of behaviour that requires memories from a previous life, Rāmakaṇṭha infers a beginningless sequence of lives, and hence a beginningless self running through all of those lives. He then takes the beginninglessness of the self as evidence that it cannot cease.

At this point (section 3.11.5) the Cārvāka argues that even a beginningless self must be accepted to be perishable (*vināśin*), because it is the agent of effects. He avails himself of the Dharmakīrtian argument that whatever is capable of producing effects must be momentary, and thus substitutes the idea of a beginningless and unceasing self with one that is formed of a beginningless sequence of discrete entities, each one ceasing after having existed only for one moment.

What we have here is a very un-Cārvāka move: an admission on the part of the Cārvāka opponent that the perceiver must be beginningless, at least in the sense that a Buddhist stream of consciousness is beginningless. The arguments that Rāmakaṇṭha gives from the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Vākyapadīya* are taken to be successful in establishing a beginningless sequence of past lives; but what stretches back through these lives is not a permanent self but a momentary stream. This does not imply that any Cārvāka ever held this view; it is just that Rāmakaṇṭha structures his argument in such a way that the Cārvāka, having been defeated to some extent, falls back on a Buddhist position in order to avoid accepting a permanent, unitary self. Hence from this point on the opponent will not be referred to as a Cārvāka, but rather as a Kṣaṇikavādin, i.e. an adherent of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness.

The Kṣaṇikavādin argues that a producer of effects must be momentary, because if it continued to exist, it would in every subsequent moment of its existence produce exactly the same effect that it did in the first moment (and we do not observe that to be the case). If in the second moment it produced something different, or produced nothing at all, its nature would

have changed, which means that it could not be the same thing. The presupposition that can be seen to drive the argument is that qualitative difference implies numerical difference: any difference in a thing's nature (*svabhāva*) entails that we are not in fact dealing with one thing. This presupposition is shared by Rāmakaṇṭha and the Kṣaṇikavādin.

How, then, does Rāmakaṇṭha explain that a producer of effects can not produce for a certain period of time and then produce something, as a seed produces nothing when it is in the granary, but does produce a sprout after having been planted in the earth? He denies that any change in the nature of the thing is required for it to produce an effect. The change that produces the effect is the presence of auxiliary causes such as earth and moisture.

Against this the Kṣaṇikavādin gives three options that Rāmakaṇṭha can take, each of them problematic. If the seed is capable of producing a sprout, then it should produce it even in the absence of the auxiliaries (while still in the granary). If it is not capable of producing a sprout, it would not produce it even in the presence of the auxiliaries (in the field). If it derives its capacity to produce the sprout from the auxiliaries, then it was not capable before and becomes capable afterwards, which means its nature changes, which means that it is not one thing.

Rāmakaṇṭha responds by naming the nature of a seed as the capacity to produce a sprout when in the presence of certain auxiliaries, such as water and earth. If a thing's nature can be specified only as either capable or not capable of producing a particular effect, then the Kṣaṇikavādin's arguments are hard to overcome. But once Rāmakaṇṭha has included within the definition of a thing's nature the fact that it is capable of producing an effect only when certain additional factors are there, the three difficulties that the Kṣaṇikavādin has pointed to can be avoided. A thing can be incapable of producing an effect in the absence of its required auxiliaries, and capable in their presence, without there being any change in its nature. For its nature is at all times the same: to produce an effect when in the presence of certain specific auxiliaries. Extrapolating from the seed to the self, one can say that the nature of the self is at all times the same: to see a blue object when in the presence of a blue object, a red object when in the presence of a red object, etc.[27]

[27]For more on Rāmakaṇṭha's explanation of how a self could perceive different objects without any change in its nature, see WATSON (2006: 334–382), (2009b) and (forthcoming).

The challenge from the Dharmakīrtian argument having been responded to in this fashion, Rāmakaṇṭha takes it that momentariness has been successfully avoided, and that the permanent perceiver that was inferred before the challenge can be retained. He rounds off the whole Buddhist / Cārvāka section by alluding to the Buddhist argument about the unreality and consequent cessation of perceivers and perceived objects. Given that the perceiver has now been established to be indestructible, and given that perceived objects are real, neither of them, he says, cease at liberation. Since neither of them cease, and since the soul's impurity does cease, its perception of objects becomes perfected, i.e. it becomes omniscient.

5 Atimārga[28]

As mentioned above (p. 18), after Rāmakaṇṭha has elaborated the first seventeen views, he introduces the remaining three as put forward by 'those of our own religion' (*samānatāntrikas*), contrasting them with all of the previous ones, which he sees as advanced by other religions (*tantrāntaras*).

These three are close to, but not identical with, the Śaiva Siddhānta view of Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha. What all four views have in common is that they hold liberation to consist in becoming the same as Śiva (*śivasamatā*), where 'same as' means not 'numerically identical with', but 'qualitatively identical to'. The liberated soul does not dissolve into, thereby losing its separateness from, God (*īśvara*), but rather takes on the same qualities (*guṇas*) as God, namely omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) and omnipotence (*sarvakartṛtva*). The only difference between liberated souls (*muktātmans*) and God is that the latter has always been liberated (*anādimukta*) whereas the former have first been bound souls (*paśus*).

What separates the three *samānatāntrika* views from each other and from the Saiddhāntika view of Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha are their explanations of how these two qualities come to belong to the liberated soul. Rāmakaṇṭha's own view, following Sadyojyotiḥ, is that even before liberation omniscience and omnipotence already exist in the soul, but in an unmanifest state. They are blocked by the soul's Impurity (*mala*), and when this Impurity is removed they become manifest. Becoming omniscient and omnipotent involves no new qualities appearing at the time of *mokṣa*, but simply the

[28]This term *atimārga* is what SANDERSON (2006b: 163) has argued to be the most appropriate label for 'the non-Āgamic Śaivism of the Pāśupatas and related systems'.

soul's power of cognition and action (*jñānakriyāśakti*) becoming unhindered. The nature (*svarūpa*) of the power to cognize and act does not change at all; it is like a light shining forth always the same from the core of the soul. But before liberation the light is blocked by a covering that partially surrounds it, whereas after liberation it shines forth unobstructed. How do the three *samānatāntrika* views differ from this?

View 18: The Arising (*utpāda*) of the Qualities of God The proponents of this view[29] hold that omniscience and omnipotence arise in the soul at the time of liberation, having not existed there before. Rāmakaṇṭha rejects this view on the grounds that anything that arises is non-eternal, so since these two qualities would be non-eternal, *mokṣa* would be a merely transitory condition.

View 20: Possession (*āveśa*) by the Qualities of God Some hold that the liberated soul is possessed by God's omniscience and omnipotence, like someone possessed by a spirit. Rāmakaṇṭha holds that if this were the case, the liberated soul would lack autonomy, being under the control of God, as the possessed person is under the control of the spirit. Thus a soul in such a condition would not even be the same as God, since he would be under the control of another, whereas God is under the control of no one.

View 19: Transference (*saṅkrānti*) of God's Qualities This view is identified by Rāmakaṇṭha as the view of the Pāśupatas. It claims that God's qualities are transferred (*saṅkrānta*) into the soul, like the smell of musk into a cloth, or like a flame from one wick to another. Sadyojyotiḥ devotes no less than twenty-eight and a half verses to refuting it; after this the next highest number of verses is four (for the refutations of Vedānta and Sāṅkhya). Given the immense priority that Sadyojyotiḥ assigns to it (the verses devoted to its refutation amount to 58% of the refutation section, and 48% of the entire text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*—for the refutation of just one out of the twenty positions), and given that Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha provide much information about the Pāśupata view that is not found in any of the small number of surviving Pāśupata sources (or in any other source that we know of), we will now deal with it in some detail.

[29] They are given by Rāmakaṇṭha, not in this text but in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *kriyāpāda* 8:10c–12b), as the Kālamukhas; see note 234 for more information.

5.1 Pāśupatas

As just stated, the Pāśupatas, or Saṅkrāntivādins, maintain that at liberation omniscience and omnipotence are transferred into the soul from God. Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha claim that it is quite implausible that the qualities of God can be transferred from one substrate to another, since there is no example (*dṛṣṭānta*) of any quality (*guṇa*) separating from its substrate (*āśraya / dravya*) and transferring to a new one.

Thus the Saṅkrāntivādin opponent puts forward (sections 3.9.1ff.) a series of examples as analogous to the hypothetical transference of God's qualities into the liberated soul. In each case Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha argue that the examples are not parallel.

(1) Transference of Knowledge

The Saṅkrāntivādin begins by pointing to the way that knowledge can be transferred from teacher to pupil. The Siddhāntin's response is that when the pupil understands something, this is not because the teacher's knowledge has been transferred; rather knowledge arises in the pupil. This knowledge is distinct from the knowledge of the teacher, but of the same kind: numerically distinct but qualitatively similar. So if we talk of transference here, it is purely metaphorical. Nothing has actually been transferred, because the teacher's knowledge stays where it is: he does not suddenly lose his understanding of what he has taught.

(2) Transference of Merit (*puṇya*) and Sin (*pāpa*)

The Pāśupata adduces two *smṛti* verses (section 3.9.2) to the effect that if you criticise and insult someone good, and they remain calm and do not criticise you back, your merit passes to them, and their sin passes to you.[30] Again the Siddhāntin's response is that it is not that one person's merit or sin is actually transferring. Rather some new merit arises in the criticised, calm person, and some new sin arises in the criticiser. So here too we are dealing with something new arising, not the transference of something pre-existent.

[30] As is well known (see e.g. INGALLS 1962), Pāśupata observance included the provoking of criticism in order to effect a transfer of merit and sin (*Pāśupatasūtra* 3.6, 3.9, 4.6 and 4.8). It is possible that Pāśupatas used to adduce these *smṛti* verses in order to explain the principle behind their practice.

(3) Transference of a Flame

The Saṅkrāntivādin next adduces the example of a flame transferring from one wick to another. Not surprisingly, the Siddhāntin responds in the same manner as he has to the first two examples: this involves, he argues, not the transference of one and the same flame, but the arising of a new flame. This flame example, furthermore, is inappropriate for a second reason, namely that flames are not qualities.

(4) Transference of Universals

The Saṅkrāntivādin argues that universals (*sāmānyas*) must be assumed to transfer for the following reason. Once a new individual, such as a baby cow, has been born, it possesses the universal, cowness. Yet in the moment preceding the birth, cowness was not present at that location. How did it get there? How did the newly arisen individual come to possess its universal? Cowness did exist in the mother cow, and the new born emerges from her; therefore it is natural to suppose that cowness transfers to the new born from the mother.

The Siddhāntin gives four levels of response to this.

> (A) The above reasoning presupposes the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika distinction between universals and individuals.[31] But for the Saiddhāntikas there is no entity cowness that is ontologically distinct from individual cows; cowness is just the fact that different individual cows are similar to each other.
>
> (B) Even if universals were separate from individuals, they could still not transfer. The proper relation between an individual and its universal is one of manifester and manifested. It is part of the nature of an individual to manifest a certain universal. Therefore it always exists with a universal and a universal can only exist as manifested by an individual. But both of these principles would be violated if a universal could transfer: a universal would be on its own during its transference, and an individual would be on its own in its first moment, before its universal arrived.

[31] Of relevance to the still open question of the precise relationship between the Pāśupatas and the Naiyāyikas / Vaiśeṣikas is the fact that three times in this passage the Pāśupata argues using Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika presuppositions.

(C) Even if universals were separate from individuals, they could still not transfer for another reason. They are lacking in form (*amūrta*), and neither the Pāśupatas nor any other disputants accept that something without form can move.

(D) Even if universals could transfer, that would not help the Saṅkrāntivādin, for universals are not qualities.

(5) Transference of Smells

Thus far the Saṅkrāntivādin has only managed to give examples of things that either arise rather than transfer, or are not qualities. His next example, that of the transference of the smell of musk into a cloth that touches the location of the musk, at least avoids both of those faults. The problem with it is that it is not a case of the transference of a quality away from its substrate. Rather what is actually happening is that tiny particles of musk transfer on to the cloth, carrying their smell with them.[32]

(6) Transference of Conciousness into Non-Conscious Matter

The Saṅkrāntivādin's next example—transference of consciousness into insentient matter—purports to avoid all of the three types of problem encountered so far, i.e. to be a case of transference rather than of arising, to be of a quality, and to be of one that leaves its substrate. The argument is that insentient matter would not be able to produce anything unless the power of consciousness of some agent entered it. The Saiddhāntikas maintained, like the Sāṅkhyas, that the world evolves out of an unconscious Ur-matter. Unlike the Sāṅkhyas, however, they maintained that this Primal Matter would not evolve into the world if it were not penetrated by Śiva's consciousness. This may be what Sadyojyotiḥ has in mind when he speaks in his verse (24) of the transference of consciousness into insentient things. But Rāmakaṇṭha sees the verse as speaking of clay producing a pot with the help of the potter's consciousness. In order for this to happen the clay must have

[32] This is at least how the *Śaivaparibhāṣā*, which is drawing on this passage in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, responds to this example. Sadyojyotiḥ does not bring up the example in his verses, and what precise response Rāmakaṇṭha intends is not clear: see note 348.

ghaṭotpādanaśakti, the power to produce a pot. But something cannot have the power to produce or act unless it also has the power of consciousness. Thus clay, when producing a pot, must temporarily be connected with the power of consciousness of some agent, i.e. the potter. For how else can we explain that clay, which being insentient is not capable of producing an effect on its own, is capable of producing a pot when a potter comes into the equation? Thus we must assume that it becomes the locus of the potter's powers of cognition and action; they transfer into it.

The Siddhāntin, having pointed (ad verse 26) to some unwanted consequences that would result if these powers really did transfer into insentient matter, argues that when cognition or agency is attributed to a material cause such as clay, this is merely metaphorical. The powers of cognition and action remain in the potter; they are the *cause* of the transformation of the clay; the clay is the locus of the *effect*. What enables and provokes the metaphorical usage is thus a conflation of cause and effect.

(7) Transference of Heat

For his next example, the Pāśupata avails himself of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika explanation of hot water.[33] Although water that has been heated seems to be hot, it is one of the defining features of water that its quality of 'touch' or 'temperature' (*sparśa*) is cold. Therefore it cannot have lost that and taken on the different quality of warm touch. Rather atoms of fire (*tejas*) have entered the water and are mingling there alongside the water atoms. Though we experience the water as hot, we are actually experiencing heat from the fire atoms, not from the water atoms.

Just as the heat remains in the fire atoms, but makes itself felt in the water, so God's qualities of omniscience and omnipotence remain in God, but show their influence in a soul undergoing liberation. In both cases qualities bring about an effect in something else, while remaining in their own substrate.

The Siddhāntin's response is that if the qualities of omniscience and omnipotence remain in God, in other words if the omniscience and omnipotence in the liberated soul are not the soul's qualities but have come from and remain in God, then it is not the soul that is knowing and doing, but God

[33] Cf. notes 31 and 34.

who is knowing and doing for the soul. The soul is thus not autonomous and hence could not be fully liberated.

(8) Omniscience and Omnipotence through Contact

In order to avoid the problem of a lack of autonomy, the Saṅkrāntivādin shifts his position slightly and maintains that it is as a result of *contact* with God's omniscience and omnipotence that the soul too becomes omniscient and omnipotent. How does this avoid the problem of a lack of autonomy? In the previous example the water's qualities were completely irrelevant; the heat in the water is explained entirely by the heat in the fire atoms. So parallelism suggests that the omniscience and omnipotence that appear to be in the soul have nothing to do with the soul's qualities, but are just the omniscience and omnipotence of God. But in this position God's omniscience and omnipotence no longer supplant and make redundant the soul's qualities, but cause omniscience and omnipotence in the soul. Though the Saṅkrāntivādin does not use it at this juncture, a flame would be a good example to illustrate this particular position: through contact of a flame with a wick, a new flame arises on the new wick, such that we now have two flames (= two sets of omniscience and omnipotence), even though the new one 'comes from' the previously existent one.

The Siddhāntin could perhaps have responded that this is hardly standard Saṅkrāntivāda, involving as it does the rise of something new. But he points to a different problem: if mere contact with God's omniscience and omnipotence were enough to bring about omniscience and omnipotence in that which is contacted, then everything would become omniscient and omnipotent, even insentient things; for everything is an object of, i.e. in contact with, God's omniscience.

(9) Transference of light

The Siddhāntin has thus far shown each of the Saṅkrāntivādin's examples to be unsatisfactory. But at this point he puts a different kind of challenge. He says: even if you *were* able to come up with an example of a quality transferring away from its substrate, you would be faced with a serious problem. Parallelism between that example and the case of God would mean that God's omniscience and omnipotence would leave him in order to enter the

liberated soul, and God would be left without omniscience and omnipotence. Thus your whole search for an example is misguided.

The Saṅkrāntivādin responds by coming up with an example of something that transfers to a new location yet also remains present at its initial location, namely the light of a flame as it spreads out from the flame and illuminates the surrounding area. The Siddhāntin's response is that anything that remains at its present location yet also spreads out from there must be subject to transformation; and anything that is subject to transformation is insentient. Thus if the qualities of God remain in God yet also spread into the liberated soul, it undesirably follows that they would be subject to transformation and hence insentient.

(10) Quality-Universals as opposed to Quality-Individuals

The Saṅkrāntivādin response is to maintain that the quality of omniscience (and omnipotence) that exists both in God and in liberated souls is not a *vyakti*, an individual instance, of that quality, but rather its *jāti*: its type or universal. Just as many different instances of a particular substance all share a common universal that exists in all of them at once, so also different instances of a particular quality such as blueness or omniscience are assumed here to have a common universal existing in all of them. Even though it is true that the *vyakti* of God's omniscience (and omnipotence) cannot also exist in liberated souls, the *jāti* of God's omniscience (and omnipotence) can.[34] The Siddhāntin's response is that a *jāti* of a quality is nothing other than the quality itself.

(11) Transference of Particles of God

The main reason, the Siddhāntin asserts, that the Saṅkrāntivādin is having difficulty coming up with a suitable example of transference of a quality is that only substances can transfer; qualities cannot move around on their own, changing location independently of the substances to which they belong.

Hence the final move of the Saṅkrāntivādin is to accept that the qualities of omniscience and omnipotence do not separate from their substrate, and to propose that they transfer to the liberated soul together with their substrate, namely a particle of God. This is countered by the Siddhāntin on the

[34]This is the third time that the Pāśupata argumentation appeals to Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika categories.

grounds that it infringes the principle of economy of postulation (the Indian equivalent of Ockam's razor): it necessitates postulating so many different substance-particles of God, omniscience and omnipotence in all of them, and transference of one of them every time a soul attains liberation.

* * *

The problems that (from the point of view of the Siddhāntin) the Saṅkrāntivādin faces in his attempt to make plausible the idea that qualities could transfer from God into a soul can be classified in different ways.

(1) Some of the examples he puts forward are problematic in themselves; others entail problematic consequences for the situation between God and the liberated soul. Into the first camp fall: knowledge, and merit and sin, for they do not transfer, rather new instances of them come into existence; flames and universals, for neither do they transfer, nor are they qualities; and consciousness, for it only transfers in a metaphorical sense. Into the second camp fall light and heat. Light could be said to transfer, but for God's qualities to transfer in that sense would entail their being insentient. Heat does transfer into water in the way that the Saṅkrāntivādin presents the matter, i.e. by sticking to fire atoms. But since it is the fire atoms in the water that are doing the heating, and hence God within the liberated soul acting, the soul would lack autonomy and hence could not actually be liberated. The example of smell, if put forward as an example of a quality separating from its substrate and transferring, would fall into the first camp: it does not separate from its substrate; rather particles of the substrate transfer along with their smell. If it is put forward as an example of a quality transferring along with its substrate, then it falls into the second camp: the same problem of the soul's lack of autonomy would result.

(2) The examples could be exhaustively divided into those that are not actually examples of a quality, and those that are not actually examples of transference. Into the first camp fall flames and universals.

The second camp can be subdivided into those that are actually examples of arising (*utpatti*), those that are more suited to illustrate possession (*āveśa*), and those that illustrate neither arising, nor possession, nor transference. Those that are actually examples of arising are knowledge, merit and sin, and flames (the last thus fall into both camps).

Those that are more suited to illustrate possession are smells and heat. For what separates the idea of possession by God's qualities from transference

of God's qualities is that in the former case the qualities remain attached to their substrate, God; and both smells and heat remain attached to their substrates (earth atoms and fire atoms respectively). The final move of the Saṅkrāntivādin, where he asserted that particles of God, each one being a substrate of omniscience and omnipotence, transfer into liberated souls, would also fit here as an assertion of Āveśavāda, not of Saṅkrāntivāda.

Those that illustrate neither arising, nor possession, nor transference, are universals, consciousness and light. The very reality of universals is challenged by Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha through their claim that a universal, far from being an ontologically separate entity, is no more than the similarity between individuals. Consciousness does not actually enter non-conscious things; it is only metaphorically said to do so. Things, such as lights, that extend to a new location while also remaining at their original location are neither transferring, nor arising in a new location, but rather 'spreading' (this point is made in verse 34).

(3) The Saṅkrāntivādin is faced with a dilemma of whether to assert transference of qualities that leave their substrate or travel along with their substrate. If God's omniscience and omnipotence leave God in order to enter the liberated soul, then God would no longer be omniscient and omnipotent. If they remain attached to God, then it is God that is knowing and doing through the soul, or the soul that is knowing and doing by means of qualities that belong to God; either way the soul would lack autonomy. If the Saṅkrāntivādin tries to avoid both of these problems by asserting that a part of God's omniscience and omnipotence stays attached to God, and a part leaves, then this can be countered either by finding it guilty of unnecessarily elaborate postulation (*kalpanāgaurava*) (as the Siddhāntin does in his response to point 11 above) or by denying that consciousness has parts (as the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* does: see note 333).

* * *

To what extent do we find the view of Saṅkrāntivāda in the surviving Pāśupata sources? We do find the view that the liberated soul becomes the same as God. *Pāśupatasūtra* 1.38 reads: *etair guṇair yukto bhagavataḥ* '[The siddha] is linked with these qualities of God'.[35] The question is asked in

[35]It is not clear that the author of the sūtras intended *bhagavataḥ* to be construed with *etair guṇair yuktaḥ*, rather than with what follows (Bisschop 2005: 12, note 79), but Kauṇḍinya certainly took it in that way: *bhagavata eva guṇair yuktaḥ* (p. 6).

Kauṇḍinya's commentary (to 1.39) whether the *siddha*, as a result of being linked with these qualities, is superior, inferior or the same (*sama*) as God, to which the reply is: the same.

This passage is thus a forerunner of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* discussion about *īśvarasamatā*: it contains the idea that the *siddha* comes to have the qualities of God and that he thereby becomes the same as God.[36] But it leaves room for all four of the more specific views about how precisely these qualities come to be in the *siddha*. Are there any passages in the corpus of Pāśupata texts that show a preference for Saṅkrāntivāda?

In the *Pañcārthabhāṣya* ad 4.24 Kauṇḍinya writes:[37]

> Now is it the case (*kim*) that the *sādhaka* attains these powers of cognition and action from Mahādeva through his own impulse, or through the impulse of another (i.e. that of God), or through the impulse of both? It is taught [that he attains them] through the impulse of another. For [the author of the sūtras] says:
>
> (1.24) May Rudra impel those [powers of cognition and action][38] for us.
>
> [...] The root *cud* [is used] in the sense of impelling. The impelling refers here to union with the powers of cognition and action. The optative indicates desire. The meaning is 'please connect me [with those powers]'. For it has been taught:
>
> The union with the powers of cognition and action, preceded by the will of Rudra, that is to say the arising [of those powers] in

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[36] A lesser liberation is mentioned along with this in the Pāśupata chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*: ACHARYA (2011: 461) has pointed out that the Pāśupata aim of the end of suffering (*duḥkhānta*), is said there to be of two kinds: either accompanied by, or devoid of, the qualities of Śiva.

[37] *athaite dṛkkriyāśaktī mahādevāt sādhakaḥ kiṃ svaśaktita āsādayati āhosvit paraśaktita utobhayaśaktitaḥ. tad ucyate paraśaktitaḥ. yasmād āha:*

tan no rudraḥ pracodayāt ‖ 4.24 ‖

... cuda preraṇe. codanaṃ nāma jñānakriyāśaktisaṃyogaḥ. yād iti lipsā. saṃyojayasva mām ity arthaḥ. uktaṃ hi:

rudrasyecchāpūrvako yo yogo jñānakriyāśaktibhyāṃ paśvādiṣu sambhavas tac codanam āhur ācāryāḥ. We thank Peter BISSCHOP for this and the previous reference.

[38] Kauṇḍinya's commentary on this word reads: *tad iti dṛkkriyāśaktyor grahaṇam.* '*Tat* denotes the powers of cognition and action.' He seems untroubled by the discrepancy of number and gender between *tat* and that which he takes it to refer to.

> bound souls etc., is termed by the masters in this tradition the 'impelling' [of them by Rudra].

We find here no use of the word *saṅkrānti*, and no mention of any similar but rival views in distinction from which this one is elaborated and justified. Does the fact that the *sādhaka* is said to attain the powers of cognition and action through the impulse of God imply Saṅkrāntivāda as opposed to the other views? No, for it would be quite coherent to hold that the powers arise in, possess, or become manifest in, the soul, as a result of the impulse of God. How about the fact that the powers are said to come 'from Mahādeva' (*mahādevāt*)? This may be incompatible with Abhivyaktivāda, but it is quite compatible with Āveśavāda. And though it might not seem naturally compatible with Utpattivāda, room seems to be left for the latter by the remark that what is meant by the impelling of the powers by Rudra is their arising in a bound soul following on from his will. It seems, then, that the surviving Pāśupata sources do not teach a liberation doctrine that is developed and defined to the same extent as the Pāśupata view recorded and argued against by Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha.

5.2 Mahāvratas, Lākulas

According to View 8, a liberated soul is an omniscient non-agent (*akartā sarvavedyavit*). Rāmakaṇṭha attributes this view to those whose scriptures were such texts as the *Hṛdayapramāṇa*. As SANDERSON has pointed out, this is an allusion to the scriptures of the Mahāvratas (see note 176). Indeed Trilocanaśiva, having summarised this section of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā-vṛtti* in his *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, attributes this view to the Mahāvratas (see note 174).

There are two other views which have some overlap with this position of inactive omniscience: View 11, 'Superiority to God' (*ādhikyaṃ parameśānāt*), and View 13, which is labelled by Sadyojyotiḥ as 'Agency in the Perfected Soul; Indifference in God' (*siddhe ... kartṛtvam, audāsīnyaṃ maheśvare*).

We will summarise Rāmakaṇṭha's exposition of these three views in such a way as to bring out the similarities and differences between them.

(1) An Omniscient Non-Agent (*akartā sarvavedyavit*)

The proponent of this position argues as follows. The only possible explanation for the existence of effects such as bodies, faculties and worlds (*bhuvanas*) is that God created them. Since he is thus established as their creator, there is no need to assume that liberated souls play any rôle in their creation, and this means that there is no possible ground for inferring agency in liberated souls.

It is further argued that souls have no agency prior to liberation either, as that belongs to *prakṛti*, as for the Sāṅkhyas. The soul has knowledge / cognition, on the other hand, as part of its nature (*svabhāva*), and this knowledge comes to encompass everything at liberation, owing to the soul's impure covering (*āvaraṇa*) ceasing. Thus a liberated soul is an omniscient non-agent.

(2) Superiority to God (*ādhikyaṃ parameśānāt*)

The proponent of this view argues that God is a bound soul (*paśu*), because he is still linked with the bondage of having a duty to perform. Two verse-fragments are quoted: 'Favouring and Concealing are two bonds of Sadāśiva' (*anugrahatirobhāvau dvau pāśau tu sadāśive*) and 'Sadāśiva is the foremost of the bound souls' (*paśur ādyaḥ sadāśivaḥ*) (the first occurs as 1:83cd of the *Nayasūtra* of the *Niśvāsa*).

The conclusion is that God is inferior to the perfected soul since the perfected soul has gone beyond all bondage, has no duties (*adhikāra*) of any kind, and is permanently beyond limiting factors (*sarvadaivānupādhi*).

Difference between 1 and 2 Both of these views maintain that the self is a non-agent in liberation. Both also stress that God, unlike perfected souls, still has duties.[39] But in the first view there is no implication that the liberated soul becomes superior to God. Nor is there any claim that God is a bound soul; in fact it is explicitly said there that God has never been bound.[40] The idea in the first view is just that souls and God are of

[39] The proponent of the first view cites a passage by one Avadhūta which distinguishes between God and perfected souls (*siddhas*) on the grounds that, although God no longer has duties (*adhikāra*) towards perfected souls, he still has duties towards other souls, whereas perfected souls no longer have any duties towards anyone.

[40] The exponent imagines that someone may argue: since God is both liberated and an agent, it follows that liberated souls must be agents. His response is that God is not

completely different natures. They always have been and they always will be. Souls, as for the Sāṅkhyas, are not agents either prior to or after liberation. At liberation they become omniscient but not omnipotent, whereas God is both omnipotent and omniscient.

(3) Agency in the Perfected Soul; Indifference in God (*siddhe ... kartṛtvam, audāsīnyaṃ maheśvare*)

The proponents of this position, whom Rāmakaṇṭha names as the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins ('those who teach that God is eternal in the way that a stream is eternal') reason as follows. As soon as the first soul in the universe becomes liberated, God realises that with there being two omnipotent beings in the universe there may be a conflict of interests: one may wish to create the universe in one way and the other in another way, such that nothing would get done and action for the sake of other souls may come to an end.

Thus God withdraws to inactivity and becomes indifferent to all other souls. The perfected soul then takes on the state of omnipotence, through compassion, because he realises that if he does not, all action for the sake of other souls would cease. When a second soul becomes perfected, the first one retires to inactivity for the same reason that God did, and the newly perfected soul takes on the rôle of creating the universe.

So these Pravāhanityeśvaravādins teach that there is a stream of different Gods, each taking on the rôle for a limited period of time before renouncing their omnipotence.

Difference from 1 and 2

- This differs from both 1 (Inactive Omniscience) and 2 (Superiority to God) in that in both of those positions it is the same soul that is God forever.
- In both this view and 2, non-agency is an achievement that places one beyond / above the soul who is God, and who is thus engaged in the tasks appropriate to God (such as creating and maintaining the universe and liberating souls). In 1 the non-agency of liberated souls distinguishes them from God, but it is neither an achievement (since this was their condition also prior to liberation), nor something that

liberated, as he has never been bound.

places them higher than God: on the contrary, it just shows that God has a power that they do not have.

- The sense that non-agency is a superior achievement is accommodated differently in this view and in 2. In 2, souls leapfrog over God at liberation, whereas in this view the liberated soul becomes God for a period of time before transcending that state.
- In 1 and 2, souls never become omnipotent; in this view they become omnipotent for a limited time.
- In 1 souls are never agents; in 2 they are agents until liberation; in 3 they are agents until the soul after them becomes liberated.

Identity of the Proponents

Next we turn to the question of who the proponents of these views were.

(1) We have already seen two pieces of evidence for the attribution of the first to the Mahāvratas: Rāmakaṇṭha claims that it was the view of those who followed such texts as the *Hṛdayapramāṇa*, which is one of the scriptures of the Mahāvratas, and Trilocanaśiva names its proponents as the Mahāvratas. To this two other pieces of evidence can be added. First, commenting on *Mokṣakārikā* 118–122, Rāmakaṇṭha gives this same view and attributes it to the Mahāvratas. Secondly, the *Śivatattvaratnākara*, an eighteenth-century text by Basavarāja, outlines the same view and describes it as the Mahāvrata doctrine (see SANDERSON 2006b: 197–198).

(2) There is some evidence that 'Superiority to God' was the view of the Lākulas. The proponent of this view, as we saw, argued that Sadāśiva is a bound soul (*paśu*), because he has *adhikāra*. In the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (vol. 2, p. 405,18–25), Abhinavagupta mentions a view that seems to hold all those who have *adhikāra* to be *paśu*s, and attributes it to the Lākulas: *siddhāḥ samayyādigurvantāḥ śuddhātmāno niṣkalāḥ vidyeśvarā anantabhaṭṭārakādyā mantramaheśvarā mantreśvarā aṅguṣṭhamātraprabhṛtayaḥ. ādigrahaṇān mantrāḥ ... na tu lākulādidṛśīva paśurūpāḥ. tadartham eva siddhaśabda eṣāṃ viśeṣaṇam.* SANDERSON (2006b: 194) cites this and translates it as follows: 'Siddhas "the perfected" are (1) all initiates from

Samayins to Gurus, (2) the Pure, those who are free of the products of Māyā, (3) Anantabhaṭṭāraka and the other Vidyeśvaras, (the Mantramaheśvaras) (4) Aṅguṣṭhamātra and the other Mantreśvaras, and (5), indicated by the word "etc.", the Mantra-souls. They are not Paśus as they are held to be in the Lākula and related doctrines. It is precisely to make this point that Utpaladeva has used the word Siddha to describe them'.

It is not actually said there that according to the Lākulas God is a bound soul, but since they are depicted as holding the eccentric view that all of these categories of souls, held by other Śaivas to be *siddhas*, are bound souls, they are good candidates for the view that God, or Sadāśiva, is a bound soul.

This position can also be linked, however, to three other groups.

(A) It may have been the view of certain Saiddhāntikas. The two quotations that are used to support it both speak of Sadāśiva, who is the form of Śiva characteristically worshipped in the Siddhānta. These two quotations, which describe Sadāśiva as a bound soul, are treated by Rāmakaṇṭha (section 3.4.1.3) as coming from sources he held to be authoritative: he does not dismiss them out of hand, but first explains why they can be regarded as speaking only metaphorically, and then shows how, on a certain understanding of 'Sadāśiva' they can be taken to be literally true: on that understanding of 'Sadāśiva', it is indeed the case that Sadāśiva is a bound soul. Perhaps, then, these verses describing Sadāśiva as a bound soul come not from Lākula scriptures, but from (Lākula-influenced?) Śaiva Siddhānta scriptures. One of them does indeed occur in a Saiddhāntika scripture (the *Niśvāsa*), though it may be being quoted there from another source: see note 207.

(B) One argument given by Rāmakaṇṭha for why the perfected soul is superior to God (section 3.4.1.2) is *śākta* in tone, drawing on *śākta* texts, and reasoning that Śakti is higher than the Supreme Lord (*parameśvara*), so that a perfected soul's attaining of Śakti places it above God. Thus Rāmakaṇṭha saw this position as having a connection to some group of Śāktas.

(C) Rāmakaṇṭha mentions (section 2.10) that some other commentators on the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* have regarded this position as that of Pātañjala Yoga. (Rāmakaṇṭha disagrees with them, saying that liberation for Pātañjala Yoga is exactly what it is for Sāṅkhya, namely separation from *prakṛti*, i.e. Isolation (*kaivalya*); since *kaivalya* has been dealt with earlier in the text, these commentators, according to Rāmakaṇṭha, are mistakenly attributing to Sadyojyotiḥ the fault of dealing with the same tradition twice.)

(3) When the third view of a stream of different Gods is given, both in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* and in parallel passages, it is always attributed to the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins or Pravāheśvaravādins (see note 215), terms which simply describe this particular doctrine and do not help us to identify the proponents. The doctrine posits a state beyond the rôle of God, so if it can be inferred from that that it regards God as a bound soul, then it can be linked to the Lākulas for the same reason that the previous view can.

There is some evidence, incidentally, that this and the first view arose out of the same consideration: that a plurality of omnipotent beings would make creation impossible. In *Mokṣakārikā* 118-122, Sadyojyotiḥ attacks the view of an opponent who holds that liberated souls are omniscient but not omnipotent, lacking any agency whatsoever (v. 122). There is no suggestion here that the soul becomes superior to God or first takes on the rôle of God before being relieved of it by a subsequently liberated soul. Thus of the three views that Sadyojyotiḥ outlines and rejects in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, this corresponds most closely to the first view of *akartā sarvavedyavit*. Rāmakaṇṭha expounds it in a way similar to the way in which he expounded that view in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*. And as he attributes that view in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* to the authors of such scriptures as the *Hṛdayapramāṇa*, i.e. the Mahāvratas, so he attributes the *Mokṣakārikā* view explicitly to the Mahāvratas.

But the motivation that Sadyojyotiḥ attributes to the proponents of the *Mokṣakārikā* view for holding it, namely that otherwise there would be a plurality of causes (*kāraṇānekatā*, v. 118) is exactly the motivation that he gives in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* (*kāraṇānīkabhīti* / *kārakānīkabhīti*, v. 12) for the view of a stream of different Lords. And Rāmakaṇṭha puts the same argument, expressed in very similar wording,[41] into the mouth of a 'Mahāvrata' in the *Mokṣakārikā* as he put into the mouth of the Pravāhanityeśvaravādin in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*. That argument (that if there were more than one omnipotent being nothing would be created) leads in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* to the view of a stream of different Lords, and in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* to the view that liberation means omniscience only, not omnipotence.

[41] See *muktānām apīśvaravat sarvakartṛtve navam idam astu purāṇam astv iti vibhinnamatitvāt sarvakāryānutpādaprasaṅgaḥ* ad *Mokṣakārikā* 118, and *parameśvarasyāpi tadā kartṛtvaṃ vibhinnam ity anekakartṛsambhavena navam idam astu purāṇam idam astv iti sarganirmāṇādau vaiśasaṃ syāt* ad *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 12.

VIEW OF LIBERATION	PROPONENT
Inactive omniscience	Mahāvratas
Superiority to God	Lākulas
Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, before retiring to a state of indifference	Pravāhanityeśvaravādins

Figure 8: Hypothesis 1

VIEW OF LIBERATION	PROPONENT
Inactive omniscience	
Superiority to God	
Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, before retiring to a state of indifference	Mahāvratas / Lākulas / Kālamukhas

Figure 9: Hypothesis 2

Conclusion There is thus strong evidence to connect the first view with the Mahāvratas, weaker evidence to connect the second with the Lākulas, and yet weaker evidence to connect the third view with the Lākulas. I mention here three hypotheses, which do not exhaust all of the possibilities.

First, all three views were held by different traditions: the first by the Mahāvratas, the second by the Lākulas and the third by the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins, who were a distinct group from both of the above (see Figure 8).

Against this is evidence presented by SANDERSON (2006b: 176–179) to the effect that the Lākulas were simply the Mahāvratas by another name. He has argued that the Atimārga, that is to say Pāśupata Śaivism in the widest sense, consisted of three distinct groups: (i) the Pāñcārthikas, (ii) the Mahāvratas, also known as Lākulas or Kālamukhas, and (iii) the Kāpālikas, also known as Somasiddhāntins. In his (2006b) study of the second group, he suggests that their liberation doctrine was Pravāhanityeśvaravāda (p. 197–199). This is the second hypothesis; see Figure 9. It regards only one of the three views—the last—as genuine. Having cited and translated the passage from the *Śivatattvaratnākara*, which as mentioned above outlines the first view and assigns it to the Mahāvratas, SANDERSON writes (p. 198):

> Perhaps we should accept this testimony without further thought. But there is something unrounded and unsatisfying about a doctrine which does not merely differentiate between God and other souls but sets God outside the definition of the soul as a being of an entirely different nature. It is, at least, unusual enough in the context of Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava and Vaidika doctrine, to allow one to speculate that the *Śivatattvaratnākara*'s account may be inaccurate in this one particular ...

Thus SANDERSON regards it as unlikely that anyone would have held the view that souls and God are of a completely different nature, with souls having only the power of cognition, and God having both this and the power of action. He thinks it more likely (p. 197) that the Lākulas / Mahāvratas would have

> looked upon God as a soul who had taken on a limiting office, the most exalted, least limiting office there is, but one that its holder will eventually renounce to a successor in order to enter the final state of perfect transcendence.

This we can recognise as the view of *pravāhanityeśvaravāda*. In arguing for it as the view of the Lākulas / Mahāvratas, SANDERSON rejects the genuineness of the second of our views too, namely that the rôle of God is permanent, and that liberated souls jump over him to their position of superiority.

The third hypothesis, for which see Figure 10, respects Rāmakaṇṭha's attribution of the first view to the Mahāvratas, and accepts the evidence of both Sadyojyotiḥ's and Rāmakaṇṭha's accounts that there were three separate views here, not just one genuine and two made up. It accepts the synonymity of the terms Lākula and Mahāvrata, but proposes that the group so designated, and characterised by its practice of the *mahāvrata*, 'Great Observance', (also known as the *kapālavrata* or *mahāpāśupatavrata*)[42] was heterogeneous enough to have come up with these three distinct but related views. The category of those who practised the *mahāpāśupatavrata*, on this view, included a wide enough variety of thinkers to produce slightly varied

[42] See SANDERSON (2006b: 158, 163–166 and 178) for the view that the reason why the members of this group were termed Mahāvratas was their practice of the *mahāvrata* / *mahāpāśupatavrata*, a practice that distinguished them from the Pāñcārthika Pāsupatas, and that included taking on the appearance of a brahmin-slayer, carrying a skull-staff and skull-bowl, etc.

VIEW OF LIBERATION	PROPONENT
Inactive omniscience	Mahāvratas / Lākulas
Superiority to God	Mahāvratas / Lākulas
Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, before retiring to a state of indifference	Mahāvratas / Lākulas

Figure 10: Hypothesis 3

VIEW OF LIBERATION	PROPONENT
Inactive omniscience	Mahāvratas / Lākulas
Superiority to God	Mahāvratas / Lākulas
Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, before retiring to a state of indifference	Pravāhanityeśvaravādins

Figure 11: Hypothesis 3a

doctrines concerning the nature of liberation and the relationship between the liberated soul and God. The common thread running through all three is that there can be only one omnipotent soul in the universe at one time. God is omnipotent; liberated souls are not. This was accommodated in three different ways: (1) souls, being of a completely different nature from God, are devoid of agency like Sāṅkhya-*puruṣas*; their liberation includes omniscience but not omnipotence; (2) liberated souls leapfrog over God; (3) souls become God for a period of time before full liberation.

Against both the second and the third hypotheses, it could be pointed out that Trilocanaśiva's *Siddhāntasamuccaya* identifies *vidyātattva* as the highest possible resting place (*paramaṃ padam*) of the Mahāvratas, but *īśvaratattva* as that of the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins, implying that for him at least they were not the same group of people. Perhaps one could regard Trilocanaśiva's evidence as compatible with the characterisation of the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins as a subgroup within the larger category of those who performed the *mahāpāśupatavrata*. If not, then the third hypothesis could be adjusted to include only the first and second views as put by the Lākulas / Mahāvratas, with the view of *pravāhanityeśvaravāda* not being associated with this Atimārgic group at all: see Figure 11.

5.3 Kāpālikas, Somasiddhāntins

SANDERSON previously (1990: 132–147[664–679]; 2006b: 151–152) held that the Kāpālikas who feature in a common fourfold division of the Māheśvaras—into (1) Pāśupatas / Pāñcārthikas, (2) Mahāvratas / Lākulas / Kālamukhas, (3) Kāpālikas and (4) Śaivas—belonged not to the Atimārga, but to the Mantramārga, i.e. to Āgamic Śaivism. But he reports (2006b: 210) that a seventh-century inscription from Chattisgarh has led him to accept the existence of Kāpālikas not only in a Mantṛamārgic, but also in an Atimārgic context, and it is these Atimārgic Kāpālikas whom he now regards as the third group in the fourfold division. The Atimārga, then, should be held to have three main divisions, not just the two that SANDERSON had identified and described in earlier work. The fact that, in several instances of this fourfold classification, Somasiddhāntins[43] feature in the place of Kāpālikas is evidence that the two terms are referring to the same group.[44]

Do the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on it offer any clues as to the liberation doctrine of this third division of the Atimārga, that of the Kāpālikas and Somasiddhāntins? As we saw above (p. 41), view 20 holds that the liberated soul is possessed by God's omniscience and omnipotence like someone possessed by a spirit. This is not attributed by Rāmakaṇṭha, but it is said in the sixteenth-century *Śaivaparibhāṣā* to be the view of the Kāpālikas, and in the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* to be the view of the Kāpālas: see note 238. The latter term is a commonly used synonym of Kāpālika.

There is evidence to connect the Somasiddhāntins with view 9 (*kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam*), which holds that the liberated soul is an agent who remains subject to the control of God. This evidence is given in note 200.

Both Rāmakaṇṭha (end of section 2.8) and Trilocanaśiva (see note 200) interpret *kartṛtve* in *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam* to mean not just agency but omnipotence: they expound the view as maintaining that liberated souls, though omnipotent as well as omniscient, are subject to the command of God. It is plausible that this was Sadyojyotiḥ's intention (and hence that it was a real view, actually espoused by a religious group known to Sadyojyotiḥ), for why otherwise would *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam* be a label for *liberation*, given that even bound souls are agents that are instigated by God (according to all of the theistic views apart from *akartā sarvavedyavit*)?

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[43] On these see BAKKER 2000.

[44] On the equating of the Kāpālikas and the Somasiddhāntins, see SANDERSON (2006b: 210) and BAKKER (2000: 12, note 34).

If this, possibly Somasiddhāntin, view was indeed that souls are omnipotent yet instigated, then we can group it with the three investigated in the last section. Like them, it too can be seen as one solution to the problem that a plurality of omnipotent beings in the universe at one time may disagree and obstruct each other. The other three all avoid the problem by positing only one omnipotent being at any one time; this view accepts a plurality, but avoids mutual obstruction by maintaining that liberated souls remain subject to the command of God in spite of their omnipotence. That being omnipotent is not incompatible with being instigated by God was also held by the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins, at least according to Trilocanaśiva's account of their position. For he characterises the perfected soul in that view as both omnipotent and instigated by God (see note 215). It ceases to be either once the next soul becomes liberated and it retires to inactivity, but, from the time of its liberation up to then, its omnipotence is something that it takes on as a result of being impelled by the previously perfected soul to do so. The previously perfected soul confers the 'burden' of omnipotence on to it; thus it is both omnipotent and impelled.

Whether or not omnipotence that goes along with being under the command of God is true omnipotence—that it is not is precisely the argument that both Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha use against it (v. 9cd and commentary thereon)—this position can be seen as an attempt to make room for a plurality of omnipotent beings in the face of the potential problem of mutual disagreement and mutual obstruction. Omnipotence features here as the ability to do anything—even create or destroy the universe—so long as one is told to. There is nothing too difficult for one's power of action to achieve, yet one's choice about what to do remains subject to the command of God.

As just mentioned, both Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha see being instigated as incompatible with full omnipotence, and hence Rāmakaṇṭha comments (section 3.3) that these supposedly liberated souls who are 'omnipotent' and instigated are actually akin to the Vidyeśvaras, a group of souls who in Saiddhāntika Śaivism are omniscient, and instigated by God to create the (impure) universe, which means that their powers of action, though equal to this act of creation, are slightly inferior to God's.[45] The Saiddhāntika solution, then, to the potential problem entailed by a plurality of fully omnipotent beings, is not to be deterred from positing this plurality (for if

[45] See *Kiraṇatantra* 3:25c–27 (and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on 3:27ef), 4:7ff., Aghoraśiva's *Tattvasaṅgrahaṭīkā* ad 41, and VASUDEVA (2004: 163, note 51).

souls are not fully omnipotent they are not fully liberated), but to explain that the problem of mutual disagreement does not arise, since it is only craving and hatred that makes people disagree. To be liberated is to be free of craving and hatred, and hence impartial; to be impartial means to have the same intentions as others who are impartial (*Mokṣakārikā* 119–121 and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary thereon, *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* ad v. 12).

Alongside the three views in the previous section that only allowed there to be one omnipotent soul in the universe at any one time, we thus have two views that posit a plurality, and that avert the potential danger in two different ways. To these could be added a third, that of the non-dualistic Śaivas. Their view does not feature in our text, since Sadyojyotiḥ's listing of the twenty views of rival religions pre-dates the rise of non-dualistic Śaivism to prominence. But it can be seen as falling with the two just mentioned views to the extent that, like them, it holds liberation to be omnipotence as well as omniscience. Yet in spite of the fact that all liberated souls attain omnipotence, that attainment coincides with the loss of separate individuality as they attain Śivahood. Hence the potential problem of a plurality of omnipotent souls does not arise, since there is ultimately only one (omnipotent) soul in the universe.

* * *

If it is correct that *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam* was the view of the Somasiddhāntins and that Āveśavāda was the view of the Kāpālikas, then we have the problem that two names indicated by other evidence to refer to the same group are used for the proponents of two different views.

The views themselves are not necessarily incompatible. A soul could achieve its omnipotence by being possessed by God's omnipotence, yet could remain subject to the control of God. In fact Rāmakaṇṭha's argument against Āveśavāda amounts to the claim that the liberated soul would remain subject to the control of God. He argues that it would lack autonomy because, as a result of being possessed by *God's* omnipotence, it would act by means of that, not by means of its own omnipotence. But the fact that this lack of autonomy is given as an *unwanted* consequence against the Āveśavādin shows that Āveśavāda was certainly regarded as a separate view from *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam*.

Furthermore, even if they could somehow be regarded as two parts of one view, so that their attribution to the Kāpālikas and Somasiddhāntins

would be compatible with these two labels referring to the same group, there is a more difficult problem. Āveśavāda is attributed to a group belonging to the same religion as the Saiddhāntikas (*samānatāntrika*) and *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam* to those of a different religion (*tantrāntara*) (see Rāmakaṇṭha's introduction to verses 6 and 7, and pp. 18 and 40 of this Introduction). The problem with which we are left, then, is that there is clearly no way to make the following compatible:

1. The Kāpālikas and Somasiddhāntins were the same group.
2. Āveśavāda was the view of the Kāpālikas; *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam* was the view of the Somasiddhāntins.
3. The holders of Āveśavāda were co-religionists; the holders of *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam* belonged to another religion.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

It has been noted above that the presentation of the twenty views to be refuted ends with three which all teach that liberation involves becoming the same as God (*īśvarasamāna*), and that a firm distinction is made between these three views and all of the other seventeen. Sadyojyotiḥ says (v. 6) that all of the other seventeen are the product of mere imagination on the part of those who are blinded by delusion, and who hence cannot see that liberation is becoming the same as God. Rāmakaṇṭha differentiates the three proponents of *īśvarasamānatā* from the other seventeen by describing the former as co-religionists (*samānatāntrikas*).

Given that there is evidence that these three proponents were the Pāśupatas, the Kālamukhas and the Kāpālikas, it is tempting to equate the three proponents of the *īśvarasamāna* views with the three divisions of the Atimārga, as has been done before in secondary literature. For Atimārgic Śaivas to be exhaustively comprised of the proponents of these three views would certainly be neat: (1) It involves a uniformity of the Atimārga, with all of its members teaching liberaton to be becoming the same as God (*īśvarasamānatā*); (2) It makes the firm division between the three views and the other seventeen natural, it being a division between Śaivism and non-Śaivism; (3) It makes the division between the three views and Sadyojyotiḥ's own view natural, it being a division between the Mantramārga and the Atimārga.

But it is not consistent with the evidence to see the Atimārga as comprised of these three views. Although there is nothing to contradict the (substantial) evidence that Saṅkrāntivāda was the view of the Pāśupatas, and the (slim, sixteenth-century) evidence that Āveśavāda was the view of the Kāpālikas, there is a problem with taking Utpattivāda as the view of the second division of the Atimārga. We know that the view of the Mahāvratas was that liberation consists of omniscience without agency. Liberation for the Mahāvratas, then, clearly did not involve becoming the same as God—a hallmark of Utpattivāda—, since it did not involve any agency at all, let alone omnipotence. The Mahāvratas held, according to Rāmakaṇṭha, that souls and God are of eternally different natures, with souls lacking agency both prior to and after liberation. He certainly cannot have regarded them as holding, then, that souls become the same as God through the rise of omniscience and omnipotence. Indeed in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* (ad 118), he presents the Mahāvrata as arguing that if liberated souls were the same as God in being omnipotent, the plurality of omnipotent souls would make creation impossible. Avoidance of this unwanted situation of a plurality of omnipotent souls is precisely what is put forward there as the motivation for and justification of the Mahāvrata view.

But is there not evidence that the Mahāvratas were the Kālamukhas by another name—and the Kālamukhas, according to Rāmakaṇṭha, held the view of Utpattivāda? There is evidence that some held them to be the same group, and evidence that others held them to be different: see note 234. It is clear that Rāmakaṇṭha held them to be different for: (1) the views he attributes to both are incompatible, and (2) he regarded the Kālamukhas as one of the three groups that belonged to the same religion as his own, but the Mahāvratas as one of the seventeen that fell outside his own religion.

So we cannot equate the three *īśvarasamāna* views with the three divisions of the Atimārga for two reasons. On the one hand, the second of the three *īśvarasamāna* views seems to be incompatible with what Rāmakaṇṭha and Trilocanaśiva put forward as the view of the Mahāvratas, the second division of the Atimārga. On the other hand, there are Atimārgic views which fall within the group of seventeen: not only the Mahāvrata view of omniscience without omnipotence, but also probably 'Being an agent, yet subject to the control of God' (9), 'Becoming Superior to God' (11), and the Pravāhanityeśvaravādin view of 'Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, then retiring to a state of indifference' (13). Thus the unavoidable conclusion is that Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha regarded some Atimārgic views as held

by co-religionists and other Atimārgic views as put forward by proponents of a different religion. The category of the Atimārga, then, is not helpful for understanding whom Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha saw in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and *-vṛtti* as belonging to their own religion.

* * *

There are three further Atimārgic groups that are occasionally mentioned in surviving Śaiva sources, but about whom little is known: the Vaimalas, the Kārukas and the Mausulas.[46] Given Sadyojyotiḥ's preoccupation with the traditions of the Atimārga,[47] it would not be surprising if he dealt with some or all of these groups. Thus it is possible that some of the theistic views whose attribution has not been established were put forward by them. Potential candidates for the views of these three Atimārgic groups are: Superiority to God (11), Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, then retiring to a state of indifference (13), Being an agent who is subject to the control of God (9)[48] and Becoming devoid of impurity (12). This last view of *nirmalatvam* may have been the view of the Vaimalas (see below).

As for the possibility that one of the twenty views was that of the Kārukas, note that the two and a half verses of the *Raurava* on which the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* comments[49] include the compound *viśikhāmalakārakāḥ*, where we wonder if *-kārakāḥ* may be a corruption of *-kārukāḥ*.[50] The compound occurs in the middle of a list of rival proponents, all of whose views will be dealt with by Sadyojyotiḥ in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*. Rāmakaṇṭha interprets the compound as comprised of two members, i.e. as naming two groups, the Viśikhākārakas and Amalakārakas, the first denoting the Pāśupatas and the second denoting the holders of the view that liberation consists just in becoming devoid of impurity (12). It is not easy to give meaning to *kāraka* at the end of Rāmakaṇṭha's compounds and we therefore wonder whether Rāmakaṇṭha—though correct to see the first of the three words in the *Rau-*

[46] See SANDERSON (1988: 667) = (1990: 135) and (2006b: 169–170, 182, 199–201), ACRI (forthcoming), and BAKKER (2000: 5ff.); on the Vaimalas in particular see ACRI (2008).

[47] See SANDERSON (2006a: 76).

[48] Although some evidence was given above to connect these views to other Atimārgic groups, that evidence was slight.

[49] See the next section (6) of this Introduction.

[50] The corruption of *-kāruka* to *-kāraka* occurs in at least three other places; see ACRI (2008: 195, note 13; 196, note 14) and *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa* II, s.v. *kāruka*.

rava's compound as indicating the Pāśupatas, and the second (*-amala-*) as indicating the proponents of view 12—might have been making the best of a corrupt text, and whether the *Raurava* might not originally have intended three groups, the last being the Kārukas.

The similarity between the words *amala* and *nirmalatvam*, the former from the list of proponents in Sadyojyotiḥ's root text, and the latter his formulation of one of the twenty doctrines, makes the correlation of the two natural, i.e. makes it plausible that this doctrine was that of the Amalas. Amala ('Lacking impurity') may be a way of referring to the Vaimalas, for (1) We find the near synonym Alepaka ('Lacking spots / stains') apparently being used of the local group of Vaimalas in Old Javanese sources (ACRI 2008); (2) An inscription discussed by BAKKER (2000: 6) mentions a lineage of Gurus with names ending in *-vimala*, which BAKKER takes as evidence that they were Vaimalas.[51] Vimala is of course a synonym of Amala.

If Amala indeed occurs here as a name for the Vaimalas, and if *kārakāḥ* is indeed a corruption of *kārukāḥ*, then the *Raurava* would be giving a commonly found list of three Atimārgic groups: the Pāśupatas, the Vaimalas and the Kārukas.[52]

As to how or why the first word of the *Raurava*'s compound, *viśikha / viśikhā*, denoted the Pāśupatas, we see three possibilities. (1) Sadyojyotiḥ names the Pāśupatas as Śikhāsaṅkrāntivādins (verse 57), which Rāmakaṇṭha explains as meaning 'Those who teach [that liberation results from] a transference of [God's] powers', explaining that *śikhā* here means 'power' (*śakti*). Since Rāmakaṇṭha correlates these Śikhāsaṅkrāntivādins with those he sees as denoted in the *Raurava* by the term *viśikhākāraka*,[53] it seems that he regarded the word *viśikhā* as, like *śikhā*, meaning 'power' and as referring to the Pāśupata doctrine of a transference of powers. (2) Sadyojyotiḥ may have intended a more usual meaning of *śikhā* in his label *śikhāsaṅkrāntivādinaḥ*, namely 'flame'. For the phrase *śikhāsaṅkrānti* brings to mind the Pāśupata's example of the transfer of a flame from one wick to another (which Sadyojyotiḥ gives in verse 19), used as an analogy for the transfer of omniscience

[51] See also ACRI (2008: 196, note 17).

[52] The same three are listed together at, for example, *Niśvāsakārikā / Dīkṣottara* 19:123 (cited at ACRI 2008: 195, note 13) and 12:25ab of the same text (cited at ACRI 2008: 196, note 14).

[53] See the end of §2.18.2: *ete ca śikhāsaṅkrāntivādinaḥ pāśupatāḥ sūtrakṛtā viśikhākārakatvenoktāḥ.* 'And these Śikhāsaṅkrāntivādins, the Pāśupatas, are mentioned by the author of the [*Raurava*]*sūtra* as the 'Power People'.

and omnipotence from God to a soul attaining liberation.[54] Similarly the author of the passage of the *Raurava* could have meant 'flame' by *viśikhā*. (3) But if it seems unlikely that the *Raurava* would refer to the Pāśupatas with either a single word meaning 'power' or a single word meaning 'flame', there is another possibility, namely that the first word of the compound is not (the unattested) *viśikhā*, but (the common word) *viśikha*, an adjective meaning 'lacking a topknot'. A few considerations can be adduced that might support such an hypothesis. (A) The topknot is removed in the one published account of a Pāśupata initiation, that of the *Saṃskāravidhi* (see ACHARYA 2007: 35–36 and 46–47, particularly verses 85 and 87). (B) The existence of a group of Pāśupata ascetics called Viśikhins ('Those who lack a topknot') is attested to in Old Javanese literature (see ACRI 2008: 201, note 37). (C) The three hairstyles mentioned in the *pāśupatavrata* described in *Atharvavedapariśiṣṭa* 40 suggest no regular top-knot, for there (2.9) the observer of the *vrata* may be *jaṭin*, *muṇḍin* or *pañcaśikhin* (see BISSCHOP and GRIFFITHS 2003: 331 and note 85 for Puranic references to these hairstyles among Pāśupatas). (D) An inscription studied by ACHARYA (2005: 210) mentions *muṇḍaśṛṅkhalikapāśupatas*. ACHARYA discusses the compound and concludes that it means 'Pāśupatas belonging to the Muṇḍa and Śṛṅkhalika sub-sects', the first who shaved their heads and the second who wore a waistband. Hans BAKKER, however, suggests (2007: 3, note 12) that the *muṇḍaśṛṅkhalikas* should rather be regarded as a single group because of the reference to *dānaśṛṅkhalikas* in another Licchavi inscription and to *rudraśṛṅkhalikas* in an inscription from Mandasor. However the compound is understood, the element *muṇḍa* seems to point to shaven heads. (E) The term *diṇḍin*, according to TAK3 s.v., may refer to shaven-headed Pāśupata mercenaries in *Bṛhatkathāślokasaṅgraha* 18.202.

Thus we have several faint indications of the existence of Pāśupatas who lacked a topknot, and who could thus have been referred to as Viśikhas.

If it is correct that the *Raurava* intended three groups, the last two being the Vaimalas and Kārukas, then we have some evidence for what the liberation doctrine of the former was, but we are in the tantalising position of knowing that one of the twenty views was that of the Kārukas without knowing which one—or at least without being able to narrow it down to less than three possibilities (views 9, 11 and 13).[55]

[54] SANDERSON (2006b: 180) interprets *śikhā* in this way; he translates *śikhāsaṅkrāntivādinaḥ pāśupatāḥ* as 'Those who hold that there is an extending [of the qualities of Rudra, in the manner] of a flame [spreading] are the Pāśupatas'.

[55] We have benefitted from discussion with Andrea ACRI and Diwakar ACHARYA on the

6 The *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* is itself a commentary; The *Rauravavṛtti* and *Rauravavṛttiviveka*

Sadyojyotiḥ's *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, commented on by Rāmakaṇṭha, is also itself a commentary. The root text that it expounds consists of two and a half verses from the *Raurava*, which Rāmakaṇṭha quotes when introducing his commentary on Sadyojyotiḥ's first verse.[56] The two and a half verses list somewhere between nine and eleven proponents, depending how we analyse the compounds; in Rāmakaṇṭha's analysis there are ten. So only about half of the positions that Sadyojyotiḥ includes in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* correspond to proponents listed in his root text; the rest he added of his own accord. The first four proponents listed in the *Raurava* verses are: those learned in Sāṅkhya (*sāṅkhyavidvāṃsaḥ*), those learned in Yoga (*yogavidvāṃsaḥ*), those learned in the knowledge of the Vedānta (*vedāntajñānavidvāṃsaḥ*), and those who are devoted to Pāñcarātra (*pāñcarātraratāḥ*). These map unproblematically on to the first four views listed in Figure 1. With the other proponents (named according to Rāmakaṇṭha's analysis of the compounds as *yogis*, *maheśvaras*, *pramāṇakartṛtvas*, *āgneyakartṛtvas*, *viśikhākārakas* and *amalakārakas*), it is harder to be sure which views Sadyojyotiḥ was putting forward as theirs. Rāmakaṇṭha, however, associates each of them with a particular view; see Figure 12 for the correspondences asserted by him.

We are dealing with a vertical structure, then, of three texts. Horizontally too the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* fits into a larger structure, being not a complete text but part of a larger one. GOODALL has argued that the *Bhogakārikā*, the *Mokṣakārikā*, the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, the lost *Mantravārttika*, the lost *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* and a lost commentary on the *mudrāprakaraṇa* of the *Raurava* together formed what is referred to as the *Rauravavṛtti*; and that the commentaries that Rāmakaṇṭha wrote on all of these (except the *Bhogakārikā*, there being no evidence of a commentary by him on that text) comprised what is referred to as the *Rauravavṛttiviveka* (see GOODALL 1998; xix–xxviii).

The three parts of the *Rauravavṛtti* that survive, the *Bhogakārikā*, the *Mokṣakārikā* and the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, occur in that order in the

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subject of this compound in the *Raurava*.

[56] See notes 81 and 912.

View of Liberation	Relevant Word in the Raurava, according to Rāmakaṇṭha
7) Becoming a great attendant of God (*mahāgaṇo maheśasya*)	Yogi
8) Being omniscient but lacking agency (*akartā sarvavedyavit*)	Pramāṇakartṛtva
10) Becoming the same as 'The Treasury of Light' (*samatvaṃ tejasāṃ nidheḥ*)	Āgneyakartṛtva
11) Becoming superior to God (*ādhikyaṃ parameśānāt*)	Maheśvara
12) Becoming devoid of Impurity (*nirmalatvam*)	Amalakāraka
19) The transference (*saṅkrānti*) from God of omniscience and omnipotence	Viśikhākāraka

Figure 12: Rāmakaṇṭha's correlation of liberation doctrines with proponents mentioned in the Raurava

Aṣṭaprakaraṇa; but there is evidence that that is not the order in which they were composed and in which they were known to Rāmakaṇṭha. The *Bhogakārikā* very likely preceded the *Mokṣakārikā*, as evidenced by, for example, the following remark in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* (ad 105, p. 314): *ityādinā prāg bhogaprakaraṇe*. These two texts are likely to have been consecutive, and indeed to have formed a kind of unitary whole, given Rāmakaṇṭha's frequent references to passages within either text as occurring in the *Bhogamokṣa*. See for example *ity uktaṃ bhogamokṣe* (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* p. 108) and *tathoktaṃ bhogamokṣe, tata evāvadhāryam* (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* p. 109).[57]

There is evidence though that the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* came before, not after these two. (1) As GOODALL has already pointed out (1998; xviii), Rāmakaṇṭha is likely to have composed his commentary on the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* before that on the *Mokṣakārikā*, as the latter refers back to the former (*ity uktam asmābhiḥ paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛttau vistareṇa, tata evāvadhāryam* ad 23ab). Furthermore as can be seen from note 91, Rāmakaṇṭha

[57]See also SANDERSON (2006a: 47, note 11).

is likely to be referring forward to the *Mokṣakārikā* twice in his commentary on the first verse of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*. (2) In the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* Rāmakaṇṭha refers to his commentary on the *Mantravārttika* in the future (ad 3c, see note 184 on p. 258), and in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* he twice (ad verse 2, p. 246, and ad verse 113, p. 268) refers to it in the past (*ity uktam asmābhir mantravārttikaṭīkāyām*). For the *Mokṣakārikā* to follow the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* would be natural if one expects the refutation of *pūrvapakṣas* to precede the establishment of the *siddhānta*. Thus the evidence points to the following order: *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, *Mantravārttika*, *Bhogakārikā*, *Mokṣakārikā*.

The *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* was not the beginning of the *Rauravavṛtti*, however. *Maṅgala* or introductory verses are found neither in it nor in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary to it, and the latter begins by referring back to the preceding section in which the supremacy of *śivahasta*, that part of Śaiva initiation in which the initiator lays his hand on the initiand, was demonstrated. It also refers back to the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* ad verse 58 (*tad etat darśitam āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsena jñānakāṇḍe*). The *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* was a commentary on the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*.[58] Thus the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* was probably preceded by at least two lost parts of the *Rauravavṛtti*, one of which was the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*.

There is thus evidence to place all of the parts of the *Rauravavṛtti* known to us, apart from the lost commentary on the *Raurava*'s treatment of *mudrās*, in a plausible order: *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*, treatment of the placing of Śiva's hand on the initiand, *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, *Mantravārttika*, *Bhogakārikā*, *Mokṣakārikā*.

7 The levels of the universe attainable by the proponents of the twenty views

In the final section of Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary, having refuted all of the opponents' views, he maintains (ad verse 58a) that they are not completely invalid. The opponents' teachings and scriptures are limited in what they can reveal, but that does not disqualify them from being means of knowledge in their own respective spheres—just as perception is limited in only being able to reveal sounds, smells, colours etc., and yet is certainly a means of knowledge regarding those.

[58] See note 911.

What, then, are the spheres regarding which the teachings of the other traditions are valid? Lower levels of the (Śaiva) universe. As is well known, the Śaivas regarded the twenty-five principles (*tattvas*) accepted by the Sāṅkhyas as the lowest levels of the universe, on top of which were a further group of, usually eleven, levels whose non-recognition by non-Śaivas was explained as resulting from the limited vision of the formulators of their doctrines.[59]

For Rāmakaṇṭha and other Śaivas, the highest point that is revealed in the teachings of another tradition is also the highest point to which adepts can reach through attaining the 'liberation' taught in that tradition. The limit of their ontology also marks the extent of their possible liberation, i.e. the amount of bondage they can be freed from. Thus Cārvākas cannot reach beyond the level of the material elements (*mahābhūtas*), the lowest five *tattvas*, Sāṅkhyas cannot reach beyond the twenty-five tattvas recognised by them, etc.

Rāmakaṇṭha has an interlocutor ask (ad 58cd) what level can be attained by each of the other opponents, in answer to which he refers the reader to a different text of his, the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*. This text seems not to have survived other than in quotations, but GOODALL has edited and translated the main part of it—that is to say the part in which the liberations of rival traditions are assigned to *tattvas*—based on citations by later authors (see note 911). The *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* does not in fact deal with exactly the same opponents as those dealt with in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and *-vṛtti*. It includes only nine of the twenty in our text, and it includes eight that are not in our text.

Trilocanaśiva, who was writing in the twelfth century in South India,[60] and who draws extensively on Rāmakaṇṭha's works, includes in the middle of a text of his named the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* a section on rival traditions and their validity. He ends the section by citing what appears to be the whole of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*. In what precedes he names twenty-nine traditions, giving brief summaries of their principal doctrines and assigning them to *tattvas*. He includes the opponents dealt with in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, and assigns them to the same locations as Rāmakaṇṭha does;[61] but he also adds the positions from the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* that are missing from the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, as well as

[59] See note 827.

[60] For his date and oeuvre, see GOODALL (2000: 208ff.).

[61] On one occasion Trilocanaśiva assigns a group to a different *tattva*: he maintains that the Transformationist Vedāntins reach *prakṛti*, not *puruṣa*.

a few extras not found in either text, and assigns them himself to *tattva*s. He extensively paraphrases the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* when he deals with the positions included in the latter, and hence we have put many of his passages into footnotes to the translation. These passages not only aid us in determining how to constitute the text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, but they also name proponents of positions unattributed by either Sadyojyotiḥ or Rāmakaṇṭha, some of whom would otherwise have remained obscure to us.

Figure 13 shows the traditions dealt with by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, by Trilocanaśiva in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, and the *tattva*s to which they are assigned by both authors.[62] The right-hand column lists the *tattva*s accepted by the Śaivas. Numbers in brackets (corresponding with the numbers given in Figure 1) are placed after the traditions dealt with in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*.

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As mentioned several times above, both Rāmakaṇṭha and Sadyojyotiḥ distinguish between three non-Saiddhāntika groups, who teach that liberation is becoming the same as God and belong to the same general religion as the Saiddhāntikas, and all of the other seventeen. Thus one expects that, out of all the non-Saiddhāntikas, the ones who can reach highest up the hierarchy of *tattva*s would be the three co-religionists. Surprisingly that is not the case.

Only one of the three groups of thinkers who are considered co-religionists in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* is mentioned by Rāmakaṇṭha in his *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*: the Pāśupata Saṅkrāntivādins. They are assigned to *māyātattva*. (Trilocanaśiva adds the other two teachers of *īśvarasamatā* at this level: the Utpattivādins and the Āveśavādins.) Above these, in *vidyātattva*, Rāmakaṇṭha places the Mahāvratas who teach inactive omniscience. Above these, in *īśvaratattva*, he places those who teach that liberation involves being omnipotent, yet subject to the control of God. As we noted in section 5.3 above, these may be the Somasiddhāntins. (Trilocanaśiva adds the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins at this level.) Highest of all, in *śaktitattva*,

[62] The text of the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* is not always clear: it does not allow us to be completely certain that Trilocanaśiva intended the locations given in the table for three groups: the Paurāṇikas, the Buddhists and the Manaścaitanikas. Verse 5a of the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* (GOODALL 1998: xxii) is also not clear: Rāmakaṇṭha may have intended a third group there in *puruṣatattva*, not included in our table, in addition to the other two at that level.

PROPONENTS / VIEW OF LIBERATION	ATTAINABLE TATTVA		ŚAIVA TATTVAS
	Rāmakaṇṭha	Trilocana	
			Śiva
Śaktyadvaitavādins	Śakti	Śakti	Śakti
			Sadāśiva
Pravāhanityeśvaravādins (13)		Iśvara	
Being an Agent yet remaining subject to the control of God (9)	Iśvara	Iśvara	Iśvara
Mahāvratas (8)	Vidyā	Vidyā	Vidyā
Āvcśavādins (20)		Māyā	
Utpattivādins (18)		Māyā	Māyā
Pāśupatas (19)	Māyā	Māyā	
Vaidika Pāśupatas		Māyā	
			Kalā, Aśuddhavidyā, Rāga, Kāla, Niyati
Paurāṇikas: Becoming a chief attendant (*gaṇeśvara*) of the Lord or attaining the same world etc. (*sālokyādi*) as Him (7).		Puruṣa	
Vedānta (Māyāvāda/Vivartavāda) (3)	Puruṣa	Puruṣa	Puruṣa
Śabdabrahmavādins	Puruṣa	Puruṣa	
Vedānta (Pariṇāmavāda) (3)		Puruṣa	
Vedānta (Pariṇāmavāda) (3)	Prakṛti		Prakṛti / Avyakta
Pāñcarātras (4)	Prakṛti	Avyakta	
Sāṅkhyas (1)	Top of Guṇas	Top of Guṇas	
Pātañjalas (1)		Top of Guṇas	
Enjoyment of Sattva (2)		Guṇas	Guṇas
Jains	Guṇas	Guṇas	
Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas (15)	Buddhi	Buddhi	
Buddhists (16)	Products (*vṛtti*) of Buddhi	Buddhi	Buddhi
Ahaṅkāracaitanikas	Ahaṅkāra	Ahaṅkāra	Ahaṅkāra
Manaścaitanikas	Manas	Manas	Manas
Indriyacaitanikas	Indriyas	Indriyas	Indriyas
Manu etc.		Tanmātras	
Jaiminīya Karmamīmāṃsakas		Tanmātras	
Those who equate *brahman* with the cause of the elements and the Egg of Brahma (*brahmāṇḍa*)	Tanmātras		Tanmātras
Becoming the same as the Treasury of Light (10)		Mahābhūtas	
Going to a world in the stars having acquired a refined body and faculties (14)		Mahābhūtas	Mahābhūtas
Kaulas	Mahābhūtas	Mahābhūtas	
Cārvākas (17)	Mahābhūtas	Mahābhūtas	

Figure 13: The Levels of the Universe Attainable by Rival Religions

Rāmakaṇṭha places those who teach that liberation is non-difference from *śakti*.

It is surprising that the one group that is identified by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* as one of the co-religionists does not come at the top, but is surpassed by

- two groups that in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and *-vṛtti* fall within the seventeen who are too blind to recognise that liberation is becoming the same as God
- a third group that does not feature in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*: the Śaktyadvaitavādins.

Whereas in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and *-vṛtti* it is the three *īśvarasamatā* views that are bracketed off from other views dealt with there, in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* it is these four views—Saṅkrāntivāda, inactive omniscience, omnipotence while remaining subject to the control of God, and *śaktyadvaitavāda*—that are bracketed off from the others. Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* (v. 4b) regards the proponents of these four views as capable of achieving a 'pure' liberation, one at the level of *māyā* or higher, contrasting them with all other groups, whom he describes as bound souls (*paśus*).

The first three of these four views could be those of the three main divisions of the Atimārga: there is strong evidence that the first two were the views of the Pāśupatas and the Mahāvratas, and a small piece of evidence that the third was the view of the Somasiddhāntins.

Two different traditions seem to be reflected here: that articulated in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and its *vṛtti*, according to which the non-Saiddhāntikas that can come closest to full liberation are the three groups that teach *īśvarasamatā*, and that articulated in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* (and possibly the lost work of Sadyojyotiḥ on which it comments), according to which those that come closest to full liberation are, in descending order, the Śaktyadvaitavādins, the Somasiddhāntins(?), the Mahāvratas and the Pāśupatas.

The hierarchy in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and *-vṛtti* can be explained straightforwardly as reflecting the proximity of the liberation doctrine in question to that of the Saiddhāntikas. The hierarchy in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* cannot. Why should the Mahāvratas come above the Pāśupatas, when the former claim to achieve only omniscience, whereas the Pāśupatas claim to achieve both omniscience and omnipotence? (This is the reverse of the situation in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and *-vṛtti*, where the Pāśupatas are considered co-religionists and the Mahāvratas outsiders.) Rāmakaṇṭha,

in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, justifies the Pāśupatas' placement below the Mahāvratas with the explanation that the former, since their power of consciousness is transferred from God, are devoid of their own power of consciousness. But this seems like an ad hoc strategy. For Rāmakaṇṭha's consistent position throughout the refutation of the Pāśupatas in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* is that the transference of God's power is an incoherent impossibility. That contrasts awkwardly with the claim in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* that the transference of God's power takes place into Pāśupatas, and explains their lack of autonomous consciousness.

If the hierarchy recorded in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* follows a hierarchy in the (lost) text by Sadyojyotiḥ on which it comments, the question arises as to why Sadyojyotiḥ would have presented two different hierarchies in two of his texts. In the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* he is not constrained by the scripture on which he comments; for the two and a half verses of the *Raurava* on which the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* is a commentary are known to us (see pp. 68–70 above and section 1 of the Edition and Translation below) and they simply list ten traditions; they imply no hierarchy and they anyway include only one of the three traditions that are bracketed off in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*. It thus seems likely that it was his own view that the proponents of the three *īśvarasamatā* views come at the top of the hierarchy. A remark of his in *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 58 to the effect that non-Saiddhāntikas are not able to go beyond the level of *māyātattva* is presumably also his own view. Yet not only the first of these, but also the second, contrasts with the tradition articulated in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*: as we have just seen, three groups of non-Saiddhāntikas are said there to make it above the level of *māyā*.

It is possible that Sadyojyotiḥ was constrained by scripture when he was writing the text on which the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* comments (the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*), or that Rāmakaṇṭha was constrained by scripture when writing the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*. The text on which the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* and the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* are commentary and subcommentary respectively was a part of the *Raurava* that is now lost. But we know that the placing of different religious groups in levels of the cosmos goes back at least to the *Sarvajñānottara*; perhaps it occurred in lost parts of the *Raurava*. We also have a surviving scriptural half-verse (cited in such places as Trilocanaśiva's *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, and Somaśambhu's *Kriyākāṇḍakramāvali*: see note 235) that asserts: *pāśupatās tu māyāyāṃ vidyāyāṃ tu mahāvratāḥ* | 'The Pāśupatas reach *māyā*[*tattva*], but the Mahāvratas

reach *vidyā*[*tattva*].' This accords perfectly with the hierarchy in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*; it may be part of the very scriptural passage that led to the hierarchy in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, possibly via the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*.[63]

8 The choice of these particular twenty views

Rāmakaṇṭha's *vṛtti* deals with precisely the twenty views that feature in Sadyojyotiḥ's verses. He does not add in any extra ones, though he sometimes updates Sadyojyotiḥ's account by interpreting him otherwise than intended.[64] What is distinctive about Sadyojyotiḥ's choice of these particular twenty views? There are some notable omissions, such as the Mīmāṃsakas and the Jains; the latter are included in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* and the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, and the former are included in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*. The omission of traditions such as non-dualist Śaivism, Viśiṣṭādvaita- and Dvaita- Vedānta is not surprising given that they came to prominence after Sadyojyotiḥ's time. The Kaulas and the Śaktyadvaitavādins (precisely which group of non-dualistic Śaivas is referred to with this label is not clear to us) feature in both the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* and the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*. The two just mentioned kinds of Vedānta feature in neither.

If we compare these twenty with the traditions dealt with in such doxographical texts as the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* and the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, the twenty are marked by a preponderance of theistic views, which is not surprising given Sadyojyotiḥ's theism. The theistic views, furthermore, are characterised by a notable prevalence of those belonging to the Atimārga. This fact has been commented on by SANDERSON, and taken by him as evidence for Sadyojyotiḥ's early date.[65]

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[63]For a list of passages in Śaiva scriptures that rank rival religions along a hierarchy, see SANDERSON (2009: 301, note 715).

[64]See section 2 above for Rāmakaṇṭha's decision to expound Vedānta in terms of *māyāvāda* rather than *pariṇāmavāda*.

[65]He writes: 'The second fact that fits an early date for Sadyojyotiḥ is his concern to differentiate his Mantramārgic tradition from that of the earlier Śaiva systems of the Atimārga. He does not mention them by name, but he states and rejects their doctrines of the nature of liberation in *Mokṣakārikā* 118–124b and 129c–131b, and *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 7, and 13–42' (SANDERSON 2006a: 76). The positions dealt with in the verses mentioned there are the three *īśvarasamatā* doctrines. As we have seen, the following positions may also have been put forward by Atimārgic groups: Being omniscient but lacking

The marked difference between the group of traditions that Sadyojyotiḥ puts together in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and the group dealt with in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* (the latter omits eleven of the twenty in our text, and includes eight that are not in our text) is perhaps surprising given that the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* is likely to be basing its choice on what was dealt with in the text by Sadyojyotiḥ on which it comments (the *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*).

Those traditions that Trilocanaśiva regarded as needing to be added to the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*'s group of twenty and those dealt with in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* are: 'Vaidika Pāśupatas', 'Manu etc.' and 'Jaiminīya Karmamīmāṃsakas'.

He omits two out of the group of twenty: Becoming Superior to God (11) and Becoming devoid of Impurity (12). It is possible to propose a hypothesis regarding these two omissions. In most cases there is a link between the view and the level reached: The Cārvākas cannot reach beyond the level of the material elements (*mahābhūtas*), since their ontology recognises nothing other than them. Those who hold that it is the *indriyas*, the *manas* or the *ahaṅkāra* that is conscious, go to the *tattvas* of, respectively, the *indriyas*, the *manas* and the *ahaṅkāra*. Sāṅkhyas cannot reach beyond the twenty-five tattvas recognised by them. Those who teach non-duality with *śakti* reach *śaktitattva*. This link adds plausibility to the location, avoiding a sense of arbitrariness. But in the case of the two omitted views, it is difficult to see what rationale could be taken from the teachings themselves that would not place them too high. For the Saiddhāntikas, the only souls that are completely devoid of Impurity are fully liberated. And as for being superior to God, clearly the Saiddhāntikas will not accept such a level of attainment. So perhaps it was this, combined with these two traditions' not being prominent in Trilocanaśiva's time and place, that led to his decision to leave them out.

Trilocanaśiva is not the only South Indian author to draw extensively on the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*: Śivāgrayogin paraphrases certain sections of our text in the *mokṣa* chapter of his *Śaivaparibhāṣā*; and Umāpati paraphrases parts of it in his *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* ad 4:48. Śivāgrayogin, writing in the sixteenth century,[66] treats the following traditions: those who teach

agency (8), Being an agent, yet subject to the control of God (9), Becoming superior to God (11), Becoming devoid of impurity (12), Taking on the rôle of God temporarily, then retiring to a state of indifference (13).

[66]For this date see GOODALL (2004: cxx, note 189).

that liberation is Enjoyment of *sattva* (*sattvasambhoga*), those who teach that it is the attaining of the abode of Rudra, Viṣṇu or Indra, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhyas, Cārvākas, Buddhists (he distinguishes three varieties: the 'Mādhyamikapakṣa', 'Jñānakṣaṇikavāda' and the 'Yogācāramata'), Mīmāṃsakas, Jains (he characterises their view of liberation as the manifestation of eternal pleasure, *nityasukhābhivyakti*), and the teachers of the four kinds of *īśvarasamatā*.[67] Thus it seems that in his time and place the following views were not important enough to be regarded by him as requiring treatment: Dissolution into Mahāvibhūti (4), Dissolution into *prakṛti* (5) or *ahaṅkāra* (6), Inactive omniscience (8), Omnipotence while being subject to the control of God (9), Becoming the same as the treasury of light (10), Becoming superior to God (11), Becoming devoid of Impurity (12), and Taking on the role of God before retiring to a state of indifference (13).

Umāpati, also writing probably in the sixteenth century,[68] treats the Cārvākas, Sāṅkhyas, Buddhists (he distinguishes between liberation as a stream of consciousness devoid of afflictions, *nirupaplavacittasantati*, and liberation as the annihilation of the stream of consciousness, *jñānasantativiccheda*), Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas, Jains, Illusionist Vedāntins, Pāñcarātras (he names two positions: that which Rāmakaṇṭha expounds—Dissolution into Mahāvibhūti—, and the attaining of Vaikuṇṭha), and those who teach becoming devoid of Impurity, becoming superior to God, and the four kinds of *īśvarasamatā*.

This use of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* by South Indian authors draws attention to the fact that the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* enjoyed a very different fate from that of Rāmakaṇṭha's other most philosophical text, the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*. The latter exerted virtually no influence on subsequent South Indian Śaiva Siddhānta; no South Indian manuscript of it has come to light, and it is not cited by South Indian authors.[69] The

[67] Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's Abhivyaktivāda is rejected along with the other three kinds of *īśvarasamatā* by both Śivāgrayogin and Umāpati; they belong to a slightly different branch of Śaiva Siddhānta, which emerged in the Tamil-speaking South under the influence of non-dualistic Vedānta and held liberation to consist in becoming not just qualitatively identical to Śiva, but numerically identical with him (*śivatādātmya*).

[68] For his date see GOODALL (1998: xliv, note 99 and 2000: 211, note 20) and COLAS-CHAUHAN (2008: 2, note 6).

[69] See GOODALL (1998: v, note 4). One Southern manuscript known to us transmits fragments of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* without commentary, mixed up with parts of the *Sarvamatopanyāsa*, namely the paper transcript Madras GOML MS R 16820. This could be evidence of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* having circulated by itself, but, given the widespread

Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti, by contrast, survives solely in South Indian manuscripts, is extensively paraphrased by Trilocanaśiva in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, Śivāgrayogin in the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* and Umāpati in the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, and is frequently cited by several other South Indian Śaiva authors too.[70]

practice of extracting and copying again separately the *kārikās* of a philosophical work so that they may be transmitted separately in the same bundle of leaves (cf. M^{Y}_{M}, P^{s}_{1} and P^{s}_{3}), this might be considered to be inconclusive evidence of a lost Southern manuscript of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*.

[70]For example Śālivaṭīnivāsi- Jñānaprakāśa (author of the *Pauṣkaravṛtti*) from Sri Lanka and Īśānaśivagurudeva (author of the Īśānaśivagurudevapaddhati), probably from Kerala. On the former, see GOODALL (1998: iv) and the index-entry in the present volume for Jñānaprakāśa.

Mention should perhaps also be made of the *Sarvamatopanyāsa*, an unpublished (and poorly transmitted) doxographical work in verse, perhaps largely made up of quotations, which appears to have used the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* at least for its treatment of Pāśupata views (see apparatus to the commentary on verse 17). We suppose it to be South Indian, but we know little for the moment about this text other than that a verse that appears (T. 284, p. 30) after several quotations have intervened after the colophon (*iti sarvamatopanyāsaḥ sampūrṇaḥ*, T. 284, p. 23) suggests that it was written by a certain Sarvātmaśambhu, the disciple of a certain Aghoraśiva, and that it is quoted in the sixteenth-century *Siddhāntasvapakṣadṛṣṭāntasaṅgraha* (see apparatus ad 23.7).

SOURCES AND CONVENTIONS

For all the manuscripts used here we have seen the originals, but we have used digital photographs or, in the case of the paper manuscripts in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library of the University of Madras, photocopies. For the manuscripts in Pondicherry, we were able to make use, towards the very end of the preparation of this book, of the superb new digital photographs made by a team supported by the San Marga Trust, Chennai, who in 2009 and 2010 have covered the manuscript collections of both the French Institute of Pondicherry and the Pondicherry Centre of the École française d'Extrême-Orient.

The leaves of all the palm-leaf manuscripts are pierced by two string holes. We state this once here and do not mention it in the individual descriptions.

Manuscripts of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and its commentary

Manuscripts transmitting the commentary: $M^Y A_1 P_1 P_2 P_3 M_1 M_2$
Manuscripts transmitting the *kārikā*s alone: $M_M^Y P_1^S P_3^S P_4^S M_3^S$

M^Y Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, MS P. 269.[71] The various texts in this important codex in Southern Nandināgarī script have been recorded in a somewhat confusing fashion, and with several errors, in the twelfth volume of the library's *Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts* (MALLEDEVARU 1987). The leaves measure 38cm x 5cm, according to the catalogue, and carry 10–11 lines per side. The sequence of texts, as reconstructed from MALLEDEVARU, is as follows: P. 269/1 *Tattvaprakāśa*, pp. 162–3, app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 10–11; P. 269/2 *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti* of Aghoraśiva, pp. 162–3, app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 11–12; P. 269/3 *Tattvasaṅgraha*, pp. 162–3, app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 12; P. 269/4 *Tattvasaṅgrahadīpikā* of Aghoraśiva, pp. 162–3, app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 13; P. 269/5 *Tattvatrayanirṇaya*, pp. 160–1;

[71] We are grateful to Professor Kei KATAOKA for his excellent digital photographs of this codex.

P. 269/6 *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivaraṇa* of Aghoraśiva, pp. 162–3, app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 9–10; P. 269/7 *Bhogakārikā*, pp. 172–3; P. 269/8 *Bhogakārikāvṛtti* of Aghoraśiva, pp. 172–3, app. 1 (2nd pagination), p. 38–9; P. 269/9 *Siddhāntadīpikā* of Sarvātmaśambhu, pp. 194–5, app. 1 (2nd pagination), p. 89; P. 269/10 *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*, pp. 174–5, app. 1 (2nd pagination), p. 41; P. 269/11 *Mokṣakārikā*, pp. 174–5, app. 1 (2nd pagination), p. 40; P. 269/12 *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, pp. 166–7; P. 269/13 *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, pp. 166–7, app. 1 (2nd pagination), p. 24; P. 269/14 *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* (referred to by MALLEDEVARU as *Ratnatrayodyota*), pp. 174–5, app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 41–2; P. 269/15 *Ratnatrayodyotavyākhyā*, pp. 174–5; P. 269/16 *Tattvatrayanirṇaya* (referred to by MALLEDEVARU as *Tattvanirṇaya*], pp. 162–3, app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 8–9; P. 269/17 *Bhogakārikā*, pp. 172–3, app. 1 (2nd pagination), p. 38; P. 269/18 *Mokṣakārikā*, pp. 174–5; P. 269/19 *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* (referred to as *Ratnatrayodyota*), pp. 174–5, app. 1 (2nd pagination), p. 42; P. 269/20 *Daśagranthi*, pp. 208–9, app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 124–5; P. 269/21 commentary (*Dīpikā*) of Vīraṇācārya in Kannada on *Daśagranthi*, pp. 208–9, and app. 1 (2nd pagination), pp. 124–6. P. 269/22 *Siddhāntaśikhāmaṇi*, pp. 228–9, app. 1 (2nd pagination), p. 197.

One of the several reasons why this presentation is confusing is that some texts, such as the *Bhogakārikā*, for instance, have been counted both when transmitted separately (P. 269/17) and when embedded in a commentary (P. 269/7). This means that of the above list the following texts are not really given separately in the codex: P. 269/1 (which is embedded in P. 269/2); P. 269/3 (which is embedded in P. 269/4); P. 269/6; P. 269/7; P. 269/11; P. 269/12; P. 269/14; and P. 269/20. The titles assigned to the *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* and its commentary appear to be arbitrary. It should be noted that that commentary is not in fact the well-known *Ratnatrayollekhinī* of Aghoraśiva, but an unpublished commentary of unknown authorship, some fragments of which have been published by SFERRA (2007), using this manuscript. Because of damage (SFERRA 2007:448), we do not have a final colophon, which would probably have informed us of the name and author of the commentary.

Information about the foliation in M^{Y} is also not easy to extract from MALLEDEVARU's presentation. We may note that the first half of the

Śataratnasaṅgraha (unmentioned by MALLEDEVARU) is given on f. 114 (breaking off in the middle of f. 114v, which is half blank) and that this is followed by a freshly foliated sequence of folios (1–64) giving the *Dīpikā* of Vīraṇācārya (son of Viśvanātha), namely P. 269/20 and 21. Also unidentified by MALLEDEVARU, presumably because it has no final colophon, is the separate text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* by itself (not embedded in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary) which is to be found just before this on ff. 112r–113r (f. 113v is blank). Preceding this is P. 269/19, the *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* (referred to by MALLEDEVARU as the *Ratnatrayodyota*), which breaks off in verse 99, half-way down f. 111r in the first foliation (f. 111v being left blank).

The text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* begins at the top of f. 59r and finishes in the second line of f. 71v. Although most of the manuscript is in an excellent state of preservation, several of the leaves are damaged round the edges. The writing is clear, regular and, on the whole, very accurate. This codex, whose considerable value as a source for Śaiva intellectual history has already been demonstrated by SFERRA (2007), is invaluable for the constitution of the text not just of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, but for other works of the *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa* collection,[72] the transmission of which is, with two exceptions,[73] otherwise restricted to a group of closely interrelated manuscripts from the Grantha script region. M^{Y} is an independent witness that appears not to be closely related to any of the sources from the Tamil-speaking South and we have therefore relied often on its testimony.

M^{Y}_{M} This siglum marks the readings of the *mūlapāṭha* of the *kārikās* as given on ff. 112–113 of the codex M^{Y}, described above. The readings do not always agree with those embedded in M^{Y}'s text of the commentary.

A_1 Adyar Library MS 71471. Palm-leaf (talipot). Grantha. Originally 15

[72] It has been used by FILLIOZAT (1988) for his edition of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* with Aghoraśiva's commentary, where it is assigned the siglum G, and for his edition of the *Tattvatrayanirṇaya* with Aghoraśiva's commentary (FILLIOZAT 1991), where it is assigned the siglum M.

[73] The *Tattvatrayanirṇaya*, transmitted in one Śāradā script manuscript with the commentary of Rāmakaṇṭha, for which see GOODALL, KATAOKA, ACHARYA, YOKOCHI 2008, and the *Tattvaprakāśa*, which has been transmitted independently outside the Tamil-speaking South with the commentary by the possibly Keralan author Śrīkumāra (see GENGNAGEL 1996:21–3).

leaves of this bundle, each of about 23cm x 4.5cm, transmitted the text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, namely ff. 192–206, but ff. 204 and 205 are now missing.[74] The codex has been catalogued only in the sense that the titles of several of the works that have been identified in it have appeared listed under different rubrics and followed by the shelf mark 26 F 40 on pp. 175–77 and 190 (with our text appearing at the top of p. 176) of Part II of the catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Adyar Library (T. R. CHINTAMANI 1928). Several texts appear not to have been listed, and the codex is not described. A description is now difficult, for the leaves are not correctly ordered, there is more than one sequence of old foliation (we ignore the several sequences of Arabic numbers written in blue biro in the right-hand margin of both recto and verso of the folios transmitting a number of texts of the *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa*), and that old foliation, which is given in Grantha at the bottom of the left-hand margin of each recto, is often not visible. The leaves may well not have been better ordered in 1928. It seems pointless to dwell much on the relative positions of the leaves at the time of photographing (February 2004), since these are different from their relative positions a few years earlier, when the library kindly furnished us with excellent photocopies of a large portion of the manuscript.

If our counting (from photographs covering 4 sides each) is correct, there are 272 folios in the whole codex. There are 10 to 18 lines to a side, but in the portion that most concerns us there are fairly consistently 18 lines to a side. Following the clutch of 15 labels tied to the bundle, each identifying one text, we should expect to find part of the *Mṛgendra* [(a)], part of a *Pauṣkarāgamavyākhyā* [(b)], part of the *Sarvajñānottara* (c), the *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti* (d), the *Tattvasaṅgrahaṭīkā* (e), the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* (f), the *Bhogakārikāvṛtti* (g), the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* (h), the *Nādakārikāvṛtti* (i), the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* (j), the *Ratnatrayollekhinī* (k), the *Śivayogasāra* (l), a *Siddhāntasārāvalivyākhyā* (m), a *Smṛtivacanasaṃgraha* (n) and a *Nirṇayadīkṣāvidhi* (p). The *vidyāpāda* of the *Mṛgendra* is indeed transmitted from the top of f. 1r to the bottom of f. 16r; f. 16v, which was the first folio in the

[74] This codex has been used by FILLIOZAT (1988) for his edition of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* with Aghoraśiva's commentary, where it is assigned the siglum E, and for his edition of the *Tattvatrayanirṇaya* with Aghoraśiva's commentary (FILLIOZAT 1991), where it is assigned the siglum A.

bundle at the time of photographing, gives the text of the VYOMA-VYĀPI-MANTRA. After this, the folios are disordered and foliation is often not apparent, but it is clear that there is next a text of the South Indian *Pauṣkara*, not a commentary upon it: the colophon to its 3rd chapter appears on lines 13–14 of f. 24r, to its 7th on f. 51r, and to its 8th and final chapter on f. 52v. Later in the bundle, we find the beginning only of Jñānaprakāśa's unpublished *Pauṣkaravṛtti*, which starts at the top of the recto of a folio numbered 136. This may be the only folio of what was once a separate manuscript bundle. The final (published) chapters of the *Sarvajñānottara*, making up what are today known as its *yogapāda* (chapter 27) and *vidyāpāda* (chapters 28–31), are also transmitted, but on disordered folios, distinctive for having 14 lines to a side, on which the foliation is for the most part not decipherable to us. The foliation on the folio on which the text concludes, however, is clearly legible: the last verse of the text appears at the bottom of the verso of a f. 78, followed, without a colophon, by the words *śubham astu*. The *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti* begins at the top of another f. 136r (different from the one on which the *Pauṣkaravṛtti* began), and from here onwards, although the leaves are now out of sequence, the foliation was probably continuous through the various texts of the so-called *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa* and beyond, as detailed below. On the fifth and final line of a f. 146v, we find the colophon to Aghoraśiva's *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti*. The leaf that is presumably f. 147, on which the beginning of the *Tattvasaṅgrahaṭīkā* is to be found, has lost everything to the left of its left-hand string-hole, and so no foliation is visible. We find the colophon to the *Tattvasaṅgrahaṭīkā* on the verso of a folio the numbering of which is illegible, but which is presumably f. 157, since it is followed by the beginning of the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* at the top of f. 158r. The colophon to that text ends on line 12 of f. 1[61]v, and it is followed, in line 13, by the opening verse of Aghoraśiva's *Bhogakārikāvṛtti*. The concluding verse of the *Bhogakārikāvṛtti* is visible on line 16 of f. 177r, but the rest of the leaf is broken and so the colophon is not legible, nor, therefore, is the opening of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*, which began at the top of f. 177v. Immediately after the conclusion of the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*, Aghoraśiva's *Nādakārikāvṛtti* begins in line 15 on f. [190]r; its colophon ends on line 11 of f. 192v. Transmitting the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, which begins on line 12 of f. 192v, we find the following folios: 192–200, [2]01, 20[2],[203] and 206. We seem

to be missing ff. 204–5. Immediately following the conclusion of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* at the bottom of f. 206r is the beginning of Aghoraśiva's *Ratnatrayollekhinī* at the top of f. 206v, the colophon to which appears on f. 220(?)v (out of order). On f. 221r, according to a note in the left-hand margin, begins the *Śivayogasāra*. The colophon to this, which reads simply *śivayogas samāptaḥ*, is to be found on line 15 of f. 266v, which was the leaf placed last in the bundle at the time of photographing. The unpublished commentary of Sadāśiva on Trilocanaśiva's *Siddhāntasārāvalī* begins on f. 267r, and the final colophon of that text appears on line 12 of f. 357v: *iti sadāśivācāryyakṛtau siddhāntasārāvalikriyāpādas samāptaḥ*. There is an intermediate colophon in between, on lines 11–12 of f. 293v (folio unnumbered, but between 292 and 294): *iti śrīmadvyāghrapuravāsisadāśivācāryyakṛtau siddhāntasārāvaliprakāśikāyāṃ vidyāpādaprakāśikā samāptā*.

In the left-hand margin of one of two unnumbered folios that have only 10 lines of writing to a side and that share the oddity of having three string-holes instead of two, we read the label *smṛtisaṃgraha*: this portion of text presumably corresponds to what has been referred to above as the *Smṛtivacanasaṃgraha* (n).

The scribes' obeisances are generic (*hariḥ om*, *śubham astu* and the like) and contain no clues to the provenance of the leaves making up this codex.

P_1 Uncatalogued. Pondicherry IFP 15553. Palm-leaf (palmyra). Grantha. 41 folios, beginning on f. 173r (numbered in Arabic numerals in biro in a modern hand) and ending on f. 213v, of approximately $1'5'' \times 1\frac{1}{4}''$.

There are between four and five lines of writing per side. A text of chapter 13 of the *vidyāpāda* of the *Mṛgendra* begins on f. 1r and concludes at the bottom of f. 22v. This is followed by the *Tattvaprakāśa*, which begins at the top of f. 23r and finishes in the middle of f. 27v, the remainder of which is left blank. The *Tattvasaṅgraha* begins at the top of f. 28r and ends at the bottom of f. 32r; the *Tattvatrayanirṇaya* begins at the top of f. 32v and ends in line 2 of f. 34v; it is followed immediately by the *Bhogakārikā*, which begins in line 3 of the same folio and ends in line 3 of f. 45r; the *Mokṣakārikā* begins in line 3 of f. 45r and ends at the bottom of f. 56r; the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* begins on f. 56v and ends at the top of f. 61r (the readings of these folios are

marked with the siglum P_1^s). The *Nādakārikā* begins at the top of f. 61r and ends on the 3rd (and final) line of f. 63r. F. 63v has been left blank. The *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* begins on the top of f. 64r and ends at the bottom of f. 83r. A post-colophon verse at this point reveals the name and dwelling place of the scribe: *śvetāraṇyaśivākhyena sitakānanavāsinā*[/] *ratnatrayaparīkṣā ca likhitā mokṣadāyinī*/. A prose remark to the same effect has been crossed out before this verse, and just before that we find obeisances to the Śiva of Tiruveṇkāṭu (= Śvetāraṇya/ Sitakānana/ Sitāṭavi, etc.), near Sirkazhi, and to his consort: *śrībrahmavidyāyai namaḥ*/ *śvetāṭavīśāya namaḥ*. Obeisances to the same deities are dotted through the manuscript. F. 83v is blank. The *Nādakārikāvṛtti* begins on the top of f. 84r and ends at the bottom of f. 89v. The *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* begins at the top of f. 90r and ends at the top of f. 105v, the rest of which is left blank. The *Bhogakārikāvṛtti* begins at the top of f. 106r and ends in the middle of f. 138v, the rest of which is left blank. The *Tattvasaṅgraha* begins at the top of f. 139r and ends at the top of f. 172r, the rest of which is left blank. Another post-colophon verse gives the name of the scribe's father (mentioned also on f. 90r above): *sarveśvarasya putreṇa likhitā jñānadāyinī*/ *śrītatvasaṃgrahavyākhyā śvetāraṇyeśvareṇa hi*. F. 172v is left blank. The *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* begins at the top of f. 173r and finishes at the bottom of f. 213v. The *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* begins at the top of f. 214r and ends in the middle of f. 259v, the rest of which is left blank. This last text may have been copied by another scribe, unless Aghorāstra is another name of Śvetāraṇyaśiva, for it concludes with the following post-colophon verse: *aghorāstreṇa guruṇā śvetakānanavāsinā*/ *mokṣakārikāvṛttir llikhitā suparisphuṭā*. There is no marked difference in the style of writing visible to us. The final fragmentary folio of the codex, f. 260, has some devotional verses.

As recorded in our apparatus, P_1 first skips, in its text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, from the concluding sentence of the commentary on verse 7 to the introduction to verse 21. No text is omitted, because it returns to the commentary on verse 7 after the end of the commentary on 26ab. Since this disorder is echoed in the text of the *kārikā*s given in P_1^s, which places verses 8 to 20 after verse 27b, it seems probable that the transposition took place, perhaps because of a flipped or misplaced folio, in an antecedent of P_1 in which the text

of the *kārikās* was still embedded in the text of the commentary. The disordered *kārikās* were then at some point extracted from the commentary and replaced with *pratīkas* in the line of transmission that led to P_1, and that disordered sequence of *kārikās* was transmitted to P_1^s and also to P_4^s, which might or might not have belonged to a codex that transmitted also a disordered text of the commentary.

P_1^s This siglum marks the readings of the *mūlapāṭha* of the *kārikās* as given on ff. 56v–61r of P_1, described above. In the same way as P_4^s, it has a certain number of verses out of order; but that oddly does not seem to mean that it is particularly close to P_4^s in readings: note, for instance, that it shares the widespread corruption *dṛśya* for *dravya* in $23c_1$, whereas P_4^s does not.

P_2 Uncatalogued. Pondicherry IFP 47615. Palm-leaf (palmyra). Grantha. Worm-damage is particularly heavy on the right side of many leaves. 14 lines per side. Leaves of approximately 11″ × 2″. Foliation appears in the bottom half of the left-hand margin of the recto of each folio. This is not visible, because of damage on some folios, e.g. ff. 1–3, and it is quickly out of step because two consecutive folios have been labelled "4". At the top of the left-hand margin of each recto appears the first letter of the title of the text transmitted, e.g. *ta* for *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti* and *bho* for *Bhogakārikāvṛtti*. Aghoraśiva's opening verse to his *Tattvaprakāśavṛtti* appears without preamble at the top of f. 1r. That text finishes in line 5 of f. 17v and it is followed immediately, without scribal remarks or obeisances, by the opening verse of Aghoraśiva's *Tattvasaṅgrahaṭīkā*. The colophon to that work ends on line 13 of f. 36r, and is followed, again without any intervening text, by the opening verse of Aghoraśiva's *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti*, which ends in line 2 of f. 42v. It is immediately followed by the opening verse of Aghoraśiva's *Bhogakārikāvṛtti*, whose colophon appears in line 13 of f. 67r. The end of the line is damaged, but the 14th line begins with the fifth syllable of the first verse of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*. That text ends in line 6 of f. 87r and is followed immediately by the first verse of Aghoraśiva's *Nādakārikāvṛtti*, which ends on line 6 of f. 91v, where it is immediately followed by the opening prose (*tadiyatā śivahastasya...*) of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*. Our text covers twenty-four folios and its colophon is to be found on lines 9–11 of f. 114v. It is followed by the

words *hariḥ om u śrīśivakāmasundaryai*, which suggests the possibility that the manuscript might have been written in or near Chidambaram, and then the opening verse of Aghoraśiva's *Ratnatrayollekhiṇī*. After the colophon to the *Ratnatrayollekhinī*, which ends in the fifteenth and last line of f. 146v, we may read: *aṣṭaprakaraṇaṃ samāptaṃ u hariḥ om u śrīgurubhyo* ..... This is followed by one entirely blank folio.

P_3 Uncatalogued. Pondicherry IFP 40042. Palm-leaf (palmyra). Grantha. Twelve folios of approximately $1'7'' \times 1\frac{3}{4}''$. Written with sixteen to seventeen lines to a side in a miniature hand. It is worm-eaten in places and occasionally broken, but, compared with the other South Indian sources, it is generally in excellent condition. Only *pratīka*s of the text of Sadyojyotiḥ's *kārikā*s are transmitted here embedded in the commentary, but a separate text of the *kārikā*s is given elsewhere in the same codex, for which see P_3^s below. Our text covers eight folios and commences immediately after the end of Aghoraśiva's *Nādakārikāvṛtti*, towards the end of line 6 of f. 93r in the recent foliation and continues over the folios now numbered 94–99, ending on a folio that has now been displaced and has been newly numbered 30. This enormous codex originally had no foliation, nor, in the case of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, any syllables in the margin to indicate the start of the work, but foliation has been added in the left-hand margin of each recto some time between April 2004 and February 2006.[75] The leaf that now bears the number 100 is the leaf that originally followed f. 30. Altogether there are 182 leaves, the first and last of which are blank. This vast codex is all copied in the same minute, meticulously neat hand. This manuscript was used by FILLIOZAT for its text of the *Nādakārikā* and commentary (he assigns it the siglum A) and briefly described in his introduction (1984:226) and for its text of the *Tattvasaṅgrahaṭīkā* (1988). He did not use it for his edition of the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* (1991). It was also used for the edition of the first volume of the *Kiraṇavṛtti*, where it also bore the siglum P_3, and so for a fuller description of the manuscript and a list of the numerous other works that it transmits we refer the reader to GOODALL 1998:lxxxii–lxxxiii.

[75] It is in this period, just before the foliation was added, perhaps when the leaves were being displaced, that the last leaf, "f. 30", became displaced, for it was in the correct order in photographs of 2003 and April 2004, but out of place in a set taken in February 2006, and also in the greatly superior images prepared by the San Marga Trust.

P_3^s This siglum is given to the *mūlapāṭha* of the *kārikā*s, which appear as the second text in this codex. As in the case of the last folio that transmits the commentary, the folio that covers the text of the *kārikā*s only has now also been displaced since April 2004, and it now bears the number 92 in the left-hand margin of the recto, just below the marginal indication '*paramokṣanirāsakārikā*'. The recto of the folio begins with the ten *pāda*s beginning *yāṃ sāṃkhyayogavidvāṃso...* that are attributed in the editions to the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha*, and these are followed without any identifying label or quotative *iti* by the first verse, which is numbered '3'. ('1' and '2' are written after the fourth and eighth *pāda*s respectively of the quotation.) The colophon appears on the seventh line of the verso: *iti sadyojyotikṛtā paramokṣanirāsakārikā samāptaḥ* (*sic*). This is followed immediately by the first verse of the *Nādakārikā* (the transmission of which at this point was overlooked in the above-mentioned description of this codex given in GOODALL 1998).

P_4^s Uncatalogued. Pondicherry IFP 30369. Palm-leaf (palmyra). Grantha. This bundle begins with the *mūlapāṭha* only of the works of what is now called the *aṣṭaprakaraṇa*. Our text begins in the middle of line 5 of the recto of f. 12, just after the text of the *Nādakārikā*, and this is indicated by the writing of '*paramokṣanirāsakārikā*' in the left-hand margin. The text of the *kārikā*s is preceded by the ten *pāda*s beginning *yā*[*ṃ*] *sāṃkhyayogavidvāṃso...*, which are followed by the label *iti rauravasūtraṃ*. Verse-numbering, enclosed within single *daṇḍa*s and placed so as to follow each numbered unit, is included, but this is at once out of step with ours because of the inclusion of the verses attributed to the *Raurava* and because of the omission of 2cd and 3ab. Furthermore, verses 8 to 20 have been placed after 27b, as in P_1^s (for which see the remarks on P_1 and P_1^s above). Unlike in P_1^s, here verses 21 to 27b have been copied twice, once before and once after verses 8 to 20, and the readings of P_4^s are not particularly close to those of P_1^s. This suggests that, although there is a genetic relationship between the P_1^s and P_4^s, the texts that they transmit have grown apart through subsequent conflation in the transmission of P_4^s.

M_1 Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, University of Madras, Chennai. MS R. 16818. Uncatalogued. Paper. Devanāgarī script. Com-

plete, but disordered. Out of a total of 92 sides, 57 feint-lined sides with 24 lines of writing to a side transmit the text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*. The manuscript has been copied on feint-lined sheets along with fragments of other texts, including the text of the *Nādakārikāvṛtti* of Aghoraśiva, which has been assigned, on the title-page of the bundle, the MS No. R. 16819. In other words, we have really one bundle of somewhat muddled pages that artificially bears two manuscript shelf numbers. This same title-page, as in the case of M_3^s, states that it has been 'Transcribed from the Ms. of Kunnakkudimath' and bears an accession stamp that reads: 'Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library Received 19 Jun 1962 Madras'. Like M_3^s, the text that M_1 transmits is damaged and disordered, but in this case the disorder all appears to date from the moment of copying the text, rather than largely from a muddling of the order of the copied and already numbered sheets. The text begins with five sheets whose sides are numbered 1–10, but in the fifth line from the bottom of this first p. 10 the text skips from the beginning of the commentary to verse 7 to the introductory line of commentary on 43. Other such abrupt cuts occur and are recorded in our apparatus in the appropriate places. After the first sequence of pages numbered 1–10, there follows a second section numbered 1–10, then a sequence numbered 1–11, then two further ones each numbered 1–10, then a sequence numbered 1–11. It is on p. 6 of this last sequence that the text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* ends, followed immediately by the beginning of the *Nādakārikāvṛtti*. After that follows a sequence of pages numbered 1–10 that transmits a further section of the *Nādakārikāvṛtti*, but on p. 5 of that sequence begins a large fragment of Aghoraśiva's *Ratnatrayollekhinī*. Another fragment of the same text is transmitted in the sequence of pages after that, numbered 1–9. The final set of pages, numbered 1–10, transmits a fragment from the beginning of Anantaśambhu's commentary on the *Siddhāntasārāvalī*, beginning from the middle of the commentary on *kriyāpāda* verse 7 and ending in the commentary on verse 9.

Although M_3^s and M_1 may have belonged to the same bundle, and so one might expect M_3^s to furnish the readings of the root text for someone reading the commentary transmitted in M_1, the readings of the root-text are also embedded in full in M_1's text of the commentary, which is thus the only manuscript from the Tamil-speaking South in which

the text of the *kārikās* is included in the commentary, rather than cut down to *pratīkas*. We may note also that, although there appears to be a close relationship between the texts of P_3^s (which furnishes a separate text of the *kārikās* in the same manuscript as P_3) and M_3^s, there does not seem to be a close relationship between P_3 and M_1.

M_2 Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, University of Madras, Chennai. MS R. 14727. Uncatalogued. Paper. Devanāgarī script. Complete. 41 sides (not counting the title-sheet) of feint-lined paper numbered 1–41 with 24 lines to a side. The title-sheet records that the manuscript was 'copieerd' (sic) 'by E. S. Srinivasaraghavan 30-4-1955' and gives the following sequence of numbers and letters: 'R.C. 1025/50' and then 'B. No. 50 g'. It also places the letter "g." before the title of the text, as though this were the seventh text to be copied from one bundle. This suspicion receives some support from GOML MS R. 14466, an uncatalogued paper manuscript copied by a certain G. Subramanyan in October and November of the previous year, 1954, transmitting Rāmakaṇṭha's *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*, for on the first page of that manuscript we read 'R.C. 1025/52(F)'. Neither of these transcriptions gives information about the provenance of the exemplar, and it seems therefore conceivable that that exemplar should have been an untraced palm-leaf manuscript held in the library of the GOML. In the margins of M_2 we find what seem to be references to the folios of the exemplar, beginning with '67A', written in the left-hand margin beside line 4 of p. 1. At the bottom of p. 41 we read again that the text was copied by E. S. Srinivasaraghavan, but with the date given as '9-5-1955', presumably the date of completion, and that the text was 'compared' (presumably checked against the exemplar) first by D. K. M. Subrahmanyasastri and second by E. S. Srinivasaraghavan. The text of M_2 appears very often, as we shall see below, to agree in error with that of A_1, but it does not appear to be directly descended from it, not only because the folio numbers recorded in the margins of M_2 do not correspond to those in A_1, but also because we see numerous instances in M_2 where syllables are recorded as being missing or illegible and where the corresponding text in A_1 is clearly legible. Like the Grantha-script manuscripts, M_2 gives *pratīkas* for the *kārikās* rather than giving them in full.

M_3^s Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, University of Madras, Chen-

nai. MS R. 16833. Uncatalogued. Paper. Devanāgarī script. Complete. Out of a total of 30 sides in the bundle, 7 sides with 24 lines of writing to a side transmit the text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*. The manuscript is part of a set of feint-lined sheets on which have been copied five texts belonging to what has become known as the *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa*, each assigned a different manuscript number: *Bhogakārikā* (R 16831), *Mokṣakārikā* (R 16832), *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* (R 16833), *Nādakārikā* (R 16834), and *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* (R 16835). The title sheet at the beginning bears the library's accession stamp dated, like that of M_1, to 19th June 1962 and states that the texts have been 'Transcribed from the Ms. of Kunnakkudimath'. It seems probable that this bundle of texts was copied from the same manuscript as M_1's text of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*. The pages transmitting these various texts have been shuffled and renumbered, so that p. 1, transmitting the two and a half verses attributed to the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* on which the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* is purported to be a commentary, have become separated by other sheets from pp. 2–3, which transmit the first verses of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, and pp. 4–7 are dispersed, each separated from its fellows, across the bundle. The verses of the text (1–59) have been sporadically numbered, but starting with 3 and ending with 62, because the two and a half verse of the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* have been assigned the numbers 1 and 2. The text transmitted is close to that of P_3^s, since it shares omissions (e.g. in 28c) but cannot have been copied from P_3^s, since it sometimes marks gaps when the text of P_3^s is still legible (e.g. in 24cd).

Previous editions

E_D The first of two editions of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, this was prepared, as the title-page informs us, by Nā. Kṛṣṇaśāstrin of the Śivāgamasiddhāntaparipālanasaṅgha and printed, along with the *Ratnatrayollekhinī*, *Bhogakārikāvṛtti*, *Nādakārikāvṛtti*, and *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*, at the Vāṇīvilāsa press in Śrīraṅgam in 1925. No description of manuscripts is given, but three people are thanked on p. 4 of the preface for having furnished manuscripts that were used: Kalyāṇaśivācārya, a resident of the Agrahāra at Kīvalūr (presumably the town of this

name in Nagapattinam district), Vaidyanāthaśivācārya, the head of the Śivāgamapāṭhaśālā in Māyūrapurī (presumably Mayilāṭuturai /Mayiladuthurai, again in Nagapattinam district), and a certain Muttukkumāradeśikavarya. It is not clear from the above how many manuscripts these three individuals furnished, nor whether all the manuscripts that they provided transmitted all the texts edited in the volume. But combining this with information from p. 7 of the preface to the earlier volume of texts of the *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa*, published in 1923, we learn that Kalyāṇaśivācārya provided one palm-leaf manuscript, that Vaidyanāthaśivācārya provided one paper manuscript, and that Madhurāntakam Subrahmaṇyaśivācārya and Bhānupurādhīna-Muttukumāradeśikavarya contributed manuscripts transmitting one or two of the books of the collection.[76] Presumably, then, Kalyāṇaśivācārya's and Vaidyanāthaśivācārya's manuscripts each transmitted all eight works with commentaries, whereas what Madhurāntakam Subrahmaṇyaśivācārya contributed did not transmit the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, since he is not mentioned in the preface of 1925. Assuming that Muttu(k)kumāradeśikavarya (the qualification Bhānupurādhīna- perhaps means that he belonged to the Śaiva maṭha at the village now known as Suryanar Koyil, in Thiruvidaimaruthur Taluk) contributed one manuscript that transmitted the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, we may conclude that this edition was probably based upon three manuscripts from just one region of the Grantha-script area, that of the Kaveri delta.

We do not know whether any of the manuscripts used for this first edition are among the manuscripts that we have consulted, but we think it unlikely.

E_V This second edition of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, printed in 1988 in a volume containing the other works of the so-called *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa*, is not based upon fresh manuscript evidence. The editor, Vrajavallabha Dvivedi, has reproduced the text of E_D with some corrections and has supplied several useful indices.

E This siglum marks the agreement of both the editions.

[76] Unfortunately we are not told how many manuscripts were contributed by the latter two: *tathā prakaraṇāṣṭakamadhye dvitrāṇāṃ prakaraṇānām madhurāntakaṃ subrahmaṇyaśivācāryāḥ, tathā bhānupurādhīna-muttukumāradeśikavaryāś copakṛtavantaḥ.*

Σ This siglum marks the agreement of all sources except one.

Remarks on the relationships between the manuscripts

The surviving manuscripts that transmit the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* can be divided into two groups, the first having only one member, the Mysore manuscript in Nandināgarī script (M^{Y}), and the second containing all the Grantha-script manuscripts ($A_1P_1P_2P_3$) and the recent Devanāgarī-script manuscripts that have been copied from Grantha-script exemplars (M_1M_2). One manuscript of this latter group is known to us that has not been collated, and that is a fragmentary Grantha-script palm-leaf manuscript kept in the Maṭha in Dharmapuram: we are grateful to the Maṭha for having granted us permission to photograph the codex in July 2004. We can discern in its broken, age-blackened folios portions of the texts of the *Bhogakārikāvṛtti*, *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti*, *Ratnatrayollekhinī*, *Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, but the work of ordering its marginless and therefore unnumbered fragments and then recording not just its readings but its many, many lacunae seemed to us not to be commensurate with the benefits that would be gained from doing so.

The close interrelatedness of the Grantha sources is suspected throughout, but only rather few pieces of compelling evidence demonstrate it clearly. One is the garbling of the quotation *tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvaṃ tasya bhāsā sarvam idam anubhāti* in § 3.15.2.4. The tag is well-known in its own right, and appears to be quoted without variation in, for instance, the *Brahmasiddhi*, the *Bhāmatī* and by Rāmakaṇṭha himself in the *Kiraṇavṛtti*. Among our manuscripts, only M^{Y} gives the correct text here—correct, that is, except for a trivial corruption (*bhrāntam* for *bhāntam*). This reflects, in a nutshell, our overall picture of the manuscript relations: M^{Y}'s text is, on the whole, markedly better than that of our other sources, which are all from the Grantha-script area, and those Grantha-script sources form one related group. Their relationships are difficult to determine: they may all be descended from a single witness, but it seems likely that conflation between the lines of transmission has produced some shared corruptions.

Among the Grantha-script sources, there is plentiful evidence of a relationship between A_1M_2: see, for example, their shared omission of a portion of commentary ad 10cd and of lines 21.1–2 and compare their corrupt readings in, for instance, 4.63–5, 4.88, 4.92, 4.112. We can see, however, that, if this relationship is to be accounted for by the paper manuscript M_2 hav-

ing descended from the older palm-leaf manuscript A_1, it must have done so through at least one intermediary, since there are places where A_1's text is plainly legible and the scribe of M_2 records a lacuna in his exemplar (e.g. in 4.108–9, 4.119–20). There are also instances where corruptions in A_1 have not found there way into M_2 (e.g. in 5.10), which might be evidence either that M_2's text, if it derives from A_1, was afterwards conflated with that of another another source, or that A_1 and M_2 are both descendants from another witness.

There is also evidence of a fairly close relationship between P_2 and P_3, at least in the second half of the text (e.g. small shared errors in 32.2, 41.5, 43.36–7, 43.52, 43.83–84, 44.6, 48.11, 48.62, 49.72, 53.9 and the omission of a *pratīka* for 30cd). At the very end of the text, there are a few places in which, where speeches are introduced with the formula *...ity āha* in other sources, P_2P_3 share *...ity atrāha* (introducing verse 50 and 58b) or *ity ata āha* (introducing verse 52 and 57cd and in 53.2 and 53.5). But even where they appear to be related, it is clear that neither is the apograph of the other (one clear example may serve to illustrate this: the *avatārikā* to verse 51, where the text of P_2 is clearly legible, and yet we find a marked lacuna in P_3).

Dotted across the length of the text we find occasional minor errors shared between P_1 and P_2; but these are all trivial and fit the pattern of the kinds of errors that tend to crop up independently in Grantha-script manuscripts, for instance the omission of a *visarga* (or sibilant) before a sibilant (in 4.118, 9.5), shortening of a final long *ī* in 12.2 (short and long *i* being often graphically difficult to distinguish in Grantha), *°kauśalyaṃ* for *°kauśalam* in 31.7, the (involuntary?) addition of a *visarga* before the conjunct *pra* in 36.11, forgetting an *anusvāra* in 43.60, writing *sarvadeva* for *sarvadaiva* in 46.14, confusion of *ma* and *m* (or *anusvāra*) in 46.88 (*m* and *ma* are in some contexts and in some hands indistinguishable in Grantha), and writing *°ddhṛvo* for *°dhruvo* in 52.1 (cf. P_4^s's reading in 52d). Only a couple of shared errors could perhaps be considered conjunctive: the addition of a particle *ca* in 12.4 and an eyeskip that shortens the confusing sequence of letters *sarveṣām anātmanām ātmanāṃ ca* in 48.70. In short, there is some agreement in error between P_1 and P_2, but not enough to build a case for their being closely related. For similar faint, but uncompelling agreement in error might be found between other pairs, such as between P_1 and M_1, which share, for instance, such slips as *gṛhiṣyatīti* for *grahiṣyatīti* (a trivial error typical of Grantha sources) in 48.54 and *muktāv ajñāna°* (for *muktau jñāna°*) in 47.1–2, or between A_1 and P_2; but we do not see grounds for proposing any further sub-grouping among

the Grantha-script sources, other than the sub-group that includes A_1 and M_2.

Having spoken of the two groups—M^Y on the one hand and the Grantha-script-area sources on the other—, we should emphasise that there are places where all the sources seem to us to share corruption, and that there are occasional signs that might be taken to indicate that M^Y too may descend from a Grantha-script witness (in 4.68, for instance, a corruption of M^Y involves a confusion of *ya* and *dha*, two letters that are very commonly confused in Grantha script). The corruptions shared by all sources may sometimes be trivial (e.g. 12.13), and might in some cases have arisen independently (e.g. *°pravṛtter iti* for *°pravṛttir iti* in 10.45–6); but we have in a few passages diagnosed major shared corruptions that suggest that the surviving witnesses all derive from one hyparchetype: see, for example, 43.70–72, in which we have supplied what appear to be missing lines of text from a parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, and 43.73, 43.78–9, 43.82, 46.49–50 (again all repaired on the basis of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*).

The following rough schematic diagram represents the relationships between the sources that transmit the commentary as we see them:



After presenting what looks like a stemma, we should state at once that the considerations mentioned above about the transmission of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*—conflation and the fact that all our manuscripts probably descend from a single imperfect witness—precluded attempting to reconstruct a plausible text by applying some rigid notion of a stemmatic method.[77] In preparing our edition, we naturally began by transcribing E_V and gradually

[77]For further remarks on the difficulty of arriving at a plausible text transmitted by eclectic South Indian witnesses in a mechanistic fashion from a stemma, see GOODALL 1998:cxiv.

collated the other sources. In an ideal world, we might have collated all the sources before beginning to study and discuss them together, but this we could not do. (Collation is a time-consuming and tiring business requiring concentration, and it can be counterproductive to rush it.) We were from the first aware that M^{Y}'s text was of special importance, partly because we had seen something of its significance for establishing the text of the *Bhogakārikāvṛtti* when studying parts of Fabio Boccio's edition in progress of the commentary on the first 65 verses of that text. We therefore collated the whole of M^{Y} first and relied often on its testimony rather than on that of the others when we had no other criteria for making a choice between readings. As our apparatus reveals, we also drew on testimonia from later works, such as the *Śivajñānabodhavṛtti* of Jñānaprakāśa, and on parallels in Rāmakaṇṭha's other commentaries, most particularly the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*.

On every page we think that we have been able to improve in some detail or the other upon the text furnished by the previous editions, and in some places the improvements are obvious and considerable (three omitted lines from the end of §3.15.2.3 and the beginnings of paragraphs §3.15.2.1.1 and §3.15.2.4 have been restored, for example, as well as part of a *kārikā*: 56ef).

As for the manuscripts that transmit only Sadyojyotiḥ's *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, we suspect that they are all texts extracted from sources with a commentary and that none descends from an independent witness unconnected to Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary. In most cases they are still in bundles that also transmit the commentary, and it is probable that the ones that are not now in such bundles ($P_3^s M_3^s$) once were. We can discern some relationships between them, particularly between P_1^s and P_4^s and between P_3^s and M_3^s (see the descriptions of P_1^s, P_4^s and M_3^s above), but we have not attempted to construct a tree of relationships, which would have seemed both too sketchy to be worthwhile and too little useful. For in selecting readings in our text of the *kārikā*s we have been guided principally by the imperative to find a reading that most plausibly fits Rāmakaṇṭha's comments. Since Rāmakaṇṭha typically does not comment on each word, this is often not obvious. An edition of Sadyojyotiḥ's text as it might have been before Rāmakaṇṭha commented upon it—rather hard to construct now from the materials at our disposal— might have looked rather different, as we will have occasion to remark from time to time in our annotation.

Conventions in the Apparatus

The critical apparatus is divided into four registers:

- The bottom and fullest register reports the variants from the *textus criticus* of Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary. Each entry is preceded by paragraph and line number and followed by a lemma sign:]. There follow the sigla of the witnesses which read as printed. Finally the variants are reported, followed by the sigla of the witnesses that give them and separated from one another by semicolons. A siglum with superscript *ac* (ante correctionem) marks readings of a manuscript before alteration (e.g. P_3^{ac}), and a siglum with a superscript *pc* marks readings of a manuscript as altered (e.g. $P^{pc}{}_3$). The siglum Σ is used to mark readings that are shared by all except a single witness or group of witnesses that can be represented by a single siglum. A single illegible syllable is signified in the apparatus with an anceps symbol: ≍. Where the scribe has marked a syllable as illegible to him, this is represented in the apparatus with a raised dash (˙), in imitation of a convention often used in Devanāgarī manuscripts. In some places gaps have been left in the manuscripts and these are signified with a ␣. Where damage to the manuscript prevents us from reading some letters, the lacuna is signalled with an interrupted line: ---. A siglum with superscript *vl* (*varia lectio*) marks a reading labelled in the manuscript itself as a *pāṭhāntara*. Text in the apparatus bracketed by × ...× has been cancelled. Small repairs to the text are marked *em*[*endation*]; bolder conjectures are marked *conj*[*ecture*]. (The difference is of course subjective.)

- The register which reports the readings of the verses appears at the top of the apparatus. The readings are presented in much the same way as in the bottom register, but they are preceded by the verse number and a letter to indicate to which *pāda* they belong. A spot (•) separates different entries within the same *pāda*. Unfortunately, this register of the apparatus in fact has to record not only the readings of the verses given in the sources, but also often their position in those sources. For the manuscripts that transmit the verses only, this is generally not problematic, for the verses normally follow one another in the expected fashion. In a manuscript that transmits the commentary, however, a verse or fragment of a verse may appear exactly where it

appears in our edition, or it may be replaced with a short *pratīka* (typically the opening syllables followed by an *iti*), or it may be replaced by the *pratīka* but also given in full next to the previous or following unit of Sadyojyotiḥ's text. These differing practices are discussed with respect to the *Kiraṇavṛtti* in GOODALL 1998:cxxiv–cxxv, who observes that it seems likely that it was Rāmakaṇṭha's practice to cut up and embed in his commentary the text on which he was commenting. It is probably in the course of transmission in South India that these embedded units of text were lifted out, gathered into a separate *mūlapāṭha* (such as P_1^s, P_3^s), and replaced in the commentary with *pratīka*s. Some slips in this process were of course inevitable. Returning to the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, although M^Y and M_2 have the text embedded in the commentary, there are signs (units of text in the wrong places) that it may have been reintegrated on the basis of *pratīka*s. The others ($A_1P_1P_1P_3M_2$) generally have *pratīka*s instead, but some units of text have not been replaced by *pratīka*s. Reporting all this complexity in a manner that is consistent seemed less important to us than reporting it in a manner that is intelligible. Nonetheless, this register of apparatus is not always easy to read.

- Where lacunae are reported, these appear in the second register of apparatus.

- The register second from the bottom, when it appears, identifies quotations in the commentary, reports testimonia and locates passages from other works or references forward and back.

We have attempted to reproduce the fragments of text in the lemmata exactly as they are printed in the *textus receptus* and the apparatus is fully positive.[78]

The punctuation of the manuscripts has not been reported because it seemed rarely helpful and in those rare instances this might have been due to chance. Instances of gemination and degemination of consonants in ligature with semivowels (e.g. *dharmma* and *tatva*) have been ignored, as have uses of a retroflex *ḷ* in certain words in place of a non-retroflex *l*. Such divergences are reported when they occur within variant readings (at least in those variants

[78] A defence of a fully positive apparatus in an edition of a Sanskrit work seems less necessary today than it did fifteen years ago, but for those who should wish to be convinced, a short defence may be found, for instance, here: GOODALL 1998:cxxi.

which deviate from the *textus receptus* in more than that they contain such variant orthographies), but they are silently ignored in a lemma.

Conventions in the Translation

As mentioned in the preface, our translation is both relatively literal and heavily annotated and so, in the main, needs little explanation; but there are a few points worth signalling. The first two are structural ones. First, the numbered paragraphing in the translation follows the numbered paragraphing of the Sanskrit edition. This enables us to point at the same time to a unit of text in the edition and to the corresponding passage in our English translation by the use of one number preceded either by 'section' or by '§'. Second, the translations of portions of Sadyojyotiḥ's root-text appear indented and prefaced by the number of the verse (or fragment of a verse) translated.

Regarding brackets: square brackets are used to enclose matter that is not explicit in the Sanskrit and that an English reader may require or expect, but that a Sanskritist reader of the original might reasonably regard as being expressed implicitly; round brackets enclose Sanskrit expressions, often retaining inflections, in cases where it may be useful to remind readers of exactly which element in the Sanskrit has just been translated.

Two further typographical conventions should be noted. We have tried never to leave a particle untranslated. However in certain cases the emphatic function of *eva* is best rendered in English merely by tone of voice; to render it in other ways would be to overtranslate, resulting in a sentence that would be at best ugly and at worst inaccurate. In a few such instances we have italicised the word that is emphasised. Finally, when Rāmakaṇṭha repeats in his commentary a word from the root-text—which he either glosses or embeds in a sentence that clarifies the meaning of the verse—the translation of that word is printed in bold italics. The purpose of this convention is to make it easier to see how precisely the commentary reflects the syntax and the meaning of the verse.

रौरववृत्तिविवेके
भट्टरामकण्ठविरचिता
परमोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तिः

[१ उपोद्घातः]

तदियता शिवहस्तस्य प्राधान्यं प्रतिपाद्याधुना दीक्षाफलस्य वक्ष्यमाणस्य तावद्व्यतिरेकेण समानासमानतन्त्रान्तरगीतानि फलानि दर्शयितुम्

यां सांख्ययोगविद्वांसो गतिं मोहात् प्रपेदिरे।
वेदान्तज्ञानविद्वांसो गतिमिच्छन्ति वैदिकीम्॥

0.3 प्राधान्यं प्रति°] — P_2

0.5–7. यां सांख्ययोगविद्वांसो ···मोक्षवादिनः Not traced in the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha*. A sixth half-line that completes the construction is given when the passage is quoted in Madhyārjuna's *Siddhāntadīpikā* (see annotation to translation): सर्वेषां कुगतिर्ज्ञेया; तथ्यमीश्वरभाषितम्

0.3 तदियता ··· फलानि दर्शयितुम्] in E this introduction is placed after the two-and-a-half-verse quotation attributed to the *Raurava*, and followed, as in P_4^s, with: इति रौरवसूत्रम् 0.3 तदियता शिवहस्तस्य] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; तंदीयता शिवहस्तस्य A_1; तदियता शिवहीकारस्य M_1 0.3 °पाद्याधुना] Σ; °पद्याधुना A_1 0.3 वक्ष्यमाणस्य] $M^{\gamma}M_1^{ac}$; प्रामाण्यस्य A_1; प्रमाणस्य $P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; प्रक्ष्यमाणस्य M_1^{pc} 0.4 तावद्व्यति°] Σ; तावद्व्यक्ति° A_1 0.4 समानासमानतन्त्रान्तरगीतानि] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_1^{pc}E$: समनास-मानतत्रान्तरगीतानि P_1; समानासमानतन्त्रगीतानि M_1^{ac}; सम ⊔ मानतन्त्रान्तरगीतानि M_2 0.4 दर्शयितुम्] $M^{\gamma}M_1$; दर्शयितुं यां सांख्ययोगविद्वांस $A_1P_2P_3E$; दर्शयितु -- योगविद्वांस P_1; दर्शयितुं यां सांख्ययोगव्यवच्छेदेनापवर्गकारणमतः सदिति विद्वांस M_2 0.5 यां सांख्ययोगविद्वांसो ··· मोक्षवादिनः] As recorded above, these half-lines are placed at the very beginning of the work in E; they also begin the text of $P_1^sP_3^s$ $P_4^sM_3^s$; *om.* $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 0.5 यां] $M^{\gamma}P_1^sP_3^sM_1M_3^sE$; या P_4^s 0.6 वैदिकीम्] $M^{\gamma}P_1^sP_4^sM_1M_3^sE$; वै(?)दिकम् P_3^s

पाञ्चरात्ररता ये च ये च योगिमहेश्वराः।
प्रमाणाग्नेयकर्तृत्वविशिखामलकारकाः॥
प्रवदन्ति मलासिद्धा ये चान्ये मोक्षवादिनः। 9

इति सार्धसूत्रद्वयस्य कारिकाभिरर्थमाह—

सत्संस्कारस्य यस्येदमङ्गजातं निरूपितम्।
तत्फलव्यतिरेकेण यदुक्तफलवर्णनम्॥ १॥

यस्य शिवहस्तादीन्यङ्गान्युक्तपूर्वाणि, तस्य संस्कारस्यायोगान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदेनापवर्गकारणत्वतः सदिति विशेषितस्य दीक्षाख्यस्य यत् फलं वक्ष्यमाणमशेषबन्धनिवृत्तौ स्वगुणसर्वज्ञत्वाद्यभिव्यक्तिः, तद्भेदेन तन्त्रान्तरगीतानि फलानि वर्ण्यन्ते। फलभेदकथनप्रयोजनं च वक्ष्यत्युपसंहारे 'तत्साधनेषु' (५९) इत्यादिना॥ 3

[२ तन्त्रान्तरगीतफलवर्णनम्] 6

तत्र क्रमेण तान्युद्दिशति

1.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; सत्संस्कारस्येत्यादि A_1; +सत्+संस्कारेत्यादि P_1; सत्संस्कारेत्यादि P_2P_3; यत्संस्कारस्येत्यादि M_2 1 a. सत्संस्कारस्य यस्येदम्] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}E$; सत्सं ⊔ रस्येदम् M^{S}_{3} 1 c. तत्फलव्यतिरेकेण] *conj.*; तत्फलव्यतिरेकाय $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}E$; तत्फलं व्यतिरेकाय $P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$ 1 d. यदुक्तफलवर्णनम्] *conj.*; यत्तूक्तं फलवर्णनम् M^{Y}; य त्तू(?) क्त फ ल व ण न M^{Y}_{M} (tops missing); यदुक्तम् फलवर्णिनाम् $P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}M^{S}_{3}$; यदुक्तं फलवर्णनम् $P^{S}_{4}M_{1}E$

1.3 °ज्ञत्वाद्यभिव्यक्तिः] °ज्ञत्व— क्तिस् P_1

0.7 °महेश्वराः] $M^{Y}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; °महेश्वरः P^{S}_{3} 0.9 मलासिद्धा ये चान्ये] M_1E; महासिद्धा ये चान्ये $M^{Y}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}M^{Sc}_{3}$; महासिद्धा योग ⊔ न्ये P^{S}_{3}; महासिद्धा यो शान्ये M^{Sc}_{3} 0.10 इति] $M^{Y}M_1$; इत्यादेः $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; इत्यादौस् P_1; इति रौरवसूत्रं P^{S}_{4} 0.10 °सूत्रद्वयस्य] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °सूत्रद्वय P_1; °स्सूत्रद्वयस्य P_2 1.1 °न्यङ्गान्युक्तपूर्वाणि] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; °न्यंगानीन्युक्तपूर्वाणि P_2; °न्यङ्गानि दत्तपूर्वाणि E 1.1 संस्कारस्यायोगान्ययोग°] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; संस्कार — ग° P_1; संस्कारस्य योगायोग° P_2 1.2 °पवर्गकारणत्वतः सदिति] Σ; °पवर्गाय कारण × ात्सदिति× त्वतस्सदिति P_1 1.3 स्वगुण°] Σ; सगुण° A_1 1.3 तन्त्रान्तर°] Σ; तत्रान्तर° P_2 1.4 °कथन°] Σ; °कथरं P_2 1.7 क्रमेण तान्युद्दिशति] $M^{Y}A_1M_1M_2$; क्रमे— द्दिशति P_1; क्रमेण तान्युद्दिश ≃ P_2; क्रमेण तान्युद्दिशन्ति P_3; क्रमेण तानुद्दिशति E

कैवल्यं सत्त्वसम्भोगो विलयः परमात्मनि।
अव्याकृतादिष्ववर्वाक् च लय एव विकारिषु॥ २॥
महागणो महेशस्य अकर्ता सर्ववेद्यवित्।
कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वं समत्वं तेजसां निधेः॥ ३॥
आधिक्यं परमेशानान्निर्मलत्वं च केवलम्।

[२.१ कैवल्यम्]

कैवल्यमिति। गुणत्रयलक्षणप्रकृतिसम्बन्धो ह्यकेवलताहेतुरात्मनः। स च न सम्बन्धमात्रम्, तयोर्व्यापकत्वात्, आत्मनः कैवल्यावस्थायामपि तस्य
3 भावात्तथात्वानुपपत्तेः। अपि तु भोक्तृभोग्यरूपो ऽनादिस्तदविवेकप्रतिपत्त्यात्मकः, प्रत्ययाविवेकरूपत्वाद्भोक्तृभावस्य। यदाहुः 'प्रत्ययाविशेषो भोगः'

2.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; कैवल्यमित्यादि $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$ 2a. सत्त्वसम्भोगो] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}E$; सत्यसंभे ⊔ M_{1} 2cd.] *om.* P^{S}_{4} 2c. °दिष्ववर्वाक् च] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}$; °दिष्ववर्वाग्वा $P^{S}_{1}M_{1}$; °दिष्ववर्ग्व $P^{S}_{3}M^{S}_{3}$; °दिष्ववर्वाक्कं E 3ab.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; *om.* $P_{1}P_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{2}$ 3b. अकर्ता] *conj.* (see *pratīka* in commentary below); त्वकर्ता सर्ववेद्यवित् $M^{Y}P^{S}_{1}M_{1}E$; ह्यकर्ता सर्ववेद्यवित् M^{Y}_{M}; त्वकर्ता सर्वेद्यवित् $P^{S}_{3}M^{S}_{3}$(unmetrical) 3cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; *om.* $P_{1}P_{3}M_{2}$ 4ab. आधिक्यं परमेशानान्निर्मलत्वं च केवलम्] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; *om.* $P_{1}P_{3}M_{2}$; आधिक्यम् परमेशानम् निर्म्मलत्वञ्च केवलम् P^{S}_{1}

2.2 E give only verse 2 at this point. $M^{Y}M_{1}$ continue with the root text here: M_{1} gives up to and including 5cd; M^{Y} gives up to 7. Judging from the way subsequent *pratīkas* are embedded in the commentary, we have decided to give up to 4b at this point. 4.4 °त्वाद्भोक्तृभावस्य] °त्व—स्य P_{1}

4.4 सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासंकीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भोगः *Yogasūtra* 3.35.

4.1 कैवल्यमिति] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E_{D}$; *om.* $P_{1}E_{V}$ 4.1 °त्मनः] Σ; °त्मन A_{1} 4.2 न सम्बन्धमात्रम्] Σ; स्संबन्धमारत्रन् P_{2} 4.2 तयोर्व्यापकत्वात्, आत्मनः] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{3}M_{1}E$; तयोर्व्य— P_{1}; तयोर्व्यापकत्वात्मनः $P_{2}M_{2}$ 4.2 कैवल्यावस्थायामपि] Σ; कैवल्यस्था— P_{2} 4.3 तथात्वानुप°] Σ; तथानुप° A_{1} 4.3 °रूपो ऽनादिस्तद°] Σ; °रूपन्नादिसद° P_{2} 4.3–4 °विवेकप्रतिपत्त्यात्मकः, प्रत्ययाविवेकरूप°] $A_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; °विवेकरूप° M^{Y}(eyeskip); °विवेकप्रतिपद्यात्मकः प्रत्ययाविवेकरूप° P_{1}; °विचेकप्रतिपत्या ⌣ ⌣प्रत्ययाविवेकरूप° P_{2} 4.4 °विशेषो भोगः' इति] *conj. Bhat*; °विवेको भोग इति $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{2}M_{2}E$; °विवेको भो+ग+ इति P_{1}; °विवेको भो ⊔ M_{1}

इति। प्रकृतिर्ह्यात्मानं भोग्यत्वेन समर्पयन्त्यपि पुंसस्तमःसामर्थ्योपार्जितक्लेशभूताविद्यास्मितादिशक्तियोगेन तथा समर्पयति विदग्धवेश्यावत्, न यथा तद्विकारविशेषेषु तस्य हेयत्वबुद्धिरुपजायते, अन्यथा तदतिरिक्तबन्धासिद्धेर्भोगायोगात् संसाराभावप्रसङ्गात्। स एव च संसारः कैवल्यप्रतिपक्षभूतः प्रोच्यते।

यदा त्वात्मज्ञानाद्योगाद्वा तस्मात्प्रत्ययात्पुंसः स्वरूपेण भास्वरेणानन्यरूषितेन विवेकः प्रकाशते, तदानीं तेनाविवेकस्य प्रतिपक्षतयैवापध्वंसितत्वात्तदात्मकस्यापि संसारस्य तं प्रत्यनुदयात्सर्वात्मना प्रकृतेर्भोग्यत्वनिवृत्तौ तस्य परं कैवल्यं मुक्तिरिति तच्छास्त्रवित्प्रवराः।

[२.२ सत्त्वसम्भोगः]

फलान्तरमाह सत्त्वसम्भोग इति। अनादिरेव प्रकृतिसम्बन्धः। पुरुषो भोक्तृ-

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4.6 °योगेन] — P_1 4.13 °निवृत्तौ तस्य] °निवृ— P_1 4.15 सत्त्वसम्भोग] स— भोग P_2

4.5 प्रकृतिर्ह्यात्मानं] Σ; प्रकृतिसात्मानं M_2 4.5 समर्पयन्त्यपि] Σ; समर्पयत्यपि M_2 4.6 समर्पयति] M^{γ}; समर्पयन्ति $A_1P_1P_2M_2$; समर्प्पन्ति P_3; सर्मयन्ति M_1; समर्पयन्ती E 4.6 विदग्धवेश्यावत्, न] Σ; विदग्धवेश्यादि M_2 4.7 तद्विकारविशेषेषु] Σ; तद्विकारशेषेषु E 4.7 हेयत्वबुद्धिरुपजायते] Σ; हेयत्वबुद्धिरूपं जायते M_2 4.7–8 तदतिरिक्तबन्धासिद्धेर्भोगायोगात्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2M_1E$; तदिरिक्तबन्धासिद्धेर्भोगायोगात् P_3; तदतिरिक्तबद्धासिद्धे भोगायोगात् M_2 4.8 संसाराभावप्रसङ्गात्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2^{pc}M_2$; स—वप्रसंगात् P_1; संसारभावप्रसंगात् P_2^{ac}; संस्काराभावप्रसङ्गात् P_3M_1E 4.8 च संसारः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2M_2$; च संस्क+ा+रः P_1; संसारः P_3; च संस्कारः M_1E 4.9 प्रोच्यते] Σ; ⊔ ते M_1 4.10 यदा त्वात्मज्ञानाद्योगाद्वा] $M^{\gamma}A_1^cP_1M_1E$; यदा×त्म× +त्व+ात्मज्ञानाद्योगाद्वा A_1; यदा त्वात्मज्ञानायोगाद्वा P_2; यदा त्वात्मजानाद्यो ⊔ द्वा P_3; यद त्वात्मज्ञानाद्ययोगाद्वा M_2 4.10 प्रत्ययात्पुंसः] M^{γ}; पुंसः A_1M_2E; पुंस $P_1P_2P_3M_1$ 4.10 स्वरूपेण] Σ; स्वस्वरूपेण M^{γ} 4.10–11 भास्वरेणानन्यरूषितेन] $A_1^cP_2^{pc}M_1E$; भास्वरेणान्योन्यारूपितेन M^{γ}; भास्वरेण×भास्वरेण× ानन्यरूषितेन A_1; भास्वरेणानन्यरूषिते— P_1; (भास्वरेण) भास्वरेणानन्यरूषिते (त P_2^{ac}) P_2; भास्वरेणान्यरूषितेन P_3; भास्वरेण नान्यरूषितेन M_2 4.11 विवेकः प्रकाशते] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; — प्रकाशते P_1; विवेकः प्रकाशिते M_1 4.11–12 °तयैवापध्वंसितत्वात्तदात्मकस्यापि] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3$ E; °तथैव ध्वंसितत्वात्तदात्मकस्यापि A_1; °तयैवापध्वंसितत्वात्तदा ⊔ पि M_1; °तयै (थै M_2^{ac})व ध्वंसितत्वादात्मकस्यापि M_2 4.12 संसारस्य] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1M_2$; संस्कारस्य P_1; संहारस्य P_2; प्रसारस्य E 4.12 सर्वात्मना प्रकृते°] Σ; सर्वात्मनो प्राकृते° P_2 4.13 कैवल्यं] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_2E$; कैवल्य° $P_1P_2M_1$ 4.15 इति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; ⊔ ना M_1; इत्यादिना E 4.15 प्रकृतिसम्बन्धः] Σ; प्रकृतिरेव संबन्धः M_2

तया सर्वैरभ्युपगतः। न च तद्भोक्तृत्वमौपाधिकं, तस्य तथात्वे हि तस्य न तत् स्यात्, अन्यकृतस्य धर्मस्य नित्यधर्मिणि व्यतिकरायोगात्, व्यतिकरे
18 वा नासौ भोक्तेति कस्य बन्धो मोक्षो वेति भोक्तृत्वं स्वभावात्मकमेष्टव्यम्। न चानादेर्नित्यस्वभावस्य विनाशो युक्तः, कैवल्ये पुरुषे ऽपि तथाभावप्रसङ्गतो वैनाशिकत्वप्राप्तेः। तद्विनाशासम्भवादेव च मुक्तावपि भोक्तृभोग्यसम्बन्धः
21 पुंप्रकृत्योरेष्टव्यः। केवलं त्वनादिकर्मदौरात्म्यतः प्राग् दुःखमोहान्तरितसुखलवरूपा प्रकृतिस्तस्य भोग्याभूत्। अद्य पुनस्तत्कारणभूतसर्वकर्मप्रत्यस्तमयतो मुक्तौ शुद्धनिरन्तरनिरतिशयानवच्छिन्नसत्त्वात्मसुखरूपासौ भोग्येति
24 तत्प्राप्ताः किल सत्त्वभुजः प्रोच्यन्त इति तदागमविदां पीठबन्धः।

4.16 °भ्युपगतः। न च] °भ्युप— P_1 4.16 न च तद्भोक्तृत्वमौपाधिकं ⋯ मोक्षो वेति भोक्तृत्वं] न च तद्भोक्तृत्वं M_2(eyeskip) 4.20 वैनाशिकत्वप्राप्तेः] वैनाशिक—प्तेस् P_1

4.16 तद्भोक्तृत्व°] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; भोक्तृत्व° M^{γ} 4.16 तस्य न] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2M_1E$; न P_3 4.17 अन्यकृतस्य] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; अन्यनित्यकृतस्य M_1 4.17 धर्मस्य नित्यधर्मिणि व्यतिकरायोगात् व्यतिकरे वा] M^{γ}; धर्म्मस्य नित्यधर्म्मव्यतिकरायोगात् व्यतिकरे वा A_1P_2; धर्म्मस्यान्न्यधर्म्मव्यतिकरायोगात् व्यतिकरे ×र× +वा+ P_1; धर्मस्य नित्यकर्मव्यतिकरायोगात्, व्यतिकरे वा P_3E; धर्मस्य नित्यधर्मव्यतिकरा ⊔ करे वा M_1 4.18 मोक्षो वेति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1E$; —ति P_1; मोक्षे वेति P_2 4.18 °कमेष्टव्यम्] Σ; °कमेव दृष्टव्यम् P_3 4.19 चानादेर्नित्य°] $M^{\gamma}P_1^{pc}M_1E$; चाग्न्यादेर्नित्य° $A_1P_3M_2$; चानादे×र× न्नित्य° P_1; चाग्न्यादेन्नित्य° P_2 4.19 विनाशो युक्तः, कैवल्ये] $A_1P_1M_2$; विना+शो+ युक्तकल्पनः। M^{γ}; विनाशो युक्तकैवल्ये P_2; विनाशो युक्तः, केवले P_3E; विन ⊔ ल्पनः M_1 4.19 पुरुषे ऽपि] Σ; पुरुषो पि M^{γ} 4.19 तथाभाव°] Σ; तत्तथाभाव° M_1 4.20 °सम्भवादेव च] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °संभवादेव P_1; °सम्भवात् एवं च M_1 4.20 भोक्तृभोग्यसम्बन्धः] $A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; भोक्तृभोग्यबंधः M^{γ}; भोग्यभोक्तृ(भोक्तृ)संबन्धः P_2; भोक्तभोग्यसम्बन्धः P_3 4.21 केवलं त्वनादिकर्म°] $M^{\gamma}P_3M_2$; केवलन्त्वनादिकर्म्मा° A_1; केवलं चानादिकर्म° P_1E; केवलञ्चानादिकर्म्मा P_2; केवल ⊔ म° M_1 4.21 °मोहान्तरित°] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °मोहरूपांतरित° M^{γ}; °मो— P_1 4.22 °लवरूपा] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2^{pc}M_2$; °×व× लवरूपा P_2; °लयरूपा M_1; °लयरूपिका E 4.22 तस्य] $M^{\gamma c}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; तस्या $M^{\gamma ac}M_1$ 4.22 अद्य पुन°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2M_2$; यत्पुन P_3M_1E 4.22–23 °सर्वकर्मप्रत्यस्तमयतो] $M^{\gamma}A_1M_2$; °सर्वकर्म्मप्रत्यस्तम् यतो P_1; °सर्वकर्म्मप्रत्य—स्तन्ततो P_2; एव सर्वकर्म्मप्रकृत्यस्तम् ततो P_3; °सर्वकर्मप्रत्यस्तमिते M_1; °सर्वकर्मप्रत्यस्तं यतो E_D; °सर्वकर्मप्रत्यस्तत्वं यतो E_V 4.23 शुद्धनिरन्तरनिरतिशया°] $P_1P_2M_2$; शुद्धनिरंतरा° M^{γ}; शुद्धनिरन्तरनिरतिशय° A_1; शुद्धनिरातरनिरतिशया° P_3; शु ⊔ रनिरतिशया° M_1; शुद्धनिरन्तरानतिशया° E 4.23 °रूपासौ भोग्येति] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1M_2$; °रूपासौर्भोग्येति A_1; °रू?ो—ग्येति P_1; °रूपो ऽसौ भोग्येति E_D; °रूपो ऽसौ भोग इति E_V

[२.३ विलयः परमात्मनि]

विलयः परमात्मनीति शास्त्रान्तरफलम्। 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' 'नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन' इति श्रुतिलक्षणात्सिद्धार्थविषयलब्धप्रमाणभावादपौरुषेयतया 27
तदन्यागमेभ्यः प्रबलतररूपादागमात् प्रतिपन्नस्य परमानन्दाद्यनेकतदागमगीतगुणस्वभावस्य प्रमाणान्तरागोचरानवच्छिन्नचिद्ब्रह्मणः सत्यतया, तदन्येषां च भेदरूपाणामविद्यादिनिर्माणैकसारत्वेनासत्यतयावगतिस्तत एव। 30
तदाहुः

आम्नायतः प्रसिद्धिं च कवयो ऽस्य प्रचक्षते। इति।

न चास्यावगमस्य भेदसत्ताप्रमाणभूतप्रत्यक्षादिबाधे अग्निना सिञ्चेदित्यादेरिवाप्रामाण्यमाशङ्कनीयम्, भेदस्येतरेतराभावप्रसिद्धिव्यपेक्षत्वेन. वस्तु- 33

4.27 किञ्चन' इति] किञ्च--- P_1 4.28 °द्यनेकतदागमगीत°] °द्यनेक---गीत° P_1 4.29 °स्वभावस्य] °स्वभाव--- A_1 4.29 सत्यतया] ---तया P_2 4.30 °सारत्वेनासत्यतया°] °सार---तया° P_1

4.26 सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म *Chāndogyopaniṣat* 3.14.1.

4.27 नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.4.19b, *Kaṭhopaniṣat* 4:11b.

4.32 आम्नायतः प्रसिद्धिं च कवयो ऽस्य प्रचक्षते। भेदप्रपञ्चविलयद्वारेण च निरूपणाम्॥ *Brahmasiddhi* 1:2.

4.26 विलयः] Σ; विलय P_2 4.26 °फलम्। 'सर्वं खल्विदं] Σ; ⊔ सर्वं कल्विदं M_1 4.27 °लक्षणात्सिद्धार्थविषयलब्धप्रमाणभावाद्] M^{γ}; °लक्षणात्सिद्धार्त्थ ≍ ≍यलब्धप्रामाण्याद् A_1; °लक्षणात् सिद्धार्त्थविषयलब्धप्रमाण्याद् $P_1P_2M_2$; °लक्षणात्सिद्धार्थविषयलब्धप्रामाण्याद् P_3E; °लक्षणादसिद्धार्थविषयलब्धप्रमाणात् M_1 4.27 °पौरुषेयतया] Σ; °पुरुषेयतय P_2 4.28 तदन्यागमेभ्यः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3^{pc}M_1M_2E$; तदस्यागमेभ्यः P_1; तदन्यागमेभ्यो ब्र P_3^{ac} 4.28 प्रबलतररूपादागमात्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3^{pc}M_2E$; प्रबलतररूपा ×न्तर× दागमात् P_3; प्रबलतर ⊔ गमात् M_1 4.29 °रागोचरानव°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E_V$; °रागोचरेणानव° M_1; °रगोचरानव° E_D 4.30 °रूपाणामविद्यादिनिर्माणैक°] Σ; °रूपाणां ⊔ दिनिर्माणेणेक° M_1 4.30 °तयावगतिस्तत एव] $M^{\gamma}P_1E$; °तयावगति--- तत एव A_1; °तया ≍गति---अत एव P_2; °तया ⊔ गवतिरत एव P_3; °त्वावगतिः। तत एव M_1; °तयावगितिस्तत एव M_2 4.31 तदाहुः] Σ; त आहुः E_V 4.32 आम्नायतः प्रसिद्धिं] M^{γ}; आत्मा यतः प्रसिद्धं $A_1P_3M_2E$; आत्मा यतः प्रसिद्धिं P_1M_1; आत्मा यतः प्रसि≍ञ् P_2 4.33 चास्यावगमस्य] M_1M_2E; चास्यागमस्य $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3$; चास्या×म× गमस्य P_1 4.33 भेदसत्ता°] Σ; भेदस्सक्तः M_1 4.33 अग्निना सिञ्चेदित्या°] Σ; नि---दित्या° P_1 4.34 °भावप्रसिद्धिव्यपेक्षत्वेन] $M^{\gamma}E$; °भावाप्रसिद्धयपेक्षत्वेन $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; °भावप्रसिद्धावपेक्षत्वेन M_1

मात्रग्राहिप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वासिद्धेः शशविषाणवदविद्यामात्रकल्पितत्वेनासत्य-
36 त्वात्। तदुक्तम्

आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्षम् इति।

एवं च सति जीवात्मनामपि स्वतःप्रमाणसिद्धप्रोक्तसत्यभूतपरमात्मसारत्वे
39 ऽप्यविद्याकलुषितत्वेन भ्रान्तत्वात् प्रसुप्तपुरुषसाधारणानामिव स्वप्नानुभववृ-
त्तीनां तात्त्विकप्रबोधानुदयतस्तद्रूपानुपजातबोधकः संसाराभिधानभेदप्रपञ्चः
स्वरूपतो ऽनिदम्प्रथमः। कदाचित्तु 'आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः' इत्यादिशास्त्रगी-
42 तक्रमेण प्रोल्बणतरज्ञानप्राप्तितस्तत्प्रतिपक्षभूतभ्रान्तिकारणप्रोन्मूलनेन तिर-
स्कृताखिलभ्रान्तिः परमात्मबोधः सुप्तप्रबुद्धस्येव स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठो जीवा-
त्मनः पूर्वप्रवाहविलयरूपो भवतीति सैव परा मुक्तिरिति केषांचिद्ग्रहः॥

4.35 °वदविद्यामात्र°] °व—त्र° P_1 4.38–39 °सारत्वे ऽप्यविद्या°] °सार— P_1 4.40 संसाराभिधानभेदप्र°] संसा—कप्र° P_1 4.42 °कारण°] — P_1 4.44 भवतीति] — P_1

4.37 आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धु विपश्चितः *Brahmasiddhi* 2:1ab.

4.41 आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः Source unknown, but quoted as scripture elsewhere: see footnote to the translation.

4.35 शशविषाण°] Σ; शशिविषण° P_2 4.38 सति जीवात्मनामपि] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; सति जीवात्मभेदानामपि M^Y; सती। एवात्मभेदानामपि P_1 4.38 °सत्यभूत°] Σ; °सत्वभूत° M_1 4.39 °पुरुषसाधारणानामिव] $M^YP_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_2^{pc}E$; °पुरुषसाधाराणा+ना+मिव A_1; +पुरुष+साधारणानामिव P_1; °पुरुषां साधारणानामिव M_1; °पुरुषसाधरणामिव M_2^{ac} 4.40 °नुदयतस्तद्रूपानुपजातबोधकः] M^YA_1; °नुदयस्तद्रूपानुपजातबोधकस् P_1; °नुदयस्तद्रूपानुपजातबोधस् P_2; °नुदयतस्तत्र तद्रूपानुपजातबोधस् P_3; °नुदय+त+स्तद्रूपानुपजातबोधकः M_1; °नुदयस्तत्र तद्रूपानुपजातबोधकस् M_2; °नुदयतस्तद्रूपानुपज्ञातबोधकः E 4.40–41 भेदप्रपञ्चः स्वरूपतो ऽनिदम्प्रथमः] A_1; °भेदप्रपंचस्वरूपो निदंप्रथमः M^Y; —कप्रपञ्चस्वरूपतो निदम्प्रथमः P_1; °भेदप्रपञ्चस्वरूपतो निदंप्रथमः P_2; °भेदकप्रपञ्चस्वरूपतो निदम्प्रथमः P_3; °भेदकप्रपंचस्फुरत्यनिदंप्रथमः M_1; °भेदप्रपञ्चस्वरूप(पे M_2^{ac})तो ऽनिदंप्रथमा M_2; °भेदकप्रपञ्चः स्वरूपतो ऽनिदम्प्रथमः E 4.41 कदाचित्तु 'आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः'] Σ; कदाचिदात्मा ज्ञात M_1 4.41–42 °गीतक्रमेण] Σ; °गीत+ऱ+ऱमं(?)ण P_2 4.42 प्रोल्बणतर° M^Y; प्रोत्बणतर° $A_1P_1P_2P_3$; प्रोक् बणतर° M_1; प्रोड्रणतर° M_2; प्रोद्वणतर° E_D; प्रोद्वलतर° E_V 4.43 °बोधः] Σ; °बोधकस् P_2 4.43 °प्रबुद्धस्येव] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °प्रतिबुद्धस्येव M^Y; °बुद्धस्यैव P_1; °प्रबुद्धस्यैव M_1 4.44 पूर्वप्रवाहविलयरूपो] Σ; पूर्वप्रवाहाखिलरूपो M_2

नन्वत्र वृत्तिकर्तुः परिणतिवेदान्तमतिरेवोद्देश्यतयाभिमता, न माया- 45
वादमतिः, सैव 'उपादानत्वसंसिद्धिः' इति वक्ष्यमाणदूषणानुसारिणी
यतः। सत्यं तदनुसारिणी, किन्तु नैषा वेदान्तेष्वध्यात्मवित्प्रवरैर्मुख्यत्वेन
गीयते। न चात्र श्रुतयो ऽनुरूपाः। सैव च यथा दूषणानुसारिणी तथा तत्रैव 48
वक्ष्यामः॥

[२.४ परस्यां प्रकृतौ लयः]

अव्याकृतादिष्वित्यागमान्तरफलोद्देशः— 51

यत्र तिष्ठन्त्यणीयांसः क्षेत्रज्ञाः कर्मभिः सह।

तदव्याकृतमुच्यते। कुत्र तिष्ठन्तीत्यत्र केचिदाहुः—इह यथा मृदन्वितेषु

4.46 उपादानत्वसंसिद्धिः Verse 49a.

4.49 वक्ष्यामः We think (see note to the translation) that this refers to 49.75–7, भवतु सत्यम् ··· अत्र चोक्तो दोष इत्याह।

4.52 यत्र तिष्ठन्त्यणीयांसः क्षेत्रज्ञाः कर्मभिः सह Source unknown. It is cited ad *Mataṅgavidyāpāda* 15:8 as part of a verse: see annotation to the translation.

4.45 वृत्तिकर्तुः परिणतिवेदान्तमतिरेवो°] E; वृत्तिकर्तुः परिणतिपरिणतिवेदांतमतिरे-वो° M^{Y}; वृत्तिः परिणतिवेदान्तमितिरेवो° A_1; वृत्तिः कर्त्तुः परिणतिवेदान्तमितिरे×व× वो° P_1; वृत्तिक ≃परिणतिवेदान्तमतिरेवो° P_2; कवृत्तिकर्तुः परिणतवेदान्तमितिरेवो P_3; वृत्तिकर्तुः परिणतिवेदान्तमितिरेवो° M_1; वृत्तितुः परिणति वेदान्तमिति रेवो° M_2 4.45–46 न मायावादमतिः] $M^{Y}E$; न मायावादमिति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; मायावादमिति M_1 4.46 °पादानत्व°] $P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °पादान° M^{Y}; °पा--- P_1 4.47 °सारिणी यतः। सत्यं] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_1^{pc}M_2$; °सारिणि यतः। सत्यं A_1P_2; °सारिणी यतः स × त्युं× त्यं M_1; °सारिणी सत्यं E 4.47 किन्तु नैषा···यथा दूषणानुसारिणी] *om.* P_3(eyeskip) 4.47 वेदान्तेष्वध्यात्म°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2E$; वेदान्ते × वि× ष्वद्यात्म° M_1; वेदान्तेषु स्वात्म° M_2 4.48 न चात्र श्रुतयो ऽनुरूपाः] $M^{Y}A_1P_2M_2E$; न चात्र श्रु इत-–पाः P_1; न चा × स्य× +श्रु+ तयो नुरूपाः M_1 4.48 सैव च यथा दूषणानुसारिणी] $M^{Y}P_2M_1E$; सैव च यथा दूषणानुसारिणि $A_1P_1^{pc}$; (सैव च यथा दुषणानुसारिणि यतः सत्यन्तदनुसारिणी किन्तु नैषा वेदान्तेषुष्वद्यात्मवित् प्रवरैर्म्मुख्यत्वेनगीयते न चात्रश्रुत-–पाः) सैव च यथा दूषणानुसारि×रि× णि P_1; सैव च यथानुसारिणी M_2 4.48 तथा तत्रैव] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; तथात्रैव P_2; तथात्रैव E 4.51 अव्याकृता°] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; अव्यकृता° A_1; अव्यकृत्या° P_2 4.53 तदव्याकृतमुच्यते] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; तदव्याकृतमुच्येत M^{Y}; तदव्य--- P_1 4.53 तिष्ठन्तीत्यत्र] $M^{Y}M_1$; तिष्ठति अत्र A_1M_2; तिष्ठन्ति अत्र P_2P_3E; तितिष्ठति अत्र P_1 4.53 इह यथा] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3E$; इह P_2; यथा M_1; उभयथ M_2

घटादिषु मृत्कार्यत्वदर्शनाद् भवद्भिः सुखाद्यन्वितेष्वपि कार्यकरणादिषु सुखादिरूपप्रधानकारणत्वमिष्यते, तथैवात्मनां प्रधानस्य च भेदे ऽप्येकसदन्वयसम्भवादेककारणत्वमिष्यताम्, अत्र वा तन्मा भूदिति विशेषाभावात्।

तेषां यत्कारणं सा परा प्रकृतिर्महाविभूत्यभिधाना, जडाजडकारणत्वात्। सैव साक्षादीश्वरलक्षणेन चातुरात्म्येनानीश्वरक्षेत्रज्ञात्मना जडात्मकाविद्यारूपेण च परिणमते। अविद्या तु बुद्धिमनोभूता अविशेषात् तन्मात्रतया भूता, विशेषाच्च भूततया भूता, इन्द्रियत्वेन, इत्येवंक्रमेण सैव तथा तथा परिणमत इति परत्वं तस्याः। तदाहुः—भगवान् वासुदेवः परा प्रकृतिर्ज्यायसी विभूतिर्भूतिरेव च। स स्वयं भवति भूतो भावीति। एवमणीयस्तया

4.55 °प्रधानकारणत्वमिष्यते] °प्रध—ष्यते P_1 4.57 °विभूत्यभिधाना] —ना P_1 4.60 तथा तथा] —तथा P_2 4.61 भगवान्] —वान् P_1

4.54 मृत्कार्यत्व°] Σ; मृत्कार्य्यत्वा° P_2 4.54 सुखाद्यन्वितेष्वपि] Σ; सुखान्वितेष्वपि P_2 4.54 °करणादिषु] P_2; °कारणादिषु Σ 4.56 अत्र वा तन्मा] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1E$; तन्मा P_1^{ac}; अत्र वा तमा M_2 4.57 यत्कारणं सा परा] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; यत्का—सा +परा+ P_2; यत्कारणं सा अपर° M_2 4.57 प्रकृतिर्म°] Σ; प्रकृतिम° P_2 4.57 जडाजडकारण°] Σ; जजडज ⌣⌣⌣ण° P_1 4.58 चातुरात्म्येना°] $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; चातुरात्मेना° M^{γ}; चातु—त्म्येन P_2 4.58 °क्षेत्रज्ञात्मना जडात्मकाविद्या°] $M^{\gamma}E$; °क्षेत्रज्ञात्मना जडात्मकविद्या° $A_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3^{pc}$; °क्षेत्रज्ञात्मना जडात्म+क+विद्या° P_1; °क्षेत्रज्ञात्मना जडात्म× न× कविद्या° P_3; °क्षेत्र ⊔ त्मना जडात्मकाविद्या° M_1; °क्षेत्रज्ञानात्मकविद्या° M_2(eyeskip) 4.59–60 अविद्या तु बुद्धिमनोभूता अविशेषात् तन्मात्रतया भूता, विशेषाच्च] *em.*; विद्या तु बुद्धिमनोभूतविशेषरूपतया भूता विशेषाच्च M^{γ}; विद्या तु बुद्धिमनोभूता अविशेषात् तन्मात्रतया भूताविशेषाच्च A_1P_3E; विद्या तु बुद्धि—विशे ⌣⌣⌣⌣तन्मात्रतया भूता विशेषाच्च P_1; विद्या तु बुद्धिमनोभूता —सेषात्तन्मात्रतया भूत—विशेषाच्च P_2; अविद्या तु बुद्धिमनोभूताविशेषरूपतया भूताविशेषाच्च M_1; विद्या तु बुद्धिमनोभूता अविशेषात्तन्मात्रतया भूताविशेषाच्च M_2 4.60 भूता, इन्द्रियत्वेन, इत्येवंक्रमेण] *conj.*;भूतानींद्रिय× ।× णेत्वेनेत्येवंक्रमेण M^{γ}; भूता इयत्त्वेनेत्येवंक्रमेण A_1; भूतानिन्द्रियत्वेनैवत्येवंक्रमेण P_1; भूता भूतेन्द्रियत्वेनेत्येवंक्रमेण P_2; भूते इन्द्रियत्वेनेत्येवंक्रमेण P_3; भूतानीन्द्रियत्वेनेत्येवंक्रमेण M_1E; भूता इय+त्+त्वेनेवेत्येवं क्रमेणैव M_2 4.60 सैव] Σ; त्येसेव M_1 4.61 परिणमत] Σ; परिणत M^{γ} 4.61 तदाहुः] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; तदाह M^{γ}; तदाहु— P_1 4.61 परा प्रकृ°] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2^{ac}P_3M_1E$; पराकृ° A_1M_2; पर+।+प्रकृ° P_2 4.62 °र्ज्यायसी] Σ; °र्ज्यायसि P_1 4.62 विभूतिर्भू°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; विभू—भू° P_2; विभूतिभू° P_3 4.62 स स्वयं भवति भूतो भावीति। एवमणीयस्तया] $A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; सा स्वयं भवद्भूतो भावीत्येवमणीयस्तया M^{γ}; स्वयं भवति भूतो वा भावीत्येवमणीयस्तया P_2; स स्वयं भवति भूतो भावीत्येवंमणीयस्त यथा M_1

अव्यापकत्वेन तत्रैव कार्यत्वात् क्षेत्रज्ञास्तिष्ठन्तीति। तत एवोपादानकारणाद् 63
विकृतिधर्मकादविद्याकर्मानुबन्धेन जीवात्मनां सम्भवात्, तत्क्षयतः समुप-
शान्तकार्यभेदरूपे तस्मिन् परमकारणात्मनि तेषां विलयः परं श्रेय इति
केषाञ्चिद् दुरभ्युपगमः। 66

[२.५ तौष्टिकानां प्रकृत्यादिलयवादः]

अव्याकृतादिष्वित्यादिग्रहणात् प्रकृतिलयवादिनः, अर्वाक् चेत्यतो ऽधो
ऽवस्थितास्त्वहङ्कारादिलयवादिनस्तौष्टिकाः। तदुक्तम् 69

आध्यात्मिक्यश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः।

4.68 The syllables between अव्याकृता and त्युपादान° (in the quotation below) were first omitted by the scribe of A_1 and then supplied in the bottom margin. 4.70–73 प्रकृत्युपादानकाल° ⋯ सालोक्यसामीप्यप्राप्तिः। यदुक्तं पौष्करे] प्रकृत्युपादानकाल ⊔ क्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे M_1

4.70 –71 आध्यात्मिक्यश्चतस्रः ⋯ तुष्टयो ऽभिहिताः *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 50.

4.63 अव्यापकत्वेन] M^{γ}; अव्यापकव्यापकत्वेन $A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; व्यापकव्याप्कत्वेन P_2; अव्यापकाव्यापकत्वेन M_1 4.63 क्षेत्रज्ञास्तिष्ठन्तीति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; ---ज्ञा तिष्ठन्निति P_1; क्षेत्रज्ञः(?) तिष्ठन्तीति P_2 4.64–65 जीवात्मनां सम्भवात्, तत्क्षयतः समुपशान्तकार्यभेदरूपे तस्मिन् परम°] $M^{\gamma}P_3M_2^{pc}E$; जीवात्मनां संभवात्तत्क्षयतः समुशान्तकार्यभेदरूपे तस्मिन् परम° A_1; जीवात्मनाम् संभवात् तत्क्षयतस्समुपशान्तकार्य्यरूपभे--वे तस्मिन् परम° P_1; जीवा ≍नां तत्क्षयस्समुपशशान्तकार्य्यभेदरूपे तस्मिन् परम° P_2; ⊔ प तस्मिन् ⊔ रम° M_1; जीवात्मनां संभवात् तत् क्षयतः। समु+प+शान्तकार्यभेदरूपे तस्मिन् परम° M_2 4.65 श्रेय इति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; श्रे ≍ इति P_2; श्रेय M_1 4.68 अव्याकृतादिष्वित्यादिग्रहणात्] Σ; अव्याकृतादि+त्यादि+ग्रहणात् P_1 4.68–69 °वादिनः, अर्वाक् चेत्यतो ऽधो ऽवस्थितास्त्वहङ्कारादि°] *conj.*; °वादिनः अर्वाक्चेत्यतो योवस्थितास्त्वहंकारादि° M^{γ}; °वादिनः अर्वाग्वेत्यतो धोवस्थितास्त्वहंकारादि° A_1P_3; °वादिनः। अर्वङ्चेत्यतो ×≍× धोवस्थित--कारादि° P_1; °वादिनः। अर्वाग्वे--तो धोवस्थिताः अहंकारादि° P_2; °वादिनः। अर्वाग्वेत्यतो यो ऽवस्थितो स्वहंकारादिषु M_1; °वादिनः। अर्वाञ्चेत्यतो धोवस्थितास्त्वहंकारादि° M_2; °वादिनो ऽर्वाक्तो ये ऽवस्थितास्त्वहङ्कारादि° E 4.69 °लयवादिनस्तौष्टिकाः] $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$ E; °नस्तौष्टिकाः M^{γ}(eyeskip); °लयवादिनस्तष्टिकाः P_2 4.70 आध्यात्मिक्यश्चतस्रः] P_1E_V; आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_2E_D$; आद्या×द्ध× +≍+ काश्चतस्रः A_1; आद्यात्मिका चतस्रः M_1 4.70 °भाग्याख्याः] $P_1P_3M_2E_V$; °भोग्याख्याः M^{γ}; °भागाख्यः $A_1P_2E_D$

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव च तुष्टयो ऽभिहिताः॥ इति।

72 [२.६ गाणपत्यम्]

महागणो महेशस्येति फलान्तरं सालोक्यसामीप्यप्राप्तिः। यदुक्तं पौष्करे

अन्याभिरिह दीक्षाभिर्न निर्वाणमवाप्यते।

75 गाणपत्यपदं ताभिः। इति।

एत एव योगिपदेन सूत्रकृता निर्दिष्टाः।

[२.७ अकर्तृत्वं सर्ववेद्यवित्त्वं च]

78 अकर्ता सर्ववेद्यविदिति दर्शनान्तरफलम्। परमेश्वरे तावत् कर्मकर्तृत्वं तनुकरणभुवनादिरूपकार्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रतिपादितम्। एतस्मिन्नवस्थिते ऽधुना मुक्तपुरुषकर्तृत्वसिद्धौ न कार्यान्यथानुपपत्तिः प्रभवति। अथ ईश्वरवन्मुक्तत्वे-

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4.76 योगिपदेन सूत्रकृता] यो—कृता P_1

4.74 –75 अन्याभिरिह दीक्षाभिर्न ⋯ ताभिः Not traced.

4.71 बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव च तुष्टयो ऽभिहिताः॥ इति] M^{γ}; बाह्या विषयोपरमाः पञ्च नव च तुष्टयो भिहिताः। इति A_1M_2; बाह्यविषयोपरमाः पञ्च नव च तुष्टयादिति P_1; बाह्यविषयोपरमाः पञ्च नव च तुष्टयो भिहिता इति P_2E_D; बाह्या विषयोपरमाः पञ्च नव च तुष्टयो भिहित P_3; बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयो ऽभिहिताः॥ इति E_V 4.73 महागणो महेशस्येति $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2M_2$; महागणो म—स्येत् P_1; दहागणो महेशस्येति P_3 (E give the whole of verse 3 here.) 4.73 °सामीप्य°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_2$; °सामीप्यादि° P_2P_3E 4.73 पौष्करे] E; श्रीमत्पौष्करे Σ 4.74 अन्याभिरिह] Σ; अन्याभिरिव P_3 4.75 गाणपत्यपदं ताभिः। इति] $M^{\gamma}M_1M_2E$; गाणापत्यपदन्ताभिरिति $A_1P_2P_3$; गणापत्य+पदन्+तदाभिरिति P_1 4.76 एत एव] M^{γ}; एतदेव च $A_1P_1P_2^{pc}M_1M_2E$; ए+त+देव च P_2; एतदेव P_3 4.76 निर्दिष्टाः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1^{ac}$; निर्दिष्टम् $P_1^{pc}P_2M_1E$; निर्दिष्टा P_3M_2 4.78 दर्शनान्तर°] Σ; दर्शना ⊔ न्तर° P_2 4.78–79 कर्मकर्तृत्वं तनुकरणभुवनादिरूपकार्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रतिपादितम्] M^{γ}; कर्म्मकर्तृत्वन्तनुकरणभुवना+दि+रूपकार्य्यान्यथानुपपत्या प्रतिपादितम् A_1; कर्म्मकर्तृत्वन्तनुकरणभुवनादिरूपकार्य्या× ⊔ ⊔× न्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रति — तम् P_1; कर्म्मकर्तृत्वन्तदनुकरणभुवनादिरूपकार्य्यान्यथानुपपत्या प्रतिपादितं P_2; कर्तृत्वन्तनुकरणभुवनादिरूपकार्यान्यथानुपपत्या प्रतिपादितम् P_3; कर्तृ ⊔ M_1; कर्मकर्तृत्वन्तनुकरणभुवनादिरूपकार्यान्यथानुपपत्या प्रतिपादितः M_2; कर्मकर्तृत्वं तनुकरणभुवनादिकार्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रतिपादितम् E 4.79 एतस्मिन्नवस्थिते] Σ; एतस्मिन्नस्थिते P_2 4.80 मुक्तपुरुषकर्तृत्वसिद्धौ न कार्यान्यथा°] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_2$; मुक्तपुरुषकर्तृत्वसिद्धौ न कार्य्यथा° A_1; मुक्तपुरुषकर्तृत्वसिद्धौ न कार्य्यन्यथा° P_2; मुक्तौ पुरुषकर्तृकत्वसिद्धौ न ⊔ न्यथा° M_1; मुक्तपुरुषे कर्तृत्वसिद्धौ न कार्यान्यथा° E_V 4.80 °नुपपत्तिः] Σ; +नु+पपत्ति P_3 4.80 प्रभवति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3$; भवति $P_2M_1M_2E$

न तत्र कर्तृत्वसिद्धिः, तदयुक्तम्, ईश्वरस्य मुक्तत्वासिद्धेरदृष्टान्तत्वात्। बद्धो 81
हि मुच्यत इति ईश्वरसिद्धयोरनेनांशेनात्यन्तवैसादृश्यम्। यथाह वटयक्षि-
ण्यां तत्रभवानवधूतः 'परमशिवः सिद्धान् प्रत्युपरताधिकारो ऽप्यन्येष्वनु-
परताधिकारः। सिद्धः पुनरेकान्तेन सर्वत एवोपरताधिकार इति भेदः।' 84
इति।

न च प्रागपि पुंसः कर्तृत्वम्, किन्तु प्रकृतेरेव तत् सांख्यपक्षवदिति
मुक्तौ कर्तृत्वस्य प्रमाणाभावात् अकर्तृत्वमेव। ज्ञत्वं तु पुंसः स्वाभाविकं 87
प्रागनुभवतः सिद्धम्। तत्तु मुक्तावावरणाभावेन सर्वविषयं भवतीत्यकर्ता
सर्ववेद्यविन्मुक्त इति तदागमविदः। त एव हृदयप्रमाणादिग्रन्थकर्तृत्वेनात्र
सूत्रकृता प्रमाणकर्तृत्वपदेनोपक्षिप्ताः। 90

4.88 °विषयं भवतीत्य°] °वि—तीत्य° P_1

4.84 –85 परमशिवः सिद्धान् ⋯ इति भेदः Source unknown. The same unit is quoted, with the attribution *padayakṣiṇyām*, in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*: see translation.

4.81 तत्र कर्तृत्वसिद्धिः] M^{Y}; कर्तृत्वसिद्धिः Σ 4.81 °सिद्धेरदृष्टान्तत्वात्] Σ; °सिद्धेदृष्टान्तत्वात् P_2 4.82 °वैसादृश्यम्] Σ; °वैसादृशं P_2 4.82–83 यथाह वटयक्षिण्यां] M^{Y}; यथाहाव्ययक्षिण्यान् A_1; यथाह अव्येक्षिण्यान् P_1; यथाह व्यासाक्षिण्यां $P_2^{pc}E$; यकाह व्यासाक्सिण्यान् P_2^{ac}; यथाह अव्ययसाक्षिण्यान् P_3; यथाह अव्यण्यन्यवैलक्षण्यात् M_1; यथाहाप्ययक्षिण्यान् M_2 4.83 तत्रभवान्] $M^{Y}M_1M_2E$; तत्रभगवान् $A_1P_1P_3$; तत्रभवन् P_2 4.83 परमशिवः सिद्धान्] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; परमः शिवः सिद्धान् $M^{Y}M_1$; परमशिव— P_1 4.84 °परताधिकारः] Σ; °परताधिकारिस् P_2 4.84 सिद्धः पुनरेकान्तेन] P_1P_2E; सद्धः पुनरेकांतेन M^{Y}; सिद्धः पुनरैकान्तेन A_1M_2; सिद्धः पुनरेकान्ते P_3; सिद्धः पुनरेका ⊔ M_1 4.86 कर्तृत्वम्] $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; कर्तृत्वमित्याहुः $M^{Y}P_1P_1M_1E$ 4.86 प्रकृतेरेव तत्] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_1E$; प्रक — ता ≃त् P_1; प्रकृतेरेव तत्व° M_2 4.86–87 °वदिति मुक्तौ] Σ; °वदितिर्म्मुक्तौ P_2 4.87 प्रमाणाभावात्, अकर्तृत्वमेव] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; प्रमणाभावादकर्त्तृत्वमेव P_2; प्रमाणाभावात्कर्त्तृत्वमेव P_3 4.87 ज्ञत्वं] Σ; ज्ञानं E 4.87 पुंसः] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2E_V$; पुंस $P_2P_3E_D$ 4.88 प्रागनुभवतः सिद्धम्। तत्तु] M_1E; प्रागनुभवतः सिद्धसत्वतत्वं M^{Y}; प्रागनुभवसिद्ध तत्तुर् A_1M_2; प्रागनुभव+त+स्सिद्धं तत् P_1; प्रागनुभवतः तस्सिधन्तत्तु P_2; प्रागनुभवतस्सिद्ध ⊔ P_3 4.88 मुक्तावावरणाभावेन] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; मुक्तावावरणाभवेन P_2; मुक्तावाचरणाभावेन P_3 4.89 सर्ववेद्यविन्मुक्त] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; सर्ववेद्यविमुक्त M_1M_2 4.89 त एव] Σ; त ए P_2 4.90 प्रमाणकर्तृत्वपदेनो°] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2^{pc}E$; प्रमाणकर्त्तृत्वेनो° P_1; ⊔ णकर्तृत्व × विधे× पदेविना° M_1; प्रमाणकर्तृत्ववदेनो° M_2^{ac}

[२.८ कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वम्]

कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वमित्यागमान्तरम्। अयमर्थः—ज्ञातृत्ववत् कर्तृ-
93 त्वमपि पुंसः स्वभाव एव। न तु प्रकृतेः कर्तृत्वं युक्तं, कारणत्वात्तस्याः। अन्यद्धि कारणत्वं स्वरूपान्यथाभावरूपं जडवस्तुस्वभावतयैव परिणामित्वाद्यव्यभिचारि क्षीरदध्यादिष्वध्यक्षसिद्धम्। अन्यच्च कर्तृत्वं हिताहितप्रा-
96 प्तित्यागफललिप्सया सर्वान्यकारकप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिकारणत्वेन स्वातन्त्र्यात्मकं चिद्वस्त्वव्यभिचारि स्वसंवेदनसिद्धमिति वक्ष्यामो मन्त्रवार्त्तिके। अनुमानेनाप्यात्मनां कर्तृत्वं साधितमेव तत्त्वसंग्रहादौ वृत्तिकृता।

99 ननु कर्तृत्वे सत्यात्मनां स्पन्दात्मकत्वेन परिणामिता? न, कर्तृत्वस्य स्पन्दात्मकत्वासिद्धेः। क्रिया हि स्पन्दः। न च क्रियारूपत्वं कर्तुः, कर्त्रन्तरकल्पनायामनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्, अपि तु तत्र हेतुतैव, तत्सामर्थ्येनैव

4.96 °कारणत्वेन] °कारण— P_1 4.99 ननु कर्तृत्वे सत्या°] ननु क—त्या° P_1

4.98 साधितमेव तत्त्वसंग्रहादौ वृत्तिकृता See *Tattvasaṅgraha* 17–19 (= E_V 15–17).

4.92 कर्तृत्वे] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; कर्तृत्वो A_1M_2 4.92 °गमान्तरम्] Σ; °गमान्तर P_2 4.93 पुंसः] $M^{Y}A_1M_1M_2E$; पुंस P_1P_2; पुङ्स P_3 4.93 कारणत्वात्तस्याः] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; कारणत्वात्तु तस्याः M^{Y}; कारणात्। तस्याः M_2 4.94 °न्यथाभावरूपं] $M^{Y}P_3E$; °न्यथाभावरूप P_1P_2; °न्यथाभावरूपत्वं M_1; °न्यथाभावं A_1M_2 4.94 जडवस्तु°] M^{Y}; जडवस्तुषु $A_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_1M_2E$; जड° P_1; जडव×ऽ×स्तुषु P_2 4.95 °त्वाद्यव्यभिचारि] $M^{Y}A_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3E$; °त्वा×व्य×द्यव्यभिचारि P_1; °त्वाद्याभिचारि M_1M_2 4.95 क्षीरदध्यादि°] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; क्षीरन्दध्यादि° A_1; क्षीरदद्यादि° M_1 4.95 हिताहित°] $M^{Y}P_3E$; हि+हिताहि+त° A_1; हि हिताहित° P_1P_2 M_1M_2 4.96 °प्राप्तित्यागफललिप्सया] Σ; °प्राप्तीत्यागमफललीप्सया P_2 4.96 सर्वान्यकारक°] Σ; सर्वाकार° P_2 4.96 स्वातन्त्र्यात्मकं] Σ; स्वातन्त्रात्मकं P_2 4.97 चिद्वस्त्वव्यभिचारि] *conj.* (cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*); चिद्वस्त्वभिचारि M^{Y}; शिवत्वाव्यभिचारि $A_1^{c}P_1P_2P_3^{pc}M_1M_2E$; शिवत्वा× भि× व्यभिचारि A_1P_3 4.100 स्पन्दात्मकत्वा°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1^{pc}P_2M_1M_2E$; स्पन्दात्म+क+त्वा° P_1; स्पन्दनात्मकत्वा° P_3 4.100 क्रिया हि] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; क्रियादि A_1M_2 4.100 क्रियारूपत्वं] Σ; क्रि×ऽरूपत्वत् P_2 4.100 कर्तुः, कर्त्रन्तरकल्पनायामनव°] $M^{Y}P_1$; कर्तुः कर्तृकत्वम् +ऽ+ तरकल्पनयामनव° A_1; कर्तृत्वं कर्त्तृन्तरकल्पनायामन+व+ P_2; कर्तुः कर्त्तृत्वमकर्त्रन्तरकल्पनायमनव° P_3; कर्तुः, कर्त्रन्तरकल्पनायानव° M_1; कर्तृकर्तृकर्तृत्वमन्तरकल्पनायामनव° M_2; कर्तुः कर्तृत्वं, कर्त्रन्तरकल्पनायामनव° E 4.101 तु तत्र हेतुतैव] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; तु तत्र हेतुतैव सा M^{Y}; —हेतुतैव P_1; तु तत्र हेतुतयैव E_V

कार्यकरणस्पन्ददृष्टेरिति। जडव्यापकक्रियात्मकः स्पन्दः कथं चैतन्यव्यापकत्वाव्यभिचारिणि कर्तरि भवेत्? न च स्पन्दात्मकतैव कारकत्वम्, अपि तु विशिष्टशक्तियोगो ऽयस्कान्तादीनामिवेत्युक्तमस्माभिरन्यत्र— 102

जडस्पन्दक्रियायां या शक्तिः सा कर्तृता चितः। 105
व्याप्तेरस्पन्दरूपेण सिद्धायस्कान्तवत् स्वतः॥ इति।

तच्च कर्तृत्वं तेषामनादेवेश्वरप्रयोज्यतया सिद्धम्। अनादेश्च विनाशो न सम्भवतीति मुक्तशिवाः सर्वज्ञाः सर्वकर्तारः परमेश्वरेण प्रयोज्या एवेति तन्नीतिज्ञाः। 108

[२.९ समत्वं तेजसां निधेः]

समत्वं तेजसां निधेरिति दर्शनान्तरफलम्, आदित्याग्न्यादिसमता तत्तदागमेषु महोपनिषदादिषु श्रूयते यतः। आग्नेयकर्तृत्वेन चैते सूत्रकृता निर्दिष्टाः। 111

4.103 स्पन्दात्मकतैव कारकत्वम्] स्पन्दात्मक — ारकत्वम् P_1

4.105 –106 जडस्पन्दक्रियायां या ⋯ सिद्धायस्कान्तवत्स्वतः Source unknown. Quoted also ad *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 1:57d, where the first half-line ends with कर्तृतात्मनः।

4.102 कार्यकरण॰] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1^{pc}M_2E$; कार्यकरणादि॰ M^Y; कार्यकारण॰ M_1^{ac} 4.102 जडव्यापकक्रियात्मकः] $M^YP_2M_2$; जडत्वाव्यापकक्रियात्मकः A_1; जडत्वाव्यापकक्रियात्मक॰ P_1; जडव्यापक्रियात्मक॰ P_3; जडव्यापकक्रियात्मक॰ M_1E 4.104 विशिष्ट॰] Σ; विष्ट॰ P_2 4.104 ॰यस्कान्ता॰] $M^YP_3M_1E$; ॰यस्कान्दा॰ A_1; ॰यस्का×≍×न्दा॰ P_1; ॰यस्कन्दा॰ P_2; ॰यं स्कन्दा॰ M_2 4.105 चितः] Σ; चिता M_2 4.106 व्याप्तेर॰] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2$; व्याप्ते P_1E(unmetrical); व्याप्तेन P_2 4.106 ॰यस्कान्तवत् स्वतः] $M^YP_2P_3M_2E$; ॰यस्कान्दन्तवत् स्वत A_1(unmetrical); ॰य — त्स्वत P_1; ॰यस्कान्तवत् ⊔ त M_1 4.107 कर्तृत्वं तेषाम्] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2E$; कर्तृत्वं तेषाम् P_1; कर्त्तृन्तेसाम् P_2 4.107 अनादेश्च विनाशो] Σ; अनादि ⊔ विनाशो P_3 4.108 मुक्तशिवाः सर्वज्ञाः] $M^YP_3M_1$; मुक्तश्शिवास्सर्वज्ञा A_1; मुक्तश्शिवास्सर्वज्ञास् P_1; मुक्तशिवास्सर्वज्ञा P_2; मुक्तशिवासर्वज्ञा M_2; मुक्ताः शिवाः सर्वज्ञाः E 4.108–109 परमेश्वरेण प्रयोज्या एवेति तन्नीतिज्ञाः] $A_1P_2P_3$; परमेश्वरप्रयोज्या एवेति तन्नीतिज्ञाः M^Y; परमेश्वरेण प्रयोज्या—तन्नीतिज्ञाः P_1; परमेश्वरे प्रयोज्या(ज्यो M_1^{ac}) एवेति तन्नितिज्ञाः M_1; परमेश्वरेण प्रयोज्यता एवेति ⊔ ज्ञाः M_2; परमशिवेन प्रयोज्या एवेति तन्नीतिज्ञाः E 4.111 ॰फलम्] Σ; ॰परम् P_1 4.111 आदित्याग्न्यादिसमता] $M^YA_1P_1P_2P_3^{pc}M_1E$; आदित्यादिसमता $P_3^{ac}M_2$ 4.111–112 तत्तदागमेषु महोपनिषदा॰] $M^YA_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1E$; तत्तदा+गमेषु+महोपनिषदा॰ P_1; तत्तदागमेषु मभोपनिषदा॰ M_2 4.112 यतः] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_1E$; *om.* A_1M_2

114 [२.१० आधिक्यं परमेशानात्]

आधिक्यं परमेशानादिति पक्षान्तरम्। परमेशस्य लयाधिकारभोगाभ्युपगमेनाधिकारादिबन्धयोगतः पशुत्वस्यानपायात्—यदाहुः

117 अनुग्रहतिरोभावौ द्वौ पाशौ तु सदाशिवे। इति,

पशुराद्यः सदाशिवः

इति च—विनिवृत्तसमस्तबन्धनात् तिरस्कृतलयाद्यवस्थाधिकारात् सर्वदै-

120 वानुपाधेः सिद्धात्मनः प्रकृष्टतरान्न्यूनभाव इति।

अन्ये त्वत्र पातञ्जलमुक्तिरुपक्षिप्तेति कथयन्ति। तेषां पूर्वमेव कैवल्यपदेन सांख्यमुक्तिवत् साप्युपात्तेति पौनरुक्त्यमनिवार्यम्। न हि तयोर्मुक्तौ

4.119 °बन्धना°] —ा° P_2

4.117 अनुग्रहतिरोभावौ द्वौ पाशौ तु सदाशिवे *Niśvāsa Nayasūtra* 1:83cd. Also quoted, without attribution, ad *Mataṅgavidyāpāda* 3:1–3 and by Tryambakaśambhu ad *Kiraṇa* 1.13 (IFP T. 1102, p.13).

4.118 पशुराद्यः सदाशिवः Source unknown. Also quoted ad *Mataṅgavidyāpāda* 3:1–3.

4.115 आधिक्यं परमेशानादिति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_2$; आदि ≍परमेशानादिति P_2आधिक्यं परमे ⊔ नादि M_1; आधिक्यं परमेशानान्निर्मलत्वं च केवलम्। सिद्ध एव हि कर्तृत्वमौदासीन्यं महेश्वरे E 4.115 पक्षान्तरम्] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_1$; फलान्तरम् $A_1P_2M_2E$ 4.115 परमेशस्य] Σ; तस्य M_2 4.115 लयाधिकारभोगाभ्युप°] M^{γ}; लयाधिकाराभ्युप° $A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; लयादिकाराभ्युप° P_2; लयाधिकाराहिप° M_1 4.116 °कारादिबन्ध°] Σ; °कारादिति बन्ध° P_2 4.116 पशुत्वस्यानपायात्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_2E$; पशुत्वन्तस्यानपायात् P_1; पशुत्वस्य नपायाद् P_2; ⊔ स्यानपायात् M_1 4.116 यदाहुः] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1E$; तदाहुः $A_1P_1M_2$ 4.118 पशुराद्यः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; पशुराद्य P_1P_2 4.119 इति च] Σ; इति A_1 4.119 विनिवृत्त°] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; निवृत्त° A_1M_2 4.119–120 °द्यवस्थाधिकारात्सर्वदैवानुपाधेः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3$; °तिद्यवस्थाधिकारात् सर्वदैवानुप ≍ ≍ ≍स् P_1; °द्यवस्थात्सर्वदैवानुपाधेस् M_1; °द्यवस्थाधिक ⊔ सर्वदैवानुपा(बा M_2^{sc})धेस् M_2; °द्यवस्थाधिकारात् सर्वथैवानुपाधेः E 4.120 प्रकृष्टतरान्न्यूनभाव] P_1; प्रकृष्टतरा न्यूनभाव $M^{\gamma}P_3M_1$; प्रकृष्टतरा ≍नभाव P_2; प्रकृष्टतया न्यूनभाव A_1M_2; प्रकृष्टतरो न्यूनभाव E 4.121 अन्ये त्वत्र] M^{γ}; अन्ये तु Σ 4.121 पातञ्जलमुक्तिरुपक्षिप्तेति] $P_2P_3M_2E$; पातंजलं मुक्तिरुपक्षिप्तेति M^{γ}; पातञ्जलिमुक्तिरुपक्षिप्तेति A_1; पादञ्जलमुक्तिरुपक्षिप्तेति P_1; पातञ्जलमुक्तिरूप ⊔ षिप्तेति M_1 4.122 °मुक्तिवत् साप्युपात्तेति पौनरुक्त्यमनिवार्यम्] $A_1P_1P_2E$; °मुक्तिवत्साप्युपन्नेति पौनरुक्त्यमनिवार्यं M^{γ}; °मुक्तिवत् साभ्युपोत्तेति पौनरुक्त्यमनिवार्य्यम् P_3; °मुक्त्यात्साप्युपात्तेति ⊔ क्तमनिवार्यम् M_1; °मुक्तिवत् सा +प्यु+ × पर× पात्तेति पौनरुक्त्यमनिवार्यं M_2

भेदः, प्रकृतिवियोगरूपत्वाद्उभयत्रापि तस्याः, अत एवाहुः 'एकं सांख्यं च योगं च' इति, किन्तूपायभेदः—एकत्र हि ज्ञानं तदुपायः, अपरत्र त्वभ्यास इत्यलं विस्तरेण। एतदेव चाधिक्यं सूत्रकृता महेश्वरपदेनोक्तम्। 123

[२.११ केवलं निर्मलत्वं] 126

निर्मलत्वं च केवलमिति मलनिवृत्तिमात्रमेव मोक्षः, न तु सर्वज्ञत्वाद्यभिव्यक्तिरपि, प्रागनभिव्यक्ततत्सङ्गावे प्रमाणाभावात्। सतो ह्यभिव्यक्तिरित्याशयः। यदाह सूत्रकृत् 'अमलकारकाः' इति। 129

[२.१२ सिद्धे कर्तृत्वं, औदासीन्यं महेश्वरे]

सिद्ध एव हि कर्तृत्वमौदासीन्यं महेश्वरे॥ ४॥

परमेश्वरो हि पारार्थ्येन जगत्करणाय प्रवृत्तः। स सर्वकर्तृत्वपदप्राप्तावस्थं

4d. °मौदासीन्यं] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}{}^{c}P_3P^{s}_{3}M_2M^{s}_{3}E$; °मौदासिन्यं $A_1P^{s}_{4}$; °मौदासीन्य P_1P_2; °मौदासीन्ये $P^{s}_{1}{}^{ac}$; °मौदा ⊔ M_1 4 cd.] All sources for the commentary ($M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$) give this half-line here followed by *iti*; $M^{Y}M_1E$ have also given it above (see apparatus on 2–4b)

4.127 केवलमिति मल°] केव— P_1 4.131 °प्राप्तावस्थं] °प्रा— P_1

4.123–124 एकं सांख्यं च योगं च *Bhagavadgītā* 5:5c.

4.123 भेदः] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; भे≍ P_2; भे ⊔ M_2 4.123–124 सांख्यं च] $M^{Y}E_V$; साख्य° P_1(unmetrical); सांख्यं $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E_D$(unmetrical) 4.124 किन्तूपाय°] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; किन्त्वत्रोपाय° A_1M_2 4.124 एकत्र हि ज्ञानं तदुपायः] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; —कत्र हि ज्ञानन्तदुपायो P_1; एकत्र ⊔ न्तदुपायः M_1 4.125 विस्तरेण] $M^{Y}M_1$; विस्तारेणेति P_1; विस्तरेणेति $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$ 4.125 एतदेव चाधिक्यं] Σ; एतदेवाधिक्यं M^{Y} 4.125 महेश्वरपदेनोक्तम्] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; महेश्वरपदेनात्रोक्तं M^{Y}; महेश्वर ⊔ देनोक्तम् M_1 4.127 निर्मलत्वं च] Σ; निर्मलत्वच M^{Y} 4.127–128 °भिव्यक्तिरपि, प्रागनभि°] $A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; °भिव्यक्तिरपि तु प्रागभि° M^{Y}; °भिव्य ⊔ गनाभि° M_1; °भिः व्यक्तिरपि प्रागनभि° M_2 4.128 प्रागनभिव्यक्त°] Σ; प्रागनभिव्यक्त इति P_2 4.128 ह्यभिव्य°] $M^{Y}M_1E$; नभिव्य° A_1M_2; न हि व्य° P_1; ह्यनभिव्य° P_2P_3 4.129 यदाह सूत्रकृत् 'अमलकारकाः' इति] A_1M_2; यदाह सूत्रकृत् विशिखामलकारकाः इति $M^{Y}M_1E$ (placed after the following quotation[?] of 4cd in E); यदाह सूत्रकृ—लाकारक इति P_1; यदाह ≍त्रकृत् अमलकारक इति P_2; यंदाह सूत्रकृत् विशिखाः मलकारक इति P_3 4.131 पारार्थ्येन] $M^{Y}E$; पार्त्थेन A_1; परार्थेन $P_1M_1M_2$; पारा—र्त्थन P^{ac}_{2}; पारार्त्थेन P_3 4.131 जगत्करणाय] $M^{Y}A_1M_1E_V$; जगत्कारणाय $P_1P_2P_3M_2E_D$ 4.131 प्रवृत्तः] Σ; प्रवृत्तेः A_1 4.131 स सर्वकर्तृत्वपद°] $A_1P_1P_3$; स सर्वकर्तृपद° $M^{Y}M_2$; +स+स्सर्वकत्तृत्व≍द° P_2; सः सर्वक ⊔ त्वपद° M_1; सर्वकर्तृत्वपद° E_V; सर्वकर्त्रत्वपद° E_D

132 स्वात्मतुल्यं सिद्धमवलोक्य तत्कालमेवात्मनः कर्तृत्वं विभिन्नमित्यनेककर्तृ-
सम्भवेन समस्तकृत्यानियमदोषप्रसङ्गतः प्रत्युत परार्थानिर्वाहकारणमेवाव-
गम्य तदुपसंहृत्योदासीनः स्वात्मना भवति। सिद्धः पुनः परार्थनिर्वाहमना-
135 स्थयेश्वरेण त्यक्तमवबुध्य सर्वकर्त्रा च विना समस्तपरार्थासम्पत्तिमाकलय्य
करुणयैव सर्वकर्तृत्वपदमवलम्बत इति प्रवाहनित्येश्वरवादिनः।

[२.१३ तारकाभुवनवासित्वम्]

सत्कार्यकरणोपेतस्तारकाभुवने स्थितः।

अनादिरेव पुरुषस्य कार्यकरणैः प्रवाहतः संसारितावत् सम्बन्धः। तत्राना-
देर्विनाशायोगेन मुक्तौ कार्यकरणाभावे प्रमाणासम्भवात् केवलं संसारपरि-

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5b. तारकाभुवने स्थितः] $P_1^sP_4^sM_1M_2$; तारकाभुवने स्थित इति $M^{Y2}A_1P_1P_2P_3$; तारकाभुवने स्थितिः $M^{Y1}M_M^YE$; तरकाभुवने स्थितः $P_3^sM_3^s$ (M^Y also gives this part of the text above in a block with verse 2; E give 5abcd together here)

4.134 प्रत्युत परार्थ°] प्र--प--र्थ° P_2

4.132–133 विभिन्नमित्यनेककर्तृसम्भवेन] $M^YA_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_2E$; विभिन्नमिति अनेककर्तृत्व-सम्भवेन P_1; विभिन्नमित्यमेककर्तृसंभवेन P_2^{ac}; विभिन्न ⊔ त्रसंभवेन M_1 4.133 °दोषप्र-सङ्गतः] M^Y; °प्रसङ्गदोषतः $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °प्रसंगदोषात् M_1 4.133–134 °कार-णमेवावगम्य] P_2P_3E; °कारणमवगम्य M^YM_1; --रणमवगम्य P_1; °करणमेवावगम्य A_1M_2 4.134 °संहृत्योदासीनः] E_V; °संहृत्यौदासीन्यतः M^Y; °संहृत्योदासीन $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; ⊔ हृत्योदासीन E_D 4.134–135 पुनः परार्थनिर्वाहमनास्थयेश्वरेण त्यक्तमवबुध्य सर्वकर्त्रा] *em.*; पुनः परार्थनिर्वाहमनास्थयेश्वरेण व्यक्तमवबुद्ध्य सर्वकर्त्रा M^Y; पुनः परार्त्थनिर्वाहमनास्थेयेश्वरेण त्यक्तमवबुद्ध्य सर्वकर्त्त्रा A_1P_3; ×≃× पुनः परा-र्त्थनिर्वा×हि× +ह+मनास्थयेश्वरेण त्यक्तमवबुद्ध्य सर्वकर्त्ता P_1; पुनः --र्त्थनिर्वाहमनास्थ-येश्वरेणे (रेणP_2^{ac}) त्युक्तं अवबुद्ध्य सर्वकर्त्रा P_2; पु ⊔ र्थनिर्वाहमनास्थयेश्वरेण त्यक्तमवबुध्य सर्वकर्त्रा M_1; पुनः परार्थनिर्वाहमास्थेश्वरेण त्यक्तमवबुद्ध्य सर्वकर्ता M_2; पुनः परार्थनि-र्वाहमनास्थयेश्वरेणोक्तमवबुध्य सर्वकर्त्रा E 4.135 समस्तपरार्थासंपत्ति°] $M^YA_1P_2P_3M_2$; सम ≃ पर--सम्पत्ति° P_1; समस्तपरार्थास ⊔ पत्ति° M_1; सर्वपरार्थसम्पत्ति° E 4.136 करुणयैव] Σ; करुणैव P_3 4.136 °वादिनः] Σ; °वादिना M_1 5.1 पुरुषस्य कार्यकरणैः] *conj.*; पुरुषः कार्यकरणैः $M^YA_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; पुरुषकार्यक (का P_1^{ac}) रणैः P_1 5.1 संसारितावत् सम्बन्धः] $A_1^sP_1P_2$; संसारी तावत्संबंधस् M^YM_2; सांसारिता-वत् संबन्धः A_1^{ac}; संसारी तावत् बन्धः P_3; संसानी तावत्संबन्धः M_1^{ac}; संसारी तावत् सम्बद्धः M_1^{pc}; संसारी तावत्संबन्ध E_D; संसरति सम्बद्धः E_V 5.2 °र्विनाशायोगेन] $M^YA_1P_2P_3E$; °र्विनाशोयोयोगेन P_1; °र्वि ⊔ गेन M_1; °र्विनाशायोगे न M_2

दृष्टकर्मनिबद्धदुःखशरीरेन्द्रियनिवृत्तौ प्रकृष्टतरकार्यकरणलाभतस्तारकाभुवने नक्षत्रमार्गे ऽवस्थानमात्मनां मोक्ष इति केषाञ्चिद् दुरभिसन्धिः।

[२.१४ ज्ञानकर्तृत्वयोर्नाशः]

ज्ञानकर्तृत्वयोर्नाशः

मुक्तौ बुद्धेरभावादिच्छाप्रयत्नयोरभावे कर्तृत्वनाशः, बुद्ध्यादीनामभावश्च नवानामात्मगुणानामभावात्। यदाहुः—'बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसंस्कारधर्माधर्माणां नवानामत्यन्तविमोक्षो ऽपवर्गः' इति।

[२.१५ सर्वनाशः]

सर्वनाशस्तथापरः॥ ५ ॥

ग्राहकैकरूपत्वाच्चैतन्यस्य ग्राहकत्वस्य च ग्राह्यापेक्षयावस्थितेर्ग्राह्यस्य चाणुस्थूलादिविकल्पैः सर्वथा सम्भवाभावेनावस्तुरूपत्वात् तदपेक्षस्यापि ग्राहकत्वस्य भ्रान्तत्वे सति बाधकज्ञानोदयमात्रेणैव ध्वंस इति प्रदीपनिर्वाणवा-

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5 c. ज्ञानकर्तृत्वयोर्नाशः] $M^{Y1}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}E^{1}$; ज्ञानकर्तृत्वयोर्नाश इति M^{Y2} $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E^2$ ($M^{Y}E$ give this part of the text above too) 5 d. तथापरः] $M^{Y1}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}E^{1}_{D}$; तथापर इति $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E^2$; तथापरे E^{1}_{V} (E also gives 5d after 5abc above)

5.3 °दृष्टकर्मनिबद्धदुःख°] M^{Y}; °दृष्टकर्म्मनिबन्धदुःख° A_1; °दृष्टे कर्म्मनिबन्ध+दुःख+° P_1; °दृष्टं कर्म्म ⌣बन्धदुःख° P_2; °दृष्टकर्मनिबन्धनदुःख° P_3E; °दृष्टकर्म ⊔ बन्धदुःख° M_1; °दृष्टिकर्मनिबन्धदुःख° M_2 5.3 प्रकृष्टतर°] Σ; प्रकृष्टतरा P_1 5.3 °करणलाभत°] $M^{Y}A_1P^{pc}_{2}P_3M_1E$; °करणाभत° P_1; °करणलाभ+त+ P_2; °करणालाभत° M_2 5.4 दुरभिसन्धिः] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; ⌣दुरभिसन्धिः P_2; दुरभिसिद्धिः M_1 5.6 °प्रयत्नयोरभावे] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; °प्रयत्नयोरभ+ा+व° P_2; °प्रयत्न ⊔ भावे M_1 5.6–7 बुद्ध्यादीनामभावश्च नवानामात्मगुणानामभावात्] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E^{pc}_{V}$; बुद्ध्यादी ⌣ ⌣भा---श्च नवानामात्म× ना× गुणानामभावात् P_1; बुद्ध्यादीनां(नाम)भावश्च नवानामात्मगुणानां(नाम)भावात् E_V; बुद्ध्यादीनां भावश्च नवानामात्मगुणानां भावात् E_D 5.8 °त्यन्तविमोक्षो ऽपवर्गः] $A_1P^{pc}_{2}P_3$; °त्यन्तं विमोक्षो ऽपवर्गः $M^{Y}M_2E$; °त्मनामत्यन्तमो× क्ष× क्षोप--- P_1; °त्यन्तविमोक्षापवर्ग P^{ac}_{2}; °त्यन्तं विमोक्षापवर्ग M_1 5.10 ग्राहकैकरूप°] Σ; ग्राहकैरूप° P_2 5.10 ग्राहकत्वस्य च] Σ; ग्राहकत्वस्य च × भ्रांतत्वे सति बाध× M^{Y} 5.10 °वस्थितेर्ग्राह्यस्य] $M^{Y}P_2E$; °वस्थिते ग्राह्यस्य $P_1P_3M_1M_2$; × पेक्षया× वस्थिते ग्राह्य A_1 5.11 °विकल्पैः सर्वथा सम्भवाभावेनावस्तु°] $M^{Y}P^{pc}_{2}P_3E$; °विकल्पैस्सर्वधा सम्भवाभावेनानुवस्तु° A_1M_2; °विकल्पैस्सर्वथा सम्---भावेनावस्तु° P_1; °विकल्पैस्सर्वथा संभवाभ+ा+वेनावस्तु° P_2; °विकारै ⊔ र्वथा संभवाभावेनावस्तु° M_1 5.12 भ्रान्तत्वे सति बाधक°] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; च भ्रांतत्वे सति बाधक° M^{Y}; भ्रान्तत्वे स ⊔ बाधक° M_1; भ्रान्तत्वे सति बाध° E

दिनः।

[२.१६ चार्वाकरीत्या सर्वनाशपक्षः]

अन्यैस्तु भूतेभ्य एव विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, तान्येवानु विनश्यतीति शरीरविनाशादेव सर्वनाश इत्येवमयं पक्षो ऽभ्युपगतो जाड्यादिति॥ ५॥

[२.१७ असमानतन्त्रगीतफलोपसंहारः]

एवं च तन्त्रान्तरप्रसिद्धं फलं प्रदर्श्योपसंहरति

स्वमतैर्वादिभिस्त्वेवं विमुक्तिः परिकल्पिता।
दृष्टा नैव हि मोहान्धैः सदीश्वरसमानता॥ ६॥

तैस्तैर्मोहान्धैरविद्याक्रान्तचिन्नयनैः सत्यभूतपरमेश्वरसमतालक्षणं पतिशास्त्रैकगम्यं मुक्तिलक्षणं फलं न दृष्टम्। अतस्तैरेवंविधा मुक्तिः स्वकल्पनाभिः कल्पितेति॥ ६॥

[२.१८ ईश्वरसमता मोक्षः]

इदानीं समानतान्त्रिकान् प्रत्याह

6.] स्वमतैरिति $M^{Y^2}A_1P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_2$; स्वमतेरिति P_2^{ac} 6a. °स्त्वेवं] $M^{Y^1}M_M^YP_3^S P_4^SM_1M_3^SE$; °स्त्वैवं P_1^S 6b. परिकल्पिता] $P_3^SP_4^SM_3^SE$; प्रविकल्पिता $M^{Y^1}M_M^Y$; परिकता [कीर्तिता] M_1 6d. सदीश्वरसमानता] P_4^SE; सदेश्वरसमानता $M^YM_M^YP_3^S M_1M_3^S$; सदेश्वरसमानताः P_1^S

6.1 °रविद्याक्रान्तचिन्न°] °र---न्तचि--- P_2

5.12–13 °निर्वाणवादिनः] $A_1P_2P_3$; °निर्वाणवादिन इति $M^YP_1M_1M_2E$ 5.15 अन्यैस्तु भूतेभ्य] Σ; जन्यै--- P_1 5.15 °मुत्पद्यते ता°] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °मुपपद्यते ता° P_1; °मुत्पद्यतो° P_2 5.15 विनश्यतीति] E; विनश्यन्तीति $M^YA_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; विनश्यन्तीति न P_2 5.16 सर्वनाश] $P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; सर्वविनाश M^Y; सर्वं नाश A_1M_2 5.16 पक्षो ऽभ्युपगतो] $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; पक्षोभ्युपगमतो M^Y; पक्षेभ्युपगतो P_2 5.16 जाड्यादिति] $M^YP_1P_3M_1M_2E$; जाड्यात् A_1; जास्यात् P_2 5.18 प्रदर्श्योप°] $P_3M_1M_2E$; प्रदृश्योप° $M^YA_1P_2$; प्र--- P_1 6.1 तैस्तैर्मोहा°] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_1E$; तैस्तैर्म्महा° A_1M_2 6.1 °क्रान्त°] $M^YA_1P_1P_3M_1E$; °कान्त° M_2 6.1 °समतालक्षणं] Σ; °समान+त्व+लक्षण× त्व× म् P_1 6.2 °गम्यं] $M^YA_1M_1M_2$; °गम्य° $P_1P_2P_3E$ 6.2 °लक्षणं फलं न दृष्टम्। अतस्तैरेवंविधा मुक्तिः] $A_1M_1M_2E$; °लक्षणं फलमतस्तैरेवंविधा मुक्ति M^Y(eyeskip); °लक्षण--- लन्न दृष्टमतस्तैरेवंविधा मुक्ति P_1; °लक्षणं ≍लन्न दृष्ट≍तस्तैरेवंविधा मुक्ति P_2; °लक्षणं फलन्न दृष्टमतस्तैरेवंविधमुक्ति P_3 6.5 इदानीं समान°] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; इदानीं समानकाल° M^Y; इ(उ M_1^{ac})दा ⊔ समान° M_1

समता च समुत्पत्तिसङ्क्रान्त्यावेशपक्षतः।
नाभिव्यक्तिः परा गीता बद्धवाचामगोचरा॥ ७॥

सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणाभिव्यक्तिरूपा परमेश्वरसमता परा प्रकृष्टा न गीता। कुतः परेत्याह—समुत्पत्तिसंक्रान्त्यावेशपक्षत इति।

[२.१८.१ उत्पत्तिसमतापक्षः]

पश्ववस्थायां सर्वज्ञत्वादिधर्मासत्त्वान्मुक्तौ च परमेश्वरसमत्वश्रुत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या पश्वात्मन्यपूर्व एव तदा सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणः परमेश्वरसम उत्पद्यत इत्युत्पत्तिसमतापक्षः कैश्चिदभ्युपगतः।

[२.१८.२ सङ्क्रान्तिसमतापक्षः]

तथा परैरपि पटादौ कस्तूरिकामोदवत्तत्र परमेश्वरगुणः संक्रामति मुक्ताविति

7.] समता चेति $M^{Y2}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 7a. समुत्पत्ति°] $M^Y_MP^s_1E$; समुत्पत्तिः $M^{Y1}P^s_3P^s_4M_1M^s_3$ 7c. नाभिव्यक्तिः परा] $M^{Y1}M^Y_MP^s_1P^s_3M^s_3$; नाभिव्यक्तिः परं M_1; अभिव्यक्तिपरा E_D; अभिव्यक्तिः परा $P^s_4E_V$ 7d. बद्धवाचामगोचरा] $M^{Y1}M^Y_M$; बद्धवा ×च× चाम × ।× गोचरात् P^s_1; बुद्धिवाचामगोचरा $P^s_3M_1E$; बद्धवाचामगोचर P^s_4; बुद्धिवाचामगोचरात् M^s_3

7.1 सर्वज्ञत्वादि°] after this M_1 skips to the middle of the *avatārikā* to 43; but the text continues on a subsequent p. 10 in the MS. 7.1 परमेश्वर°] परमे— P_1 7.1 कुतः] — P_2 7.5 परमेश्वर°] —मेश्वर° P_1 7.5 पश्वात्म°] —त्म° P_2 7.6 M^Y accidentally repeats and then deletes from °तापक्षः कैश्चिदभ्युपगतः up to इयमभिव्यक्तिसमता in the middle of the commentary on verse 10 (f. 61^v). The readings of this repeated passage are marked M^{Y2}, where they differ from those of the first copying (M^{Y1}). 7.8 तथा] — P_1

7.1 °भिव्यक्तिरूपा] Σ; °भिव्यक्तिरूप° E 7.1 न गीता] $M^YA_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; ≃गीता म— P_2; गीता E 7.2 °संक्रान्त्यावेशपक्षत इति°] $M^YA_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; °संक्रान्त्यावेशपक्षतः बुद्धिवाचामगोचरादिति M_1; °संक्रान्तावेशपक्षत इति E 7.4 °धर्मासत्त्वान्मुक्तौ] Σ; °धर्म्मसत्व—क्त— P_2 7.5 तदा] Σ; तद° P_2 7.5 °गुणः परमेश्वरसम उत्पद्यत] $M^YA_1P_1M_1E$; °गुणः परमेश्वरस(?)दुत्पद्यत P_2; × धर्म्मासमत्वात् मुक्तौ च× गुणः परमेश्वरसम उत्पद्यते P_3; °गुणः परमेश्वर +त्+ समुत्पद्यते M_2 7.6 °भ्युपगतः] Σ; °भ्युपगमः P_3 7.8 पटादौ] Σ; पदादेः P_1 7.8 कस्तूरिका°] $P^{pc}_1P_3M_1M_2E$; नवकस्तूरिका° M^Y; कुस्तुरिका A_1; क+ा+स्तूरिका° P_1; कस्तूरि≃ P_2 7.8 संक्रामति] $M^YA_1P^{ac}_2P_3M_1M_2E$; संक्रान्तिमति P_1; संक्रा+न्त+मति P_2

9 संक्रान्तिसमतापक्षः प्रतिपन्नः। एते च शिखासंक्रान्तिवादिनः पाशुपताः सूत्रकृता विशिखाकारकत्वेनोक्ताः।

[२.१८.३ आवेशसमतापक्षः]

12 अन्यैस्तु तदा परमेश्वरगुणैः स्वाश्रयस्थैरेव सिद्धः समाविश्यते ग्रहैरिव पुरुष इत्यावेशपक्षः।

एतेभ्य ईश्वरसमतापक्षान्तरेभ्य इयमभिव्यक्तिसमता वक्ष्यमाणा बद्धवा-

15 चामगोचरत्वात् परा॥ ७॥

[३ पूर्वपक्षप्रतिक्षेपः]

एवं तन्त्रान्तरफलान्युद्दिश्यार्थक्रमेण प्रतिक्षिपति

18 [३.१ सत्त्वसम्भोगस्तारकाभुवनवासित्वं च]

सत्त्वभुक् तारकावासी द्वयमेतद् विनश्वरम्।
भोक्ता भुवनवासी च दृष्टो लोके विनश्वरः॥ ८॥

8.] $M^{Y}M_{M}^{Y}P_{1}^{S}P_{3}^{S}P_{4}^{S}M_{3}^{S}E$; सत्वभुक्तारकावासीत्यादिन A_1; सत्वभुक् तारकावासीत्यादिना P_1M_2; सत्वभु ⌣ ⌣ त्तारकावासीद्यादिना P_2; *om.* P_3M_1 8a. तारकावासी] $M^{Y}M_{M}^{Y}E$; तारकावासि $P_{1}^{S}P_{3}^{S}P_{4}^{S}$; तारकावासीत् M_3^S

7.13 After इत्यावेशपक्षः P_1 skips up to, but not including, उच्यमानं न शोभते in the *avatārikā* to 21a. It skips back, however, to exactly this point immediately after the word परिगृहीतः at the end of the commentary on 26ab. 8.1 $P_{1}^{S}P_{4}^{S}$ place verses 8 to 20 after verse 27b.

7.9 संक्रान्तिसमतापक्षः] $M^{Y}P_3M_1$; पतिसंक्रान्तिसमतापक्षः P_1; समतासंक्रान्तिपक्षः A_1M_2E; संक्रन्तिसमतपक्षः P_2 7.9 एते च शिखासंक्रान्तिवादिनः ⋯ °त्वेनोक्ताः] M_1 has this sentence after the following sentence (अन्यैस्तु ⋯ इत्यावेशपक्षः) 7.9 एते च] $A_1P_1M_1M_2$; एतेन $M^{Y}P_2P_3E$ 7.9 °वादिनः पाशुपताः] $M^{Y^2}A_1P_3M_1E$; °पाशुपताः M^{Y^1}; °वा—पाशुपतास् P_1; °वादिनः पा⌣पतास् P_2; °वादिनः पाशुपता M_2 7.10 सूत्रकृता विशिखाकारकत्वेनोक्ताः] P_2M_1E; सूत्रे संस्कारकत्वेनोक्ताः M^{Y^1}; सूत्रे शिखाकारकत्वेनोक्ताः M^{Y^2}; सूत्रकृता विशिखामलकारकत्वेनोक्ताः $A_1P_1M_2$; सूत्रे विशिखाकारकतेनोक्ताः P_3 7.12 तदा] $M^{Y}P_2M_1E$; ततदा P_1; *om.* P_3; तथा A_1M_2 7.12 ग्रहैरिव पुरुष] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; ग्रहै— P_1; ग्रहेरिव पुरुष M_1 7.13 इत्यावेशपक्षः] Σ; इत्यावेशपक्षः परिगृहीतः M^{Y} 7.14 वक्ष्यमाणा] Σ; वक्ष्यमाण P_1 7.14–15 बद्धवाचाम्] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; बुद्धिवाचाम् M_1E 7.17 एवं तन्त्रान्तरफलान्युद्दिश्या°] $M^{Y}P_1M_1$; एव तन्त्रान्तरफलान्युद्दिश्या° $A_1P_3M_2$; ए तन्त्रान्तरफलान्यद्दिश्या° P_2; एवं तन्त्रान्तरफलानि निर्दिश्या° E

सत्त्वभुक् तारकावासीत्येतद् द्वयमपि फलं विनश्वरम्, भोक्तुर्भुवनवासिनश्च देवदत्तादेर्विनाशो दृष्टः।

[३.१.१ सत्त्वसम्भोगः]

ननु भोक्तृत्वं ज्ञातृत्वमेव, पुरुषस्वभावः। अत्राकर्मफलं कथं विनश्यति? इत्युक्तम्। यद्येवं सर्वज्ञ एव तदा पुरुषो भवेत्, न सत्त्वमात्रज्ञः, विशेषे हेत्वभावादित्यस्मद्दर्शनमेव भवतु।

[३.१.२ तारकाभुवनवासित्वम्]

नन्वत्रैवम्, भुवनवासिनस्तु प्रवाहानादिभिर्भुवनादिभिः सम्बन्धः कथं निवर्तते? अत एव प्रवाहानादित्वात् कर्मभिस्तत्तत्फलैर्वा। कूटस्थनित्यस्त्वनिवर्त्य इति परमार्थः॥ ८॥

[३.२ गणेन्द्राग्निसमत्वे]

गणेन्द्राग्निसमौ प्रेर्यावसम्पूर्णमनोरथौ।

अत्र 'महागणो महेशस्य, समत्वं तेजसां निधेः' इत्येतयोः पक्षयोः पराकृतिः। गणेन्द्रसमस्य तावदुपरितनपदसङ्गावेनैव तत्प्राप्तिकामनान्तरयोगतो

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9 ab.] गणेन्द्राग्निसमाविति $M^{Y2}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; M^Y gives 9ab and then this *pratīka* for it; E give 9cd immediately after 9ab. 9a. °समौ] $M^{Y1}M^Y_MP^s_1P^s_4M_1M^s_3$; °समा P^s_3

8.1 विनश्वरम्, भोक्तुर्भु°] विनश---भो---र्भु° P_2

9.1 महागणो महेशस्य, समत्वं तेजसां निधेः *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 3a,d.

8.1 द्वयमपि फलं] M^YP_3E; द्वयं विफलं $A_1P_1M_1M_2$; द्ववयमपि फला P_2 8.4 °त्राकर्मफलं] $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °त्र कर्मफलं M^Y; °त्र---फलं P_2 8.4–5 कथं विनश्यति? इत्युक्तम्] $M^YA_1P_1M_1M_2E$; विनश्यन्तीत्युक्तम् P_2P_3 8.5 विशेषे] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; विशेष° M^YP_1E 8.8 नन्वत्रैवम्] Σ; नन्वस्त्वेवं E 8.8 °भिर्भुवनादिभिः] $M^YP_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °भिर्भुवनादिभि A_1; ---स् P_2 8.9 प्रवाहा°] Σ; प्रवाह° A_1 8.9 कर्मभिस्तत्तत्फलैर्वा] $M^YA_1P_1P_3M_2E$; कर्म्मभिस्तत्फलैर्वा P_2; कर्मभिर्वास्तत्तत्फलैर्वा M_1 8.9–10 कूटस्थनित्यस्त्वनिवर्त्य] M^Y; कूटस्थो नित्यस्त्वनिवर्त्य $A^c_1P_2P_3M_2$; कूटस्थो नित्यस्त्वनिवर्त्य× त× A_1; कूटस्थ × नित्य× नित्यस्त्वनिर्वर्त्य P_1; कूटस्थनित्यत्वं निवत्यत M_1; कूटस्थनित्यस्वभावो ऽनिवर्त्य E. 9.1 महेशस्य, समत्वं] Σ; महेशस्यासमत्वं M_2 9.2 गणेन्द्रसमस्य] Σ; गणेशमस्य P_2 9.2 °कामनान्तर°] M^YM_1E; °कामन्तर° A_1P_3; °कामान्तर° $P_1P_2M_2$

ऽसंपूर्णमनोरथतेति कथं मुक्तिः? एवमग्न्यादित्यसमयोरपि द्रष्टव्यम्। अथास्मदाद्यप्रत्यक्षो ऽन्य एव—

सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्ता च वह्न्यादित्यादिरुच्यते।

—यद्येवं तत्समत्वं मुक्तिरित्यस्मद्दर्शनमेवेत्यदोषः।

[३.३ अकर्तृत्वं च, कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वं च]

अकर्ता चाकृतार्थो हि तद्वन्नेशसमो यतः॥ ९॥

अनेन 'अकर्ता सर्ववेद्यवित्, कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वम्' इत्येतौ पक्षावपोद्येते।

तद्वदिति। यद्वद् गणेन्द्राग्निसमावपरिपूर्णमनोरथावुक्तौ, तद्वदेतावपि परमेश्वरसमकर्तृत्वपदाप्राप्तिहेतोस्तदभिलाषयोगाद् अपरिपूर्णमनोरथ-

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9cd.] अकर्ता चेत्य् $M^{Y^2}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$. M^Y gives first 9cd and then this *pratīka* for it; E place 9cd immediately after 9ab, but have a *pratīka* for it here. 9c. चाकृतार्थो] $M^{Y^1}M^Y_MP^s_1P^s_3P^s_4M^s_3E$; च कृतार्थो M_1 9d. तद्वन्नेशसमो] $M^Y_MP^s_1P^s_4M_1M^s_3$; तद्वन्नेशसमौ M^{Y^1}; तद्वन्ने ⌣ समो P^s_3; तद्वन्नेशे समो E

9.8 M_1's text is again garbled because of muddled folios, for it reads here: प्रयोज्यत्वमियं वेदनो वृत्यन्तराळेष्वप्यलुप्त ⋯ (this being a slip to the middle of the commentary on 43). We must pick up the text from the middle of line 5 of p. 3 of M_1's second sequence of pagination. 9.11 °समकर्तृत्वपदा°⋯योगाद् अपरिपूर्ण°] —गादपरिपूर्ण्ण° A_1

9.5 सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्ता च वह्न्यादित्यादिरुच्यते Source unknown.

9.8 अकर्ता सर्ववेद्यवित्, कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वम् *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 3bc.

9.3 °पूर्णमनोरथतेति] $M^YA_1P_1P_2P_3E$; °पूर्णमनोरथेति M_1; °पूर्ण मनोरथतेति M_2 9.3 °दित्यसमयोरपि] $P_1P_3M_1$; °दित्यसमत्वयोरपि M^YE_V; °दित्यासमयोरपि A_1M_2; °दिसमयोरपि P_2; °दित्यसमययोरपि E_D 9.3 द्रष्टव्यम्] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2E_V$; दृष्टव्यम् P_1E_D; द्रव्यं P_2 9.4 °प्रत्यक्षो ऽन्य] Σ; °प्रत्यक्षान्य M_1 9.5 सर्वज्ञः] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2E$; सर्वज्ञ° P_1P_2 9.5 वह्न्यादित्या°] M_1M_2E; वह्न्यादीत्या° M^Y; वन्ह्यादित्या° $A_1P_1P_3$; वन्यादित्या° P_2 9.6 तत्समत्वं] Σ; तत्समत्व° P_2 9.8 °पि प्रयोज्यत्वम्] $M^YP_1P_2M_1M_2E$; प्रयोज्यत्वम् A_1; °पि प्रयोज्यम् P_3 9.8 इत्येतौ] Σ; इति चेतौ M^Y 9.8–9 पक्षावपोद्येते] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2E$; पक्षापोद्येते P_1; पक्षावपोद्यते P_2 9.10 तद्वदिति] Σ; तद्विति P_2 9.10 °समावपरि°] Σ; °समापरि° P_2 9.10 °रथावुक्तौ, तद्वदेतावपि] $M^YP^{ac}_2P_3M_2E$; °रथा—तावपि A_1; °रथावुक्तौ तद्वदेदावपि P_1; °रथा+द्य+वुक्तौ तद्वत् तावपि P_2; °रथावृतौ ⊔ पि M_1 9.11 °समकर्तृत्वपदाप्राप्ति°] P_1P_3; °समकर्तृत्वपदाप्राप्तितो M^Y; °कर्तृत्वपदाप्राप्ति° P_2; °समकर्तृकत्वपदाप्राप्ति° M_1M_2E

त्वात् सर्वज्ञावप्यमुक्तौ। स्वरूपावाप्तिरेव हि मोक्षः। कर्तृत्वमपि ज्ञातृत्ववत् पुंसः स्वभाव एवेत्युक्तम्, अतस्तदनवाप्तौ कथं मुक्तिः? 12

अस्त्वेवमत्र, ईश्वरप्रयोज्यत्वं त्वनाद्यात्मनां कथं तदा व्यावर्तते? बन्धनिमित्तत्वात् कलादिवदिति। तदनिवृत्तेस्त्वसावपि विद्येश्वरवत् प्रेर्यत्वादमुक्त एवेति॥ ९॥ 15

[३.४ आधिक्यं परमेशानात्]

'आधिक्यं परमेशानात्' इति पक्षमाभासयति— 18

[३.४.१ आधिक्ये प्रमाणाभावः]

आधिक्ये साधनासत्त्वम्

साधनासत्त्वं प्रमाणाभावः। न हि सर्वज्ञसर्वकर्तृत्वरूपनिर्मलप्रकृष्टतरस्वगुणव्यक्तिप्रतिलम्भतः काचिदात्मनामधिकावस्था प्रमाणैरुपपद्यते, यत्प्राप्तावी-

10a.] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M^{s}_{3}E$; आधिक्ये साधनासत्वमिति $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$ (E give the whole of verse 10 here)

9.12 सर्वज्ञावप्यमुक्तौ] सर्वज्ञा--क्तौ P_2 9.13 °क्तौ कथं] -- P_2 9.18 °पक्षमाभासयति] °पक्षम -- यति P_1

9.13 कर्तृत्वमपि ज्ञातृत्ववत् स्वभाव एवेत्युक्तम् See 3.18–32.

9.18 आधिक्यं परमेशानात् *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 4a.

9.12 कर्तृत्वमपि ज्ञातृत्ववत्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M^{pc}_{2}E$; ⊔ ज्ञातृत्ववत् M_1; कर्तृत्वमपि ज्ञातृत्व × वति× वत् M_2 9.13 स्वभाव एवेत्युक्तम्] Σ; स्वभावेत्युक्तं P_2 9.13 मुक्तिः] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; मुक्तः $M^{\gamma}P_1$ 9.14 अस्त्वेवमत्र, ईश्वरप्रयोज्यत्वं त्वनाद्यात्मनां] P_3; अस्त्वेवम् मन्त्रेश्वरप्रयोज्यत्वमनाद्यात्मनां $M^{\gamma}E$; अस्त्वेवं मन्त्रेश्वरप्रयोज्यत्वन्त्वनाद्यात्मनां A_1M_2; अस्त्वेव मन्त्रेश्वरः प्रयोज्यत्वन्त्वनाद्यात्मनां P_1; अस्त्वेमत्रेश्वरप्रयोज्यत्वन्त्वनाद्यात्मनां P_2; अस्त्वेवमत्रेश्वरप्रयोज्यत्वे अनाद्यंजनं M_1 9.14 कथं तदा] $M^{\gamma}A_1E_D$; क-- P_1; कथन्तदा तद् P_2; कथं तदतनु P_3; कथं कदा $M_1M_2E_V$ 9.15 तदनिवृत्तेस्त्वसावपि] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; तदनिव× त्त× र्त्तें त्वसावपि P_2; तदनिवृत्तावसावपि P_3 9.15 विद्येश्वरवत् प्रेर्यत्वा°] Σ; विद्येश्वर ⊔ र्यत्वा° M_1 10.1 साधनासत्त्वं] $A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; *om.* M^{γ}(eyeskip); सम् P_1; सादनासत्वं P_2 10.1 प्रमाणाभावः] Σ; तत्र सत्प्रमाणाभावः M_1 10.1 सर्वज्ञसर्वकर्तृत्वरूपनिर्मलप्रकृष्टतर°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3$; सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वरूपनिम ⊔ तु ष्टतर° M_1; सर्वज्ञस्सर्वकर्तृत्वरूपनिर्मलप्रकृष्टतर° M_2; सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वरूपनिर्मलप्रकृष्टतर° E 10.2 °लम्भतः] Σ; °लंबतः P_2 10.2 काचिद्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_2$; कदाचिद् P_1M_1E 10.2 °धिकावस्था] $M^{\gamma}A_1M_1M_2E$; °धिका-- P_1; --स्था P_2; °धिकारावस्था P_3 10.2 प्रमाणैरुपपद्यते] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_1E$; प्रमाणै आपपद्यते A_1; प्रमाणैरु ⊔ पद्यते P_2; प्रमाणैः आप × प× द्यते M_2

3 श्वरादाधिक्यं मुक्तौ वर्ण्येत।

[३.४.१.१ ईश्वरस्य लयाद्यवस्थासमावेशः]

ननूक्तमीश्वरस्य लयाद्यवस्थासमावेशेन सिद्धात् न्यूनत्वमिति। अथ को ऽय-
6 मवस्थासमावेशः? यदि वस्त्वन्तरम्, तन्नेष्यते, एकत्वाद् देवतायाः। अथ धर्मपरिणतिः, साप्याचैतन्यदोषेण पूर्वं निषिद्धा निषेत्स्यते च। अथ विवृत्तिः, सापि न, असत्यत्वात्। तद्रूपतास्य कुतः? केवलं क्रियाशक्तिः
9 कर्तव्यतिरस्कारेण कर्तर्येवावस्थिता शिवपदं समुद्दीपयन्ती लयादिपदवाच्यत्वोपाधिभावं तत्र प्रतिपद्यते। सैव यदा कार्यसम्पादनप्रवृत्तानवाप्तकार्यविकृतिस्तदा सदाशिवपदप्रकाशिका भोगादिशब्दवाच्यतायां कारणीभवति।

10.10 यदा] — P_2 10.11 कारणीभवति] कर—ति P_2

10.7 निषिद्धा निषेत्स्यते च Perhaps 4.49–85 and the commentary on 34 are referred to here: see annotation to the translation.

10.3 °श्वरादाधिक्यं] $M^{\gamma}A_1^{\text{i}}P_1P_3M_1M_2$; °श्वरा× व× दाधिक्यं A_1; °श्वरादाधिक्य° P_2; °श्वराधिक्यं E 10.3 वर्ण्येत] *conj.*; वर्ण्यते Σ 10.5 ननूक्त°] Σ; न निरुक्त° P_1 10.5 सिद्धात् न्यूनत्वमिति] A_1P_3; सिद्धान्यूनत्वमिति $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2M_1M_2$; सिद्धं न्यूनत्वमिति E 10.5–6 अथ को ऽयमवस्थासमावेशः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_2^{\text{pc}}E$; अथ कोयमवक्ता—समावेशो P_1; अथ के ⊔ समावेशः M_1; × (साधनासत्वं अथ कोयमवस्थाविशे) × अथ कोयमवस्थासमावेशो M_2 10.6 वस्त्वन्तरम्] Σ; भवस्त्वन्तरं M_1 10.6–7 अथ धर्मपरिणतिः, साप्याचैतन्यदोषेण] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1$; कथं धर्म्मपरिणतिः स्वाप्याचैतन्यदोषेण A_1; असुधर्म्मपरिणतिस्साप्याचैतन्यदोषेण P_1; अथ धर्म्मपरिणतिस्साप्याचैतन्यादोषेण P_2^{ac}; अथ धर्मपरिणतिः साप्यावैतन्यदोषेण M_2; कथम्? धर्मपरिणतिस्थाप्याचैतन्यदोषेण E 10.7 पूर्वं निषिद्धा निषेत्स्यते च] Σ; पूर्ववन्निषद्धा निषेत्स्यते P_2 10.7–8 विवृत्तिः, सापि न, असत्यत्वात्] P_3; विवर्तिः सापि नासत्यत्वात् M^{γ}; विवृत्तिस्सापि न असत्यत्वक् A_1; विवृत्तिस्स—पि नासत्यत्वात् P_1; विवर्त्तस्सापि न सत्यत्वान् P_2; विनिवर्त्तः सापि न असत्यत्वात् M_1; विवृत्तिस्सापि न असत्यत्वन् M_2; विवर्तस्सापि न असत्यत्वात् E_D; विवर्तः, सो ऽपि न, असत्यत्वात् E_V 10.9 कर्तव्यतिरस्कारेण] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E_D^{\text{ut}}$; कर्तर्यव्यतिरेकेण E 10.9 कर्तर्येवावस्थिता] $M_2^{\text{pc}}E$; कर्तर्येव स्थिता $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1$; कर्त्ति(?)र्य्येव स्थिता P_2; कर्तर्ये +वा+ वस्थिता M_2 10.9 °द्दीपयन्ती] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3E$; °द्—पयन्ति P_2; °द्दीपयन्ति M_1; °द्दीपयन्नी M_2 10.11 °वाच्यतायां] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; °वाच्यतायाः M_1; °वाच्यत्वे तथा M_2

यदा तु खल्ववाप्तकार्यग्रामा, तदेश्वरपदप्रबोधिकाधिकारादिपदप्रवृत्तौ हेतुतां 12
भजतीति क्रियाशक्तेरेव तत्तत्कार्योपाधिभेदालम्बनमात्रेणैवात्र भेदव्यवहारः,
न वस्तुभेदः, विवर्तपरिणामपक्षयोरत्रासम्भवादिति गुरवः सच्छास्त्रविवे-
कनिपुणाः, यदाहुः 15

मूर्तिस्तद्वांश्चेति हि लेशादुक्तिश्च शक्तिशक्तिमतोः।

अत एव पञ्चस्रोतसो ऽप्यस्य शास्त्रस्यैकत्वान्न देवताया भेदः, अपि तु
सृष्टिस्थित्यादिपञ्चविधकृत्यभेदेनोपास्यमानस्य तदाकारमात्रस्यैव। अन्यथा 18
कौलमहाव्रतादेरिवात्र शास्त्रभेदप्रसङ्गादेकत्वश्रुतिभिर्विरोधः। एवं च सिद्ध-
स्य प्रोक्तलयाद्यवस्थानभ्युपगमे कर्तृत्वादृष्टेः प्रत्युत ईश्वरान्न्यूनत्वमभिहितं
स्यात्, नाधिक्यम्। 21

10.18 °पास्यमानस्य] °प---नस्य P_1 10.20 Between °न्यूनत्वम° and °भिहितं M^Y has recopied and then deleted (with brackets) a couple of lines of commentary on verse 7 (तापक्षः कैश्चिदभ्युपगतः···इयमभिव्यक्तिसमता). See apparatus thereon.

10.16 मूर्तिस्तद्वांश्चेति हि लेशादुक्तिश्च शक्तिशक्तिमतोः *Tattvasaṅgraha* 52cd (E_V 50ab).

10.12 यदा तु] $M^Y A_1 P_1 P_3 M_1 M_2$; ---दा--- P_2; यदा E 10.12 खल्ववाप्त°] Σ; खल्वाप्त° P_3 10.12 °कार्यग्रमा तदेश्वरपदप्रबोधिकाधिकारादि°] *conj.*; °कार्यग्रामाधिकारपदप्रबोधिका तदा ईश्वरादि° $M^Y P_1 P_3 E$; °कार्यग्रामा अधिकारपदसंप्रबोधिका तदा ईश्वरादि° A_1; °कार्य्यग्रामा≃कारपदप्रबोधिका तदा ईश्वरादि° P_2; °कार्यग्रामा तदाधिकारपदप्रबोधिका ईश्वरादि° M_1; °कार्यग्रामात् अधिकारपदसंप्रबोधिकः तदा ईश्वरादि° M_2 10.13 भजतीति] $M^Y M_1 E$; भजन्तीति $A_1 P_1 P_3 M_2$; भ≃तीति P_2 10.13 क्रियाशक्तेरेव] $M^Y A_1 P_1 M_1 M_2 E$; क्रि---क्तेरेव P_2; क्रियासशक्तेरेव P_3 10.13 °भेदालम्बन°] $M^Y P_3 M_1 E$; °भेदावलंबन° $A_1 P_1 P_2 M_2$ 10.14 °रत्रासम्भवादिति] $M^Y A_1 P_2 P_3$; °रत्र सम्भवादिति P_1; °रसम्भवादिति $M_1 M_2$; °रत्यन्तासम्भवादिति E 10.14 गुरवः] Σ; गुरव P_3 10.16 हि लेशादुक्तिश्च] $M^Y P_2 M_1 M_2 E_V$; लेशादुक्तिश्च A_1(unmetrical); हि लेशादु--- P_1; ⊔ लशोदुक्तिश्च P_3; लेशादिकश्च E_D 10.16 °शक्तिशक्तिमतोः] $M_1 M_2 E$; °शक्तिशक्तिमतोरिति $M^Y A_1 P_1 P_3$; शक्तिमतोः। इति P_2 10.17 अत एव पञ्चस्रोतसो] $M^Y A_1 P_1 M_1 M_2 E$; पञ्चस्रोतसो P_2अत एव पञ्चस्सोतसो P_3 10.17 अपि तु] $M^Y P_1 P_3 M_1 E$; अपि $A_1 M_2$ 10.18 °पञ्चविधकृत्य°] $M^Y A_1 P_1 P_2 P_3 M_1 M_2$; °पञ्चकृत्य° E 10.19 °देकत्वश्रुति°] Σ; °देरिवकर्तृत्वश्रुति° P_3^{ac} 10.20 °वस्थानभ्युपगमे] $A_1 P_2 M_1 M_2$; °वस्थानाभ्युपगमे $M^Y E$; °वस्थानभ्युप---P_1; °वस्थानमभ्युपगमे P_3 10.20 कर्तृत्वादृष्टेः] ---त्वादृष्टेः P_1 10.20 °न्न्यूनत्वमभिहितं] $P_1 P_3 M_1 E$; °न्यूनत्वमभिहितं $M^Y P_2$; °न्यूनत्वामभिहितं A_1; °न्यूनत्व × ।× मभिहितं M_2

[३.४.१.२ ईश्वरादपि प्रकृष्टतरा शक्तिः?]

अथेश्वरस्यापि यत्परमेश्वरत्वं निरुपाधिज्योतीरूपा सर्वज्ञत्वादिशक्तिः—य-
24 दाहुः

यया विना न सर्वज्ञः सो ऽपि तस्यै नमो ऽस्तु ते। इति—

तत् प्रकृष्टतरं परमेश्वरस्थानात् सिद्धप्राप्यमभ्युपगम्यत इति—तदयुक्तं, श-
27 क्तिशक्तिमतोर्भेदासिद्धेर्व्यपदेशभेदस्य कल्पितत्वात्। सर्वज्ञत्वादिशक्तेरिवेश्व-
रस्यापि तदूपत्वान्नान्योन्योर्ध्वता युक्तेत्यभिन्नः स्वभावः, शाब्दस्तु भेदो
न बाध्यते। न च ततो ऽर्थस्थितिः— शक्तेरपि यच्छक्तत्वं, तस्यापि
30 यः प्रकर्षः, तस्यापि प्रकृष्टतरावस्था मुक्तिरित्येवं तरतमादिप्रतिपाद्यप्रक-
र्षभेदाव्यवस्थितेरनवस्थितिरेव मुक्तौ भवेत्, कल्पितव्यपदेशमात्रभेदस्य न

10.23–24 °शक्तिः—यदाहुः यया] °सक्त— P_1 10.27 °शक्तिमतोर्भेदासिद्धे-र्व्य°] °शक्तिम—र्व्य° P_1; °शक्तिमतो —सिद्धेर्व्य° P_2 10.29 न च ततो ऽर्थस्थितिः···तस्यापि] illegible interlinear scrawl in P_1

10.25 यया विना न सर्वज्ञः सो ऽपि तस्यै नमस्तु ते Source unknown.

10.23 °श्वरत्वं] Σ; °श्वरत्व° A_1 10.23 °ज्योतीरूपा] $M^{\gamma}A_1E_V$; °ज्योतिरूपा $P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E_D$ 10.25 यया विना] $M^{\gamma}P_2M_1M_2E_V$; यथा विना A_1; —विना P_1; यया ∸∸ P_3 10.25 नमो ऽस्तु ते। इति] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; नमो नम इति M^{γ}; नमस्तु ते। इति M_1 10.26 तत् प्रकृष्टतरं] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; प्रकृष्टतरं A_1M_2 10.26 प-रमेश्वरस्थानात्] $M^{\gamma}A_1^{c}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; परमे+श्व+रस्थानात् A_1; परमेश्वरं परमेश्वरस्था-नात् M_2 10.26 °गम्यत] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °गम्य P_2 10.27 °देशभेदस्य] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; °देशस्य भेदस्य E 10.27 कल्पितत्वात्] Σ; कल्पितवात् E_D 10.27–28 °शक्तेरिवेश्वरस्यापि] M_1; °शक्तेस्तथोक्तेरेवेश्वरस्यापि M^{γ}; °शक्तेरेवेश्वरस्या-पि $A_1P_1M_2$; °शक्तेरेवे—स्यापि P_2; °शक्तेरेव ईश्वरस्यापि P_3; °शक्तिरिवेश्वरत्वस्यापि E 10.28 तदूपत्वान्नान्योन्योर्ध्वता] *conj.*; तदूपत्वान्नान्योर्ध्वतायुक्त इत्य° M^{γ}; त-दूपत्वान्नान्ये+ा+तायुक्तेतीत्य° A_1; तदूपत्वान्नान्न्योन्यतर ∸ त्व(?)ता युक्तेत्य° P_1; तदूपत्वान्नान्यो भेदे युक्तेत्य° P_2; तदूपत्वान्नान्योन्यभेदे युक्त इत्य° P_3; तदूपत्वान्नान्यो-भिदा युक्ता इत्य° M_1; तदूपत्वा +न्या+ न्योता युक्तेतीत्य° M_2; तदूपत्वान्नान्योन्यता युक्तेत्य° E 10.28 °भिन्नः स्वभावः] *conj.*; °भिन्नस्वभावः $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °भिन्न-स्वभाव A_1M_2 10.28 शाब्दस्तु] Σ; श ∸ब्दास्तु P_1 10.29 न च ततो ऽर्थस्थितिः] M^{γ}; न च तदूर्ध्वस्थितिश् A_1P_3; —तदूर्द्धश्शक्ति P_2; तेन च ततो ऽर्थस्थितिः M_1E; न च तदूर्ध्वस्थिति M_2 10.29 शक्तेरपि यच्छक्त°] Σ; स्थितेरपि य ∸क्त° P_2 10.30 प्र-कर्षः] Σ; प्रकृष्टः A_1 10.30 प्रकृष्टतरा°] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1E$; प्रकृष्टतरो $A_1P_3M_2$; प्रकृष्टरो P_2 10.30–31 °प्रकर्षभेदाव्यवस्थितेरनवस्थितिरेव] $M^{\gamma}P_2M_1E$; °प्रकृष्टभेदाव्यवस्थि-तेरेवानवस्थितिरेव A_1M_2; °प्र—नवस्थितिरेव P_1; °प्रकृष्टभेदाव्यवस्थितेरनवस्थितिरेव P_3

क्वचिदप्यप्रसृतिर्यतः। तस्मादीश्वरसमतैव मुक्तावभ्युपगन्तव्या, न त्वाधिक्यम्। 33

[३.४.१.३ ईश्वरस्य पशुत्वम्]

अनुग्रहतिरोभावकर्तृत्वं कर्तृत्वविशेषात्मकत्वान्न पाशात्मकम्, अनौपाधिकत्वात्। यदपि पशुत्वमुक्तं भगवतः, तद् आभिमानिकभेदकल्पनया शक्त्यन्तरप्रकाशप्रतिपादनफलं योगपीठसंस्थितायेति मन्त्रभाष्यप्रतिपादितभगवत्सदाशिवपीठभाववत् सकलशास्त्रपर्यालोचनयोपचारदृशा व्याख्येयम्, न तु पदमात्रार्थप्रतिपत्तौ ग्रहो बालवद्विधेयः। इत्यलमनुपासितगुरुभिः स्वकल्पनोत्थापितशास्त्रार्थशालिभिः सह विवादेन। 36 39

यद्वा पशुराद्यः सदाशिव इति संस्कार्यसदाशिवाभिप्रायेणानुपचारत एव। तथा हि—दीक्षायां विद्यातत्त्वाद्धुतस्य क्रमेण मलक्षपणपूर्वं क्रियाशक्त्यात्मकशिवत्वाभिव्यक्तिः स्थूलसूक्ष्मपरभेदेन क्रियमाणानेकविद्येश्वराद्य- 42

10.32–35 न त्वाधिक्यम्। अनुग्रहति°] — P_1 10.36–37 शक्त्यन्तरप्रकाशप्रतिपादनफलं] शक्त्य—दनफलम् P_1 10.38 °दृशा व्याख्येयम्] — P_1 10.41 यद्वा पशुराद्यः सदाशिव] —शिव P_1; यद्वा पशुराद्यस्सदा— P_2 10.42–43 क्रियाशक्त्यात्मकशिवत्वाभिव्यक्तिः] क्रियाशक्—क्ति P_1

10.37 योगपीठसंस्थिताय This is an element in the Vyomavyāpin mantra; it is commented upon in *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* 10:21–2.

10.32 क्वचिदप्यप्रसृतिर्यतः] $A_1P_1M_2$; क्वचिदप्यप्रसृतिरिति यतस् M^Y; क्वचदप्यपसृतिर्य्यतस् P_2; क्वचिदप्यप्रसृतिस् P_3; क्वचिदप्यपसृतिः। यतः M_1; क्वचिदप्यप्रसृतिः E 10.32 °श्वरसमतैव] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °श्वरस्य समतैव M^Y; °श्वर ⊔ मतैव M_2 10.35 °कर्तृत्वं] Σ; *om.* P_1 10.35 °विशेषात्मकत्वान्न] Σ; °विशेषात्मकत्व M_1 10.36 भगवतः] $M^YA_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; —वतस् P_2; भवता E 10.39 ग्रहो बालवद्] $M^YP_2P_3M_1$; ग्रहो बलवद् A_1E; गृहो बालवद् P_1; ग्रहौ बलवद् M_2 10.39 °नुपासित°] $M^YA_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E_V$; °नुभा×वि× +सि+त° P_1; °नुवासित° E_D 10.42 °द्धुद्धृतस्य] Σ; °दुद्धुतस्य M^Y 10.42 °क्षपणपूर्वं] $A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; °क्षयपणपूर्वं M^Y; °क्षपणपूर्य्य(?) ≃ P_2; °क्षपणपूर्वकं M_1 10.42–43 क्रियाशक्त्यात्मक°] $M^YA_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; क्रियाशक्— P_1; क्रियाशक्त्यात्म° E 10.43 °व्यक्तिः स्थूल°] $A_1M_1M_2E$; °व्यक्तिस्थूल° M^YP_2; —क्तिस्थूल° P_1; °व्यक्ति° P_3

वस्थास्वरूपाभिव्यक्तिभेदभिन्नस्य वस्तुतो ऽभिन्नस्येश्वरसदाशिवशिवरूपस्य
45 तत्त्वत्रयस्य प्राप्तिहेतुर्भवतीति तस्मिन् सदाशिवे प्रेर्यत्वानिवृत्तेः संस्कारमात्रविशेषत्वेन मलसङ्गावात् पशुत्वमव्यावृत्तमेवेत्यनुपचारात् पशुशब्दप्रवृत्तिरिति। एतच्च वक्ष्यति वृत्तिकारः—दीक्षयान्ते हि क्व सम्भवन्तीत्यादिना।
48 संस्कारके तु सदाशिवे परमार्थतः शिवाद् भेदासम्भवे न तथात्वमित्युपचारः प्रोक्तः।

[३.४.२ पक्षे ऽस्मिन् मार्गद्वयेनासंस्था]

51 दोषान्तरमप्यस्मिन् पक्षे ऽस्तीत्याह—

10.44 °शिवरूपस्य तत्त्वत्रयस्य] °शि—यस्य P_1 10.46 °त्यनुपचारात् पशु°] — P_1 10.48 भेदासम्भवे न तथात्वमित्युपचारः] भेदास—पचारः P_1

10.47 दीक्षयान्ते हि क्व सम्भवन्तीत्यादिना The intended form of this (unmetrical) quotation is quite unclear; no subsequent verse in the text appears to include together these words or those of the variant readings.

10.43–44 °विद्येश्वराद्यवस्था°] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; °विद्येश्वरावस्था° $M^{\gamma}P_1E$ 10.44 °भिव्यक्तिभेदभिन्नस्य वस्तुतो ऽभिन्नस्ये°] M_1; °भिव्यक्तिभेदवद्वस्तुतो भिन्नाभिन्नस्ये° M^{γ}; °भिव्यक्तिर्वस्तुतो भिन्नाभिन्नस्ये° A_1M_2; °भिव्यक्तिभेदावस्तुतो भिन्नाभिन्नस्ये° P_1; °भिव्यक्तिस्तुतोभिन्नाभिन्नस्ये° P_2; °भिव्यक्ति+र्व+स्तुतो भिन्ना सती भिन्नस्ये° P_3; °भिव्यक्तिर्वस्तुतो भिन्ना भिन्नस्ये° E 10.44 °शिवरूपस्य] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °शिवरूप° M^{γ}; °शि— P_1; °शिवरूपरस्य M_1 10.45 प्राप्ति°] Σ; व्याप्ति° P_1 10.45 प्रेर्यत्वानिवृत्तेः] Σ; प्रेर्यत्वानतिवृत्तेः M^{γ} 10.46 पशुत्वमव्यावृत्तमेवेत्यनुपचारात्] P_3E; पशुत्वमव्यावृत्तमेवेत्यनुपचारादः M^{γ}; पशुत्वमव्यावृत्तरूपमेवेत्यनुपचारात् A_1; पशुत्वमव्यावृत्तमेवे— P_1; पशुत्वमव्यावृत्तरूपमे×ऽ×वेत्यनुपच+ा+रात् P_2; पशुत्वं व्यावृत्तमेवेत्यनुपचारादत्र M_1; पशुत्वमव्यावृत्तमेवे ⊔ रात् M_2 10.46–47 प्रवृत्तिरिति] *conj.*; प्रवृत्तेरिति Σ 10.47 एतच्च] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; एच्च M_1; एतद् M_2 10.47 दीक्षयान्ते हि क्व सम्भवन्तीत्यादिना] P_3E_V; दीक्षायां ते हि क्व संभवतीत्यादिना M^{γ}; दीक्षायान्ते हि क्व संभवन्तीत्यादिना (नP_2) $A_1P_2E_D$; दीक्षायान्ते हि त्वासम्भवतीत्यादिना P_1; दीक्षायां देहित्वं संभवतीत्यादिना M_1; दीक्षायां ते हि त्वसंभवतीत्यादिना M_2 10.48 संस्कारके तु] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_1E$; संस्कारमात्रविशेषत्वेन मलसत्भावात्। पशुत्वमला P_2^{ac}; संस्कारहेतु° M_2 10.48 सदाशिवे] Σ; सादाशिवे E 10.51 पक्षे ऽस्तीत्याह $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1$; पक्षे इत्याह P_2; पक्षे ऽस्तीत्य ⊔ M_2; पक्ष इत्याह E

असंस्था च द्विमार्गगा।

मार्गद्वयेनात्रानवस्थाप्रसङ्गश्च।

[३.४.२.१ परमेश्वरत्वस्यासंस्था]

तत्रैकेन मार्गेणाह— 54

प्रेर्यत्वं परमेशाने निर्निमित्तमथापतेत्॥ १०॥

अथ तावत् परमेश्वरस्य कारणं विनैव सिद्धप्रेर्यत्वमपरमेश्वरत्वमापतती-ति—सिद्धस्यैव तदाधिक्येन तदा परमेश्वरत्वात्, अन्यथा तदाधिक्याभिधानं निष्फलमेव सिद्धस्य स्याद्यतः— तस्यापि च सिद्धेश्वरस्य सिद्धान्तरप्राप्ता- 57 वनीश्वरता, तस्यापि तस्यापीत्येवमनवस्थितिः परमेश्वरत्वस्येत्यर्थः॥ १०॥

[३.४.२.२ सिद्धपरिकल्पनायाश्च व्यर्थता]

द्वितीयेन मार्गेणाह— 60

व्यर्था च भविनां येयं निमित्तपरिकल्पना।

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10 b. असंस्था च द्विमार्गगा] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{3}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; असंस्था च द्विमार्गगेति M^{γ}; असंस्था च द्विमार्गातेति $A_1P_3M_2$; असंस्था च द्विमागेति P_1; असंस्थापद्विमार्गगा P^{s}_{1}; अ-संस्था च द्विमार्गत इति P_2E; असंस्था च द्विमार्गगः P^{s}_{4} (E give 10bcd together after 10a) 10 cd. प्रेर्यत्वं परमेशाने निर्निमित्तमथापतेत्] $M_1P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M^{s_c}_{3}$; प्रेष्यत्वं परमेशाने निर्निमित्तमथापतेत् M^{γ}; प्रेर्य्यत्वं परमेशाने निर्णिमित्तमथापतेत् M^{γ}_{M}; प्रेर्य्यत्वम् परमे-शाने निन्निमित्तमतापतेत् P^{s}_{3}; प्रेर्यत्वं परमेशाने निर्निमित्तमतापतेत् $M^{s_{ac}}_{3}$; प्रेर्यत्वमिति $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$ (E give 10abcd together above); ---ति P_1 11 ab.] $M^{\gamma}M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}$ $P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$; व्यर्था चेति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ (E place 11cd here immediately after 11ab) 11 a. व्यर्था च भविनां येयं] $M^{\gamma}M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; वृत्था च भविनां येयन् P^{s}_{3}; व्यर्था च भविनां चेयं E 11 b. °कल्पना] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$; कल्पनेति M^{γ}

10.54 मार्गेणाह] मार्गे— P_1; म—णाह P_2 10.60 मार्गेणाह] मा—ह P_1

10.52 मार्गद्वयेना°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; अमार्गद्वयेना° P_1; द्वयेना° M_1 10.52 °प्र-सङ्गश्च] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3E$; °प्रसङ्गस् A_1M_2; °प्रसंगाश्च P^{ac}_{1}; °प्रसंगाच्च $P^{pc}_{1}M_1$ 10.56 °त्वमपरमेश्वर°] P_1P_3; °त्वं परमेश्वर° $M^{\gamma}P_2M_1E$ 10.55–56 परमेश्वरस्य कारणं ··· तदाधिक्येन तदा] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; *om.* A_1M_2(eyeskip) 10.57 स्याद्यतः] M^{γ} $A_1P_1P_2M_1M_2$; साद्यतस् P_3; स्यात्, यतः E 10.57 तस्यापि च] Σ; तस्यापि M^{γ} 10.58 °प्राप्तावनीश्वरता] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °प्राप्तवानीश्वरता A_1M_2 10.58 तस्या-पि तस्यापीत्ये°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M^{ac}_{2}$; तस्य तस्यापीत्ये° P_2M_1E; तस्यापि ×तस्यापी× त्ये° M_2 10.58 परमेश्वरत्वस्ये°] M^{γ}; परमेश्वरस्ये° $A_1P_1P_2P^{pc}_{3}M_1M_2E$; परमेश्वर× त्वादन्यथा× स्ये° P_3

येयं मुमुक्षूणां भविनामीश्वरो ऽहं स्यामिति निमित्तत्वेनेश्वरत्वेनात्मनः परिकल्पना सङ्कल्पः फलपर्यन्तः, सा व्यर्था विगतप्रयोजना अनवस्थिता भवेत्। न कश्चित् संसारमुक्त्यर्थं यतेतेति यावत्।

[३.५ केवलं निर्मलत्वम्]

अधुना 'निर्मलत्वं च केवलम्' इति पक्षं दूषयति—

वैमल्यमात्रे न पशुर्न पतिः किमसौ भवेत्॥ ११॥

पशोः किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वात् पत्युश्च सर्वज्ञत्वादुभयविवेकेन निर्मलस्य निर्मलत्वेनाननुभूतज्ञानशक्तितया चाभ्युपगमात्, किमसावपुरुषार्थरूपो मोक्षः पाषाणप्रख्यः? न किञ्चित्। अयमाशयः—वक्ष्यमाणवज्ज्ञातृस्वभावत्वादेवात्मनस्तदनभ्युपगमे तन्नाशदोष एव, यद्वक्ष्यति—मूढानां ज्येष्ठमल्लास्ते येषां स्वात्मा विनश्यतीति॥ ११॥

[३.६ सिद्धे कर्तृत्वं, औदासीन्यं महेश्वरे]

'सिद्ध एव हि कर्तृत्वम्' इत्यादिपक्षं प्रतिक्षिपति—

किमित्यकारको देवः

11cd. वैमल्यमात्रे न पशुर्न पतिः किमसौ भवेत्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1$; वैमल्यमात्रे न पशुं न पतिः किमसौ भवेत् M^{s}_{3}; वैमल्यमात्रे न पशुर्न पति किमसौ भवेत् M^{Y}(unmetrical); वैमल्यमात्र इति $A_1P_1P_2P_3$; वैमल्यमात्रमिति M_2; वैमल्यमात्र इति E_D; वैमल्यमात्रेणेति E_V (but when the half-verse is given in full immediately below 11ab, E read: वैमल्यमात्रेण पशुर्न पतिः किमसौ भवेत्) · 12a. किमित्यकारको देवः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; किमित्यकारको देव इति M^{Y}; निमित्तकारको देवः $P^{s_{ac}}_{1}$; ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ कारको देवः $P^{s_{c}}_{1}$; किमित्याकारको देवः M^{s}_{3}; किमत्यकारक इति $A_1P_2M_2$; किमित्यकारक इति P_1P_3 (E gives 12abcd together here)

11.5 निर्मलत्वं च केवलम् *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 4b.

11.9–10 मूढानां ज्येष्ठमल्लास्ते येषां स्वात्मा विनश्यति *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 57ab.

11.1 स्यामिति] $A_1P_2M_2E$; स्यादिति $M^{Y}P_1M_1$; स्या ⊔ ति P_3 11.2 फलपर्यन्तः, सा] $M^{Y}M_1E$; फलपर्यन्ता $A_1P_3M_2$; फलपर्यन्ता सा P_2; फलपर्यन्त— P_1 11.3 संसार°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2M_1E$; संस्कार° P_3M_2 11.6–7 °त्वेनाननुभूत°] Σ; °त्वेनानुभूत° P_1 11.7–8 पाषाणप्रख्यः? न किञ्चित्] $M^{Y}P_2M_1E$; प्रपाषाणप्रख्यो न किञ्चित् A_1; प्रपाषाणप्र⏑ख्यो न किञ्चिद् P_1; पाषाणप्रख्यो न किद् P_3; प्रपाषाणप्रख्यो न कश्चित् M_2 11.9 °मल्लास्ते येषां] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °मल्लास्त एषां M^{Y}; °मल्लादेस्तेषां P_1 11.10 विनश्यतीति] $M^{Y}A_1P_2M_1M_2E$; विनश्य— P_1; विनश्यति P_3

कारकत्वं हि, प्राक् सिद्धाद्, भगवतो ऽभूत्। तत्किमिति केन कारणेन पुरुषान्तरसिद्धौ नेष्यते। पूर्वपक्षवादी कारणमाह—

कारकानीकभीतितः।

कारकाणामनीकः समूहो ऽनेकत्वम्, तस्माद्भयं, ततः। तथा हि—सिद्धस्य तावत् तदानीं लब्धाचरितार्थसर्वकर्तृत्वतो यदा कर्तृत्वं परमेश्वरस्यापि तदा कर्तृत्वं विभिन्नमित्यनेककर्तृसम्भवेन नवमिदमस्तु पुराणमिदमस्त्विति सर्गनिर्माणादौ वैशसं स्यात्, तद्भीतेर्नेष्यते। एतत् सिद्धान्तवाद्याह— 3 6

बहूनां युगपन्मुक्तेर्दुर्निवारा स्थितैव सा॥ १२॥

अचिन्त्यत्वात् कारकसामर्थ्यस्य यदा युगपद् बहवो मुच्यन्ते पुरुषाः, तदा तेषां प्रत्येकमचरितार्थसर्वकर्तृत्वयोगेन तुल्यतया कर्तृत्वविकल्पस्यान्यतर-

12b. कारकानीकभीतितः] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}E^{1}_{D}$; कारकानीकभीतित इति $M^{\gamma}A^{c}_{1}P_{3}$; कारकानीׄ×तׄ× कभीतित इति A_1; कारणानीकभीतितः P^{s}_{1}; कׄ—कानीभीतित इति P_2; कारकानीकभीतिगः P^{s}_{4}; कारणानीकभीतितः M_1; कारणानीकभीतित इति P_1M_2E (but E also gives 12bcd together immediately after 12a, where E_D reads with the accepted text) 12cd. बहूनां युगपन्मुक्तेर्दुर्निवारा स्थितैव सा] $M^{\gamma ac}M^{\gamma}_{M}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; बहूनां युगपन्मुक्तेर्दुर्निवारा स्थितैव सेति $M^{\gamma c}$; बहूनां युगपन्मुक्ते दुर्न्निवारस्थितेव सा P^{s}_{1}; बहूनां युगपन्मुक्ते दुर्न्निवारा स्थितैव सा P^{s}_{3}; बहूनां युगपन्मुक्तौ दुर्न्निवारस्थितैव सा P^{s}_{4}; बहूनामिति $A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; भूरामिति P_2 (but E also gives 12bcd together immediately after 12b, where E_D reads स्थितेव सा)

12.2 पुरुषान्तर॰] Σ; पुरुषान्तरेण P_2 12.2 ॰वादी] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; ॰वादि P_1P_2 12.2 कारणमाह] Σ; करणमाह M_2 12.3 कारकाणामनीकः] P_3; कारकानामनीकः M^{γ}; काकारणाणमनीकस् A_1; कारणानामनीकः $P_1M_1M_2E$; कारकाणामनीको P_2 12.3 भयं, ततः] Σ; भयन्नतः M_2 12.4 लब्धाचरितार्त्थसर्वकर्त्तृत्वतो] P_3; लब्ध्वा चरितार्थसर्वकर्तृत्वतो $M^{\gamma}A_1$; लब्धा चरितार्थसर्वकर्तृतो P_1M_2; लब्ध —र्त्थसर्वकर्तृत्वतो P_2; लब्ध × ׀× चरितार्थसर्वकर्तृतया M_1; लब्धचरितार्थसर्वकर्तृत्वतो E 12.4 परमेश्वरस्यापि] $M^{\gamma c}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; परमेश्वरस्यापि × चׄ× M^{γ}; परमेश्वरस्यापि च P_1P_2 12.6 वैशसं] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; वैशसः A_1; वैशस्य M_2 12.6 तद्भीतेर्नेष्यते] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; तत्भीतोन्नेष्यते P_2; तत् ⊔ तेर्न्नेष्यते P_3 12.7 कारकसामर्थ्यस्य] $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; कारणसामर्थ्यस्य $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1E$ 12.7 पुरुषाः] Σ; पूषास् P_2 12.8 ॰कमचरितार्थ॰] *conj.*; ॰कं चरितार्थ॰ $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; ॰कं चरितार्थं M_1 12.8 तुल्यतया कर्तृत्वविकल्पस्यान्तर॰] *conj.*; तुल्यतया सर्वकर्तृत्वाविकल्पस्यान्यतर॰ M^{γ}; तुल्यतथा कर्त्तृत्वाविकल्पस्यान्यतर॰ A_1; तुल्यता कर्त्तृत्वाविकल्पस्यान्न्यतर॰ P_1; तुल्यतया कर्त्तृत्वविकल्पस्यं—न्यतर॰ P_2; तुल्यतया कर्त्तृत्वाविकल्पस्यान्न्यतरस्य P_3; तुल्यतया कर्तृत्वविकल्पस्यान्यतर ×स्य× ॰ M_1; तुल्यतया कर्तृत्वाविकल्पस्यान्यतर॰ M_2; तुल्यतया कर्तृत्वादविकल्पः स्यात्। अन्यतर॰ E

9 व्यवस्थायाश्वासम्भवात् समुच्चयेन कर्तृत्वे स्थितैव सा सर्गनिर्माणादिवैशस-
दायिका कारकानेकत्वतो भीतिः। अथायं वादी—लोभरागादिकारणत्वात्
पुंसां मत्यन्यथाभावस्य तन्निश्चित्य मुक्तौ रागाद्यभावेनानेकसिद्धयोगेनापि
12 मत्यन्यथाभावाभावेन सर्गनिर्माणादिवैशसं परिहरिष्यति, तदस्मन्मतमेव
प्रवेक्ष्यतीत्याशयशेषः॥ १२॥

[३.७ ईश्वरगुणसमुत्पत्तिः]

15 इदानीं समानतान्त्रिकफलानि दूषयति—

अथोत्पत्तावनित्यत्वम्

यैर्मुक्तावीश्वरसमः सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणः समुत्पद्यते पुंस इतीष्यते, तन्मते उत्प-
त्तिमतामनित्यत्वादनित्यत्वं मुक्तेरिति।

13a.] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; अथोत्पत्तावनित्यत्वमावेशे न स्वतंत्रतेति M^{γ}; अतोत्पत्तावनि-
त्यत्वम् $P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}$; अथोत्पत्ताविति $A_1P_1P_3M_2$; —थोत्पत्ताविति P_2 (but E give 13abcd
together here)

12.9 सर्गनिर्मा°] — P_1 12.11 मुक्तौ रागाद्यभावेना°] मुक्त—रागा×दि× द्य— P_1
12.12 °निर्माणादिवैशसं] °निर्म—शसं P_2 12.15 °तान्त्रिक°] त— P_1 • दूष-
यति] — P_2

12.9 °श्वासम्भवात्] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °श्वासंभवेन M^{γ}; °श्व संभवात् P_1 12.9–
10 °वैशसदायिका] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1M^{rc}_{2}$; °वैशसादायिका P_1; °वैशस— P_2; °वैशसदा-
धिका M^{ac}_{2}; °वैशस्यदायिका E 12.10 कारकानेकत्वतो भीतिः] *conj.*; कारणानेकत्व-
तो भीतिः $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; कारकानेकत्वतो हीति M_1 12.10 वादी—लोभरागा-
दि°] P_1P_3E; वादिलोभरागादि° $M^{\gamma}A^{c}_{1}M_1$; वादिलोभ×का× रा+गा+दि° A_1; वा-
दिलो≍रागादि P_2; वादिलोभकारादि° M_2 12.11 पुंसां मत्यन्यथाभावस्य तन्निश्चित्य]
P_3E; पुंसामत्यन्यथाभावस्य तंत्रं निश्चित्य M^{γ}; पुंसाममत्यन्यथाभावः तन्निश्चित्य A_1;
पुंसाममत्यन्न्यथाभावस्य तन्निश्चित्य P_1; पुंसाम—निश्चित्य P_2; पुंसां मत्यन्यथाभावस्त्य
तन्निवृत्तौ M_1; पुंसां मत्यन्यथाभावः—तन्निश्चित्य M_2 12.11 °सिद्धयोगे ऽपि] M_1;
°सिद्धयोगेनापि $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_2$; °सिद्धियोगेनापि E 12.12 मत्यन्यथाभावाभावेन]
M_1; मत्यन्यथाभावेन Σ 12.12 परिहरिष्यति] Σ; परिहरिष्यंते M^{γ} 12.12 तद-
स्मन्मतमेव] $A_1P_2P_3E$; तदस्मिन्मतमेव M^{γ}; तदस्मान्मतमेव P_1; तदास्मन्मतमेव M_1;
तदस्मम्मतमेव M_2 12.13 प्रवेक्ष्यती°] *conj.*; प्रत्यवेक्ष्यती° Σ 12.13 °शयशेषः]
$M^{\gamma}A_1P^{rc}_{1}P_2P_3M_1E$; °शयदोषः P^{ac}_{1}; °शयशेषं M_2 13.1 °समः] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1M_2$;
°समर्थस् A_1; °सम° P_2P_3; °समता E 13.1 °गुणः समुत्पद्यते] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1$; °गुण
उत्पद्यते $A_1P_3M_2$; °गुणसाम्यमुत्पद्यते P_2E 13.1–2 उत्पत्तिमतामनित्यत्वादनित्यत्वं]
$M^{\gamma}A_1P^{rc}_{1}M_1$; उत्पत्तिम×≍×तामनित्यादनित्यत्वम् P_1; उ≍पत्तिमतामनित्यत्वानि-
त्यत्व° P_2; उत्पत्तिमतामनित्यादनित्यत्व° P_3; उत्पत्तिमतानित्यत्वादनित्यत्वं M_2;
उत्पत्तिमदनित्यत्वादनित्यत्वं E

[३.८ ईश्वरगुणावेशः]

आवेशे न स्वतन्त्रता।

ईश्वरगुणावेशान्मुक्तिसाम्यपक्षे ऽपि भूताविष्टस्येव पुंसो मुक्तावस्वातन्त्र्यमेव, न त्वीश्वरसमतेति।

[३.९ ईश्वरगुणसंक्रान्तिः]

संक्रान्तिसमतापक्षं पराकरोति—

नोदाहरणसद्भावो गुणसंक्रान्तिसाधने॥ १३॥

ईश्वरगुणा मुक्तौ संक्रमन्त इति गुणसंक्रान्तिः। एषा भवतां न तावत् प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा, अतीन्द्रियत्वात् तेषाम्। अथानुमानादित्युच्यते, तदयुक्तं, गुणसंक्रान्तिसाधने ऽनुमाने नोदाहरणस्य दृष्टान्तस्य सद्भावो ऽस्ति यतः। न चादृष्टान्तमनुमानं प्रवर्तते, व्याप्यसम्भवात्॥ १३॥

[३.९.१ शब्दोपदेशनं शास्त्रसंक्रान्तिश्च दृष्टान्तीक्रियेते]

अत्र संक्रान्तिवादी दृष्टान्तमाह—

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13 b. आवेशे न स्वतन्त्रता] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; आवेश इति $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; आवेशयति P_2 But E give 13bcd immediately after 13a, and there read 13b as follows: आवेशेनास्वतन्त्रता E_V 13 cd. नोदाहरणसद्भावो गुणसंक्रान्तिसाधने] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_1$; नोदाहरणसद्भावो गुणसंक्रांतिसाधने इति M^{γ}; नोदाहरणसत्भावे गुणसंक्रान्तिसाधने $P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}$; नोदाहरणसद्भाव इति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$ (but E give 13bcd together after 13a, where they have the accepted text of 13cd)

13.9 अथानुमाना°] ---माना° P_1 13.11 प्रवर्तते] ⊔ M_1

13.4 ईश्वरगुणावेशान्मुक्तिसाम्य°] $A_1P^{pc}_{1}P^{pc}_{2}P_3$; ईश्वरगुण ⊔ वेशान्मुक्तिसाम्य° M^{γ}; ईश्वरगुणा×मुक्तौ× वेशान्मुक्ति×ऽ×P_1; ईश्वरागुणावेशान्मुक्तिसाम्य° P^{ac}_{2}; ईश्वरगुणावेशान्मुक्तौ साम्य° M_1; ईश्वरगुणावेशामुक्तिसाम्य° M_2; ईश्वरगुणावेशान्मुक्तिः। साम्य° E 13.4 भूताविष्टस्येव] $M^{\gamma}A_1P^{pc}_{1}P_2P^{pc}_{3}M_2E$; भूताविष्टस्यैव $P^{ac}_{1}M_1$; भूत+ा+विष्टस्येव P_3 13.4-5 °स्वातन्त्र्यमेव, न त्वीश्वरसमतेति] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; °स्वतन्त्र्यमेव न त्वीश्वरसमतेति A_1; °स्वातन्त्र्यमेवेश्वरसमतेति E 13.7 संक्रान्ति°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2M_2E$; संक्रान्तन्ति° P_1; सांक्रान्ति° P_3; ⊔ न्ति° M_1 13.7 पक्षं पराकरोति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; प---पराकरोति P_1; पक्षमपाकरोति P_2 13.8 ईश्वरगुणा] Σ; ईश्वरगुणान् A_1 13.8 संक्रमन्त] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1E$; संक्रामन्त $A_1P_1M_2$ 13.8 °संक्रान्तिः। एषा] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; °संक्रान्तिर्नैषा E 13.10 °नुमाने] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; न मानेन M_1; न माने M_2 13.10 दृष्टान्तस्य] Σ; द्राष्टान्तस्य A_1 13.13 °वादी दृष्टान्तमाह] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3E$; °वादि दृष्टमाह A_1M_2; °वादि दृष्टान्तरमाह P_1; °वादि दृष्टान्तमाह M_1

ननु स्वबोधसंक्रान्तौ दृष्टं शब्दोपदेशनम्।
शास्त्रे ऽपि ज्ञानसंक्रान्तिर्विहिता सा कथं भवेत्॥ १४॥

स्वबोधसंक्रान्तिनिमित्तं गुरूणां शिष्यस्य विषय उपदेशो दृष्टः। शास्त्रे ऽप्यस्मिन् स्वायम्भुवादावाचार्याभिषेके ज्ञानसंक्रान्तिः श्रूयते—

अद्य संक्रमितो यो ऽयमधिकारो मया त्वयि।
स कर्तव्यस्त्वया तावद्यावत्संक्रमितो ऽन्यतः॥ इति।

सा तु गुणसंक्रान्त्यनभ्युपगमे कथमुपपद्यत इति युष्मदागमप्रत्यक्षाभ्यामत्र दृष्टान्तः सिद्ध इति॥ १४॥

[३.९.१.१ ज्ञानसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तः पराक्रियते]

सिद्धान्तवाद्याह—

विज्ञानमुपदेशात्तु तादृगन्यत् प्रजायते।
संक्रान्तिशब्दः सादृश्ये

14.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; नन्विति $A_{1}P_{1}P_{3}M_{2}$; नन्वति P_{2} 14c. °पि ज्ञानसंक्रान्तिर्] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}M^{S}_{3}$; °पि ज्ञानसंक्रान्ति M_{1}; विज्ञानसंक्रान्तिर् $P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}E$ 14d. सा कथं भवेत्] M^{Y}_{M}; साधनं भवेत्। इति M^{Yac}; साधकं भवेत्। इति M^{Yc}; साधके भवेत् $P^{Sac}_{1}P^{S}_{3}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$; साधको भवेत् P^{Sc}_{1}; साधकं भवेत् $P^{S}_{4}E$ 15abc.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; विज्ञानमिति $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$ (E_{V} gives 15abcd all together here) 15c. °शब्दः सादृश्ये] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{4}$; °शब्दसादृश्ये इति M^{Y}; °शशब्दसादृश्ये P^{S}_{1}; °शब्दसादृश्ये $P^{S}_{3}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E_{V}$

14.1 °निमित्तं] ⊔ M_{1} 14.2 °षेके] — P_{1} 14.3 यो ऽयमधिकारो] यो ⊔ कारो M_{1}

14.3–4 अद्य संक्रमितो यो ऽयम् ⋯ संक्रमितो ऽन्यतः *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 16:21, where the edition reads : अद्य सङ्क्रामितो यो ऽयमधिकारो मया त्वयि। कर्तव्यं हि त्वया यावन्नैव सङ्क्रामितो ऽन्यतः॥

14.1 उपदेशो] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}$; उपदेश M_{2}; उपदेशेन E 14.2 ज्ञानसंक्रान्तिः] $M^{Y}M_{2}E$; ज्ञानसंक्रान्ति $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}$ 14.4 तावद्] Σ; तद्वद् A_{1} 14.5 सा तु] $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}E$; सा $M^{Y}M_{1}$ 14.5 °क्रान्त्यनभ्युपगमे] Σ; °क्रान्ति अनभ्यु— P_{1} 14.5–6 °भ्यामत्र दृष्टान्तः सिद्ध इति] $P_{1}P^{pc}_{2}P_{3}E$; °भ्यां दृष्टान्तसिद्ध इति M^{Y}; °भ्यामत्र दृष्टान्तस्सिद्धा इति A_{1}; °भ्यामत्र दृष्टान्तः +सिद्ध+इति P_{2}; °भ्यामत्र दृष्टान्तसिद्ध इति M_{1}; °भ्यामत्र दृष्टान्तस्सिद्धान्त इति M_{2} 14.8 सिद्धान्तवाद्याह] $M^{Y}A_{1}P^{pc}_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}E$; +सिद्धान्त+वाद्याह P_{1}; सिद्ध ⊔ द्याह M_{1}

गुरूपदेशान्निमित्ताच्छिष्यबुद्धौ विज्ञानान्तरमन्यदेवात्यन्तसदृशत्वात् संक्रान्तमिवोत्पद्यते, न तु तस्यैव संक्रान्तिः। कुत इत्याह—

तद्गुरोर्यन्न हीयते॥ १५॥

तज्ज्ञानं यद्यस्माद् गुरोर्न हीयते। संक्रान्तिपक्षे हि शिष्य एव ज्ञानस्य संक्रान्तेर्गुरावभावः स्यात्॥ १५॥ 3

[३.९.१.२ शास्त्रसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तं पराक्रियते]

शास्त्रे ऽपि गुरुनियोगाद् गुरुवद् व्याख्यानादौ स्वातन्त्र्यमेव संक्रान्तिपदस्यार्थः। तथैवाचार्याभिषेकप्रकरणे गुरुणा स्वयम्भुवा प्रतिपादित इति नात्र संक्रान्तिः सिद्धेत्याह 6

गुरोर्नियोगतः शास्त्रे स्वातन्त्र्यं गुरुवद्भवेत्।
संक्रान्तिवचनस्यार्थस्तत्रैव गुरुणोदितः॥ १६॥

[३.९.२ पुण्यपापसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तः]

अथ कदाचित् श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धदृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकभ्रान्त्या संक्रान्तिवादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठेत, तदपि दृष्टान्तन्यायातिदेशेन निवर्तयितुमाह— 3

15d. तद्गुरोर्यन्न हीयते] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}$; तद्गुरोर्यन्न हीयत इति M^{Y}; तत्गुरोर्य्यन्न गीयते P^{S}_{1}; तद्गुणैर्यन्न हीयते M_1; तदिति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$ (but E give the accepted text of 15d immediately after 15abc) 16.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; गुरोरित्यादि $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 16 d. गुरुणोदितः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{Sc}_{3}E$; गुरुणोदित इति M^{Y}; गुरुणेदितः M^{Sac}_{3}

15.7 गुरुणा] — P_1

15.1 गुरूपदेशा°] Σ; उपदेशा° E 15.1 °देवात्यन्तसदृशत्वात्] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °गत (?)—दृशत्वात् P_1; °देवात्य ⊔ शत्वात् M_1 15.3–4 ज्ञानस्य संक्रान्तेर्गुरावभावः] $M^{Y}E$; —क्रान्तेः गुरावभा+व+ P_1; ज्ञानस्य संक्रान्तौ गुरावभाव $A_1P^{pc}_{2}P_3M_2$; ज्ञानस्य संक्रान्तौ गुरा+व+भाव P_2; ज्ञानस्य संक्र ⊔ रावभाव M_1 15.7 तथैवाचार्या°] Σ; तथैवा+चा+चार्या° M^{pc}_{1} 15.7 स्वयम्भुवा] M^{Y}; स्वायम्भुवादौ Σ 16.3 °सिद्धदृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकभ्रान्त्या] $A^{i}_{1}P_2P_3E$; °सिद्धदृष्टांतदार्ष्टांतिभ्रांत्या M^{Y}; °सिद्धदृष्टा × न्ता× न्तदार्ष्टान्तिकभ्रान्त्या A_1; °सिद्धदृष्टान्त ≍र्ष्टा—न्त्या P_1; ⊔ दान्त्या M_1; °सिद्धदृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकभ्रान्त्या M_2 16.4 °तिष्ठेत] Σ; °तिष्ठते P_1 16.4 दृष्टान्तन्यायातिदेशेन] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; दृष्टान्तन्ययातिदशेन A_1; दृष्टन्यायातिदेशेन M_1

तद्वत् साधुसमाक्रोशात् पापं पुंसां प्रजायते।
क्षीयते च स्वकं पुण्यं विपर्यस्तं क्षमावति॥ १७॥

तथा च स्मृतिः

निन्दनाद्विजसाधूनां पापानामथ सेवनात्।
पापं संक्रमते पुंसां स्वपुण्यमपयाति च॥ इति।

तथा

क्षमावति त्वनाक्रोशात्पुण्यवद्भिः सह स्थितेः।
पुण्यं संक्रमते पुंसां पापं याति ततो ऽन्यतः॥

इत्यादिदृष्टान्तः पूर्ववत् प्रतिक्षिप्तः, यतो ऽत्राप्यपूर्वयोः पुण्यपापयोरुत्पत्तिरेव संक्रान्तिरित्युच्यते, न तु तयोरेव संक्रमः, पुण्यार्जनविधीनां सहस्थितिमात्रेणैव फलापहारतो वैय्यर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्, प्रायश्चित्तोपदेशानर्थक्याच्चेत्याह—

17.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; तद्वादित्यादि $A_{1}M^{ac}_{2}$; तद्वदित्यादि $P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}$; तद्व× ſ× दित्यादि M_{2} 17a. साधुसमाक्रोशात्] $P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}M_{1}M^{s-c}_{3}E$; साधुसमावेशात् $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}$; सा तु समाकोशात् P^{s}_{4}; साधुसमाकोशात् M^{s-ac}_{3} 17b. पापं पुंसां] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; ⊔ पुंसाम् P^{s}_{3}; पापं पुण्यं E 17d. विपर्यस्तं] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; विपर्यस्ता° E_{D}; विपर्यस्तौ E_{V} 17 M^{Y} gives 17 and 18 together here.

17.2 °मथ सेवनात्] —वनात् P_{1}

17.2 –3 निन्दनाद्विजसाधूनां ···स्वपुण्यमपयाति च Source unknown.

17.5 –6 क्षमावति त्वनाक्रोशात् ··· पापं याति ततो ऽन्यतः Source unknown.

17.2 निन्दनाद्विज°] $P_{3}M_{2}E_{V}$; निंदनाद्वंधु° M^{Y}; निन्दना द्विज° $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}M_{1}E_{D}$ 17.3 च॥ इति] Σ; चेत् P_{2} 17.5 पुण्यवद्भिः सह स्थितेः] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}P_{3}M_{2}E_{V}$; पुण्यवद्भिस्सह स्थिते $P_{2}E_{D}$; 'क्षमा'वद्भिः सह स्थितेः (तैः M^{ac}_{1}) M_{1} 17.7 प्रतिक्षिप्तः] Σ; प्रक्षिप्तः A_{1} 17.7–8 °त्पत्तिरेव संक्रान्तिरित्युच्यते] Σ; °त्पत्तिरित्युच्यते M_{2}(eyeskip) 17.8 न तु] Σ; ननु E^{vl}_{D} 17.8 संक्रमः] Σ; संक्रामः A_{1} 17.9 °मात्रेणैव] Σ; °मात्रेणेव A_{1} 17.9 फलापहारतो] $A_{1}P_{2}P^{ac}_{3}M_{2}E$; फलापहरतो $M^{Y}P^{a-c}_{3}M_{1}$; फलापहरणतो P_{1} 17.9 वैय्यर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E_{V}$; वैय्यर्त्यपुंसात् P_{1}; वैय्यर्त्यप्रसंगात् P_{2}; वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् E_{D} 17.9–10 °नर्थक्याच्चेत्याह] $A_{1}P_{1}M_{1}M_{2}E$; °नर्थक्याच्च $M^{Y}P_{3}$; °नर्त्यक्याच्चेति P_{2}

पापीयसां च संसर्गात् पापमन्यत् प्रजायते।
तथा पुण्यवतां पुण्यं नान्यथा तदुदीरितम्॥ १८॥

[३.९.३ दीपसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तः]

ननु प्रदीपो वर्त्यन्तरादौ दाह्ये संक्रामन् दृश्यत इति संक्रान्तिवादिदृष्टान्तान्तराशङ्कां निवर्तयति— 3

दीपान्तरसमुत्पत्तिः प्रदीपादिन्धनान्तरे।
संक्रान्तिस्तस्य नैवेष्टा बौद्धवैशेषिकादिभिः॥ १९॥

अत्रापि, प्रदीपशिखाभमात्रादतिमहतो वह्नेर्वनदाहादावुत्पत्तिदर्शनात्, अपूर्वोत्पत्तिरेव बौद्धाद्युपलक्षितसर्ववादिसिद्धा, न तु तस्य तावन्मात्रस्य तदेकदेशस्य वा संक्रान्तिरुपपद्यते। 3

[३.९.४ कस्तूरिकामोदसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तनिरासः]

एतेन कस्तूरिकामोदादेः पटादौ संक्रान्तिभ्रमः पराकार्यः॥ १९॥

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18 .] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; *om.* $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2$ (M^{Y} gives the text of 18 above, immmediately after that of 17); —पीयसामिति P_1 18 a. संसर्गात्] $M^{Y}_{M}M_1E$; संपर्कात् $M^{Y}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}$; ⊔ म्पर्क्कात् P^{S}_{3} 18 cd. तथा पुण्यवतां पुण्यं नान्यथा] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}E$; स्य तथा पुण्यवतां पुण्यं M_1(unmetrical) 18 d. °दीरितम्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; °दीरितमिति M^{Y} 19 .] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; दीपान्तरसमुत्पत्तिरिति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 19 a. °त्पत्तिः] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; °त्पत्ति P^{S}_{1} 19 d. बौद्धवैशेषिकादिभिः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}$; बौद्धवैशेषिकादिभिरिति M^{Y}; बुद्धवैशेषिकादिभिः E

18.3 ननु प्रदीपो वर्त्यन्तरादौ] $M^{Y}P_3M_1E$; ननु प्रदीपो वत्यन्तरादौ A_1P_2; ×प्र⌣× ननु प्रदीपोत्पत्यन्तरादौ P_1; ननु प्रदीपो पपत्यन्तरादौ M_2 18.3 संक्रामन्] M^{Y}; संक्रमान् A_1; संक्रमणन् P_1; संक्रमन् $P_2P_3M_1M_2E$ 18.3–4 संक्रान्तिवादिदृष्टान्तान्तराशंकां] *conj.*; संक्रान्तिवादिदृष्टान्ताशंकां $M^{Y}M_1$; संक्रान्तिवादिदृष्टान्तशङ्कान् $A_1P_1M_2$; संक्रान्तवादी दृष्टान्तान्तरशंकान् P_2; संक्रान्तिवादी दृष्टान्तान्तरशंकान् P_3; संक्रान्तिवादी दृष्टान्ताशङ्कां E 18.4 निवर्तयति] Σ; निवर्त्तय इति P_2 19.1 °पि प्रदीपशिखाभमात्रादति°] M^{Y}; °पि प्रदीपशिखाभामात्रादति° $A_1P_2M_2$; —पशि×⌣× खाभामात्रादति° P_1; °पि दीपशिखाभामात्रादति° P_3; °पि प्रदीपशिखामात्रादति° M_1E 19.2 °सर्ववादिसिद्धा] $M^{Y}P_2P_3E$; °सर्ववादिसिद्धान्ता A_1P_1; °सर्ववादि ⊔ द्धा M_1; °सर्ववादिदृष्टान्तरमह(हि M^{ac}_{2}) सिद्धान्ता M_2 19.2–3 तदेकदेशस्य] $M^{Y}P_1P_2M_1E$; तदैकदेशस्य $A_1P_3M_2$ 19.3 °रुपपद्यते] Σ; °रुत्पद्यते P_1 19.5 पराकार्यः] Σ; परकार्य्यः P_1

[३.९.५ सामान्यसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तः]

संक्रान्तिवादी दृष्टान्तान्तरमाह—

गोत्वादेर्ननु संक्रान्तिर्व्यक्त्यन्तरविसर्पिणी।

तत्क्षणजातायां गोव्यक्तौ तत्सामान्यस्य तत्कालमेवोपलब्धेः, तत्क्षणात्प्रागनुपलब्धितस्तत्रासत्त्वाद् व्यक्त्यन्तरात् संक्रान्त्यनभ्युपगमे तत्सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेस्त्ववश्यं संक्रान्तिरेष्टव्येति।

[३.९.५.१ व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्तसामान्यानभ्युपगमात् संक्रान्त्यसम्भवः]

सिद्धान्तवादी प्रतिक्षिपति—

सादृश्यं यस्य गोत्वादि तं प्रत्येतन्न शोभते॥ २०॥

नास्माकं सामान्यसंक्रान्तिः सिद्धा, व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्तस्य सामान्यस्यानभ्युपगमात् सांख्यवद् व्यक्तिगतानेकावयवसादृश्यस्य सामान्यरूपत्वात् तत्क्षणजातस्य गोपिण्डस्य संक्रान्त्याशङ्कासम्भवात्, अत्र व्यक्तितः पिण्डान्तरस्य

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20 ab.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; गोत्वादेर्ननन्विति $A_1P_3M_2$; गोत्वादोर्त्रन्विति P_1; गोत्वादेर्त्रन्वति P_2 (E gives 20cd immediately after 20ab) 20 ab. संक्रान्तिर्व्यक्त्य°] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; संक्रान्तिव्यक्त° $P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}$ 20 b. °सर्पिणी] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; °सर्पिणी इति M^{Y} 20cd.] $M^{Y}_{M}M^{Y}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}$; सादृश्यं यस्येति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$ (but E give 20cd in full immediately after 20ab) 20 c. सादृश्यं] $M^{Y}_{M}M^{Y}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}$; सादृश्य यस्य $P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}$ 20d. शोभते] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; शोभत इति M^{Y}; शोभवेत् P^{S}_{1}

20.2 °त्यन्तरात् संक्रान्त्यन°] °त्यन्तरा—न्त्यन° P_1 20.8–9 पिण्डान्तरस्य सादृश्यस्य] पिण्डा—दृश्यस्य P_1

20.1 तत्कालमेवोप°] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; तत्कालमेवो° A_1; तत्कलादेवोप° P_1 20.2 °सत्त्वाद् व्यक्त्यन्तरात्] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °सत्वाद्व्यक्त्यन्तरा— P_1; °सत्वाद्व्यक्तिरात् M_2 20.2 °भ्युपगमे] Σ; °भ्युपगमेन A_1 20.3 °पत्तेस्त्ववश्यं] Σ; °पत्तेरवश्यं P_1 20.3 °ष्टव्येति] Σ; °ष्टवेति P_3 20.6 सामान्यसंक्रान्तिः सिद्धा] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_2E$; सामान्यसामान्यसंक्रान्ति— P_1; —न्यसंक्रान्तिस्सिद्धा P_2; सामान्यसंक्रान्ति ⊔ द्ध M_1 20.6 व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्तस्य] M_1; व्यतिरिक्त° M^{Y}; व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्त° $A_1P_3M_2E$; —व्यतिरिक्त° P_1; व्यक्तव्यतिरिक्त° P_2 20.6–7 °स्यानभ्युपगमात्] Σ; °स्यात् नभ्युपगमात् P_2 20.7 व्यक्तिगतानेकावयव°] M^{Y}; व्यक्तित्वेनैकावयव° M^{pc}_{1}; व्यक्तिष्वनैकावयव° A_1M_2; व्यक्तित्वेनेकावयव° P_1; व्यक्तिष्वनेकावयव° P_2P_3; व्यक्तित्वेनैकावयव× त्वा× M^{ac}_{1}; व्यक्तित्वेनैकावय° E 20.8 °जातस्य गोपिण्डस्य] M^{Y}; °जातकोपिण्डस्य A_1; °जातगोपिण्डस्य $P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °जातगोपिण्डकस्य M^{pc}_{2}; °जातकोऽपिण्डकस्य M^{ac}_{2} 20.8 संक्रान्त्याशङ्कासम्भवात्] संक्रान्त्यसम्भवात् P_3

सादृश्यस्य जातत्वेन तथात्वायोगात्। सामान्यान्तरासत्तयैवासंसृतिरित्युक्तं 9
तं प्रत्येतदुच्यमानं न शोभत इति॥ २०॥

[३.९.५.२ व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्तसामान्यपक्षे ऽपि, न सामान्यसंक्रान्तिः]

[३.९.५.२.१ अभिव्यक्तिः सामान्यस्य, न तु संक्रान्तिः] 12

व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्तसामान्यवाद्यभिप्रायेणाह—

स्वाश्रयव्यापकम्

सर्वसर्वगतसामान्यपक्षे संक्रान्त्याशङ्कासम्भवादत्र व्यक्तिसर्वगतमेव सामान्यमाश्रित्याह—

21a. स्वाश्रयव्यापकम्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}E$ (E give the accepted readings of 21abcd together in full here, but E_D also gives the following *pratīka*); स्वाश्रयव्यापकमिति $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3$ E_D; *om.* A_1M_2; स्वाश्रये व्यापकम् $P^{S}_{3}M^{S}_{3}$; स्वाश्रये व्यापकमिति M_1

20.10 The testimony of P_1 here (after तं प्रत्येतद्) skips forward to the *avatārika* to the first part of 27c, but the text is represented as continuous, for by cutting back from here (the end of f. 187v) to the middle of the 2nd line of f. 181r we may pick up the text at exactly this point, with उच्यमानं 21.1 P^{S}_{4} reads verses 21 to 27b twice, once immediately after verse 7, and then again after giving verses 8 to 20 (which follow the first instance of 27ab). Where the readings of the second pass differ from those of the first, they are marked with the sigla P^{2}_{4}. P^{S}_{1}, however, which, like P^{S}_{4}, places verses 8 to 20 after 27b, does not repeat 21 to 27b, but moves from 20 to 27cd. 21.1 सर्वगतसामान्यपक्षे ... °सामान्यमेवाश्रित्याह] *om.* A_1M_2(eyeskip)

20.9 सादृश्यस्य जातत्वेन तथात्वा°] $A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; सादृश्यस्य जातत्वेन तथात्व° M^{Y}; सादृशस्य जातत्वेन तथात्वा° P_2; सादृश्यस्य ⊔ जातत्वेन तथात्वा° M_1 20.9–10 सामान्यान्तरासत्तयैवासंसृतिरित्युक्तं तं प्रत्येतदुच्यमानं] P_3; सामान्यांतरासत्तयैवासंवृतिरित्युक्तं संप्रत्येते उच्यमानं M^{Y}; सामान्यान्तरसत्तयैव संसृतिरित्युक्तम्। तं प्रत्येतदिति उच्यमानन् A_1M_2; सामान्यन्तरादेरासक्तयैवासंसृतिरित्युक्तम् तम् प्रति एतद् उच्यमानं P_1; सामान्यान्तरसत्तयैव संसृतिरित्युक्तम् तं प्रत्येतदुच्येत मानन् P_2; सामान्यान्तरासत्तयैव। संक्रान्तिरियुच्यमानं M_1; सामान्यान्तरासत्तयैव संसृतिरित्युक्तं तं प्रत्येतदुच्य(च्च E_D)मानं E 20.13 व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्त°] $A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; व्यतिरिक्त° $M^{Y}P_3$; व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्ति° P_2 20.13 °भिप्रायेणाह—... व्यक्तिगतसामान्यमेवाश्रित्याह] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E_V$; °भिप्रायेणाप्याह A_1M_2(eyeskip) 20.13 °भिप्रायेणाह] P_3 M_1E; °भिप्रायेणाप्याह $M^{Y}A_1P^{pc}_{1}P_2M_2$; °भिप्रायेणा+प्या+ह P_1 21.1 सर्वसर्वगत°] *conj.*; सर्वगत° $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$ 21.1 °शङ्कासम्भवादत्र] $M^{Y}P_2M_1E$; °शंक--भवादत्र P_1; °शंकासम्पत् × ⌣ × P_3 21.1–2 व्यक्तिसर्वगतमेव सामान्यमाश्रित्याह] $M^{Y}P_1P_2M_1$; व्यक्तिसर्वगतमेव सामान्यमाश्रत्याह P_3; व्यक्तिगतसामान्यमेवाश्रित्याह E

भेदे ऽप्याश्रये व्यज्यते हि तत्।

तत्क्षणजाते भिन्ने ऽप्याश्रये व्यज्यते, तद्व्यक्तिव्यङ्ग्यत्वात् सामान्यस्य व्यक्तीनां च तद्व्यङ्गकैकस्वभावत्वात्, न त्वन्यतस्तस्य संक्रान्तिः।

[३.९.५.२.२ सामान्यस्यामूर्तत्वान्न संक्रान्तिः]

हेत्वन्तरमाह—

विसर्पणं न यस्येष्टं तस्य संक्रमणं कुतः॥ २१॥

अमूर्तस्य च संक्रान्तौ न लोका न परीक्षकाः।

निष्क्रियत्वेनामूर्तत्वेन च सामान्यस्य तैरभ्युपगमात् कुतः संक्रमणयोग्यता? न ह्येतल्लोकसिद्धं विद्वत्सिद्धं वेति।

[३.९.५.३ दीपसामान्यसंक्रान्त्यभ्युपगमे ऽपि नात्र दृष्टान्तता]

अधुना प्रदीपसामान्ययोः संक्रान्तिमभ्युपगम्याह—

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21 ab. भेदे ऽप्याश्रये व्यज्यते हि तत्] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M^{s}_{3}$; भेदे ऽप्याश्रये व्यज्यते हि तदिति $M^{\gamma}M_{1}$; भेदे ऽपीति $A_1P_3M_2E$; भेदेपिति P_1; भेदे—ति P_2 (E print the whole verse together where the first part of 21 is placed, where they give the accepted text) 21 cd. विसर्पणं न यस्येष्टं तस्य संक्रमणं कुतः] $M^{\gamma}M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; विसर्पणमिति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$ (But E give 21cd thus above, immediately after 21ab.) 22ab. अमूर्तस्य च संक्रान्तौ न लोका न परीक्षकाः] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}$; अमूर्तस्य च संक्रांतौ न लोका न परीक्षका इति M^{γ}; अमूर्त्तस्य च संक्रान्तौ न लोको न परीक्षकाः P^{s}_{3}; अमुक्तस्य च संक्रान्तौ न लोका न परीक्षकाः M^{s}_{3}; अमूर्तस्य च संक्रान्तौ न लोको न परीक्षकः $P^{s}_{4}E$; *om.* $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$

21.3 तत्क्षणजाते] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3$; तत्क्षणे जाते M_1M_2E 21.3 °प्याश्रये] Σ; स्वाश्रये P_2 21.3 तद्व्यक्तिव्यङ्ग्यत्वात्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3$; तत्व्यक्तिव्यंगत्वात् तत् P_2; तस्यद्व्यक्तिव्यंग्यंत्वात् M_1; तद्व्यक्तिव्यङ्ग्यत्वात् M_2; तद्व्यक्तिव्यज्यत्वात् E 21.3–4 सामान्यस्य व्यक्तीनां च तद्व्यङ्गकैकस्वभाव°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; सामान्यस्य व्यक्तिनाञ्च तद्व—केकस्वभाव° P_1; स+ा+—व्यक्तिनाञ्च तद्व्यङ्गकैकस्वाभाव° P_2 21.4 संक्रान्तिः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2M_1M_2E$; संक्रान्तिं P_1; सम्भवादत्र संक्रान्तिः P_3 22.1 निष्क्रियत्वेनामूर्तत्वेन] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; निष्क्रयत्वेनामूर्त्तित्वे P_2; निष्क्रियत्वेन च अमूर्त्तत्वेन P_3 22.1–2 °णयोग्यता] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1E$; °ण— A_1; —ग्यता P_1; °णतयोग्यता M_2 22.2 ह्येतल्लोकसिद्धं विद्वत्सिद्धं वेति] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3E$; —तल्लोकसिद्धः विद्वत्सिद्धं वेति A_1; ह्येतल्लोकसिद्धं वेति M^{ac}_{1}; ह्येतल्लोकसिद्धमवेति M^{ac}_{1}; ह्येतल्लोकसिद्धः विद्वत्सिद्धं वेति M_2 22.4 °गम्याह] Σ; °गम्यमाह P_2

गुणत्वं न च सामान्ये न वह्नौ तद्वृथोदितम्॥ २२॥

अयमर्थः—गुणसंक्रान्तिवादिना तत्सिद्ध्यर्थं गुणसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्ताय प्रयतनीयम्। सामान्यस्य दीपस्य च संक्रान्तिसिद्धावपि तयोरगुणरूपत्वात् तत्रादृष्टान्ततेति तद्वर्णनमेतन्निष्फलमेव॥ २२॥

[३.९.६ केदारवारिसंक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तः]

दृष्टान्तान्तरं प्रतिक्षिपति—

केदारवारिसंक्रान्तिर्द्रव्यत्वादुपपद्यते।
द्रव्य एव हि सा शक्तिरुक्ता

केदाराभिधानस्य तीर्थपानीयस्य तदुपयोक्तृपुरुषसहभुजि पुरुषान्तरे द्रव्यत्वात् संक्रान्तिरभ्युपगम्यत एव। निदर्शनमाह—

सिद्धकृपाणवत्॥ २३॥

सिद्धखड्गो हि सिद्धादतिदूरतरदेशस्थितो ऽपि तदभियोगात् तद्धस्तमेव

22cd. गुणत्वं न च सामान्ये न वह्नौ तद्वृथोदितम्] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; गुणत्वं न च सामान्ये न वह्नौ तद्वृथोदितमिति M^{γ}; गुणत्वन्न चेति $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; गुणत्वेन चेति P_1; गुणत्वन्न च सामान्ये न वन्हौ तदपृथोदितम् P^{s}_{3}(unmetrical); गुणत्वन्न च सामान्ये न दीपे तदथोदितं P^{s}_{4}; गुणत्वन्न च सामान्ये न दीपे न अथोदितं P^{2}_{4}; गुणत्वं न च सामान्ये न दीपे तद्वृथोदितम् E 23. $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ give just the *pratīka* केदारवारीति here instead of the verse; M^{γ} gives the verse up to and including शक्तिरुक्ता here; M_1 gives the whole verse followed by this same *pratīka*; E give the whole verse together here. 23 c. द्रव्य] $P^{s}_{4}E_V$; दृश्य $M^{\gamma}M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; दृव्य E_D 23 d. सिद्धकृपाणवत्] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M^{s}_{3}$; सिद्धकृपाणवदिति $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; सिद्धकृपाणवादिति P_2; सिद्धक ⊔ णवत् P^{s}_{3}

22.5 गुणसंक्रान्ति॰] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; गुणसंक्रान्त॰ A_1; संक्रान्ति॰ E 22.6 प्रयतनीयम्] Σ; प्रयतनीया P_3 22.6 दीपस्य च] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; च दीपस्य च M^{γ}; दीपस्य P_1 22.6 संक्रान्तिसिद्धावपि] Σ; संक्रान्तसिद्धावपि P_3 22.7 ॰मेतन्निष्फलमेव] M^{γ}; ॰मतिनिष्फलमेव $A_1P_1P_2M_2E$; ॰न्निष्फलमेव P_3; ॰मतन्निष्फलमेव M_1 22.9 दृष्टान्तान्तरं] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; दृष्टान्तरं P_2M_2 23.1 केदाराभिधानस्य] Σ; इति केदाराभिधानस्य M^{γ} 23.1 तीर्थपानीयस्य] Σ; *om.* A_1 23.1–2 द्रव्यत्वात्] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E^{vl}_{D}E_V$; दृष्टत्वात् M^{γ}; अ—व्य× ष्ट?× त्वात् P_1; अदृष्टत्वात् M_1; दृष्टसत्वात् E_D 23.3 सिद्धादतिदूरतरदेश॰] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_1M_2$; सिद्धदतिदूरतरदेश॰ A_1; सिद्धानदूरतरदेश॰ P_2; सिद्धादतिदूरदेश॰ E 23.3 तदभियोगात्] $M^{\gamma}P_3M_1E$; प्रयोगात् A_1; तदभिप्रयोगात् $P_1P_2M_2$ 23.3 तद्धस्तमेव] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; तस्तमेव M^{γ}; तद्ध—मेव P_1

संक्रामति, अचिन्त्या द्रव्यशक्तयो यत इत्यर्थः। अत एव चात्यद्भुतदृष्टान्तसिद्धशक्त्यनुमानतः संक्रान्तिसाधनान्न केदारवारि क्षेत्रपानीयमत्र व्याख्येयम्, तत्संक्रान्तेः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वेनानुपयोगात्। तदुक्तम्—

प्रत्यक्षेण हि सिद्धे ऽर्थे नानुमानं प्रवर्तत इति॥ २३॥

[३.९.७ अचिद्वस्तुनि चित्संक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तः]

तदियता संक्रान्तिवादिनो दृष्टान्तासम्भवे प्रतिपादिते सम्प्रति संक्रान्तिवादी सिद्धान्तसिद्धमेव वस्तु दृष्टान्तीकृत्य प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—

चितो ऽचिद्वस्तुवृत्तित्वं गुणत्वे ऽपि समीहितम्।

चितश्चेतनाशक्तेर्गुणत्वे ऽप्यचिद्वस्तुवृत्तित्वमभिमतं भवताम्।

कुत इत्याह—

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24 ab.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; चित इत्यादिनः A_1; चित इत्यादिना $P_1P_1P_3M_2$ (M_1E give abcd all together here; M^{Y} ends with समीहितमिति) 24 b. गुणत्वे ऽपि] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; गुणत्वे हि E

23.7 प्रत्यक्षेण हि सिद्धे ऽर्थे नानुमानं प्रवर्तते Source unknown. It is quoted as belonging to the *Sarvamatopanyāsa* in the *Siddhāntasvapakṣadṛṣṭāntasaṅgraha* (IFP T. 533, p. 205 [reading *siddhānte* for *hi siddhe 'rthe*], and T. 317, p. 978 [reading *hi siddherddhe*]) and it is indeed to be found there as the first half of the eighth verse on p. 1 of T. 284 [reading *siddhyarthe* corrected to *siddhe 'rthe*].

23.4 अचिन्त्या] Σ; अचिन्त्य P_1 23.4 द्रव्यशक्तयो] Σ; व्यशक्तयो P_3 23.5 °सिद्धशक्त्यनुमानतः] $M^{Y}A_1P^{pc}_{1}P_2P_3M^{pc}_{1}E$; °सिद्ध× ⌈× शक्त्यनुमानतः P_1; °सिद्धशक्त्यनुमानसिद्ध M^{ac}_{1}; °शक्त्यनुमानतस् M_2 23.5 °पानीयमत्र] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; °पानी--त्र P_2; °पानीयमात्र P_3 23.6 तत्संक्रान्तेः] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; तत्संक्रान्ते P_1 23.6 प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वेनानुपयोगात्। तदुक्तम्] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; *om.* E(eyeskip) 23.9 तदियता] Σ; तदीयता P_3 23.9 संक्रान्तिवादिनो दृष्टान्तासम्भवे प्रति°] $M^{Y}P_3M_1E$; संक्रान्तवादिनो दृष्टान्तासंभवो प्रति° A_1M_2; संक्रान्तवादिनो दृष्टान्तासंभ--ति° P_1; संक्रान्तवादिनो दृष्टान्तासंभवे प्रति° P_2 23.9 संक्रान्तिवादी] $M^{Y}E$; संक्रान्तिवादि $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; संक्रान्तवादि P_1 23.10 सिद्धान्तसिद्धमेव] Σ; सिद्धासिद्धमेव M_2 24.1 चितश्चेतनाशक्तेर्गुणत्वे] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; ⊔ तनाशक्तेः गुणत्वे M_1; चितेश्चेतनाशक्तेश्च गुणत्वे E 24.1 °वृत्तित्वमभिमतं भवताम्] $A_1P_2M_1M_2E$; °वृत्तित्वमभिहितं भवताम् M^{Y}; °व्रतत्त+ ̲+--भव-- P_1; °वृत्तित्वाभिमतम् भवताम् P_3

नान्यथा वस्तुनः कृत्ये प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते॥ २४॥

अन्यथा तदविषयत्वे तस्य वस्तुनो ऽचेतनस्य करणीयफलविषया प्रवृत्तिर्न घटेत। एतदुक्तं भवति—कर्तरि कर्मण्यपि ज्ञानक्रिययोरवस्थितिरेष्टव्या, चिदनन्वितस्याचितः प्रवृत्त्यशक्तेः। सर्ववस्तूनां च स्वात्ममात्रायामेवावस्थितेः परस्परसंसर्गाधिष्ठानासम्भवेन तत्र ज्ञेयत्वे ऽपि कार्यकारित्वाद्यात्मको विशेषो न भवेदेव। दृश्यते च कुम्भकारादिशक्त्याघ्रातस्य मृदादेरचेतनस्यापि कारणवस्तुनः प्रोक्तो विशेष इति तत्र चिच्छक्तेरवस्थितिरवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्या॥ २४॥

[३.९.७.१ दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकसम्बन्धः]

ततः किमित्याह—

इष्यतामिति सिद्धे ऽपि परमेशगुणोदयः।

इत्यनयैव युक्त्या सिद्धे ऽपीष्यतां परमेश्वरसम्बन्धिनो गुणस्यावस्थितिः। न तु सिद्धस्य प्रागपि स्वतस्तादृशो गुणो दृश्यत इत्याह—

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24 cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}$; नान्यथा वस्तुकृत्ये प्रवृत्तिर ⊔ M^{s}_{3}; नान्यथेति $A_1P_1P_2P_3$ M_1M_2E (M_1E give cd thus immediately above 24ab; M^{Y} follows the half-verse with *iti*) 25 ab.] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s^c}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; इष्यतामिति सिद्धे ऽपि परमेशगुणोदय इति M^{Y}; इष्यतामिति सिद्धेपि परमेशगुणादयः $P^{s^{ac}}_{1}P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}$; इष्यतामिति $A_1P_1P_2P_3$; इष्यतामित्य् M_2 (E give 25abcd together here)

24.3 करणीयफलविषया] $M^{Y}A_1P^{pc}_{1}P_2P_3M_1M^{ac}_{2}E$; करणीय× स्य× फलविषया P_1; करणीय+विष+फलविषया M_2 24.4 घटेत] M^{Y}; घटते Σ 24.4 कर्मण्यपि] Σ; कर्मण्यवि° M_1 24.4 °क्रिययोरव°] $M^{Y}A_1P^{pc}_{2}P_3M_2E$; ---योरव° P_1; °क्रियोरव° $P^{ac}_{2}M_1$ 24.5 चिदनन्वितस्याचितः] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E_V$; चिदन्वितस्याचितः M^{Y}; चितनन्वितस्याचितः P_1; चिदनन्वितस्याचिदः E_D 24.5–6 °मात्रायामेवावस्थितेः] Σ; °मात्रायमेवावस्थिते। P_2 24.6 परस्पर°] Σ; परस्परं P_2 24.6 °सम्भवेन तत्र] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P^{pc}_{3}M_2E$; °सम्भवेन +तत्र+ P_3; °सं ⊔ M_1 24.6 कार्यकारित्वाद्यात्मको] *conj. Mani Dravida*; कार्यत्वाद्यात्मको $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; ---त्वाद्यात्मको P_1; कार्यत्वाद्यात्मको ऽपि M_1 24.9 तत्र चिच्छक्तेरव°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; तत्र चिच्छक्ते--- P_2; त ⊔ च्छक्तेरव° M_1 24.9 °वश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्या] $M^{Y}E$; °वश्याभ्युपगन्तव्या $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; °वश्य---पगन्तव्याः P_2 25.1 इत्यनयैव] $A_1P_1P_3M_1$; इत्यनया $M^{Y^{ac}}$; इत्यनया +व(?)+ M^{Y^c}; इत्यनै--- P_2; अनयैव M_2E 25.1 सिद्धे ऽपीष्यतां] Σ; सिद्धोपीष्यताम् P_3 25.1 °वस्थितिः। न तु सिद्धस्य] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; वस्थितिः ननु सिद्धस्य P_2; °वस्थिति ⊔ द्धस्य M_1 25.2 स्वतस्तादृशो] Σ; तादृशो M_1 25.2 गुणो दृश्यत] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_1E$; गुणा दृश्यन्ते A_1; गुणो दृश्यन्त P_2; गुणो दृश्यन्ते M_2

प्रागसत्त्वात्तदानीं तु महाविभवदर्शनात्॥ २५॥

प्राक् पश्ववस्थायां परिमितं ज्ञत्वकर्तृत्वादिगुणजातं तस्याभूत्, तदानीं तु सिद्धावस्थायां तदीश्वरसममपरिमितं श्रूयते। न च परिमितमेव तदपरिमितीभूतमिति युज्यते वक्तुम्, विरोधात्, परिणामिताप्रसक्तेश्च। न च तदानीमसतस्तस्योद्भवो युक्तः, अविनाशित्वेनास्योक्तत्वात्। तत् पारिशेष्यादीश्वरगुणस्यैव तथाभूतस्य तत्र तदा संक्रान्तिरिति पाशुपताः॥ २५॥

[३.९.७.२ अचिद्वस्तुनि चित्संक्रान्तिदृष्टान्तनिरासः]

इयत्परवचनमाशङ्क्य पराकरोति—

वस्त्वन्तरे न वृत्तिस्तु केवलस्य गुणस्य हि।
स्वगुणिन्यधिरूढस्य तस्यासावुपचारतः॥ २६॥

स्वगुणिनं परित्यज्य न केवलस्यास्य ज्ञानक्रियात्मनश्चिद्गुणस्य वस्त्वन्तरे

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25 c. °त्तदानीं] $P_1^s P_3^s P_4^2 M_1 M_3^s$; °दिदानीं $M^Y M_M^Y P_4^s E$ (E have this half-verse immediately after 25ab and here, in place of 25cd, $A_1 P_1 P_2 P_3 M_2 E$ have only the *pratīka*: प्रागसत्त्वादिति) 25 d. महाविभवदर्शनात्] $P_1^s P_3^s P_4^s M_1 M_3^s E$; न भावि भवदर्शनादिति $M^Y M_M^Y$ 26.] $M^Y M_M^Y P_3^s P_4^s M_1 M_3^s E$; वस्त्वन्तर इत्यादि $A_1 P_1 P_2 P_3 M_2$ 26 a. वस्त्वन्तरे न वृत्तिस्तु] $M_M^Y P_4^s E$; वस्त्वंतरे निवृत्तिस्तु M^Y; वस्त्वन्तरनिवृत्तिस्तु $P_1^s P_3^s P_4^2 M_3^s$; ⊔ वृत्तिस्तु M_1 26 b. केवलस्य गुणस्य हि] $M_M^{Yc} P_4^s E$; गुणस्य केवलस्य हि $M^Y P_1^s P_3^s M_1 M_3^s$ (unmetrical); × न भावि भवदर्शनात्× केवलस्य गुणस्य हि M_M^Y 26 c. स्वगुणिन्यधिरूढस्य] $P_4^s E$; स्वगुणेनाधिरूढस्य $M^Y M_M^Y P_1^s M_1 M_3^s$; स्वगुणेनाविरु⊔स्य P_3^s 26 d. तस्यासावुपचारतः] $M_M^Y P_1^{sc} P_3^s M_1 M_3^s$; तस्यासावुपचारत इति M^Y; त ⌣ ⌣ पचारतः P_1^{ac}; तस्य स्यादुपचारतः $P_4^s E$; तस्य सा उपचारतः P_4^2

25.3 तस्याभूत्, तदानीं] $M^Y P_1 P_2 P_3 M_2$; तस्याभूतन्तस्याभूत्तदानीन् A_1; त ⊔ दानीन् M_1; तस्याभूत्। इदानीं E 25.4 °सममपरिमितं] $M^Y P_3$; °समं परिमितं $A_1 P_1 P_2 M_1 M_2$; °समयपरिमितं E 25.4–5 तदपरिमिती°] $A_1 P_3 M_2 E$; तदपरिमित° $M^Y P_1$; तदपरिमिति° $P_2 M_1$ 25.5 वक्तुम्] Σ; वक्तु P_1 25.6 तदानीमसतस्तस्यो°] Σ; तदानीं समतस्तस्यो° A_1 25.6 युक्तः, अविनाशित्वेनास्योक्तत्वात्] $A_1 P_2 P_3 M_2 E$; युक्तः। अविशित्वस्योक्तत्वात् M^Y; युक्तः। अविनाशित्वे× ने ⌣+⌣+⌣क्तत्वात्× नस्योक्तत्वात् P_1; ⊔ नाशित्वस्योक्तत्वात् M_1 25.6–7 तत् पारिशेष्या°] $M^{Yc} P_1 P_3 M_1 E$; तत्पारिषे ×ष× ष्या° M^Y; पारिशेष्या° A_1; त ⌣प—शेष्य+ा+× ष× P_2; तत्पारीष्यो° M_2 25.7 तदा] Σ; *om.* P_3 25.9 इयत्पर°] $M^Y A_1 P_1 M_1 M_2 E$; इ—त्पर° P_2; इयत्परि° P_3 26.1 केवलस्यास्य] Σ; केवलस्य P_3 26.1 °श्चिद्गुणस्य वस्त्वन्तरे ग्राह्यतामापन्ने] Σ; °श्चिद्गुणस्ववस्त्वन्तरे ग्राह्यता ⊔ M_1

ग्राह्यतामापन्ने चिच्छून्ये स्थितिर्युज्यते वक्तुम्। तथात्वे हि तस्यापि ज्ञातृत्वं कर्तृता च स्यादिति सर्व एव चेतनाः स्युः, सर्वे सर्वेश्वराश्च, ईश्वरेण सर्वस्य संवेदनात्। किन्तु स्वगुणिस्थस्यैव तस्य तत्राश्रयान्तरे विकारवत्यवस्थितिं विनापि विकारहेतुत्वादवस्थानमुपचाराद्उच्यते, न मुख्यतः। शक्तत्वमेव कारणत्वम्, शक्तता चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कर्तुः कर्मणि सिद्धेति तत्र तच्छक्तत्यवस्थितिकल्पनं निष्फलमेव। नापि च कर्तुः क्रिया कर्मस्था युज्यते, प्रोक्तन्यायविरोधात्। अपि तु तद्बलात् तत्रापि स्पन्दोद्भूतेस्तथात्वमुपचर्यत इति॥ २६॥

[३.९.८ सिद्धान्तिनो दृष्टान्तः]

दृष्टान्तमाह—

यथोष्णतागुणो वह्नेरम्भस्युच्चैर्विजृम्भते।

औष्ण्यं वह्नेर्विशेषगुणः, न सलिलस्य युक्तः, भूतानां सांकर्यप्रसङ्गात्। पृ-

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27ab.] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}E$; — भस्युच्चैर्विजृंभते। वह्निसंस्थ इति M^{γ}; यथोष्णतागुणो वन्हेरम्भस्यु ⊔ ऐर्विजृम्भते P^{s}_{3}; यथोष्णतागुणो वह्नेरम्भस्युच्चै विजृम्भ × तौ× M_1 (note that there has been confusion about the boundary between verse and commentary); यथोष्णता गुणो वह्नेरम्भ ⊔ चैव विजृम्भते M^{s}_{3}; यथेति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ (E have 27abcd together here)

26.9–27b °त्वमुपचर्यत इति···यथोष्णतागुणो वह्नेरम्] — M^{γ}

26.2 चिच्छून्ये] Σ; चिच्छक्ति M_2 26.2 तस्यापि] Σ; तस्या M_1 26.3 एव चेतनाः स्युः] $M^{\gamma}M_1M_2E$; एव चेतना स्युः पुरा च A_1P_3; एव चेतना स्युः पुनश्च P_1; व चेतना स्युः पु(?) ≃ा च P_2 26.3 सर्वे सर्वेश्वराश्च, ईश्वरेण] Σ; सर्वे सर्वे पराश्चेश्वरेण M^{γ} 26.3–4 सर्वस्य संवेदनात्। किन्तु स्वगुणि°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_2E$; सर्वस्य संवेदनात् किन्तु स्व≃ण° P_2; सर्वसंवेदनात् किन्तु स्वगुणि° P_3; सर्वस्य संवेदना ⊔ वगुणि° M_1 26.4 तस्य तत्राश्र°] Σ; तत्र तस्याश्र° M_2 26.5 °चारादुच्यते] Σ; °चारादृश्यते E 26.6 कारणत्वम्] Σ; *om.* M_1 26.6 कर्तुः] Σ; क ⊔ M_1 26.7 °कल्पनं निष्फलमेव] $M^{\gamma}A_1P^{pc}_{2}P_3M_2E$; °कल्पननिष्फलमेव P_1; °कल्पन+न्नि+ष्फलमेव P_2; °कल्पनं निफलमेव M_1 26.7 नापि च कर्तुः क्रिया] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_2$; नापि च कर्तृक्रिया $P_1P_2M_1$; नापि कर्तृक्रिया E 26.8 °न्यायविरोधात्। अपि तु] Σ; °न्यायाविरोधाद-- P_2 26.8 स्पन्दोद्भूतेस्तथात्व°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_2E_D$; स्पन्दो+त्+भूतेस्तथात्वा° P_2; स्पन्दोद्भूते तथात्व° M_1; स्पन्दोद्भतेस्तथात्व° E_V (broken type?) 27.1 औष्ण्यं] Σ; तौष्ण्यं M_1 27.1 सलिलस्य] $A_1P_1M_2$; जलस्य $M^{\gamma}P_3E$; —लस्य P_2; जसजलस्य M_1 27.1 सांकर्य°] Σ; संकार्य्य° P_1

थिव्यादीनि हि परस्परं धृतिसंग्रहपाकादिहेतुत्वैर्विभिद्यन्त इति नोदकस्योष्णतागुणो ऽग्निसंयोगात्परिगृहीतः, अपि तु

वह्निसंस्थः

तत्रोदके ऽनुद्भूतरूपो वह्निरुपलभ्यमानः स्वगुणस्पर्शस्थित्या स्वकार्यं दाहादिकं करोति यथा, दार्ष्टान्तिकमाह—

तथेशानगुणस्तत्स्थो विजृम्भते॥ २७॥

तद्वत् परमेश्वरसम्बन्ध्यपि गुणः स्वाश्रयस्थ एवाश्रयान्तरे नानाविकारकारित्वेन प्रभविष्यतीति न तत्रावस्थितिकल्पनायां हेतुरस्ति॥ २७॥

[३.९.९ सिद्धान्तस्य सङ्क्रान्त्यादिवादैर्व्यत्यासः]

27a. वह्निसंस्थः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; वह्निसंस्था इति A_1; *om.* P_1; व—स्थ इति P_2; वह्निसंस्थ इति P_3M_2E 27cd. तथेशानगुणस्तत्स्थो विजृम्भते] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; तथेशानगुणस्तत्स्थो विजृंभते। एवं चावेशपक्षस्तु अधिष्ठातृत्वमेव वा इति M^{Y}; तथेति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; but E read 27abcd together where 27ab is placed, and there their reading is: तथेशानगुणस्तस्यैव जृम्भते

27.2–3 °स्योष्णतागुणो···तत्रोदके ऽनुद्भूत°] — M^{Y} 27.3 Here, in the middle of line 2 of f. 182r, P_1's text cuts back to the end of the commentary on verse 7. We must take up its text, from अपि तु, in the last line of f. 187v. This echoes the disturbance in order of verses in P^{s}_{1}. 27.4 वह्निरुपलभ्यमानः स्वगुण°] — P_1 27.6 तद्वत् परमेश्वरसम्बन्ध्यपि···एवाश्रयान्तरे] तद्वत्पर — वाश्रयांतरे M^{Y}

27.2 परस्परं] Σ; *om.* M^{ac}_{1} 27.2 °ग्रहपाकादिहेतुत्वैर्विभिद्यन्त] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2M_1$; °ग्रहेतुत्वैर्विभिद्यन्त P_3(eyeskip); °ग्रहपातादिहेतुत्वैर्विभिद्यन्त M_2; °ग्रहपाकादिहेतुत्वैर्विभिद्यत E_D; °ग्रहपाकादिहेतुभिर्विभिद्यन्त E_V 27.2–3 नोदकस्योष्णतागुणो] $A^{c}_{1}P_1P_2P_3M_1$; नोदक — M^{Y}; नोक्तस्योष्णतागुणो $A^{ac}_{1}M_2$; नोदकस्योष्णता गुणो E 27.3 परिगृहीतः] P_1M_2E; परिगृहीत A_1; परि॒हितः P_2; परिहीतः P_3; परं भातः M_1 27.4 °नुद्भूतरूपो] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; — रूपो M^{Y}; °नुत्भूतरूपत्वोप— P_1; °नुद्भूत° M_1 27.4 °लभ्यमानः] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °लभ्यमान M_1 27.6 °सम्बन्ध्यपि] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °सम्बन्धोपि P_1 27.6 गुणः] $M^{ac}_{2}E$; गुणा A_1; गुण $P_1P_2P_3M_1M^{ac}_{2}$ 27.6–7 नानाविकारकारित्वेन प्रभविष्यतीति] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; नानाविकारे—प्रभविष्यतीति P_1; नानाविकारिकारित्वेन भविष्यतीति M_1 27.7 °नायां हेतुरस्ति] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °नायां हेतुरस्तीत्याह M^{Y}; °नाया हेतुरस्ति P_1

एवं नावेशपक्षस्तु तदधिष्ठानमेव वा।

परमावेशपक्षो ऽधिष्ठातृपक्षो वा यः 'कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वम्' इत्यत्रोद्दिष्टः, †तयोर्न तथा, यथा† संक्रान्तिपक्ष इत्याह—

पक्षो हि गुणसंक्रान्तेरजातो हि मृतस्तदा॥ २८॥

स ह्यनुत्पन्न एव मृतः॥ २८॥ 3

कुत इत्याह—

शम्भुरेव हि तत्रापि सर्वं वेत्ति करोति च।
स्वगुणेन न सिद्धस्तु पारक्येन ह्यदर्शनात्॥ २९॥

28ab. एवं नावेशपक्षस्तु तदधिष्ठानमेव वा] *conj.*; एवं चावेशपक्षस्तु तदधिष्ठानमेव वेति M^{Y}; एवं चावेशपक्षस्तु तदधिष्ठानमेव वा M^{Y}_{M}; एवन्नेति $A_1P_1M_2$; —वञ्चेति P_2; एवञ्चावेशपक्षो यस्त्वधिष्ठातृत्वमेव वा P^{s}_{1}; एवरञ्चावेशपक्षोयस्त्वधिष्ठात्रत्वमेव व P^{s}_{3}; एवन्नावेशपक्षो वास्त्वधिष्ठात्रत्वमेव वा P^{s}_{4}; एवञ्चेति P_3; परं चावेशपक्षो यस्त्वधिष्ठातृत्वमेव वा M_1; एवं चावेशपक्षो यस्त्वधिष्ठातृत्वमेव च M^{s}_{3}; एवं चावेशपक्षो वा त्वधिष्ठातृत्वमेव वा E (E here give abcd all together). 28 cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; पक्षो हीति $A_1P_1M_2E$; पक्षे हीति P_2P_3 (E give this half-verse immediately after 28ab above) 28 c. गुणसंक्रान्ते°] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; गुणसंक्रान्तो° P^{s}_{1}; संक्रान्ते° $P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}$ (unmetrical) 28 d. तदा] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}M_1$; तदेति M^{Y}; तथा $P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M^{s}_{3}E$ 29abcd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; शम्भुरेव हीति $A_1P_1P_2M_2$; शम्भुरेव हिति P_3; शम्भुरेव हि तत्रापि सर्वं वेत्ति ⊔ M^{s}_{3} 29 d. पारक्येन ह्यदर्शनात्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; पारक्येन ह्यदर्शनात्। तत्संपर्काच्च सिद्धोपि सर्वकृत्सर्ववित्त्व — M^{Y}; पराक्येन हि दर्शनात् P^{s}_{3}; परत्वेनास्य दर्शनात् E

28.1 प्रयोज्यत्वम्···संक्रान्तिपक्ष इत्याह] प्रयो — क्ष इत्याह M^{Y} 28.2 यथा संक्रान्ति°] —न्ति° P_1

28.1 कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वम्] *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 3c.

28.1 परमावेशपक्षो] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; परमावेशपक्ष एव P_2; परः आवेशपक्षो M_1 28.1 °धिष्ठातृपक्षो वा यः 'कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वम्'] $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °धिष्ठातृपक्षो वा यः कर्तृत्वेपि प्रयो— M^{Y}; यावत्तत्र ⏑ ⏑ योज्यत्वम् P_2 28.1–2 इत्यत्रोद्दिष्टः] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E_V$; इत्यत्रोद्दिष्टन् P_1; इत्यत्राद्दिष्टं M_1; इत्यन्यत्रोद्दिष्टः E_D 28.2 तयोर्न तथा, यथा] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; तयोर्न्न तथा— P_1; तौ। न तथा M_1 28.3 स ह्यनुत्पन्न एव मृतः] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; स ह्यनुत्पन्न एव मतः M^{Y}; उत्पन्न एव मृतः E

न केवलमावेशपक्ष एव, यावत् तत्रापि संक्रान्तिपक्षे ऽपि स्वगुणेन सिद्धगतो ऽपीश्वरः सर्वं वेत्ति सर्वं च विधत्ते, न तु सिद्धः। न हि पारक्येन
3 परकर्मणान्यो जानन् कुर्वन् वा दृष्टः॥ २९॥

[३.९.१० ईश्वरगुणसम्पर्कः]

पराशङ्का—

तत्सम्पर्काच्च सिद्धो ऽपि सर्वकृत् सर्ववित् यदि।

शम्भुगुणसम्पर्कात् सिद्धो ऽपि तथाभूतश्चेत्। पराकरोति—

अचिद्वतामपि प्राप्तं तर्हि सर्वार्थदर्शनम्॥ ३०॥

अचिद्वतामपि मायादीनामपि, ईश्वरज्ञेयत्वेन तत्सम्पर्कस्याविशेषो भवेदिति
3 तेषां सर्वज्ञत्वप्रसङ्गः॥ ३०॥

[३.९.११ सिद्धान्तिपक्षे दूषणस्योद्धरणम्]

30ab.] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; तत्सम्पर्कादिति $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$ (E give the whole of verse 30 here and then the *pratīka* found in M_{2}) 30 b. सर्ववित् यदि] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; ×वि× सर्ववित्यति P^{s}_{1}; सर्व×कृ×वित्यति P^{s}_{3} 30 cd.] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s_{c}}_{1}P^{s}_{3}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; — चिद्वतामपि प्राप्तं तर्हि सर्वार्थदर्शनं। प्रागसत्वमसिद्धं च दृष्टं ज्ञानक्रियाबलं। उत्कृष्यमाणमुत्कर्षाव्यंजकस्थानत स्फुटमिति M^{Y}; अचिद्वतामिति $A_{1}P_{1}M_{2}$; अचिद्वतामपि ×व्य× प्राप्तन्त×स्य× हिं सर्वार्त्थदर्शनम् P^{s}_{1}; *om.* $P_{2}P_{3}$; अचिद्वतापि प्राप्तन्तर्हि सर्वार्त्थदर्शनं P^{s}_{4}(unmetrical); अचिद्वतामपि E (E gives the accepted text of cd immediately after 30ab)

29.1 न केवलमावेशपक्ष एव या°] — M^{Y} 30.1 सिद्धो ऽपि···पराकरोति] — M^{Y}

29.1 संक्रान्तिपक्षे ऽपि] Σ; संक्रांतिपक्षे M^{Y} 29.1–2 सिद्धगतो ऽपीश्वरः] $M^{Y}A_{1}M_{2}E$; सिद्धगतेनेश्वरः M_{1}; सि—पीश्वरः P_{1}; सिद्धगतोपीश्वरः शम्भुस् P_{2}; सिद्धगतेपीश्वरः P_{3} 29.2 सर्वं वेत्ति] $A^{c}_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; संवेत्ति M^{Y}; सर्वं वेत्ति A^{ac}_{1} 29.2 पारक्येन] $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; पारत्वेन A_{1}; —न P_{2} 29.3 परकर्मणान्यो] $M^{Y}M_{1}E$; परज्ञानेन कर्मणा वान्यो $A_{1}M_{2}$; परज्ञानेन परमकर्म्मणान्न्यो $P_{1}P_{2}$; परज्ञानेन परकर्म्मणा × ञ्च× वान्यो P_{3} 29.5 पराशङ्का] M_{1} has this thus before the verse; $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$ have it after the *pratīka* for the verse thus: तत्सम्पर्कादिति पराशङ्का; E give verse 30, then तत्सम्पर्कादिति पराशङ्का 30.1 तथाभूतश्चेत्] $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}E$; तथाभूतश्चेदिति M_{1} 30.2 अचिद्वतामपि मायादीनामपि] Σ; मायादीनामपि M_{2} 30.2 °स्याविशेषो भवेदिति] M_{1}; — M^{Y}; °स्य विशेषा भवेत्तदिति A_{1}; °स्याविशेषात् भवेदेतदिति P_{1}; °स्याविशेशोत् भवेत्तदिति $P_{2}P_{3}$; °स्याविशेषो भवेत्तदिति M_{2}; °स्याविशेषाद् भवेत् तदिति E

प्रागसत्त्वमसिद्धं च दृष्टं ज्ञानक्रियाबलम्।
उत्कृष्यमाणमुत्कर्षाद् व्यञ्जकस्थानतः स्फुटम्॥ ३१॥

प्रागसत्त्वमिति परोपन्यस्तयुक्तिनिरासः। यदुक्तं प्राग्भवावस्थायामात्मनां सर्वज्ञत्वादिसामर्थ्यस्यासत्त्वमिति, तदसत्त्वमसिद्धम्, यतस्तेषां प्रागपि ज्ञानक्रियाबलं स्वव्यञ्जककार्यकरणादिस्थानतो दृष्टम्। यथैवात्मनो यत्र स्व- 3
व्यञ्जकं शरीरं तत्र तत्रात्मप्रतिपत्तितो व्यापकत्वं प्रतीयते, तथैव तद्गुणानां सत्त्वं व्यापकत्वं च सिद्धमिति भावः। यथैव प्राक् सिद्धं तथैव व्यञ्जकस्यालोकादेर्विषयाभिव्यक्तिं निर्वर्तयतः, सिद्धाञ्जनादेर्बुद्धीन्द्रियशक्तिमुत्तेजयतः, 6
शिल्पवेदनादेः कर्मेन्द्रियकौशलं कुर्वतः, योगाभ्यासादेश्चित्तं जयतो यथायथमुत्कर्षेण ज्ञत्वकर्तृत्वात्मकं स्वबलमुत्कृष्यमाणं दृष्टम्॥ ३१॥

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31 abcd.] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; प्रागसत्त्वमिति $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ (M^{Y} gives 31abcd after 30d) 31 b. °बलम्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; °फलम् P^{S}_{1} 31 cd. °त्कर्षाद् व्यञ्जकस्थानतः] $P^{S}_{4}E$; °त्कर्षव्यंजकस्थानत $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}M_1$; °त्कर्षम् व्यञ्जकस्थानत P^{S}_{1}; °त्कर्षव्यञ्जकस्थानतः M^{S}_{3}

31.6 सिद्धाञ्जनादेर्बुद्धीन्द्रिय°] सिद्धा --- द्धींद्रिय° M^{Y} 31.8 स्वबलमुत्कृष्यमाणं दृष्टम्] स्वबल ---ष्यमाणन्दृष्टं A_1; स्वब---त्---ष्यमाणं--- P_2

31.1 प्रागसत्त्वमिति] E; *om.* $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ (but see above register); इति M_1 31.1–2 प्राग्भवावस्थायामात्मनां] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1$; प्राग्भवावस्थायामात्मनः P_1E; प्राक्भावस्थायामात्मनां P_2; ⊔ यामात्मनां M_2 31.2 सर्वज्ञत्वादिसामर्थ्यस्यासत्त्वमिति] $M^{Yc}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; सर्वज्ञत्वादिसाधर्म्यस्यासत्वमिति M^{Yac}; सर्वत्वादिसामत्र्थ्यास---ति P_2; सर्वज्ञत्वादिसामर्थ्यस्यार्थवत्वमिति M_2 31.2 तदसत्त्वमसिद्धम्, यतस्] $M^{Y}A_1P^{pc}_{2}M_2E$; तदसिद्धं यतः $P_1P_3M_2$; तदसत्वमिद्धं यतस् P^{ac}_{2} (?) 31.3 ज्ञानक्रियाबलं] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; ज्ञानक्रियाबल° M^{Y}; ज्ञानक्रियाबल--- P_1 31.3 °करणादिस्थानतो दृष्टं] $A_1P_3M_2$; --- इति स्थाने दृष्टं M^{Y}; °करणादिस्थानत इति स्थाने दृष्टः P_1; °करणादिस्था ⌣तो दृष्टं P_2; °करणादिस्थानतः तदनुसारेण दृष्टम् M_1; °करणादिस्थानतो दृष्टमिति E 31.3–4 स्वव्यञ्जकं] $M^{Y}A_1P^{pc}_{1}M_1M_2E$; स्व+व्य+ञ्जकं P_1; स्वव्यञ्जक° P_2; व्यञ्जकं P_3 31.4 °प्रतिपत्तितो] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °प्रतिपत्तिता $P_2E^{vl}_{D}$ 31.4 प्रतीयते] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_2E_{V}$; प्रतियते A_1; प्रकीर्यते M_1; प्रतीर्यते E_{D} 31.5 सत्त्वं व्यापकत्वं] Σ; सत्वव्यापकत्वञ् P_2 31.5 तथैव व्यञ्जकस्यालो°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M^{pc}_{1}M_2E$; तथैव × ालोकादे× व्यंजकस्यालो° M_1 31.6 °व्यक्तिं निर्वर्तयतः] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_2E$; °व्यक्तिन्निर्व+⌣+यतस् A_1; °व्यक्तिनिरवृत्तयत P_2; °व्यक्तिर्निर्वत्तयतः M_1 31.6 °त्तेजयतः] $M^{Y}P_3M_2E$; °त्पतेजयत A_1; °त्तेजयत P_1P_2; °ततेजयतश् M_1 31.7 °वेदनादेः] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °वेदना--- P_1; °वेदनादे P_2 31.7 °कौशलं] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °कौशल्यम् P_1P_2 31.7 °भ्यासादे°] $M^{Y}A_1P^{pc}_{2}P_3M_1M_2E$; °भ्यासाते° P_1; °भासाधे P_2 31.8 °मुत्कर्षेण] Σ; °दुत्कर्षेण P_1

9 किमत इत्याह

मोक्षे हि व्यञ्जकं दृष्टं सर्वार्थं शाम्भवं बलम्।
तत्समत्वमतस्तस्य भवत् केन निवार्यते॥ ३२॥

मुक्तावीश्वरलक्षणस्य व्यञ्जकस्योत्कृष्टतरस्य योगाद् व्यङ्ग्यस्यापि तथाभावसिद्धौ तस्येश्वरसमगुणाभिव्यक्तेरीश्वरसमत्वं भवत्तदा न निवारयितुं पार्यते।
3 अनभिव्यक्त्यभिव्यक्ती चावरणभावाभावकृते तस्य, न तु स्वरूपान्यथात्वकृते परिणामित्वापादिके, परगतत्वात्॥ ३२॥

[३.९.१२ सङ्क्रान्तौ पूर्वाश्रयविवर्जनम्]

6 एवं स्वपक्षे दूषणमुद्भृत्य परस्य दोषान्तरमाह—

आश्रयान्तरसंक्रान्तिः पूर्वाश्रयविवर्जनम्।

32abcd.] $P_3^s P_4^s E$; मोक्षे हि व्यंजकं दृष्टं सर्वार्थं शांभवं बलं। तत्समत्व — स्य भवत्केन तिवार्यते इति M^Y; मोक्षे -व्यंजकं दृष्टं सर्वार्त्थं शांभवं बलं। तत्समत्वमतस्तस्य भवत् केन निवार्य्यते M_M^Y; मोक्षो हि व्यञ्जकन्दृष्टम् सर्वार्त्थम् साम्भवम् बलम्। तत्सम ×स× त्व ×म्× मतस्तस्य भवेत् केन नि ×य× वार्य्यते P_1^s; मोक्षो हीति $A_1 P_1 M_2$; मोक्षे हीति $P_2 P_3$; ⊔ सर्वार्थं शांभवं बलम्। तत्समत्वमतस्तस्या भवत्को ⊔ M_1; मोक्ष हि व्यञ्जकं दृष्टं सर्वार्थं शाम्भवं बलम्॥ ३४ तत्समत्वमतस्तस्याभवत्केन निवार्यते M_3^s 33.] $M^Y M_M^Y P_1^s P_3^s P_4^s M_1 M_3^s E$; आश्रयान्तरे संक्रान्तिरिति A_1; आश्रयान्तरसंक्रान्तिरिति $P_1 P_2 P_3 M_2$ 33a. °संक्रान्तिः] Σ; °संक्रान्ति° P_3^s

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32.2 तदा न निवारयितुं] तदा —म् P_1

31.9 किमत इत्याह] $M^Y A_1 P_3 M_2$; किमि— P_1; किमेतदित्याह P_2; ⊔ M_1; किमितीत्याह E 32.1 मुक्तावीश्वरलक्षणस्य व्यञ्जकस्यो°] $M^Y A_1 P_1^{pc} P_3 E$; मुक्तावीश्वरलक्षणस्य +व्य+ञ्जकस्यो° P_1; मुक्तावीश्वरलक्षणस्य ≍ ञ्जकस्यो° P_2; ⊔ लक्षणस्य व्यंजकस्यो° M_1; मुक्तावीश्वरलक्षणस्यो° M_2 32.1 व्यङ्ग्यस्यापि] Σ; व्यंजकस्यापि $M^{Y\,ac}$ 32.2 °समत्वं भवत्तदा न] M^Y; °समत्वमभवत्तदा न $A_1 M_1$; °समत्वम् भवत्तदा — P_1; °समत्वं भवत्तत् केन $P_2 P_3$; °समत्वमभवत्तदानीं M_2; °समत्वं भवत्केन E; °समत्वं तत्तत्केन E_D^{wl} 32.2 पार्यते] $M^Y P_1 P_2 P_3 M_1 E$; वार्यते $A_1 M_2$ 32.3 अनभिव्यक्त्यभिव्यक्ती] Σ; अभिव्यक्त्यनभिव्यक्ती E 32.3 °भावाभावकृते] $A_1 P_1 P_3 M_1 E$; °भा ≍ भावकृ ≍ M^Y; °भावाभावावकृते M_2 32.3–4 तस्य, न तु स्वरूपान्यथात्वकृते परिणामित्वापादिके, परगतत्वात्] $A_1 P_3 M_2$; तस्य न तु स्वरूपात्यथात्वकृते तत्र परिणामित्वापादिके परगतत्वात् M^Y; तस्य न तु स्वरूपान्न्यथात्वकृते तत्र परिणामि×≍× त्वापादिके। परगतत्वात् P_1; तस्य न तु स्वरूपान्यथात्वकृते परिणा≍≍पादिकेने परगतत्वात् P_2; त ⊔ त्वादिकेति परकृतत्वात् M_1; तस्य, न तु स्वरूपान्यथात्वकृते, परिणामित्वापादकेन पराहतत्वात् E 32.6 परस्य दोषान्तरमाह] $M^Y A_1 P_2 M_1 M_2 E$; दूषणान्तरमाह $P_1 P_3$

विना नैव प्रसिद्धा स्यात् त्यागे पूर्वस्तु निर्गुणः॥ ३३॥

संक्रान्तिर्हि पूर्वाश्रयत्यागेनाश्रयान्तरे सूर्यादीनां दृष्टा। तदत्रापि पूर्वाश्रय-त्यागाभ्युपगमे स पूर्वः परमः शिवः सर्वगुणरहितो भवेत्, सिद्ध एव तद्गुणसंक्रान्तेरिति॥ ३३॥ 3

ननु स्वाश्रये भावस्तत्र चाश्रयान्तरे संक्रान्तिः प्रदीपप्रकाशस्येव तस्य भविष्यतीति। आह—

गच्छतस्त्वपरित्यज्य गीतं प्रसरणं हि तत्।
ततश्च परिणामित्वाद् दोषानीकं समापतेत्॥ ३४॥

प्रदीपप्रकाशस्य हि प्रदीपोत्पत्तौ क्रामतः स्वविरुद्धतमोनिवर्तनेन तत्र तत्र देशे प्रसरणं मतम्, अम्भःप्रवाहस्येव परिणतिधर्मत्वाद्युज्यते। परमेश्वरगु-

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33 cd. स्यात् त्यागे पूर्वस्तु निर्गुणः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}M_{1}E$; स्यात् त्यागे पूर्वस्तु निर्गुण इ --- M^{Y}; स्या त्यागे पूर्वस्तु निर्गुणः P^{s}_{4}; स्यात् ⊔ र्वस्तु निर्गुणः M^{s}_{3} 34.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; गच्छत इति $A_{1}P_{1}P_{3}M_{2}$; च्छत इति P_{2} 34 a. गच्छतस्त्वपरि°] *conj.*; गच्छतस्तं परि° $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}E$; गच्छतस्थम् परि° $P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}$ 34 c. ततश्च परिणामित्वाद्] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}$; ततश्च परिणमित्वाद् P^{s}_{3}; ततश्च परिणामित्व° M^{s}_{3}; ततश्चापरिणामित्वाद् E (M^{Y} gives the text of 35–36b here immediately after 34) 34 d. °नीकं समापतेत्] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{3}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; °नीकसमाप×ते×येत् P^{s}_{1}; °नीकं समापतेः P^{s}_{4}

33.4 स्वाश्रये भावस्तत्र] स्वाश्र---त्र P_{1} 33.4–5 तस्य भविष्य°] त --- विष्य° M^{Y} 34.1 °तमो°] --- P_{1}

33.1 संक्रान्तिर्हि] $M^{Y}P_{3}M_{2}E$; संक्रान्तिहि $A_{1}P_{1}M_{1}$; संक्र--- P_{2} 33.1 °त्यागेनाश्र-यान्तरे] °त्या---रे P_{1} 33.1 दृष्टा] Σ; दृष्टाः P_{2} 33.1 तदत्रापि] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}M_{1}M_{2}$; तदत्रा ⊔ पि P_{3}; तद्वदत्रापि E 33.2 पूर्वः परमः] M^{Y}; पूर्वं परश् A_{1}; पूर्वः पर° $P_{1}P_{2}$; पूर्वः परः $P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$ 33.3 तद्गुण°] $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}E$; वा तद्गुणं $A_{1}M_{2}$ 33.4 भावस्तत्र] M^{Y}; भवतस्तत्र $A_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; ---त्र P_{1} 33.4 चाश्रयान्तरे] $P_{1}P_{3}$; वाश्रयान्तरे $M^{Y}A_{1}M_{1}M_{2}E$; ---श्रयान्तरे P_{2} 33.4 प्रदीप°] $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{3}M_{2}E$; प्रदिप° P_{2}; प्र ⊔ M_{1} 33.5 भविष्यतीति। आह] $A_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; ---विष्यतीत्या-ह M^{Y}; भविष्यतीत्यत आह P_{1} 34.1 क्रामतः स्व°] *conj.*; क्रमतः स्व° M^{Y}; संक्रामतः स $A_{1}M_{2}$; संक्रामतस्व° $P_{1}P_{2}$; संक्रमत P_{3}; संक्रमतस्य M_{1}; कृतायां स्व° E_{V}; कृते स्व° E_{D} 34.1 तत्र तत्र] $A_{1}P_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; तत्र $M^{Y}P_{2}$ 34.2 प्रसरणं मतम्, अम्भः°] $M^{Y}A_{1}P^{pc}_{1}P_{3}M_{2}E$; प्रसरणं म×ऱ×तमंभः° P_{1}; प्रसरणमंभम् P_{2}; प्रसरणम्मतम्भः° P_{3}; प्रसरणमम्भः° M_{1}

णस्य च—यदूपं परिणामि तदचेतनं मृदादि दृष्टम्—इत्याचैतन्यादिवक्ष्यमाणदोषव्रातप्रसङ्गः॥ ३४॥

[३.९.१३ गुणानां सङ्क्रान्त्यसम्भवः]

यथाकथञ्चित्संक्रान्तौ व्यवस्था द्रव्यवर्तिनी।
सर्वमानप्रसिद्धा सा विरुद्धा गुणकारिता॥ ३५॥

अथ वा पराहतयुक्तिको ऽपि संक्रान्तिवादी संक्रान्त्याक्रन्दापस्मारेण न मुच्यत इति संक्रान्तिमाग्रहादिच्छेत्, एवमपि गुणकारिता गुणैश्वर्यप्रवर्तिता संक्रान्तिः सा विरुद्धा। द्रव्यसंक्रान्तिरत्र युज्यते। द्रव्याणां हि संक्रान्तिः प्रसिद्धा न गुणानां यतः। ततश्च द्रव्यत्वमीश्वरगुणानां प्रसज्यत इति यावत्॥ ३५॥

जातित्वे नैष दोषश्चेत्

35.] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; *om.* P^{S}_{1}; यथाकथंचिदिति $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ (M^{Y} gives 35 above after 34) 35c. सा] $P^{S}_{4}E$; स्याद् $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}$; स्य $P^{S}_{3}M_1$; ⊔ M^{S}_{3} 35d. विरुद्धा] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1E$; ⊔ द्धा M^{S}_{3}; विशुद्धा E^{vl}_{D} 36a. जातित्वे नैष दोषश्चेत्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}E$; जातित्व इति $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; जातित्वे नैष दोषश्चन् P^{S}_{3}; जातित्वे नैष दोषश्चे P^{S}_{4}; जातित्वे नैष दोषं चेत् M_1; जातित्वे नैष दोषश्च M^{S}_{3} (M^{Y} gives 36ab together after 34–5 above; E give 36bcd here after 36a)

35.3 सा विरुद्धा द्रव्य°] — M^{Y}

34.3 च] Σ; *om.* P_3 34.3 तदचेतनं मृदादि दृष्टमित्याचैतन्यादि°] $A_1P_3M_2$; तदचेतनं मृदादिदृष्ट — दि° M^{Y}; तदचेतनं मृदादिदृष्टमि—तन्यादि° P_1; तदचेतनमृदादे दृष्टमित्यादिचैतन्यादि° P_2; तदचेतनं × परिणामा× +मृदा+ दि ⊔ ष्टमित्याचैतन्यादि° M_1; तदचेतनं मृदादि दृष्टमित्यचैतन्यादि° E_V 34.4 °व्रातप्रसङ्गः] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E_V$; °व्रात≃प्रसंग P_2 35.1 अथ वा] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; अथ P_2P_3 35.1 संक्रान्तिवादी] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; संक्रान्तिवाद° P_2; संक्रान्तिवादि M_2 35.1 संक्रान्त्याक्रन्दापस्मारेण न] $M^{Y}P_1M_1$; संक्रान्त्यपस्मारेण न A_1; संक्रान्ताग्रहापस्मारेण न P_2; संक्रान्त्यापस्मारेण न P_3; ×ह× क्र ×स्य× +सङ्क+ अपस्मारेण न M_2; संक्रान्त्याक्रान्तापस्मारेण E; संक्रान्त्याग्रहावस्तारेण E^{vl}_{D} 35.2 संक्रान्तिमाग्रहादिच्छेत्, एवमपि] $A_1P_3M_2$; संक्रांत्याग्रहादिच्छेदादेवमपि $M^{Y}E$; संक्रान्तिम—मपि P_1; संक्रहान्तिमाग्रहादिच्छेदेवमपि P_2; संक्रान्तिग्रहादिच्छेत् एवमपि M_1 35.2 गुणकारिता] Σ; गुणकारिका P_1 35.2 गुणैश्वर्यप्रवर्तिता] $A_1P_3M_2$; गुणैश्वर्याप्रवर्तिता M^{Y}; गुणैश्वर्य्यप्रवर्त्तिका P_1; गुणैश्वर्य्यप्रवृत्तिता P_2; गुणैश्वर्याप्रवर्तता M_1; गुणैश्वर्यादिप्रवर्तिता E 35.3 विरुद्धा] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; — M^{Y}; वृद्धा P_1 35.4 °गुणानां] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_1E$; — P_1; °गुणाय M_2 35.4–5 यावत्] Σ; तावत् M_2

अस्तु तर्हि सर्वज्ञत्वादीनां धर्माणां सिद्धेश्वरानेकगुणव्यक्तिगतत्वेन गुणजातित्वम्। तस्मिन् सति तस्याः प्राप्तसिद्धभावे पुमन्तरे ऽपि नवमालतीशौक्ल्यवत्संक्रान्तिर्भविष्यतीत्येवं संक्रान्तिसिद्धौ न दोषः कश्चिदिति परमतमाशङ्क्य निवर्तयति— 3

न ज्ञानादिगुणा हि सा।

न तेषां संक्रान्तिः सिद्धेति न किञ्चिदेतत्, मालत्यादिगुणानामपि तदोत्पत्तिरेव यतः। 6

अथायं वादी सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणाश्रयस्येश्वरद्रव्यैकदेशस्य संक्रान्तिमिच्छेत्, तथाप्ययुक्तमित्याह—

द्रव्यत्वे गौरवं कल्पेर्ज्ञानाद्याश्रयतो भवेत्॥ ३६॥

एवं द्रव्यत्वे ऽभ्युपगम्यमाने ज्ञानाद्याश्रयत्वेन या कल्पना तस्या गौरवं 9 गरीयस्त्वमप्रमाणमभ्युपगतं स्यात्। तथा हि—अनेकद्रव्यसमूहरूपत्वमी-

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36 b. न ज्ञानादिगुणा हि सा] $M^{Y2}M^{Y}_{M}A_1P_1P_3P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$; न ज्ञाना --- सा इति M^{Y1} (M^{Y} first gives this *pāda* in a block following 34–36a above); न. ज्ञानादिगुणा हि ×स× स P^{s}_{1}; नाज्ञानादिगुणा ×ᴗ× +हि+सा P_2; न ज्ञानादिगुणा हि वा P^{s}_{3}; न ज्ञानादिगुणा हिंसा M_2 36 cd.] $M^{Y}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; *om.* M^{Y}_{M}; —मिति P_1; द्रव्यत्व इति $A_1P_3M_2E_V$; द्रᴗत्व इति P_2; द्रव्यत्वे इति E_D 36 c. कल्पेर्] $M^{Y}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}$; कल्पे $P^{s}_{3}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$ (E gives 36bcd above after 36a) 36 d. °श्रयतो भवेत्] $P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; °स्रयतो भवेदिति M^{Y}; °श्रयते भवेत् $P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}$

36.1–2 °गतित्वेन गुणजातित्वम्। तस्मिन् सति] °गतित्वे --- सति M^{Y} 36.2 °पि नवमालती°] —लती° P_1 36.5 सिद्धेति न किञ्चिद्] सि—ञ्चिद् P_1 36.5 न किञ्चिदेतत्, मालत्यादिगुणानामपि] --- णानामपि M^{Y} 36.9 एवं द्रव्यत्वे ऽभ्युपगम्यमाने ज्ञानाद्या°] ए — द्या° M^{Y}

36.2 तस्मिन् सति] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; --- सति M^{Y}; तस्मिन् M_2 36.2 प्राप्तसिद्धभावे] Σ; प्राप्ते सि×द्ध× द्धभावे P_1 36.3 परमतमाशङ्क्य] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; परमतमाशंक्य दूषयति P_1; परमाशङ्क्य E 36.5 मालत्या°] $A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; मलत्या° P_2; मालक्या° M_2 36.7 °यस्येश्वरद्रव्यैकदेशस्य] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2M_2E$; °येस्येश्वरद्रव्यैकदेशस्य P_3; °यस्यैश्वरद्रव्यैकदेशस्व° M_1 36.9–10 तस्या गौरवं गरीयस्त्वमप्रमाणमभ्युपततं स्यात्] M^{Y}; तस्य गौरवं गरीयस्त्वं प्रमाणकमभ्युपगतं भवेत् A_1; $P^{pc}_{1}M_2$; तस्य गौरवं गरीयस्त्वं प्रमाण+क+मभ्युपगतं भवेत् P_1; तस्या गौरवं गरीयस्त्वमप्रमा—मभ्युपगतं भवेत् P_2; तस्या गौरवं गौरीयस्त्वमप्रमाणकमभ्युपगमम् भवेत् P_3; तस्या गौरवं गरीयस्त्वं +अ+प्रमाणकमभ्युपगतं भवेत् M_1; तस्या गौरवं गरीयष्ट्वं प्रमाणमभ्युपगतं भवेत् E 36.10 अनेकद्रव्य°] $M^{Y}A_1$; अनेकथा ह्यनेकद्रव्य° P_1M_2; अनैकथा अनेकद्रव्य° P_2; अनेकधा ह्यनेकद्रव्य° P_3M_1; अनेकधानेकद्रव्य° E_V; अनेकथाऽनेकद्रव्य° E_D

श्वरस्य, तस्य च द्रव्यस्य तत्तत्सिद्धप्राप्तौ ततः संक्रान्तिः, तस्य च
12 ज्ञानाद्याश्रयत्वकल्पनम्—अप्रमाणकमनन्तं कल्पितं स्यात्॥ ३६॥

[३.९.१४ सङ्क्रान्तिवादिनो मोक्षः शाम्भव एव, न पौरुषः]

संक्रान्तिवादी सिद्धान्तवादिमोक्षे दोषमाह—

नन्वेवं पौरुषो मोक्षः स हि व्यक्तौ न शाम्भवः।

नन्वेवं यदि स्वगुणा एव मुक्तौ पुंसो व्यज्यन्ते, तदा 'आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः' इत्यादिवत् पुरुषकर्तृक एव मोक्षो भवतामपि प्रसक्तः, न त्वीश्वरकर्तृकः,
3 तच्छक्तयसंस्पर्शेन तस्य तत्र कर्तृत्वायोगात्। संस्पर्शे हि संक्रान्तिरेव स्यात्। सिद्धान्तवादी तं प्रत्याह—

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37 ab.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; नन्वेवमिति $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; नन्वैवमिति P_1 (E gives 37cd here after 37ab) 37 ab. मोक्षः स हि व्यक्तौ] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; मोक्ष स हि व्यक्ति P^{s}_{4}; मोक्षस्त्वभिव्यक्तौ E 37 b. शाम्भवः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; शांभव इति M^{Y}

36.11–12 तस्य च ज्ञानाद्याश्रयत्वकल्पनम्—अप्रमाणकमनन्तं] तस्य य --- कमनंतं M^{Y} 36.14 °मोक्षे दोषमाह] °मो--- P_1 37.2 °कर्तृक एव मोक्षो भवतामपि प्रसक्तः, न त्वीश्वर°] ---र° M^{Y}

37.1 आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः This common formulation of an Upanishadic injunction may be borrowed from *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 103a of the *Ślokavārttika*.

36.10–11 °समूहरूपत्वमीश्वरस्य] Σ; °समूहत्वरू--- P_1 36.11 तत्तत्सिद्ध°] $A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; तत्तत्सिद्धं M^{Y}; तत्तत्सिद्धः P_1P_2 36.11 च ज्ञानाद्या°] $A_1P^{pc}_{1}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; य --- M^{Y}; च ज्ञाना× श्र× द्या° P_1 36.12 °त्वकल्पनम्—अप्रमाणकमनन्तं] M_2 E; °त्वकल्पनम्मप्रमाणकमनन्तं A_1--- कमनंतं M^{Y}; °त्वम् कल्पनम् प्रमाणकमनन्तरम् P_1; °त्वकल्पनमप्रमाणमनन्तं P_2; °त्वकल्पनमप्रामा× म× णकमनन्तं P_3; °कल्पनं प्रमाणकमनंतं M_1 36.14 संक्रान्तिवादी सिद्धान्तवादि°] $P_3M^{pc}_{2}E$; संक्रांतिवादि° M^{Y}(eyeskip); संक्रान्तवादी सिद्धान्तवादि° A_1; संक्रान्ति+वादि+सिद्धान्तवादि° P_1; संक्रान्तिवादिसिद्धान्तवादि° $P^{pc}_{1}M^{pc}_{2}$; संक्रान्तवादिसिद्धान्तवादि° P_2; संक्रान्तिवादी सिद्धान्तवादी M_1 37.1 स्वगुणा एव] M^{Y}; स्वगुणास्त एव $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; गुणास्त एव E 37.2 मोक्षो] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; --- M^{Y}; मोक्ष ⊔ M_1 37.2 प्रसक्तः, न त्वीश्वरकर्तृकः] $A_1P_3M_1E$; ---रकर्तृकः M^{Y}; प्रसक्तन्न त्वीश्वरकर्तृक--- P_1; प्रसक्तः नन्वीश्वरकर्तृकः P_2; प्रसक्तम्। नन्वीश्वरकर्तृकं M_2 37.3 तत्र कर्तृत्वायोगात्] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2$Eतत्र ≃ ≃त्वायोगात् P_2; तर्तृत्वायोगात् P_3 37.3 संक्रान्तिरेव] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; संक्रान्तिरेवं A_1M_2

नन्वेवं शाम्भवो मोक्षः संक्रान्तौ न हि पौरुषः॥ ३७॥

त्वत्पक्षे ऽपि न कश्चिन्मुक्तः। परमेश्वरगुणस्य प्राक्स्थस्यैव तत्र संक्रान्तेरपुरुषसम्बन्धिता मोक्षस्य। मत्पक्षे द्वयमपि युज्यत इत्याह— 6

पौरुषः पुरुषाधारः शाम्भवः शम्भुनिर्मितः।
द्वयं सम्पूजितं व्यक्तौ संक्रान्तावेक एव हि॥ ३८॥

पुरुषे कर्मणि समवेतः, परमेश्वरकर्तृकश्चेति कर्तृकर्मत्वलक्षणकारकद्वययोगतो भेदेन व्यपदिश्यते मोक्षः। ओदनस्य पाको देवदत्तस्य पाको वेतिवत्। न च संक्रान्तिं विना कर्तृत्वं नोपपद्यत इति युक्तम्॥ ३८॥ 3

सिद्धान्तवाद्येव स्वपक्षे सुसाध्यतामाह—

व्यक्तिरेवेष्यतां सा हि सुसिद्धा व्यञ्जकैः सह।

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37 cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; नन्विति $A_1P_3M_2$; ननन्विति P_1; नन्वीति P_2; नन्वेवं शाम्भव इति E, (but E also give 37cd after 37ab above) 37 d. संक्रान्तौ न हि पौरुषः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; संक्रान्तौ न हि पौरुष इति M^{Y}; संक्रान्तौ न ⊔ P^{s}_{3}; ⊔ न्तौ नग्निपौरुषः M^{s}_{3} 38.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$; पौरुष इति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 38 a. पौरुषः पुरुषा°] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M^{s}_{3}E$; पौ ⊔ रुषा° M_1 38 c. द्वयं सम्पूजितं] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{3}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$; द्वयम् संपूजिति P_1; द्वयसम्पूजितं P^{s}_{4} 38 d. संक्रान्तावेक एव हि] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s^{c}}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}$; संक्रांतावेक एव हीति M^{Y}; संक्रान्ता एक एव हि $P^{s^{c}}_{1}$; संक्रान्तावेव काविति E 39.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; व्यक्तिरेवेति $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; व्यक्तिरेव P_1 39 b. सुसिद्धा व्यञ्जकैः सह] *conj.*; प्रसिद्धा व्यञ्जकैः सह $M^{Y}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M^{Y}_{M}E$; ⊔ व्यञ्जकैः सह M_1; प्रसिद्धा व्यञ्जके ⊔ M^{s}_{3}

37.5 परमेश्वरगुणस्य प्राक्स्थस्यैव तत्र संक्रान्तेरपुरुष°] परमे — ष° M^{Y} 38.1 °कर्तृकश्चेति] °कर्तृ—ति P_1

37.5 त्वत्पक्षे ऽपि न कश्चिन्मुक्तः] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; त्वत्पक्षे हि पि न किञ्चिन्मुक्तः P_1; तत्पक्षे पि न कश्चिन्मुक्तः P_2 37.5–6 °पुरुषसम्बन्धिता] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2$; °पौरुषसम्बन्धितया P_3; °पुरुषसंबन्धितया P_2E 37.6 मत्पक्षे] M^{Y}; मत्पक्षे तु P_1M_1E; मत्पक्षेपि $A_1P_2P_3M_2$ 38.1 कर्तृकर्मत्व°] $M^{Y}P_1M_1$; कर्तृकर्म° $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$ 38.1–2 °योगतो] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_2E$; °गतो A_1P_2; °योगतो ⊔ M_1 38.3 न च संक्रान्तिं विना कर्तृत्वं] Σ; संक्रांतिं विनापि मोकर्तृत्वं M^{Y} 38.3 नोपपद्यत इति] $A_1M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1E$; नोप—इति P_1; नोपपद्यते, इति कर्तृकर्म+लक्षण+कारकं (द्वययोगतो भेदेन व्यपदिश्यते मोक्षः। ओदनस्य पाको देवदत्तस्य पाको वेतिवत् न च संक्रान्तिं विना कर्तृत्वं) M_2 38.4 °वाद्येव] Σ; °वाद्येवं A_1 38.4 स्वपक्षे सुसाध्यतामाह] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_2$; सुपक्षे स्वसाद्धतामाह P_2; स्वपक्षे स्वसाध्यतामाह P_3E; स्वपक्षे सुसाधनतामाह M_1

तस्यामपूर्वं कष्टं वा न किञ्चित् परिकल्प्यते॥ ३९॥

व्यक्तिर्ह्यात्मगुणानां व्यञ्जकैः सह सुसिद्धेत्युक्तम्। सैव मोक्षे ऽपीष्यताम्। ममैव दृष्टान्तानुसारिणी कल्पना भवति। न च त्वत्पक्ष इव दृष्टान्तपर्येषणादिकमत्र प्रसज्यत इति॥ ३९॥

[३.९.१५ पूर्वपक्षिणा मुक्तावात्मगुणशुद्धिर्नेष्यते]

संक्रान्तिवाद्याह—

नेष्यते येन पूर्वत्र दृष्टो ऽशुद्धो हि पुंगुणः।

सतो ह्यभिव्यक्तिस्तद्रूपप्रत्यभिज्ञया, घटादेरिव दीपादिना। इह तु सिद्धावस्थातः पूर्वमशुद्धः किञ्चिद्विषयः पुंसां गुणः सिद्धः। मुक्तौ तद्विलक्षणो ह्यत्यन्तशुद्धः परमेश्वरसमः श्रूयत इति तयोर्भेदात् पूर्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानासम्भवतो मुक्तावभिव्यक्तिः सा नेष्यते ऽस्माभिः। सिद्धान्तवाद्याह—

39c. °पूर्वं कष्टं] $M^{Y}M_{M}^{Y}P_{1}^{S}P_{3}^{S}M_{1}M_{3}^{S}$; °पूर्वदृष्टं P_{4}^{S}; °पूर्वं दृष्टं E 39d. परिकल्प्यते] $M_{M}^{Y}P_{1}^{S}P_{3}^{S}P_{4}^{S}M_{1}M_{3}^{S}E$; परिकल्प्यते इति M^{Y} 40ab.] $M^{Y}M_{M}^{Y}P_{1}^{S}P_{3}^{S}P_{4}^{S}M_{1}M_{3}^{S}E$; नेष्यत इति $A_1P_1P_3$; ---इति P_2; नेष्यते इति M_2 (E gives 40abcd together here) 40a. नेष्यते] Σ; नैष्यते $P_{3}^{S}M_{3}^{S}$ 40b. पुंगुणः] $M_{M}^{Y}P_{1}^{S}P_{3}^{S}P_{4}^{S}M_{1}M_{3}^{S}E$; पुंगुण इति M^{Y}

40.3–4 °दात् पूर्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानासम्भवतो] —प्रत्य+≍+ज्ञनासम्भवतो P_1; °दात् पूर्वप्रत्यभिज्ञान ⊔ तो M_1

39.1 सुसिद्धेत्युक्तम् See verse 31 and commentary.

39.1 व्यक्तिर्ह्या°] $M^{Y}A_1M_2E$; युक्ति हि। आ° P_1; व्यक्तिह्या° P_2M_1; व्यक्तिर्हि ह्या° P_3 39.1 सुसिद्धेत्युक्तम्] Σ; संसिद्धेत्युक्तं M_2 39.2 ममैव दृष्टान्तानुसारिणी कल्पना] $M^{Y}A_1P_2M_2E$; मैवन्दृष्टान्त—≍कल्पना P_1; मैवन्दृष्टान्तानुसारिणी कल्पना P_3; एवं इयमेव दृष्टानुस ⊔ ल्पना M_1 39.2 न च] $M^{Y}P_2P_3E$; ननु A_1; न तु $P_1M_1M_2$ 39.2–3 दृष्टान्तपर्येषणा°] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1E$; दृष्टान्तान्तरपर्य्येषणा° A_1; दृष्टान्तपर्येणा° P_1; दृष्टान्तरपर्येषणा° M_2 40.1 °प्रत्यभिज्ञया] $A_1P_1P_3^{pc}M_1E$; °प्रत्यभिज्ञया च M^{Y}; °प्रत्यभिज्ञाया P_2M_2; °प्रत्यभिज्ञ× रू× या P_3 40.1 दीपादिना। इह] $M^{Y}P_3E$; प्रदीपादिना। इह A_1M_2; ---ना इह P_1; दीपादीनां इह P_2; दी ⊔ ह M_1 40.2 किञ्चिद्विषयः] Σ; किञ्चिद्विषयं ×गुण× P_1 40.2 सिद्धः] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; सिद्धौ $M^{Y}P_1$ 40.3 परमेश्वरसमः] $M^{Y}M_1M_2E$; परमेश्वरसम $A_1P_1P_2P_3$ 40.3 पूर्वप्रत्यभिज्ञाना° $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1$; पूर्वाप्रत्यभिज्ञाना° A_1M_2; ---प्रत्य+≍+ज्ञना° P_1; पूर्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञाना° E 40.4 °व्यक्तिः सा नेष्यते] $M^{Y\text{-}ac}A_1P_3M_2$; °व्यक्तिर्नेष्यते $M^{Y\text{-}c}$?E; °व्यक्तिस्सा ≍नेष्यते P_1; °व्यक्तिस्सा यनेष्यते P_2; °व्यक्तिस्साधनं नेष्यते M_1

पुमानपि तथाभूतः प्राग्दृष्टः स किमीप्सितः॥ ४०॥

भवद्दृष्ट्यापि पुमानशुद्धः, येनेदानीं हि परमेश्वरगुणसंक्रान्तिपात्रीभूतः॥ ४०॥

अत्र पराभिप्रायः— 6

स चेच्छोधनसंशुद्धः

अथाशुद्धो ऽप्यसौ तदानीमीश्वरस्य व्यापारेण दीक्षादिना शोधकेन शुद्धो भवङ्गिरिष्यते।

यद्येवं तद्गुणाः कथमेवं शुद्धाः सर्वविषया नेत्याह— 3

गुणा नैवं किमीप्सिताः।

न च तद्गुणाः प्राग् न सन्तीत्युक्तम्। सतां तेषामज्ञानलक्षणावरणस्य तमस इव निवृत्त्याभिव्यक्तौ सकलासकलनिवृत्तिकृते शुद्धशुद्धी परगतत्वान्नाभेद-

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40 cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}$; पुमानपीति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$ (E also give 40cd with 40ab above) 40 d. प्राग्दृष्टः] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}$; प्रकृष्टः E ॰ किमीप्सितः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; किमीप्सित इति M^{Y}; किमीप्सिपितः P^{S}_{3}(unmetrical) 41a. स चेच्छोधनसंशुद्धः] $P^{Sc}_{1}P^{S}_{4}M_1$; स चेच्छोधनसंशुद्ध इति M^{Y}; स चच्छोधनसंशुद्धोः M^{Y}_{M}; स चेदिति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; स चेत् बोधनसंसिद्धो P^{S}_{3}; स चेद्बोधनसंशुद्धो M^{S}_{3}; स चेच्छोधनसंसिद्धो $P^{Sac}_{1}E$ (E gives 41abcd in full here) 41 ab. गुणा नैवं किमीप्सिताः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}$; गुणा नैवं किमीप्सिता इति M^{Y}; गुणा इति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$ (E also give 41abcd together above)

40.6 अत्र पराभिप्रायः] अ ⊔ प्रायः M_1 41.3 यद्येवं तद्गुणाः] यदो ≃न्तत्— P_1 41.3 सर्वविषया नेत्याह] सर्ववि ⊔ ह M_1

40.5 भवद्दृष्ट्यापि] $P_2P_3M_1E$; भवद्दृष्टौवपि M^{Y}; भवद्दृष्टेरपि A_1M_2; भवद्दृष्टोपि P_1 40.5 येनेदानीं] $M^{Y}A_1M_1M_2E$; येनेदारी P_1; नेदानीं P_2P_3 40.5 परमेश्वरगुण॰ Σ; परमेश्वराणां M_2 40.5 ॰पात्रीभूतः] $M^{Yc}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; ॰पात्रीकृतः M^{Yac}; ॰पात्रीभूतं M_2 41.1 ॰श्वरस्य] M_2; ॰श्वर॰ $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; ॰श्वरस्या॰ A_1 41.3 शुद्धाः] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; शुद्धा P_1; शु— P_2 41.3 सर्वविषया] $P_2P_3M_2E$; सर्वविशिष्टा $M^{Y}P_1$; सर्वा A_1; सर्ववि ⊔ M_1 41.4 तद्गुणाः प्राग् न] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; तद्गुणा प्राङ् न P_1; तद्गुणाः प्रान्दन M_1 41.4 सतां] Σ; स P_2 41.4 ॰लक्षणावरणस्य] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; ॰लक्षणावारणस्य M_1; ॰लक्षणावृतस्य E 41.5 निवृत्त्याभिव्यक्तौ] $M^{Y}M_1M_2E$; निवृत्यादिभिव्यक्तौ A_1; निवृत्याभिव्यक्तौ P_1; —वृत्यभिव्यक्तौ P_2; निवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तौ P_3 41.5 सकलासकलनिवृत्तिकृते] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E^{vl}_{D}$; सकला+स+कलनिवृत्त— P_1; सकलासकलत्वकृते M_1; सकलाकलनिवृत्तिकृते E 41.5 शुद्धशुद्धी] Σ; शुद्धशुद्धि P_2 41.5 परगत॰] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3E$; परिगत॰ A_1M_2; अपरगत॰ M_1

बाधिके इति नाभिव्यक्तिमोक्षप्रतिक्षेपो युक्तः।

न च संक्रान्तिपक्षे कदाचिदपि पुंसः शुद्धिरस्तीत्याह—

अणुस्तादृग्गुणो ऽद्यापि कथं शुद्धः स सर्वथा॥ ४१॥

यादृग्गुण एव पूर्वं पञ्चवस्थायामणुरात्माभूत् तादृगशुद्धस्वगुण एवाद्यापि। मोक्षे तद्गुणानामतिशयो न भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यत इति कथं शुद्धः सर्वथा? नैव शुद्ध इत्यर्थः॥ ४१॥

तस्य तदात्मगुणानां शुद्धनभ्युपगमे ऽपीश्वरगुणसंक्रान्त्यधिकरणस्य द्रव्यमात्रस्यैव शुद्धिरस्माभिरिष्यत एवेत्यत्र सोपहासमाह—

द्रव्यप्रिया भवन्तो वै ज्ञाता नैव गुणप्रियाः।

अयमत्र भावः—परमेश्वरगुणसंक्रान्तावप्यात्मद्रव्यस्य तदा किमशुद्धास्ते गु-

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41 cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}$; अणुरिति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$ (E also give 41abcd together above) 41 c. अणुस्तादृग्गुणो] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}E$; अणुस्तादृर्गुणो P^{S}_{4}; अणुस्तादृग्गुणा M_1; ⊔ स्तादृगुणो M^{S}_{3} 41d. सर्वथा] $P^{S}_{3}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; सर्वदा M^{Y}_{M}; सर्वदा इति M^{Y}; सर्वता P^{S}_{1}; सर्वधा P^{S}_{4} 42ab.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; द्रव्यप्रिया इति $A_1P_1P_3M_2$; द्रव्यप्रया इति P_2 (E give 42abcd together here) 42a. भवन्तो] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1E$; ×न्ते× भवेन्तो P^{S}_{1}; भवन्नो M^{S}_{3} 42b. गुणप्रियाः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; गुणप्रिया इत्य् M^{Y}; गुणप्रियौ P^{S}_{4}

41.6 °मोक्षप्रतिक्षेपो] ⊔ पो M_1

41.6 °बाधिके इति] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P^{pc}_{2}P_3M_1E$; °वा+धि+के इति P_2; °बाधिकमिति M_2 41.6 °क्षेपो] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °क्षेपा P_1; —पो M_1 41.8 यादृग्गुण] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1E$; यादृशगुण A_1M_2; —गुण P_1 41.8 पूर्वं] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; पूर्व° A_1M_2 41.8 °त्माभूत्] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_2E$; °त्माभुक् $A_1P_2M_1$ 41.8–9 तादृगशुद्धस्वगुण एवाद्यापि। मोक्षे] $M^{Y}P^{pc}_{2}P_3E$; तादृ× त्× +ग्+शुद्धस्वगुण एवाद्या ⊔ क्षे A_1; तादृक् शुद्धस्वगुण ए × वेतत् ज्ञ सोपहासमाह× वाद्यापि मोक्षे P_1; तादृक् शुद्धगुणएवाद्यापि P^{pc}_{2}; तादृग ⊔ स्वगुण एवाद्यापि मोक्षे M_1; तादृगशुद्धस्वगुण एवाद्राक्षे M_2 41.9 °शयो न] Σ; °शयो E 41.9 सर्वथा] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; सर्वदा $M^{Y}P_1$ 41.9–10 नैव शुद्ध इत्यर्थः] Σ; नैवेत्यर्थः E 41.11 तस्य] Σ; तत्र M_1 41.11 तदात्म°] Σ; तदात्म्य° A_1 41.11 °धिकरणस्य] $A_1P_1M^{pc}_{1}M_2E$; °धिकारस्य M^{Y}; °नधिकारणस्य P_2; °धिकरस्य P_3; °धिकरणेस्य M^{ac}_{1} 41.12 सोपहासमाह] Σ; सोपहमहा P_2 42.1 °प्यात्मद्रव्यस्य] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1$; °पात्मद्रव्यस्य M_2; °प्यात्मदृष्टस्य द्रव्यस्य E

णाः सन्ति वा न वा? न तावन्न सन्ति, ज्ञानक्रियानाशपक्षस्य निषेत्स्यमानत्वात्। सन्ति चेत्, किं पूर्ववदसर्वविषयाः सर्वविषया वा? यद्यसर्वविषयास्तदापि पशुरेवासावशुद्ध इत्युक्तम्। अथेश्वरगुणसंक्रान्तितः सर्वविषयाः। यद्येवमस्मद्दर्शनगुणशुद्धिरेवेति कथमात्मद्रव्यमात्रशुद्धिप्रियता गुणशुद्धप्रियता च भवतामुपपद्यते। गुणपक्षपातश्च महतां युक्त इत्युपहासः।

[३.९.१६ सङ्क्रान्तिवादस्येश्वराद्वैतप्रसङ्गः]

दोषान्तरं संक्रान्तिवादिनामाह—

क्षतं वा विदुषा येन न क्लृप्तः शाम्भवः पुमान्॥ ४२॥

42cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$; क्षणं वेति $A_1P_1M_2E$; क्षणं वेदि P_2; —वेति P_3 (E also give 42cd after 42ab above) 42c. क्षतं वा विदुषा] *conj.*; क्षणं वा विदुषा M^{Y} $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}$; अथ वा विदुषा P^{S}_{3}; कथं वा विदुषा $M_1M^{Sc}_{3}$; कथं वा विदुषो M^{Sac}_{3}; क्षणं वा वैदुषी E 42d. न क्लृप्तः शाम्भवः पुमान्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{Sc}_{1}E$; न क्लृप्तः शांभवः पुमानिति M^{Y}; न क्लृप्तश्शाम्+भ+ व ×म्× : पुमान् P^{S}_{1}; क्लृप्तश्शम्भवः पुमान् $P^{S}_{3}M^{S}_{3}$ (unmetrical); न क्लिप्तश्शांभवः पुमान् P^{S}_{4}; न क्लृप्तः शंभवः पुमान् M_1

42.4 °शुद्ध] — P_1 42.6 गुणपक्षपातश्च] गु—पातश्च P_1

42.3 निषेत्स्यमानत्वात् See 47 and commentary.

42.4 इत्युक्तम् See 41cd and commentary.

42.1–2 तदा किमशुद्धास्ते गुणाः] $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; तदानीमशुद्धास्ते स्वगुणाः M^{Y}; तदा किमशुद्धास्ते गुण+ा+ P_2 42.2 सन्ति वा न वा] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3E$; सन्ति वानघा A_1M_2; स ⊔ वा न वा M_1 42.2 तावन्न] $M^{Y}P^{pc}_{1}P_2P_3M_1E$; ताव×न्त× न्न P_1; तापन्न A_1M_2 42.2 °नाशपक्षस्य] Σ; वा नाशपक्षस्य A_1 42.2–3 निषेत्स्यमानत्वात्] A_1E; निषेत्स्यमाणत्वात् $M^{Y}P^{pc}_{1}P_3M_1$; निषेत्स्यमाण×स्य× त्वात् P_1; +⌣+षेत्स्यमाणत्वात् P_2; निचेत्स्यमानत्वात् M_2 42.3 सन्ति चेत्] Σ; सति चेत् M_2 42.3 °दसर्वविषयाः] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; °त् सर्वविषयाः P_2; °दसर्वविषया M_2 42.3–4 यद्यसर्वविषयास्तदापि] Σ; असर्वविषयाश्चेत्तदानीमपि M^{Y} 42.4 पशुरेवासाव°] Σ; पशुरेवासर्व° A_1 42.4 अथेश्वरगुणसंक्रान्तितः] M^{Y}; अथेश्वरगुणसंक्रान्तास् $A_1P_1M_2$; अथेश्वरगुणसंक्रान्ता P_2; अथेश्वरे गुणसंक्रान्तास् P_3; अथेश्वरगुणसंक्रान्तोस् M_1; अथेश्वरगुणसंक्रान्तौ E 42.5 यद्येवमस्म°] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; यद्येवमस्मा° P_1 M_1 42.5 °मात्रशुद्धिप्रियता] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; °मात्रशुद्धिप्रियताः P_2; °मात्रप्रियता M_1 42.5–6 गुणशुद्धप्रियता] $A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; गुणशुद्धभिप्रायता M^{Y}; गुणशुद्धिप्रियता P_3 42.6 महतां युक्त इत्युपहासः] $M^{Y}M_1E$; महताम् य—इत्य—ासः A_1; महतां ×⌣× युक्तमित्यप×⌣× हासः P_1; महतां युक्त इत्यपहासः P_2P_3; महतामयुक्त इत्यपहासः M_2 42.8 दोषान्तरं] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; दोषा× न्न× +न्तर+ M_1; तेषामन्तरं M_2

विस्मृतं चैतद्भवतामीश्वराद्वैतानाश्रयणम्, येन शम्भुसम्बन्धी तत्परिणतिः पुरुषो न कल्पितः। मुक्तौ तावत्तद्गुणवत्त्वेन तदद्वैतमभ्युपगतप्रायमिति भावः॥ ४२॥

[३.१० बौद्धानां सर्वनाशपक्षः]

तदियता संक्रान्तिपक्षप्रतिक्षेपं विधायाधुना सर्वनाशपक्षं तिरस्करोति—

[३.१०.१ स्मृतेः पुंसः स्थैर्यमित्याशङ्क्यते]

बालत्वे यौवने दृष्टान् वृद्धो ऽर्थान् संस्मरेद् दृढम्।
जन्मप्रायणयोरन्तः स्थैर्यं पुंसस्ततो भवेत्॥ ४३॥

यतो बालाद्यवस्थानुभूतानर्थान् वृद्धः संस्मर्तुं शक्तो दृष्टस्ततः स्मृतिदर्शनादात्मनः स्थैर्यमवगम्यते। यदि हि प्रतिक्षणमन्यो ऽन्यश्च द्रष्टा भवेत्,

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43.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; बालत्व इत्यादिना $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$ 43a. बालत्वे यौवने दृष्टान्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}E$; बाल्यत्वे यौवने दृष्टान् M^{Y}; बालत्वे यौवने द्रष्टा $P^{S}_{1}M^{S}_{3}$ 43b. वृद्धो ऽर्थान्] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{4}E$; वृद्धोर्त्था×ू× त् P^{S}_{1}; ू ू र्त्था— P^{S}_{3}; विरुद्धो ऽर्थान् M_{1}(unmetrical); न वृद्धे तां M^{S}_{3}(unmetrical) 43c. °प्रायणयोरन्तः] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}$; °प्रमाणयोरक्तन् P^{S}_{3}; °प्रयाणयोरन्त° $P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$; °प्रमाणयोरन्तः E 43d. स्थैर्यं पुंसस्ततो भवेत्] $P^{S}_{4}M_{1}E$; स्थैर्याद्भंसस्ततो भवेदिति M^{Y}; स्थैर्य्याद्भंसस्ततो भवेत् M^{Y}_{M}; सैर्य्याम् पुंसस्ततो भवेत् P^{S}_{1}; तथै—ाम् पुंसस्ततो भवेत् P^{S}_{3}; थैर्यां पुंसस्ततो भवेत् M^{S}_{3}

42.9 °श्वराद्वैतानाश्रयणम्] *conj.*; °श्वराद्वैतमनाश्रयणं $M^{Y}A_{1}P^{pc}_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$; °श्वराद्वैतमनाश्रयाणाम् P_{1}; °श्वरद्वैतमनाश्रयणं P^{ac}_{2}; °श्वरद्वैतमनाश्रयतां M_{1}; °श्वरद्वैतानाश्रयणम् E 42.9 शम्भुसम्बन्धी] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{3}M_{1}E$; शंभुसंब— P_{1}; शम्भुसंबन्धि $P_{2}M_{2}$ 42.10 पुरुषो न कल्पितः] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}M_{1}$; पुमान्न कल्पितः $P_{2}P_{3}E$; पुरुषो न कल्पित M_{2} 42.10 तावत्तद्गुणवत्त्वेन] $A_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$; तावत्तद्गुणत्वेन $M^{Y}P_{1}E$; तावतद्गुणवत्वेन M_{1} 42.10–11 तदद्वैतमभ्युपगतप्रायमिति भावः] $P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}E$; तदद्वैतमभ्युपगत इत्यभिप्रायः M^{Y}; तदद्वैतमभ्युपगतमभिप्रायमिति भावः A_{1}; तदद्वैतमभ्युपगतम् प्रायमिति भावः P_{1}; तदयैतमभ्युपगतप्रायमिति भावः M_{2} 42.13 सर्वनाशपक्षं] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}E$; सर्वनाश—न् P_{1}; सर्वपक्षं M_{1} 43.1 बालाद्यवस्थानुभूतार्थान् वृद्धः] $M^{Y}P_{3}$; बालाद्यवस्थानुभूतान् वृद्धस् A_{1}; बालाद्यवस्थानुभूतान् वृद्ध P_{1}; बालाद्यवस्ता ू रू—ान्वृद्धस् P_{2}; बालाद्यवस्थानुभूतानर्थान्वृद्धस् M_{1}; बालाद्यवस्थातुभू ⊔ M_{2}; बाल्याद्यवस्थानुभूत्या तान् E 43.1 दृष्टस्ततः] *em.*; दृष्टस्तदा $A_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}E$; दृष्टः M^{Y}; दृष्टस्तत P_{1}; दृष्टः, तथा M_{1} 43.2 °त्मनः स्थैर्यमवगम्यते] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}M_{2}$; त्मानः स्थै ू म्भ्युपगम्यते P_{2}; °त्मन स्थैर्यमभ्युपगम्यते P_{3}; °त्मन ⊔ स्थैर्यमवगम्यते M_{1}; °त्मनः स्थैर्यमभ्युपगम्यते E 43.2 द्रष्टा भवेत्] M^{Y}; दृष्टोऽनुभवेत् AM_{2}; दृष्टो भवेत् P_{1}; दृष्टा भवेत् $P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}$; द्रष्टानुभवेत् E

तदान्येनानुभूते ऽर्थे स्मृतिरन्यस्य न भवेत्, चैत्रमैत्रयोरिव। दृश्यते चात्र कालान्तरानुभूतार्थस्मरणं कालान्तरे, इत्यतः स्थैर्यम्।

[३.१०.२ बौद्ध आशङ्कां प्रतिक्षिपति]

[३.१०.२.१ चित्ते संस्कारात् स्मृतिः],

नन्वनुभवस्मरणयोस्तावत् स्थिरात्मानुभववादिनापि त्वया भेदो ऽभ्युपगतः। न हि तवापि स्मरणमेवानुभवः, सर्वचित्तवृत्तीनामभेदप्रसङ्गात्। भेदे ऽपि तयोरतीतानुभववृत्तिकृतचित्तसंस्कारेणेदानीं वृद्धस्य स्मृतिस्तदनुभवविषया तदनुभूतार्थविषया वा भवतापीष्टैव, आत्मनि विकारित्वप्रसङ्गतः संस्कारानभ्युपगमात्। चैत्रमैत्रचित्तप्रवाहयोस्तु परस्परं संस्कारजननकारणत्वाभावादेकचित्तप्रवाहपतितस्यैवानुभवस्य संस्काराधानेन स्मृतेरुत्पत्तिस्त्वयाभ्युपगतेति कथमत्राभेदः प्रतिपाद्यते।

[३.१०.२.२ चित्तवृत्तिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा नास्ति]

[३.१०.२.२.१ आत्मा चित्तवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण नोपलभ्यते]

अथ चित्तवृत्तिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनो ऽत्राभेदः साध्यते, तदयुक्तम्, चित्त-

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43.16–20 अथ चित्तवृत्तिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनो···प्रतिपाद्यते] *om.* M_2^{ac}; added in margin M_2^{pc}

43.3 °भूते ऽर्थे] Σ; °भूतार्त्थे P_2 43.3 चैत्रमैत्रयोरिव] Σ; चैत्रयोरिव M^{Y}(eyeskip) 43.4 °भूतार्थस्मरणं] $A_1P_1^{pc}P_2M_1M_2^{pc}E$; °भूतस्मरणं M^{Y}; °भूतार्त्थस्मरणं (कालान्तरानुभूतार्त्थस्मरणं) P_1; °भूतार्त्थस्मर⌣ P_3; °भूतोर्थस्मरणं M_2^{ac} 43.4 इत्यतः स्थैर्यम्] Σ; इति। अततत्स्थैर्यम् M_1 43.7 नन्वनुभव°] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1E$; न×न्व×न्वनुभव° P_1; नन्व⌣⌣भव° P_2; अनुभव° M_2 43.7 तावत्] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; ताव $M^{Y}P_1$ 43.7 स्थिरात्मानुभव°] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; स्थिरात्मनानुभव° P_1; स्थिरात्मानुभाव° P_2 43.8 तवापि] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; तद्वापि P_2; तवाहि M_2 43.8 सर्वचित्तवृत्तीनामभेद°] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_2E$; सर्वचित्तवृत्तिनाम् भे--- P_1; सर्वचित्तवृत्तिनां भेद° P_2; स ⊔ चित्तवृत्तीनां भेद° M_1 43.8–9 भेदे ऽपि] Σ; भेदाश्च P_2^{ac} 43.9 °तीतानुभव°] $P_1P_3M_1E$; °तीतानुव° M^{Y}; °तीताभव° A_1M_2; °तिनानुभाव° P_2 43.9 °दानीं] Σ; °तानि P_1 43.9–10 तदनुभवविषया तदनुभूतार्थ°] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1E$; तदनुभव° P_1(eyeskip); तदनुभवविषयतदनुभूतार्त्थ° P_2; तदनुभवविषया तदनुभूतात्म° M_2 43.10 भवतापी°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; भवतापि° P_2; भवतोपी° M_1 43.11 चैत्रमैत्र°] $A_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; चैत्र° M^{Y}(eyeskip); चैत्र×चैचित्त× +मैत्र+P_1 43.11 परस्परं] Σ; परस्पर° P_1 43.12 संस्काराधानेन] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_2$; संस्काराधनेन P_2^{ac}; संस्कारायानेन M_1; संस्कारसाधनेन E 43.13 प्रतिपाद्यते] Σ; प्रतिपद्यते E 43.16 चित्तवृत्तिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनो ऽत्राभेदः···°नुमेयस्यात्राभेदः प्रतिपाद्यते, तदपि तेनादृश्येन] चित्तवृत्तिन्दृश्येन P_1; चित्तवृत्तिन्दृश्येत P_1

वृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण तस्यानुपलम्भात्। एकमेवेदं संवेदनं हर्षविषादाद्यनेकरूपं
18 दृश्यते यतः।

[३.१०.२.२.२ अदृश्येन सह कस्यचिदपि व्याप्त्यसिद्धिः]

अथासंवेदनस्यात्मनो ऽनुमेयस्यात्राभेदः प्रतिपाद्यते, तदपि तेनादृश्येन सह
21 कस्यचिदपि व्याप्त्यसिद्धेरयुक्ततरम्।

[३.१०.२.२.३ कार्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या नानुमेयः]

न च कार्यान्यथानुपपत्त्यानुमीयते, तत्कार्यस्य स्मृत्यादेः प्रोक्तवदुपपत्तेः।

24 [३.१०.२.२.४ आत्मनः को ऽनुमाता?]

कश्च तस्यानुमातेत्यपि वाच्यम्। न चित्तम्, आचैतन्येन तस्याभ्युपगमात्। अथाचेतनस्यापि तस्य तत्सम्पर्काच्चैतन्यमित्युच्यते, तदयुक्तम्, चेतनस-
27 म्पर्काद्यचेतनस्य चेतना न भवतीति न चिद्रूपता। चिद्रूपत्वे तु स एवात्मा, प्रकाशकत्वादिति किमन्येन।

43.20 तदपि] —पि P_2 43.21 °सिद्धेरयुक्ततरम्] °सिद्धेर—तरम् P_1

43.23 प्रोक्तवद् See 43.9–13.

43.16–17 चित्तवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; तद्वृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण M^Y; वृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण M_1 43.18 यतः] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2E$; *om.* P_2 43.20 °नुमेयस्यात्राभेदः] $M^YA_1P_3$; °नुमेयत्रास्याभेदः P_2; °नुमेयत्वादत्राभेदः M_1; °नुमेय ⊔ M_2; °नुमेयस्यात्र भेदः E 43.20 तेनादृश्येन] $M^YA_1P_2^{ac}P_3M_1^{pc}M_2E$; तेनादृश्यन P_2^{ac}; +ते+नादृश्येन M_1 43.21 कस्यचिदपि] Σ; कदाचिदपि M_2 43.21 व्याप्त्य°] Σ; व्याप्त° P_2 43.23 प्रोक्तवदुपपत्तेः] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2E$; प्रोक्तयुदुपपत्तेः P_1; प्रोक्तवदुत्पपत्तेः P_2 43.25 °नुमातेत्यपि वाच्यम्] $M^YP_2P_3M_1$; °नुमानेत्यपि वाच्यम् A_1M_2; °नुमानेपि वाच्यम् P_1; °नुमातेत्यपि वक्तव्यम् E 43.25 न चित्तम्] Σ; *om.* P_1 43.25 आचैतन्येन] $M^YA_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; आचैव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोत्रभेदसाद्यते तदयुक्तम्। चित्तवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेण तस्यानुपलंभात् एकमेवेदं +संवेदनं+ हर्षविषाद्यदोद्यनेकरूपन्दृश्यते यतः अथासंवे+द+नस्यात्मनोनुमेयस्यात्र भेदः ≍तिपाद्यते तदपि तेनान्न्येन P_1(eyeskip); अचैतन्येन P_2^{ac}; अचेतनत्वेन E 43.26 तत्सम्पर्काच्चैतन्यमित्युच्यते] $A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; तत्संपर्कात्तच्चैतन्यस्यमित्युच्यते M^Y; तत्संपर्काचैतन्यमित्युच्यते M_1; तत्संपर्काच्चैतन्यमुच्यते M_2 43.26–27 चेतनसम्पर्काद्यचेतनस्य] $P_2P_3M_1E$; चेतनसंपर्कादचेतनस्य $M^YA_1M_2$; चेतनसंपर्क्का ≍ द्यचेतनस्य P_1 43.27 चेतना न भवतीति] M_1; चेतनता न भवतीति $M^YA_1P_1^{pc}$ (?) P_2P_3; चेतना भवतीति $P_1^{ac}E$; चेतनता भवतीति M_2 43.27 चिद्रूपता] Σ; चिद्रूपिता P_2 43.27 चिद्रूपत्वे तु] $M^YA_1P_1M_1M_2E_V$; चिद्रूपित्वे तु P_2; चिद्रूपत्वे पि P_3; चिद्रपत्वे तु E_D 43.28 प्रकाशकत्वादिति] $M^YA_1P_2M_1M_2E$; प्रकाशत्वादिति P_1P_3 43.28 किमन्येन] Σ; किमनेन E

[३.१०.२.२.५ अनुमितस्यात्मता न युक्ता]

न च तस्यानुमितस्याप्यात्मता युक्ता, प्रकाशकतत्प्रकाश्ययोरात्मपररूप- 30
त्वात्। यो हि स्वयमाभासते स एवात्मा, यस्तु तेन प्रकाश्यते स एव
तस्य पर इत्यसङ्करः। आत्मपरयोरेवं रूपं संकीर्येत, सर्वस्य परस्यापरस्य
चात्मत्वात्। 33

[३.१०.२.२.६ चित्तप्रकाशो ऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः]

न च प्रकाशकासिद्धौ प्रकाश्यसिद्धिरस्ति, येनात्मनः परोक्षत्वे ऽपि न
चित्तप्रकाशो ऽभ्युपगम्येतेति। एवमायातमान्ध्यमशेषस्य जगतः। अथात्म- 36
नः प्रकाशकत्वासिद्धावपि चित्तप्रकाशो ऽभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि प्रकाशात्मिका
चित्तवृत्तिरुदयव्ययवत्येवात्मत्वेनेष्यताम्, किं तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनो ऽत्य-

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43.36–37 °भ्युपगम्येतेति ⋯चित्तप्रकाशो ऽभ्युपगम्यते] °भ्युपगम्येत $M^{Y\,ac}$(eyeskip)

43.30 तस्यानुमितस्याप्यात्मता] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2^{pc}$; तस्यानुचक्तमितस्याप्यात्माता M_1; तस्यानुमितस्याप्यात्मना M_2^{ac}; तस्याप्यनुमितस्यात्मता E 43.30 प्रकाशकतत्र°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1$; प्रकाशकतातत्र° M_2; प्रकाशवत् प्र° E 43.31 स्वयमाभासते] Σ; स्वयमवभासते M_1 43.31–32 स एव तस्य पर] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1$; स एव आत्मा यस्तु तेन प्रकाश्यते स एव तस्य पर M_2; स एव तस्य प्रकाश्यऽपरः E_D; स एव तस्य प्रकाश्यो ऽपर E_V 43.32 आत्मपरयोरेवं रूपं संकीर्येत] *conj.*; आत्मपरयोरेवं संकीर्येत $M^{Y}M_1$; आत्मपरयो रूपं संकीर्येत A_1M_2; आत्मपरयोरेवं रूपं संकी ≍ त P_1; आत्मपरयोरूपन्न संकीर्य्यते P_2; आत्मपरयो रूपं न संकीर्य्येत P_3; आत्मपरयोरिव रूपं न संकीर्यते E 43.32–33 °परस्य चात्मत्वात्] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2E$; °परस्यात्म× ≍× त्वात् P_1; °परस्य चात्मकत्वात् P_2 43.35 प्रकाशकासिद्धौ] P_3M_1; प्रकाशासिद्धौ $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_2$; प्रकाशकसिद्धौ P_2; प्रकाशसिद्धौ E 43.35 प्रकाश्यसिद्धिरस्ति] Σ; प्रकाशसि ⊔ सिद्धिरस्ति M_2 43.35 परोक्षत्वे ऽपि] Σ; परोक्षत्वे M_1 43.36 °गम्येतेति] *conj.*; °गम्यत इति Σ 43.36 °मशेषस्य] Σ; °मविशेषस्य A_1 43.36–37 अथात्मनः प्रकाशकत्वासिद्धावपि] M_1; अथात्मनो सि ≍≍ पि M^{Y}; अथात्मनः सिद्धावपि $A_1P_1^{pc}M_2$; अथात्मन× ⊓× स्सिद्धावपि P_1; अथात्मनस्सिद्धौ P_2P_3; अथात्मनो ऽसिद्धावपि E 43.37 चित्तप्रकाशो ऽभ्युपगम्यते] Σ; चित्तस्य प्रकाशोभ्युपम्यते P_1 43.37 प्रकाशात्मिका] Σ; प्रकाशात्मिक° E_D 43.38 चित्तवृत्तिरुदयव्ययवत्येवात्मत्वेनेष्यताम्] P_2M_1E; चित्तवृत्तिरुदयव्ययवत्ये ×⊓× वात्मत्वेन नेष्यतां M^{Y}; चित्तिवृत्तिरुदयव्ययवत्वेनात्मत्वेनेष्यतां A_1; चित्तवृत्तिरुदयव्यव ≍त्यैवात्मत्वेनेष्यताम् P_1; चित्तवृत्तिरुदयव्य ⊔ वत्येवात्मत्वेनेष्यताम् P_3; चित्तवृत्तिरुदयं व्ययवत्येवात्मनेष्यतां M_2 43.38 किं तद्व्यति°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2M_2E$; किञ्चिद्व्यति° P_3; किं तदव्यति° M_1

39 न्तासिद्धस्यात्र नित्यत्वसाधनेनेति।

[३.१०.३ रामकण्ठस्य पक्षः]

[३.१०.३.१ कुत्रचिद्विषयेषु बौद्धमतेनाविसंवादः]

42 सत्यमनुभवो न स्मरणम्, सत्यं चैकप्रवाहपतितादनुभवादिवृत्तिसामर्थ्या-
हिताच्चित्तसंस्कारात् स्मृतिसम्भवः, न प्रवाहान्तरस्थात्। इदं च सत्यमेव
यच्चित्तव्यतिरेकेणात्मनः स्वसाक्षिकस्याभावाभिधानम्। न ह्यनुभवमपह्नुत्य
45 व्यवस्थापकानां व्यवस्था युक्तिमती। स एव व्यवस्थापकः, तदपह्नवे च किं
नापह्नुतं नाम। तत् स एवानपह्नवनीयस्वभावो निरूप्यताम्।

[३.१०.३.२ ग्राहकः किं स्थिरतया पूर्वोत्तरक्षणभिन्नतया वा प्रकाशते?]

48 किं प्रतिक्षणमपूर्वो ऽपूर्वः पूर्वोत्तरक्षणाभ्यां भिन्नः क्षणमात्ररूपावभासो ग्रा-

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43.38–39 °त्यन्तासिद्धस्यात्र] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1E$; °द्यन्तासिद्धस्यात्र P_1; °त्य×त्म×न्त-सिद्धस्यात्र P_2; ⊔ स्यात्र M_2 43.39 नित्यत्वसाधनेनेति] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2M_2E$; नित्य-त्वसाधनेति P_3; नित्यस्य साधनेनेति M_1 43.42 सत्यमनुभवो न स्मरणम्] Σ; स-त्यमनुभवो न स्मरणं सत्यमनुभवो न स्मरणं A_1 43.42–43 सत्यं चैकप्रवाहपतितादनुभवादिवृत्तिसामर्थ्याहिताच्] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; सत्यश्चैकप्रवाहपतितानुभवादिवृत्तिसाम-र्त्थ्याहिताच् P_2; ⊔ श्चैकप्रवाहपतितानुभवादिवृत्तिसामर्थ्याहिता M_2 43.43 °न्तरस्थात्। इदं] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °न्तरस्थादितञ् P_1; °न्तरस्थादित्। इदं M_1 43.44 °व्य-तिरेकेणात्मनः] $M^{Y^c}A_1M_2E$; °व्यतिरेकेणात्मनो $M^{Y^{ac}}$; °व्यतिरेकेणात्मन $P_1P_1P_3$; °व्यति ⊔ त्मन M_1 43.44 °स्याभावाभिधानम्] $M^{Y}P_2^{p^c}M_1E$; °स्य भावाधिधानन् A_1; °स्याभवाभिधानन् P_1; °स्याभवाभिधानन् $P_2^{a^c}$; °स्याभावाभिधानातन् P_3; °स्य भावाभिधान ⊔ M_2 43.44–45 न ह्यनुभवमपह्नुत्य व्यवस्थापकानां] *conj.*; न ह्यनु-भवमपह्नुत्य हि व्यवस्थापकानां M^{Y}; न ह्यनुभवमपह्नु(?)नु(?)त्याननुभवव्यवस्थापकानां A_1; न ह्यनुभवमपन्हेत्य अननुभवस्य व्य ≍स्थापकानाम P_1; तनन ह्यनुभवमपन्हुत्या ननु भवव्यवस्थापकानां P_2; न ह्यनुभवमपह्नुत्या ननु भवव्यवस्थापकानां P_3E; न ह्यनु-भवमपह्नुत्य व्यवस्थापकानां M_1; ⊔ त्याननुभवव्यवस्थापकानां M_2 43.45 युक्तिमती] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; युक्तमति P_1; युक्तिमतीति M_1 43.45 स एव व्यवस्थापकः] M^{Y} $A_1P_2P_3M_1E$; स एव व्य ≍स्थापक° P_1; स एवावस्थापकः M_2 43.45–46 तदपह्नवे च किं नापह्नुतं नाम। तत्] M^{Y}; यतपह्नवे च न किञ्चिन्नापह्नुतन्नाम तत् A_1; पदप-न्हवे न किञ्चिन्नापन्हुतन्ना×मि(?)× म तत् P_1; यदपह्नवे च न किञ्चिन्नापह्नुतं नाम तत् P_2P_3E; तदपह्नवे च। किन्नापह्नुतं नाम ⊔ M_1; यतवह्नवे च न किञ्चिन्नापह्नुतन्नाम तत् M_2 43.46 एवानपह्नवनीय°] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1E$; एवानप× न्न× न्हवनीय° P_1; एवान-पन्हवीय° P_2; एवा+न+पह्नवनीयं M_2 43.48 किं प्रतिक्षणमपूर्वो ऽपूर्वः] $P_2^{p^c}P_3M_1$; किं प्रतिक्षणं पूर्वोपूर्वः (र्वा $M^{Y^{ac}}$) $M^{Y}P_1$; किं प्रतिक्षणमपूर्वापूर्वः $P_2^{a^c}$; प्रतिक्षणं पूर्वो पूर्वः A_1M_2; किं प्रतिक्षणं पूर्वः पूर्वः E 43.48 भिन्नः] Σ; भिन्न° P_2

हकः प्रकाशते, अथ सर्वदैवाभिन्न इति।

तत्रायं स्थिररूपः प्रकाशः सर्वदैव, ग्राह्योपाधिभेदे ऽप्यनास्वादित-
स्वात्मभेदः, कालत्रये ऽपि तिरस्कृतस्वगतप्रागभावप्रध्वंसाभावः, नानावि- 51
धप्रमाणाद्यनेकचित्तवृत्त्युदयव्ययसंवेदने ऽप्यकम्पिततद्ग्राहकस्थैर्यवेदनः, वृ-
त्त्यन्तरालेष्वप्यविलुप्तज्योतिः, सुषुप्त्यादावप्यखण्डितस्वसंवित्, सततमेव
स्वप्रकाशत्वेन गम्यत्वादात्मपदप्रतिपाद्यः, प्रतिपुरुषं स्वसंवेदनसिद्ध इति 54
किमत्रान्येन साधनेन। तामेवात्मसंविदमभिन्नामनपायिनीं चाश्रित्य सर्वैः
कालान्तरफलानि कर्माण्यारभ्यन्ते। क्षणिकत्वे तु तस्याः सर्वव्यवहारप्रत्य-

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43.52 °स्थैर्यवेदनः] M_1 here reads (p. 3 of 2nd sequence of pagination) °स्थै त्येतौ पक्षावपोद्येते, since it skips back here to the commentary on 9cd. We must pick up the text again towards the bottom of p. 1 of 4th sequence of pagination, where we read कर्तृत्वे ऽपि प्रयोज्यत्वमि यंवेदनो वृत्यन्तराळे°

43.49 अथ सर्वदैवा°] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; अथ सर्वदैव M^YM_1E 43.50 °भिन्न इति। तत्रायं] M^YP_1E; °भिन्नो वेति। तत्रायं $A_1P_2P_3$; ⊔ यं M_1; °भिन्नो वेति त ⊔ M_2 43.50 सर्वदैव] Σ; सर्वदैवा° P_2 43.50–51 °प्यनास्वादितस्वात्मभेदः] $M^YA_1P_1P_3M_2^{pc}$; °प्यास्वादितस्वात्मभेदः P_2; × न× प्यनत्मास्वादितस्यात्मभेदः M_1; ×न× +प्य+नास्वादितस्वात्मभेदः M_2; °प्यनास्वादितात्मभेदः E 43.51 तिरस्कृतस्वगतप्रा-
ग°] M^YP_1; तिरस्कृतसर्गप्राग° $A_1P_2M_2$; तिरस्कृतः स्वगतप्राग° P_3; तिरस्कृतस्व-
प्राग° M_1E 43.51–52 नानाविधप्रमाणाद्यनेकचित्त°] M^YP_3; नानाविधप्राणाद्यनेक-
चित्त° A_1; नानाविदप्रमाणाद्यनेकचि--- P_1; नानाविधप्रमाणाद्यनेकचित्त° P_2^{pc}; नानावि-
धप्राणाद्यकेचित्त° P_2^{ac}; प्रमाणाद्यनेकचित्त° M_1; नानाविधप्रमाणाद्य × भाव× न कश्चित् M_2; नानाविधप्रमाणादनेकचित्त° E 43.52 °प्यकम्पिततद्ग्राहक°] A_1M_2; °प्येक-
विधस्तद्ग्राहक° M^Y; ≃प्येकमपि यत्तत् ग्राहक° P_1; °प्यकम्पिततत्तत्ग्राहक° P_2P_3; °प्येकरूपतया तद्ग्राहक° M_1; °प्येकमपि तद्ग्राहक° E 43.52 °स्थैर्यवेदनः] Σ; °स्थै
यंवेदनो M_1 (see above register) 43.52–53 वृत्त्यन्तरालेष्वप्यविलुप्त°] $M^YP_1^{pc}P_3$; वृत्त्यन्तराळेष्वप्यविलुप्तं A_1; वृत्त्यन्तराळे×≃×ष्व+प्य+विलुप्त° P_1; वृत्यन्तराळेष्वप्य-
वि≃प्य° P_2; वृत्यन्तराळेष्वप्यलुप्त° M_1; वृत्ततालेष्वप्यविलुप्त° M_2; वृत्त्यन्तरेष्वप्य-
विलुप्त° E 43.54 °दात्मपदप्रतिपाद्यः] $M^YP_2P_3M_2E$; °दात्मप्रदपतिपाद्यः A_1; °द
×नेक× ात्मपदप्रति ×प्ति× पाद्यः P_1; °दात्मपदप्रतिपाद्यम् M_1 43.54 स्वसंवेदनसिद्ध]
Σ; स्वसंवेनसिद्ध E_V 43.55 साधनेन] Σ; *om.* P_1 43.55 तामेवात्मसंविदमभिन्ना°]
$M^YP_2M_1E$; तामेव चात्मसंविदमभिन्ना° A_1; तामेवात्मसंविदामभिन्ना° P_1; तामेव वा-
त्मसंविदमभिन्ना° P_3; तामेव चात्मसंविदमभून्ना° M_2 43.55 °नपायिनीं चाश्रित्य]
$A_1P_1^{pc}P_2^{pc}P_3M_2E$; °पायिनीं चाश्रित्य M^Y; °नपायिनीष्वाश्रि×≃×त्य P_1; °न्नपायि-
नीष्वाश्रित्य P_2^{ac}; °नपायिनीं चाशृत्य M_1 43.56 कालान्तर°] $M^YA_1P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_2E$; कलान्तर° P_2^{ac}; कामान्तर° M_1

57 स्तमयः, सर्वज्ञानानां क्षणमात्रवेदनोत्तरध्वंसतः क्षणान्तरे सम्भवाभावात् कः प्रवर्तेत कुत्र किमर्थं वा यतः। न हि क्षणात्मवेदिनो नाहं न ममेति पश्यतः प्रवृत्तिर्घटते, इति निरीहं स्वरूपनिष्ठप्रकाशमात्रं हेयोपादेयबुद्धिवि-
60 कलं मिथ्याज्ञानविचारबाधाद्यनेकज्ञानशून्यं जगद् भवेत्, स्थिरग्राहकप्रकाशपूर्वत्वादेवमादेः सर्वस्य, इत्यनपह्नवनीयो ऽयं प्रकाशो व्यवहारहेतुभूतः कालान्तरभाविफलप्रवृत्तिकारणं सर्वैरेव स्यात्।

63 [३.१०.४ एकरूपस्थिरग्राहकप्राकाश आरोपित एवेति चेत्]

सत्यम्, ग्राहको ऽप्ययमेकरूपस्थिरग्राहकप्रकाशः सर्वव्यवहारसम्पादनक्षमो ऽनपह्नवनीय एव। स पुनर्न स्वसंवेद्यः, अपि तु ग्राहकक्षणप्रवाह
66 एवानुभूयमाने तत्सादृश्यदर्शनभ्रान्तैर्विकल्पैरारोप्य प्रकाश्यते ऽभ्रःप्रवाह-

43.62 °कारणं] ---P_1

43.56–57 °प्रत्यस्तमयः] M^Y; °प्रत्यस्तमयं $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °प्रति M_1 43.57 °ध्वंसतः] $M^YA_1P_1P_2P_3E$; °स्वंसतः M_1; °ध्वंसता M_2 43.58 कुत्र किमर्थं वा यतः] $M^YP_1M_1E_D$; कुत्र किमर्त्थं वा $A_1P_2P_3$; अत्र किमर्थं M_2; कुत्र किमर्थं वा। यतो E_V 43.58 क्षणात्मवेदिनो] *conj.*; क्षणात्मवादिनो Σ; क्षणमात्मवादिनो M_2 43.58–59 ममेति पश्यतः] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; ममेति पश्यत M^Y; मेति पश्यतः P_1 43.59 प्रवृत्तिर्घटते] $M^YP_1P_2M_1M_2E$; प्रवृत्तिघटत A_1P_3 43.59 निरीहं स्वरूपनिष्ठ°] $A_1P_2P_3$; निरीहं स्वरूपनिष्ठं M^YP_1E; निरीहस्वरूपनिष्ठं M_1; निरी ⊔ रूपनिष्ठ° M_2 43.59–60 °विकलं] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °विकल° P_1P_2 43.60 °विचारबाधाद्य°] Σ; °विचारबोधाद्य° E 43.60–61 °प्रकाशपूर्वत्वादेवमादेः] $M^YP_2^{rc}M_2E$; °प्रकाशपूर्वकत्वादेवमादेः A_1; °प्र×वे ≍×काशपूर्वदेवमादेस् P_1; °प्रकाशपूर्व+त्व+देव (वेP$_2^{ac}$)मादेस् P_2; °प्रकाशपूर्वकत्वादेवादेस् P_3; °प्रकाशः पूर्वत्वादेव × वा× मादेस् M_1 43.61 °ह्नवनीयो ऽयं] $M^YA_1P_3M_1E$; °न्हवनियोयं×पू ≍× P_1; °न्हवनीयो (या P$_2^{ac}$) P_2; °ह्नीयो अथ M_2 43.62 कालान्तरभावि°] $M^YP_2P_3M_1M_2E$; कलान्तरभावि° A_1; कालान्तरवि° P_1 43.62 सर्वैरेव स्यात् ···°ग्राहकप्रकाशः] *om.* P_1 43.62 सर्वैरेव] $M^YA_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; सर्वदैव E 43.64 सत्यम्, ग्राहको ऽप्ययमेकरूप°] $A_1P_2P_3^{rc}M_2$; सत्यं ग्राहको ऽप्ययमेकरूपः M^YE; सत्यम् × स ≍× ग्राहकोप्ययमेकरूप° P_3; ननु ग्राहको प्ययमेकरूप° M_1 43.64 °काशः सर्वव्यवहार°] $M^{Yc}A_1P_2P_3E$; °काशः सर्वव्यवहारः M^{Yac}; सर्वं व्यवहार° P_1; °काशस्संव्यवहार° M_1; °काशस्सव्यवहार° M_2 43.65 स्वसंवेद्यः, अपि तु ग्राहकक्षणप्रवाह एवा°] $M^YA_1P_3E$; ---संवेद्योपि तु ग्राहकक्षणप्रवाह एवा° P_1; स्वसंवेद्यो पि तु ग्राहकक्षणप्रवाहक एवा° P_2; स्वंसंवेद्योचितुर्ग्राहकक्षणप्रवाह एवा° M_1; स्वसंवेद्यो अपि तु ग्राहक× ल× क्षणप्रवाह ⊔ M_2 43.66 °दर्शन°] Σ; °दर्शना° P_2 43.66 °कल्पैरारोप्य] M^YM_1; °कल्पेनारोप्य $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$ 43.66 प्रकाश्यते ऽभ्रः°] *conj.*; प्रकाश्येतातः M^Y; प्रकाश्येत $A_1P_2M_2$; प्रकाश्यते ततः P_1; प्रकाश्येत। ततः P_3; प्रकाश्यते, अतः M_1; प्रकाश्ये ततः E_D; प्रकाश्यः। ततः E_V

स्येवैक्यमिति।

[३.१०.५ आरोपानुपपत्तिः]

स पुनर्भ्रम एव, विषयवैलक्षण्येनाकर्मतया तदैक्यस्य संवेदनात्। यदि ह्येत- 69
दारोपितं स्यात्, तदारोपका≪द्ग्राहकरूपाङ्गेदेन विषयवज्ज्ञासेत, देवदत्तबो-
धः स्थिर इतिवत्। न चैवमयमनुभवः, अपि तु विषयप्रकाशकत्वेनान्तर्ग्राह-
कस्वभावः, तत्समारोपका≫भिमतस्य स्वतः क्षणमात्रध्वंसित्वेनाप्रतिभास- 72
नात्, तत्प्रतिभासित्वे ह्यारोपानुपपत्तेः, आरोपस्य पूर्वापरपरामर्शरूपत्वेन
स्थिरबोधनिर्वर्त्यत्वात्। न च क्षणात्मनो ऽपि युगपत्पूर्वापरयुक्तदीर्घविषय-
त्वतः समारोपकत्वम्, अयोजनात्मकत्वेनाविकल्पकत्वादलातचक्रादिप्रति- 75
भासवत्। अत एव युगपच्छब्दार्थविषयत्वे ऽपि योगिज्ञानमविकल्पककल्प-

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43.76–78 अत एव युगपच्···न किञ्चिदेतत्] *om.* P_3^{ac}(eyeskip)

43.66–67 °प्रवाहस्येवैक्यमिति] *conj.*; °प्रवाहस्यैवैक्यमिति $M^{\gamma}P_3M_1E$; प्रकाशस्यैवैक्यमिति $A_1^{ac}M_2$; प्रवाहश्यैवैक्यमिति A_1^{c}; प्रवाहस्यैवेक्यमिति P_1; प्रवाहस्यैवैकमिति P_2 43.69 स पुनर्भ्रम एव] *conj. Sanderson*; न पुनर्भ्रम एव Σ; न पुन भ्रम एव P_2 43.69 विषयवैलक्ष°] $M^{\gamma}P_3E$; विषयवैलक्षि° $A_1P_2M_2$; °वि≍यवैलक्ष° P_1; कर्मवैलक्ष° M_1 43.69 °नाकर्मतया] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; °नाकर्मतथा M_1; °न कर्मतया E 43.70–72 तदारोपकाद्ग्राहकरूपाङ्गेदेन ··· तत्समारोपकाभिमतस्य] *conj.* (cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*); तदारोपकाभिमतस्य $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3^{pc}M_1$(eyeskip); तदारोपकाभिमतस्व A_1(eyeskip); तदारोपितकाभि×≍×मतस्य P_1(eyeskip); तदारोपिकाभिमतस्य P_3^{ac}E(eyeskip); तदारोप ⊔ तस्य M_2 43.72 स्वतः] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; स्यतः A_1; स्वत P_2 43.73 °भासित्वे ह्या°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °भासित्वे प्या° P_1; °भासितत्वेपि आ° M_1 43.73 °रोपानुपपत्तेः] *conj.* (cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*); °त्मत्वोपपत्तेः $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2M_2E$; °त्मत्वापत्तेः M_1 43.73 °परामर्शरूपत्वेन] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_1M_2E_v$; पर---पत्वेन A_1; °परामर्शत्वेन P_2 43.74 °बोधनिर्वर्त्यत्वात्] $M^{\gamma}P_1$; °बोधं निर्वर्त्यत्वात् A_1M_2; °बोधनिवृत्यत्वान् P_2; °बोधनिर्व्यत्यत्वात् P_3; °बोधनिर्वत्यत्वात् M_1; °बोधनिवर्त्यत्वात् E 43.74–75 °पूर्वापरयुक्तदीर्घविषयत्वतः] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3E$; °पूर्वपरयुक्त×पूर्व× दीर्घविषयत्वतस् A_1; °पूर्वापरयुक्तदीर्घविषय--- P_1; °पूर्वापरतायुक्ता दीर्घविषयत्वतस् M_1; °पूर्वापरयुक्तदीर्घविषयमतस् M_2 43.75 समारोपकत्वम्, अयोजनात्मकत्वे°] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3E$; समारोपकत्व---त्वे° A_1; ---ारोपकत्वमयोजनात्मकत्वे° P_1; समारोपकत्वं योजनात्मकत्वे° M_1; सारोपकत्वं ⊔ नात्मकत्वे° M_2 43.75 °विकल्पकत्वादलात°] $M^{\gamma}E$; °विकल्पत्वादलाभ° $A_1M_2^{ac}$; °पकल्पत्वादलात° P_1; °विकल्पत्वादलात° $P_2P_3M_1M_2^{pc}$ 43.76 युगपच्छब्दार्थ°] *conj.*; युगपत्सर्वार्थ° Σ 43.76 योगि°] $A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; योगिगि° M^{γ}; योग° M_2

मित्युक्तम्। योजितविषयं तदिति चेत् सर्वेषां क्षणिकत्वेन योजनानुपपत्तेर्न
78 किञ्चिदेतत्। अत एवानेकेषामपि क्रमभाविनां विकल्पक्षणानां नारोपकत्व-
मित्यारोपासम्भवादस्तंगता विकल्पाः।

न च ग्राहकात्माप्येवं गृह्येतेति वक्तुं शक्यते, येन स्वात्मन्यविकल्पको
81 विकल्पः। अत एवास्याहंप्रत्ययविषयतापि न सम्भवति, अपि त्वहंप्रत्ययप्र-
काशरूपतैव, तदापि तेन रूपेण स्थिरतयैव भासनात्। न हि कालत्रये ऽपि
ग्राहकात्मनो ध्वंसः संवेद्यत इत्युक्तम्। यस्य हि प्रागभावः स उत्पन्नः, यस्य

43.78 °क्षणानां नारोपकत्व°] °क्षणा---नारो--- P_1 43.82 न हि कालत्रये] ---काल-त्रये P_1; न हि ≍लत्रये P_2 43.83 इत्युक्तम्। यस्य हि] इत्यु ⊔ M_1

43.83 इत्युक्तम् See 43.52–3.

43.76–77 °कल्पककल्पमित्युक्तम्] $M^{\gamma}P_1E$; °कल्पकल्पमित्यु--- A_1; °कल्पमित्यु-क्तं P_2; °कल्पकल्पमित्युक्तम् P_3; °कल्पनमित्युक्तम् M_1; °कल्पकल्पमित्युक्त M_2 43.77 योजितविषयं तदिति] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; —यान्तदिति A_1; ---विषयन्तत् नि P_1 43.77 क्षणिकत्वेन] Σ; क्षणिकत्वे M_2 43.77 योजनानुपपत्तेर्न] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_1M_2$ E; योजनानुपपर्न्ने A_1; योजनानानुपपत्तेः +न+ P_2 43.78 किञ्चिदेतत्] Σ; कञ्चिदेतत् P_3 43.78 क्रमभाविनां] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; क्रमभविनां A_1; क्रम ⊔ M_1 43.79 °सम्भवादस्तंगता विकल्पाः] *conj.* (cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣā*); °सम्भवात् तदङ्गताविकल्पाः M^{γ}; °संभवात् तदसङ्गता विकल्पना A_1M_2; °संभवास्तदंगताविकल्प+ा+×≍× ने P_1; +सं+भवात्। तदसंगता ≍कल्पक ≍ना P_2; °सम्भवात् तदसंगता विकल्पकल्पना P_3; °संभवादसंगताविकल्पा M_1; °सम्भवात् तदङ्गताविकल्पनात् E 43.80 न च] P_2P_3 E; अतश्च M^{γ}; नव A_1M_2; न चा° P_1; ननश्च M_1 43.80 ग्राहकात्माप्येवं गृह्येतेति वक्तुं] M_1; ग्राहकात्मक(?)नह्येत इति वक्तुं M^{γ}; ग्राहकात्मन्येव वक्तुं A_1M_2E; ग्राहको गृह्येत इति वक्तुं P_1; ग्राहकात्मन्येवं वक्तुं P_2; ग्राहकात्मन्येवं वक्तुं P_3 43.80 शक्यते] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; शक्यंते $M^{\gamma}P_1^{pc}$; श×क्य×क्यन्ते P_1 43.80 येन] Σ; येन न M^{γ} 43.81 स्वात्मन्यविकल्पको विकल्पः। अत] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3^{pc}E$; स्वात्मन्यविकल्पो विक-ल्पोत M^{γ}; स्वात्मन्य--- ल्पको पिकल्पोत P_1; स्वात्मन्यविकल्पके+ा+ विकल्पः अत P_3; स्वात्मन्यपि विकल्पके अविकल्प ⊔ त M_1 43.81 °स्याहंप्रत्ययविषयतापि न] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; ---हप्रत्ययविषयतापि P_2; °स्याहंप्रत्यविषयतापि न P_3 43.82 °व भासनात्] *conj.* (cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*); °वाहंभासनात् $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_1$; °वा-हम्भास--- P_1; °वाहमवभासनात् M_2E 43.83 ध्वंसः] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3E$; ध्वंस A_1; ध्वंस P_2M_1; ध्वंसस् M_2 43.83 यस्य हि] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; यस्य P_1; ⊔ M_1

तु ध्वंसः स नष्टः। अहंप्रत्ययस्य पुनः पूर्वोत्तरयोः कोव्योर्नास्त्यभावसंवित्। 84
प्रतिक्षणमुत्पन्नो निरुद्धो भवेदिति न शक्यते वक्तुम्। न चास्वसंवेद्यः संविद्धर्मो भवतीति वक्ष्यामः। तत्स्थूलसूक्ष्मयोरिव स्थिरक्षणिकयोः परस्परविरुद्धरूपत्वाद् विद्युदादौ क्षणिकत्वं प्रमाणसिद्धं सद् अक्षणिकत्वं व्यावर्तयति 87
यथा, एवमत्र स्वात्मन्यारोपासम्भवेन स्थैर्यमवभासमानमसंशयं क्षणिकत्वं व्यवच्छिनत्तीति युक्तम्। न च स्वसंवेदनस्य बाधः सम्भवति, येन भ्रान्तता भवेदिति वक्ष्यामः। न च प्रमाणसिद्धस्य बाधकं विनान्यथाभ्युपगमो 90
मतिमावर्जयति विपश्चिताम्। स्थिरस्यार्थक्रियानुपपत्तिरेव बाधिकेति चेन्न, तदनुपपत्तेस्तत्र निषेत्स्यमानत्वेनाबाधकत्वात्।

43.86 वक्ष्यामः] —: P_2

43.86 इति वक्ष्यामः 49.62 in section 3.15.2.4.

43.90 येन भ्रान्तता भवेदिति वक्ष्यामः See section 3.15.2.4.

43.92 निषेत्स्यमानत्वेन See 46.29ff.

43.83–84 यस्य तु ध्वंसः स नष्टः] $M^{Y}P_1^{pc}M_1$; यस्य तु पुंसः उत्पत्तिः स नष्टः A_1 M_2; यस्य तु ध्वंसः +स+ नष्टः P_1; यस्य ≃ ≃त्प—नष्टः P_2; यस्य तु उत्पत्तिस्स नष्टः P_3; यस्य हि पुंस उत्पत्तिः स नष्टः E 43.84 अहंप्रत्ययस्य] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; प्रत्ययस्य $M^{Y}M_1$; प्रत्यस्य P_1 43.84 पूर्वोत्तरयोः कोव्यो°] $M^{Y}P_2M_1M_2E_V$; पूर्वोत्तरयोः को— P_1; पूर्वत्तरये+ा+ःकोटे° P_3 43.84 °र्नास्त्यभावसंवित्] M^{Y}; °र्नास्त्यभावः। संवित् A_1P_3E; °र्न्न—भावं संवित् P_1; नास्त्यभावः संवित् P_2; °नास्ती भावः। संवित् M_1; °र्नास्त्यभावः सम्पत् M_2 43.85 °त्पन्नो निरुद्धो] M^{Y}; °त्पन्ना निरुद्धा $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; °त्पन्नो निरुद्धा M_1; °त्पन्ना निरूढा E 43.85 भवेदिति] $M^{Y}P_3M_1$ M_2E; भावेदिति A_1; भदिवेदि P_1; भ—दिति P_2 43.85 न चास्वसंवेद्यः] M^{Y}; न चात्मा स्वसंवेद्यस् $A_1P_3^{pc}$; न वा स्वसंवेद्यः $P_1^{pc}E$; न वास्वसंवेद्य×त इत्युक्तं×स् P_1; न चात्मस्वसंवेद्यः $P_2P_3^{ac}$; न वा ⊔ द्यस् M_1; न चात्मा स्वसंवेद M_2 43.85–86 संविद्धर्मो] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2E$; संविद्धंर्म्मो A_1; संविद्धिममा P_1; संविद्धमो P_2 43.87 प्रमाणसिद्धं सद् अक्षणिकत्वं] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1E$; प्रमाणसिद्धमक्षणिकत्वं A_1; प्रमाणसिद्धम् तदक्षणिकत्वम् P_1; +प्रमाणसिद्ध+मक्षणिकत्वं M_2 43.88 यथा, एवमत्र] $A_1P_1P_2P_3$ M_1E; यथैवमस्त्रंव M^{Y}; यथैवमन्त्र M_2 43.88 स्वात्मन्यारोपासम्भवेन] *conj.* (cf. *Mataṅgavṛtti*); स्वात्मारोपासम्भवेन $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; स्वात्मारोपासम्भवे— P_1; स्वा ⊔ासंभवेन M_1 43.89 °वेदनस्य बाधः] $M^{Y}P_1^{pc}P_3M_1E$; °वेदनस्याबाधः A_1M_2; °वेदनस्यावाधः P_1^{ac}; °वेदनस्य बाधा P_2 43.90 बाधकं] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; —धकं P_1; इ ⊔ M_1 43.90 °थाभ्युपगमो] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °था ≃पगमो P_1; °थाभावाभ्युपगमो M_1 43.91 °नुपपत्तिरेव] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1E$; °रूपपत्तिरेव A_1M_2; °नुपत्तिरेव P_1 43.91 बाधिकेति] M_1E_V; बाधमिति M^{Y}; बाधकमिति $A_1P_1P_3M_2E_D$; बाध ≃मिति P_2 43.92 तदनुपपत्तेस्तत्र] Σ; तदनुपत्तेस्तत्र P_1

93 [३.१०.६ स्थिररूपात्मसिद्धौ कर्तृत्वमेव हेतुः, न तु स्मृतिः]

तदत्र स्वप्रकाशे स्वचित्तव्ययोदयसाक्षिणि स्थिररूपे ह्यात्मनि ग्राहके स्व-
संवेदनात् स्मर्तृत्वं प्रोक्तवदात्मसंवित्तिप्रोद्धारफलं पराभिहिततदभावसाधन-
96 हेतुव्रातातिरञ्जीनतया हेतूकृतम्, न तु स्मृतिः। सा ह्यनुभवादतीताद् भिन्नैव।
स्मर्ता तु न भिद्यते, तस्यैव पूर्वानुभवितृत्वेन तदा स्वसंवेदनादिति तद-
भेदात् तत्र भेदोपचारः, न वस्तुतो ऽभेद इत्यलमतिसूक्ष्मानुभवविचारेण
99 मुग्धमतितपस्विजनमनःखेदजनकेन॥ ४३॥

[३.११ चार्वाकाणां सर्वनाशपक्षः]

एवं जन्ममरणयोर्मध्ये पुंसः स्थैर्यं प्रतिपाद्याधुना यैर्भूतेभ्य एव ज्ञानस्यो-
102 त्पत्तिरित्युक्तं तान् प्रति जन्मनः पूर्वं तत्सत्तां साधयितुमाह—

[३.११.१ तदहर्जातशिशुप्रवृत्त्या जन्मान्तरानुभवपूर्विका स्मृतिः सिद्धा]

43.95 पराभिहित°] —हित° P_1 43.97 तदा स्वसं°] — P_1 43.101 °र्मध्ये] — P_1

43.94 तदत्र] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_1M_2E$; न तत्र P_1; ततत्र P_2^{ac} 43.94 स्वप्रकाशे स्वचित्तव्ययोदयसाक्षिणि] $A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; स्वप्रकाशस्वचित्तोदयव्यत्ययसाक्षिणि M^{γ}; स्वप्रका≍स्वचित्तयोदयसाक्षिणि P_2; स्वप्रकाशे स्वच ⊔ ादयसाक्षिणि M_1 43.95 स्मर्तृत्वं] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1$; स्वकर्तृत्वं $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$ 43.95 °संवित्तिप्रोद्धारफलं] P_3E; °संविदित्यपोद्धारफलं M^{γ}; °संवित्तिप्रद्धारफलं A_1M_2; °संविद्यबोद्धा≍फलम् P_1; °संविद्धिप्रो×त्त×+द्ध्+ारफलं P_2; °संवित्प्रोप्रोद्धारफलं M_1 43.96 °ञ्जीनतया हेतूकृतम्] A_1P_3; °ञ्जीनताया हेतुकृतं M^{γ}; °ञ्जीनताया हेतूकृतन् P_1; °ञ्जीनतया हेतुकृतम् P_2M_2E; °ञ्जीनतायाा ⊔ तु कृतम् M_1 43.96 स्मृतिः] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1E$; स्मृतिरभिन्ना $A_1P_2P_3M_2$ 43.96 सा ह्यनुभवादतीताद् भिन्नैव] $M^{\gamma}P_2^{pc}P_3$; सा ह्यनुभवतदतीतात् भिन्नैव A_1M_2; सा ह्यनुभवादिति तान् भिन्नैव P_1; सा ह्यनुभ+व+ ादतीतात् भिन्नैव P_2; सा ह्यनुभवादतीतितस्माद्भिन्नैव M_1; सा ह्यतीतादनुभवाद् भिन्नैव E 43.97 न भिद्यते] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; निविभिद्यते A_1; न विभिद्यते M_2 43.98 तत्र भेदोपचारः] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; तत्राभेदोपचारः $M^{\gamma}E$ 43.98 वस्तुतो ऽभेद] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_2M_1M_2E$; वस्तुभेद P_1; वस्तुतो देदम् P_3 43.98 इत्यलमतिसूक्ष्मानुभवविचारेण] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; इत्यलमिति सूक्ष्मानुभवविचारेण P_2; × हेतु× इत्यलम्तिसूक्ष ⊔ भवद्विचारेण M_1 43.102 तान् प्रति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; —ति P_2; ताा प्रति M_1 43.102 पूर्वं] $M^{\gamma}M_1M_2E$; पूर्वमपि $A_1P_1P_2P_3$ 43.102 तत्सत्तां] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_2E$; तत्सतां P_2; तत्सक्तां P_3M_1

जन्मान्तरानुभूते ऽर्थे स्मृतिर्जाते ऽपि लक्ष्यते।
अशनाय भवेत् सा च स्तन्यं प्रत्युपसर्पणात्॥ ४४॥

यदि हि शरीरेण सह चैतन्यमुत्पद्यते, तदा तदहर्जातस्य बालकस्य बुभुक्षितस्याशनाय भोजनार्थं स्तन्यं प्रति क्षीरप्राप्तये प्रवृत्तिर्निगरणात्मको व्यापारो न भवेत्। एतच्चोपलक्षणमन्येषां स्थानकरणाभिघातादीनाम्। यदाहुः— 3

आद्यः करणविन्यासः प्राणस्योर्ध्वं समीरणम्।
स्थानानामभिघातश्च न विना पूर्ववेदनाम्॥ इति। 6

दृश्यते च प्रवृत्तिः। सा जन्मान्तरानुभवपूर्विकां स्मृतिं तदा गमयति। ननु जृम्भाद्युद्भवो यथा बालस्य जातिधर्मतया वस्तुशक्तित एव भवति, ए-

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44abcd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; जन्मान्तरानुभूत इति $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$ 44b. स्मृतिर्जाते ऽपि लक्ष्यते] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}$; स्मृतिर्ज्ञजातेपि लक्ष्यते P^{s}_{1}(unmetrical); स्मृतिर्ज्ञाते पि लक्ष्यते $P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}$; स्मृतिजाते पि लक्ष्यते P^{s}_{4}; स्मृतिर्ज्ञातोपि लक्ष्यते M_{1}; स्मृतिरन्यस्य सम्भवेत् E 44c. अशनाय] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s^{c}}_{3}E$; अशनाया M^{Y}; असनाय $M^{s^{ac}}_{3}$ 44d. प्रत्युपसर्पणात्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}E$; प्रत्युपसर्पणादिति M^{Y}; प्रत्यपसर्प्पणात् P^{s}_{1}

44.1 यदि हि] — P_{1} 44.8 भवति, एवम्] भ—वम् P_{1}

44.1 *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:20, p. 47: यथा च स्थानकरणादीनामप्यत्र गमकत्वं तथा दर्शितमाचार्येण रौरववृत्तौ परमोक्षनिरासकारिकाभिः— जन्मान्तरानुभूते ऽर्थे स्मृतिर्जाते ऽपि दृश्यते। अशनाय भवेत्सा च स्तन्यं प्रत्युपसर्पणात्॥ इति।

44.5–6 आद्यः करणविन्यासः ⋯ न विना शब्दभावनाम् *Vākyapadīya* 1:130 (ed. Rau).

44.1 सह] Σ; इह M_{2} 44.1 °मुत्पद्यते] Σ; °मुत्पाद्यते P^{pc}_{1} 44.1 °तस्य बालकस्य] $M^{Y}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; °तस्य बालस्य $A_{1}P_{2}$; °तकस्य बालकस्य P_{1} 44.2 °शनाय] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}M_{1}M_{2}E$; ⌣नाय P_{2}; °शनाया P_{3} 44.2 प्रवृत्तिर्निगरणात्मको] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M^{pc}_{2}E_{V}$; प्रवृत्तिगरणात्म— P_{1}; प्रवृत्तिन्निगिरणात्मको P_{2}; प्रवृत्तिर्निग+र+णा×ना× त्मको M_{2}; प्रवृत्तिनिगरणात्मको E_{D} 44.3 भवेत्] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}$; भवते M_{2}; स्यात् E 44.5 आद्यः] $P_{3}M_{1}E$; आद्यं $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}M_{2}$ 44.5 समीरणम्] $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}E$; समीरिणं A_{1}; शरीरिणाम् M_{2} 44.6 पूर्ववेदनाम्] $M^{Y}P_{1}M_{1}M_{2}E$; पूर्वदेवनाम् A_{1}; पूर्ववेदिनाम् $P_{2}P_{3}$; शब्दभावनाम् *Vākyapadīya* 44.7 जन्मान्तरानुभवपूर्विकां] $A_{1}P^{pc}_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$; जन्मान्तरपूर्विकां $M^{Y}P_{1}E$; जन्म+ा+×न्म×न्तरानुभवपूर्विकां P_{2}; जानुन्मान्तरभवपूर्विकां M_{1} 44.8 जृम्भाद्युद्भवो यथा] M^{Y}; यथा जृम्भाद्युद्भवो Σ

9 वमेतदपि भविष्यतीति। असममेतत्, अवगमपूर्वकत्वात्। अस्य सर्वस्य ह्यवगमं विनोद्भवः। केशनखादेरिव तस्य जृम्भादेर्जातिधर्मता युक्ता। क्षीर-
12 निगरणादेस्त्विच्छाजन्यप्रयत्नविशेषसाध्यत्वेन दृष्टत्वान्न जातिधर्मता। क्षीरं हि तत्क्षणजातो ऽपि बालो ऽर्थितया स्तनादिच्छापूर्वप्रयत्नविशेषेणाकर्षति। आकृष्य, तेन च मुखमापूर्य न तद्वमति, अपि तु तृप्तिलक्षणफलावधि
15 निगिरन्नपि, तथा तथा निगिरन् दृश्यते, न यथा यथा प्राणाख्यवायुरोध-स्तस्य जायत इत्येवमादिहिताहितप्राप्तित्यागनिमित्तस्य प्रयत्नविशेषकार्य-स्य दर्शनाद् बालानां हिताहितबुद्धिं ज्ञात्वानुमितपूर्वानुभूतहिताहितस्मृति-सिद्धिः॥ ४४॥

44.11 °प्रयत्नविशे°] — P_2

44.9 भविष्यतीति। असममेतत्] M^{γ}; भविष्यति असमतमेतत् A_1; भविष्यतीत्यस-म्मतमेतत् P_1M_1; भविष्यति। असमञ्जसमेतत् P_2; भविष्यतीत्यसमञ्जसमेतत् P_3E; भविष्यति। असंमतमेतत् M_2 44.9 अवगमपूर्वकत्वात्] Σ; अवगमम् पूर्वगत्वाद् P_1 44.9–10 सर्वस्य ह्यवगमं] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; सर्वस्यावगमं A_1M_2 44.10 विनोद्भवः] M^{γ}; Σ 44.10 °र्जातिधर्मता युक्ता] $P_1P_3M_1E$; °र्जातिधर्मतया युक्ता M^{γ}; °र्जाति-धर्मता युक्तम् A_1M_2; जातिधर्म्मयुतायुक्ता P_2 44.11 °निगरणादेस्त्वि°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3$ M_1M_2; °निगरणास्त्वि° P_2; °निगरणस्य त्वि° E 44.11 दृष्टत्वान्न] Σ; दृष्टत्वन्न M_2 44.12 तत्क्षणजातो ऽपि बालो ऽर्थितया] M^{γ}; तत्क्षणजातेनापि बालेन्नार्थितया A_1; तत्क्षणजातेनापि बालेनोत्थिततया $P_1P_2^{pc}$; तत्क्षणजातेन+ ापि+बालेनोत्थिततया P_2; तत्क्षणजातेनापि बालेनोर्त्थिततया P_3; तत्क्षणजातो ऽपि बालोत्थितया M_1; त-त्क्षणजातेनापि बालेनार्थितया M_2E 44.12 स्तनादिच्छापूर्वप्रयत्नविशेषेणा°] $A_1P_2M_2$; स्तनात्पूर्वं प्रयत्नविशेषेणा° M^{γ}; स्तनादिच्छापूर्वम् प्रयत्न—णा° P_1; स्तनादिच्छापूर्वप्र-यत्नविशेषणा° P_3; स्तन्यपानात्पूर्वं प्रयत्नविशेषेणा° M_1; स्तनात्पूर्वं प्रयत्नविशेषेणा° E 44.12 °कर्षति] $M^{\gamma}M_1$; °कर्षाद् A_1M_2; °कर्षणम≃ P_1; °कर्षनमामत्यद् P_2°कर्षण-मत्य् P_3; °कर्षणात् E 44.13 आकृष्य, तेन च] *conj.*; आकृष्य तेन M^{γ}; आकृष्यते तेन A_1M_2; आकृष्यते। तेन P_1P_2; आकृष्यते च तेन P_3M_1E 44.13 तृप्ति°] Σ; तृप्तिस्थि° P_1 44.14 निगिरन्नपि] $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; निगरन्नपि $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1E$ 44.14 तथा तथा] Σ; तथा M_1 44.14 निगिरन्] $A_1P_2P_3$; निगरन् $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1M_2E$ 44.14 न यथा यथा] P_2M_2; न च यथा यथा $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$ 44.14 प्राणाख्यवायु°] Σ; प्राणाख्यया (?) वायु° P_1 44.15 जायत इ°] $A_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; जायते हि° M^{γ}; जा×तय×यत इ° P_1 44.15–16 °कार्यस्य] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1^{pc}P_2M_1M_2E$; °कार्य्य+स्य+ P_1; °का×ल×र्य्यस्य P_2; °चार्य्यस्य P_3 44.16–17 ज्ञात्वानुमितपूर्वानुभूतहिताहितस्मृतिसि-द्धिः] $A_1P_2P_3E$; ज्ञात्वानुमितपूर्वानुभूतहिताहितपूर्वानुभूतस्मृतिसिद्धिः M^{γ}; ज्ञात्वानुमि-ता पूर्वानुभूतहिताहितस्मृतिबुद्धिः P_1; ज्ञात्वानुमिता पूर्वानुभूतहिताहित× ।× स्मृतिसिद्धिः M_1; ज्ञात्वानुमितपूर्वानुभूतहिताहितस्तुतिसिद्धिः M_2

[३.११.२ भूतपूर्वजातिस्मरणम्]

अत्रैवाभ्युच्चयमाह—

जातिस्मराश्च दृश्यन्ते कुर्वन्तः प्रत्ययं जनाः।

भूतपूर्वजन्मस्मर्तारो जातिस्मराः प्रत्यक्षा एव।

यदि नाम स्मृतिर्जन्मान्तरविषया दृष्टा वानुमिता वा, ततः किमित्याह—

न चान्येनानुभूते ऽर्थे स्मृतिरन्यस्य सम्भवेत्॥ ४५॥

अनुभवस्मरणयोरैकाधिकरण्यं पूर्वमेव प्रतिपादितमिति जन्मनः प्रागपि सत्तासिद्धिरनुभवितुः॥ ४५॥

[३.११.३ अनादिजन्मप्रबन्धसिद्धिः]

ततो ऽनेनापि सिद्धेन किमित्याह—

एवं चानादिका पुंसामुन्नेया जन्मपद्धतिः।

45ab.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; जातिस्मराश्चेति $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; जातिस्मरा×श्चेति×चेति P_1 (E give 45abcd together here with the accepted readings) 45a. जातिस्मराश्च] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}E$; जातिस्मरां च $P^{S}_{3}M^{Sc}_{3}$ 45 b. जनाः] $P^{Sc}_{1}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; जने M^{Y}; जने $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{4}$; मनः P^{Sac}_{1}; जनोः P^{S}_{3} 45 cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P_2P_3P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$; न चान्येनेति $A_1P_1M_2E$ 45c. न चान्येना°] Σ; न चान्योना° P^{S}_{3} 45d. सम्भवेत्] $M^{Yc}_{M}P^{Sc}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$; संभवेदिति $M^{Y}P_2P_3$; जायते M^{Yac}_{M}; संभवात् P^{Sac}_{1} 46ab.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P_2P_3P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; एवश्चेति $A_1P_1M_2$ (E give 46abcd together here with the accepted readings) 46 b. °न्नेया जन्मपद्धतिः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; °न्नेया जन्मपद्धतिरिति $M^{Y}P_3$; °न्नेयजन्मपद्धतिरिति P_2

45.5 °वितुः] — P_2

45.4 पूर्वमेव प्रतिपादितम्. See section 3.10.

44.19 अत्रैवा°] Σ; अत्रा° M_1 45.2 स्मृतिर्जन्मा°] Σ; स्मृतिजन्मा° P_2 45.2 वानुमिता वा] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1E$; वा—ता वा P_2; वानुमिता M_2 45.4 °काधिकरण्यं] $M^{Y}A_1M_1M_2E$; °काधिकरणम् P_1P_3; —करण्यं P_2 45.7 ततो ऽनेनापि सिद्धेन] P_3M_2E; तत अनेनापि सिद्धेन M^{Y}; ततः अनेनापि अनेनापि सिद्धेन A_1; ततः। ऽनेन सिद्धेनापि P_1; सतः अनेनापि सिद्धेन P_2; अनेनापि सिद्धेन M_1

प्रतिजन्म पूर्वव्यतीतजन्मसंस्कारपूर्वव्यवहारदर्शनादनादिजन्मप्रबन्धः पुंसां सिद्ध इत्यनादित्वं तेषां सिद्ध्यति, न तु भूतेभ्य एवोत्पाद्यतेति।

[३.११.४ अनादेर्वस्तुनो न विनाशित्वम्]

ततश्चानादित्वात् सिद्धात् सर्वनाशपक्षनिषेध इत्याह—

अनादेर्वस्तुनो मानं विनाशित्वे न सम्भवेत्॥ ४६॥

विनाशित्वे विनाशित्वनिमित्तमनादेर्वस्तुनः प्रमाणं न सम्भवेत्। प्रमाणाभावेनात्र विनाशासंभवो लक्ष्यते। तेनानादेर्वस्तुनो विनाशित्वं न सम्भाव्यत इत्यर्थः। उत्पत्तिमतां ह्यनित्यत्वं सिद्धव्याप्तिकत्वात् सिद्ध्यति, नानुत्पत्तिमतां यतः। अनुत्पत्तिधर्मा चात्मेत्युक्तम्।

[३.११.५ चार्वाकमते, आत्मविनाशित्वे प्रमाणमर्थक्रियाकारित्वम्]

स्यादेतत्। अनादेरात्मनो विनाशित्वे प्रमाणमस्ति अर्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वम्।

[३.११.५.१ नित्यस्यार्थक्रियाकरित्वानुपपत्तिः, युगपत् क्रमेण च]

तथा हि नित्यस्यार्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वं स्वभावः, तदस्वभावत्वे ऽवस्तुत्वप्रस-

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46 cd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; अनादेरित्यादि $A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}E$ 46 d. सम्भवेत्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}{}^{c}P^{s}_{4}M_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; संभवेदिति M^{Y}; सम्×≍×भवेत् P^{s}_{3}

46.2 भूतेभ्य] भू--- P_{2} 46.5 विनाशित्वे] विना--- P_{2}

46.8 अनुत्पत्तिधर्मा चात्मेत्युक्तम् See 46ab and commentary.

46.1 पूर्वव्यतीत°] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}P_{3}M_{1}E$; पूर्व ≍+ ≍+तीत° P_{2}; *om.* M_{2}(eyeskip) 46.1 °पूर्वव्यवहार°] Σ; °पूर्वकव्यवहार° E 46.1 °दर्शनादनादिजन्मप्रबन्धः] $M^{Y}A^{c}_{1}P^{pc}_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}$; °दर्शन्दादिजन्मप्रबन्धः A^{ac}_{1}; °दर्शना ≍जन्मप्रबन्धः P^{ac}_{1}; °दर्शनादर्शनादनादिजन्मप्रबन्धः P_{2}; °दर्शनाज्जन्मप्रतिबन्धः E 46.1 पुंसां] P_{3}; पुंसः $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{1}P_{2}M_{1}M_{2}E$ 46.2 एवोत्पाद्यतेति] *conj.*; एवोत्पादित इति $A_{1}P_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; --- त्पादित इति M^{Y}; एवोत्पादित---ति P_{2} 46.4 सिद्धात्] Σ; *om.* P^{ac}_{2} 46.5 प्रमाणा°] $M^{Y}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; प्रमाण° A_{1}; प्र---णा° P_{1} 46.6 तेनानादे°] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; न तेनानादे° P_{1}; तेनानादो° P_{2} 46.7 सिद्ध्यति] Σ; सिद्धेति M_{2} 46.8 चात्मेत्युक्तम्] $A_{1}P_{1}P_{3}E$; वात्मेत्युक्तम् $M^{Y}M_{1}M_{2}$; चात्मेत्युक्तम P_{2} 46.10 स्यादेतत्] Σ; तस्य तदेतत् M_{2} 46.10 अनादेरात्मनो] $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}E$; अनारात्मनो $A_{1}M_{2}$ 46.10 प्रमाणमस्ति अर्थ°] Σ; प्रमाण ⊔ त्यर्थ° M_{1} 46.12 नित्यस्यार्थ°] $M^{Y}A_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E_{V}$; नित्यस्या--- P_{1}; नित्यस्थार्थ° E_{D}; नित्यस्याप्यर्थ° *conj. Sanderson* 46.12 °कर्तृत्वं] Σ; °कर्तृत्व° P_{1} 46.12 तदस्वभावत्वे ऽवस्तु°] M^{Y}; तदभवेत्ववस्तु° A_{1}; तदभावत्वे अवस्तु° P_{1}; तदाभावे त्ववस्तु° P_{2}; तदभावेवस्तु° P_{3}; तदभावे अवस्तु° M_{1}; तदभावे त्ववस्तु° M_{2}; तदभावत्वे ऽवस्तु° E

ङ्गात्। स च स्वभावस्तस्यैक एव, नानास्वभावत्वे हि तस्यापि नानात्वं, स्वभावभेदलक्षणत्वाद् भावभेदस्य। एकस्वभावत्वे च सर्वदैव स्वनिर्वर्त्यसर्वार्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वस्वभावत्वादेकस्मिन्नपि क्षणे सर्वस्वकार्यकरणप्रसङ्गात् कार्ययौगपद्यं भवेत्, तत्स्वभावस्य तदापि भावादिति क्रमेण कार्योत्पादाभावः। न च क्रियाकालनियमो भवेत्। द्वितीयस्मिन्नपि क्षणे तत्स्वभावत्वे तथैव कुर्यात्। द्वितीयक्षणकृताश्चार्थक्रियाः पूर्वमेव कुर्यात्, पूर्वक्षणकृताश्च पुनर्द्वितीयस्मिन् क्षण इत्याद्यनवस्थितेरेकस्वभावस्य युगपदपि कार्योत्पादानुपपत्तिरिति सा तत्रानुपपद्यमाना प्रकारान्तराभावाद्वस्तुधर्मत्वेन तत्प्रतिपक्षेषु क्षणमात्रध्वंसिषु भावेषु विश्राम्यतीति क्षणिकत्वं भावानाम्। क्षणिकत्वे तु स पूर्वः पूर्वो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्ता ध्वस्तो ऽन्यश्चापूर्वो ऽपूर्वो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्ता स-

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46.19 कार्योत्पा°] ⊔ र्यात्पा° M_2

46.14 °लक्षणत्वाद् भाव°] $M^{Y}P_3M_1$; °लक्षणत्वात् भावं A_1; °लक्षणत्वा---भा--- P_1; °लक्षणत्वाद्। भावे P_2; °लक्षण ⊔ भावं M_2; °लक्षणत्वात्। भाव° E 46.14 °कस्वभावत्वे] $M^{Y}A_1P_2M_2E$; °कत्वस्वभावत्वे P_1; °कस्वभाचवंत्वे P_3; °कस्य भावत्वे M_1 46.14 सर्वदैव] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; सर्वदेव P_1P_2 46.14 स्वनिर्वर्त्य°] $A_1M_1M_2$; स्वनिर्वर्त्या $M^{Y}P_1$; स्वनिवृत्य P_2; स्वनिर्वत्य P_3; स्वनिवृत्या E_D; स्वनिवृत्त्या E_V 46.15 °स्वभावत्वादेकस्मिन्नपि] Σ; °स्वभावत्वा ⊔ स्मिन्नपि M_1 46.15 क्षणे] M^{Ya} $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; क्षणे ×तत्स्वभावत्वे तथैव कुर्यात्× M^{Y} 46.15 °करणप्रसङ्गात्] Σ; °कारण---गात् P_1 46.15–16 कार्ययौग°] Σ; कार्य्ये यौग° P_2^{pc} 46.16 भावादिति] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E_D^{pc}E_V$; भावादि° A_1M_2; भवादिति E_D^{ac} 46.16 °त्पादाभावः] Σ; °त्पादा ⊔ वः M_2 46.17 क्रियाकालनियमो] $P_2P_3^{pc}E$; क्रियाकालो M^{Y}; क्रियाकालनियमे A_1M_2; क्रियाकालानियमे P_1; क्रियाकालनि× म× यमो P_3; क्रियाकलानियमो M_1 46.17 तत्स्वभावत्वे] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_2E$; तत्स्वभा+व+त्वे P_2; तत्स्वभावत्वात् M_1 46.18 कुर्यात्] Σ; कुर्य्यात्तु P_3 46.18–19 °कृताश्च पुनर्द्वितीयस्मिन्] $M^{Y}A_1P_2M_1M_2E$; °कृता पुनर्द्वितीयस्मिन् P_1; °कृताश्च पुनर्द्वितीयस्मिन्नपि P_3 46.20 °पद्यमाना] Σ; °पद्यमान P_3 46.21 °ध्वंसिषु भावेषु] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; °ध्वंसिष---भावेषु P_2; °ध्वंसिष्वभावेषु E 46.21 विश्राम्यतीति] $P_3^{pc}A_1M_1M_2E$; विश्रामति M^{Y}; विश्र+ा+मयतिति P_1; विश्रा× म× म्यतीति P_3 46.22 स] Σ; तस्य M_1 46.22 पूर्वो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्ता] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1$; पूर्वार्थक्रियाकर्ता $M^{Y}E$; पूर्वो ऽर्थक्रियायां कर्ता M_2 46.22 ध्वस्तो ऽन्यश्चापूर्वो ऽपूर्वो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्ता] P_2P_3; ध्वस्तोन्यश्चापूर्वोपूर्वार्थक्रियाकर्ता M^{Y}; ध्वस्तोन्यश्च। पूर्वोपूर्वोर्त्थक्रियाकर्ता A_1; द्ध्वस्तोन्यश्चापूर्वोपूर्वोर्त्थक्रियाकर्त्ता P_1; ध्वस्तः, अन्यश्च पूर्वोपूर्वो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्ता M_1; ध्वं ⊔ श्च पूर्वोपूर्वो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्ता M_2; ध्वस्तो ऽन्यश्चापूर्वो ऽपूर्वार्थक्रियाकर्ता E

मुत्पद्यत इति न क्रमेणानुभूयमानाया अर्थक्रियायाः कदाचिदनुपपत्तिरिति
24 न दोषः। ततश्चात्मनो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्तृलक्षणत्वमेव विनाशित्वे प्रमाणमिति
विनश्वर आत्मेति सिद्धम्।

[३.११.५.२ क्षणिकत्वं प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां बाधितम्]

27 तदेतदयुक्ततरम्, स्वात्मनो ग्राहकस्य स्थिरत्वेनैव संवेदनात्। न तस्मिंश्च
क्षणिके स्वभावनिवृत्त्यादिलक्षणविचारस्य चात्र सम्भव इत्यपि, अयुक्त-
मेव। न च भ्रान्तिघटितात् स्थैर्याद् भविष्यतीति वाच्यम्, स्वसंवित्तौ
30 भ्रमाभावात्। ततश्च ग्राहकस्थैर्यावभासो विचारदर्शनान्यथानुपपत्तिलक्षणे-
न चैक्यानुमानेन ससंवादो ऽर्थक्रियानुपपत्तिघटितस्य क्षणिकत्वस्य बाधकं
प्रमाणम्।

33 [३.११.५.३ सहकारिसन्निधावेव कार्योत्पत्तिः]

ननु स्थिरस्यार्थक्रिया नोपपद्यत इत्युक्तम्। तदप्ययुक्तम्, तस्य ह्येकस्वभा-
वत्वे ऽपि, विशिष्टसहकारिसन्निधौ कार्यकरणैकस्वभावत्वात् तत्सन्निधान
36 एव करोति, न प्राक्, तत्सन्निधानाभावादिति न क्रमेण कार्यानुपपत्तिः।

46.22–23 समुत्पद्यत इति न] Σ; समुत्पद्यमान M_2 46.23 °भूयमानाया अर्थक्रिया-
याः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_2E$; °भूयमानाया अर्त्थक्रियाः P_2; °भू×तिक्षणिकत्वम्× य ×भू×
माना अर्त्थक्रियायाः P_3; °भूयमानायार्थक्रियायाः M_1 46.23 कदाचिदनुपप°]
$M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; कदाचिदनुत्प° A_1; कदाचिदुत्प° M_2 46.24 °र्थक्रियाकर्तृलक्षणत्व-
मेव] $M^{\gamma}P_2$; °र्त्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वलक्षणमेव A_1; °पि अर्त्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वलक्षणत्वमेव P_1M_2;
°प्यर्थक्रियाकर्तृलक्षणत्वमेव P_3; °पि अर्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वमेव M_1; °प्यर्थक्रियालक्षणत्वमेव
E 46.25 विनश्वर आत्मेति सिद्धम्] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1^{pc}E$; विनश्वर आत्मेति सिद्धः M^{γ};
विनश्वर +आत्मा+ इति सिद्धम् M_1; विनश्यतु आत्मेति सिद्धम् M_2 46.27 तदेत-
दयुक्ततरम्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1E_D$; तदेतदयुक्तम् P_2E_V; तदेत ⊔ क्ततरं M_2 46.27 न
तस्मिंश्च] $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; न च तस्मिंश्च $M^{\gamma}P_1E$; तस्मिंश्च M_1 46.28 °दिलक्षण°]
conj.; °देः क्षण° Σ 46.28 °विचारस्य चात्र सम्भव] $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; °विचारस्य
चात्रासम्भव $M^{\gamma}M_1$; °वि≍≍स्य चात्रासम्भव P_1; °विचारस्य चागसम्भव M_2^{ac}; °वि-
चारस्याप्यत्रासंभव E 46.28–29 °पि, अयुक्तमेव] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °प्यम् युक्तमेव
A_1; °पि युक्तमेव M_1 46.29 °घटितात्] Σ; °घूतात् M_2 46.30 ततश्च ग्राहक-
स्थैर्यावभासो] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3E$; ततश्च ग्राहकस्य स्थैर्यावभासो P_1; ततश्च ग्राहकस्थैर्य्याभावो
P_2; ततश्चाग्राह+क+स्य स्थैर्याभासो M_1; ततश्च ⊔ क धैर्यावभासो M_2 46.31 चैक्या-
नुमानेन ससंवादो] $A_1P_1P_3M_1$; चैक्यानुमानेन संवादो M^{γ}; चैक्यानुमानेन ≍ संवादो
P_2; चैत्यानुमानेन स संवादो M_2; चैक्यानुमानेन स्वसंवादो E 46.34–35 ह्येकस्व-
भावत्वे ऽपि] A_1E_V; ह्यैकस्वभावत्वे ऽपि $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1E_D$; ह्येकस्व+क्रि+भावत्वे P_1;
ह्येकस्वभाव ⊔ M_2 46.35 °स्वभावत्वात्] Σ; °स्वभाव° M_2

[३.११.५.४ कार्यजननसामर्थ्यकोटित्रयम्]

अथ कुसूलस्थस्य बीजस्य क्षित्यादिसहकारिसन्निधावङ्कुरजनकस्वभावस्य सामर्थ्ये, सत्यसति वा सहकारिणि तज्जननम्। असामर्थ्ये वा सहकारिसंनिधाने ऽप्यसामर्थ्यम्, एकस्वभावत्वात्। सहकारिभ्यः सामर्थ्यलाभे वा पूर्वमसमर्थः पश्चात्समर्थ इति स्वभावभेदाद् भेद एव तस्येति नैकता। 39

[३.११.५.५ समर्थेनापि सहकारिसन्निधान एव कार्यजननम्] 42

अत्रोच्यते—समर्थो ऽप्यसौ तत्सन्निधान एव कार्यं करोति, तथास्वभावत्वान्नान्यदा। ननु समर्थश्चेत् किमिति सन्निधानमपेक्षते? तथास्वभावत्वादित्युक्तम्। स्वहेतुभ्यः स्वभावाद्वा स तथाभूतस्वभाव एव भावो भवति, 45 यः समर्थो ऽपि तथाविधसहकारिसन्निधौ कार्यं करोति, नान्यदेत्यत्रान्वयव्यतिरेकावेव स्थिरवस्तुविषयौ प्रमाणम्। न च स्वभावा भावानां पर्यनुयोगमर्हन्ति। न हि किमर्थं वह्निर्दहति न जलमित्यत्र पर्यनुयोगः शक्यते 48

46.41 नैकता] ⊔ M_2

46.45 तथास्वभावत्वादित्युक्तम् See 46.35 and 46.43–44.

46.38 अथ] Σ; *om.* M_1 46.38 कुसूलस्थस्य] M_1^{pc}; कुलत्थस्य M^Y; कुलस्थस्य $A_1P_1P_3$; कुलस्थस्तस्य P_2; कुस्थूलस्थस्य M_1^{ac}; कूलस्थस्य M_2; कुलुत्थस्य E_D; कुशूलस्थस्य E_V 46.39 सामर्थ्ये, सत्यसति वा सहकारिणि] *conj.*; सामर्थ्ये सत्यसति वा तज्जननं सामर्थ्ये सत्यसति च सहकारिणि $M^YP_2P_3E$; सामर्त्थ्ये सत्यसति वा तज्जननम् ⊔ सहकारिणी A_1; सामर्त्थ्ये ⌣सत्यसति च वा तज्जननं साम— सत्यसति सहकारिणि P_1; सामर्थ्ये सत्यस्ति वा तज्जननीं सामर्थ्ये सत्यसति च सहकारिणि M_1; साम ⊔ सति जननम्। सहकारिणि M_2 46.39 तज्जननम्। असामर्थ्ये] $M^YA_1P_1P_2P_3M_1$; तज्जननम्। अस्मिन्नर्थे M_2; तज्जननसामर्थ्ये E 46.39–40 वा सहकारिसंनिधाने] $M^YA_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; व सहकारे सन्निधाने P_2; वा सहकारिसन्निधौ कार्यकरणैकस्वभावत्वात् तत्सन्निधाने E(eyeskip) 46.40 °सामर्थ्यम्, एक°] Σ; °सामर्त्थ्य एक° P_2 46.41 वा पूर्वमसमर्थः] $M^YP_1P_3M_1E$; वा पूर्वमसामर्थ्यः A_1M_2; व पूर्वमसमर्त्थः P_2 46.43 समर्थो] $M^YA_1^sP_2^{pc}P_3M_1M_2E$; समर्त्थौ A_1^{ac}; सामर्त्थ्यो P_1; सामर्त्थो P_2^{ac} 46.43 °धान एव] $M^YA_1P_1P_3M_1E$; °धान ⌣ एव P_2; °धान M_2 46.44 नान्यदा] $M^YA_1P_3M_1E$; नन्यदा P_1; नान्यथा P_2M_2 46.45 स्वहेतुभ्यः] *conj.*; स्वहेतुभिः M^YM_2E; स्वहेतुभि $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1$ 43.46 करोति] Σ; करोती M_1 46.46 नान्यदे°] $M^YP_1P_3M_1M_2E$; तान्यदे° A_1; ना⌣दे° P_2 46.47 स्थिरवस्तुविषयौ] $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2$; स्थिरवस्तुविषये P_1; स्थितस्थिरवस्तुविषयौ P_2; स्थिरवस्तुनि विषये E 46.48 न जलमित्यत्र] $M^YA_1P_1M_1M_2E$; न जलमित्र P_2; जलमित्यत्र P_3

कर्तुम्। अथ सहकार्यसन्निधौ जनकाद्भिन्नस्तस्य स्वभावो जननाभावादेवेत्युच्यते। न, तदापि, सहकारिसन्निधौ कार्यकरणैकस्वभावत्वात्। तत्सन्निधौ
51 तु स एवेति न भेदः। न ह्यस्मात् स्वभावात् कालत्रये ऽपि प्रच्यवते भावः। सहकार्यसन्निधानात्तु न तदा तत्कार्योद्भव इति तत्सन्निध्यसन्निधी परं भिद्येते, न तु वस्तुभेदः।

54 [३.११.५.६ किं विरुद्धस्वभावत्वं सहकारिणः?]

ननु सहकारिगतौ सन्निध्यसन्निधी तर्हि सहकारिणो भेदं कुरुतः, विरुद्धस्वभावत्वात्। न तत्रापि विरोधः, तस्यापि सन्निधापकस्वसहकारिणि
57 सन्निधिस्वभावत्वात् तस्याप्यन्यसहकारिसन्निधाविति नानियमः, स्वभावनियमितत्वाद् भावानां वैचित्र्यस्येति। सहकारिणामपि क्षित्यादीनां बीजादिकारणसन्निधौ तत्कार्यकरणत्वे ऽसौ तत्सदृश एव स्वभावः, येन त-
60 त्सन्निधान एव कार्यं कुर्वन्ति नान्यदा, इति सर्वेषां तत्कारकत्वस्वभावः परस्परसन्निधानापेक्ष इति सर्वे कारकाः सहकारिपदवाच्या नैकैकः। न च

46.49 सहकार्यसन्निधौ] *conj.* (cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, p. 81); सहकारिसन्निधौ Σ 46.49 स्वभावो] Σ; स्वभावे M^{Y} 46.49 जनना°] Σ; जननं P_2 46.50 न, तदापि] *conj.* (cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, p. 81); तदापि Σ 46.50 °सन्निधौ] M_1; °सन्निधि° Σ 46.50–51 तत्सन्निधौ तु] Σ; सन्निधौ ⊔ M_2 46.51 भेदः] Σ; भेदः (ननु यदि सहकारिगतौ सन्नि×द्ध×द्धसन्निधी त≍सहकारिणो भेद) P_2 46.51 स्वभावात्] $M^{Y}A_1P_1^{ac}P_2P_3^{pc}M_1M_2E$; स्वाभावात् P_1^{pc}; स्वभाव×त्वा× त् P_3 46.52 न तदा तत्°] Σ; न्न +न(?)+तता +तत्+ P_1 46.52 °सन्निधी] Σ; °सन्निधि M_1 46.53 भिद्येते] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; भिद्यते $M^{Y}P_1M_1$ 46.53 न तु वस्तुभेदः] Σ; न वस्तुतो भेदः M_1 46.55 ननु] $M^{Y}M_1M_2^{ac}$; ननु यदि $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2^{pc}E$ 46.55 सहकारिगतौ] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; सहकारिगदौ A_1M_2 46.55 भेदं] Σ; भेदः। P_2 46.56 °स्वभावत्वात्] Σ; ⊔ वत्वात् M_1 46.56 सन्निधापकस्व°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2$; सन्निधा≍कस्व° P_2; सन्निधापकः तस्य E_D; सन्निधायकः। तस्य E_V 46.56 °कारिणि] Σ; °कारिणी A_1 46.57 तस्याप्यन्य°] Σ; तस्याप्यन्यस्य P_3 46.58 °नियमितत्वाद्] $M^{Y}A_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_1M_2$; °नियमत्वाद् P_1E; °नि+य+मितत्वात् P_2 46.58 भावानां] Σ; भाव· ⊔ नां M_1 46.59 तत्कार्यकरणत्वे ऽसौ] *conj. Isaacson*; तत्कार्यकरणस्त्वसौ $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; तत्कार्य्यकरणत्वमसौ P_2P_3 46.60 कुर्वन्ति नान्यदा, इति] M_1; कुर्वह्निनान्यदेति M^{Y}; कुर्वन्नान्यदेति $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; कुर्वन्—न्न्यदेति P_1 46.60 सर्वेषां तत्कारकत्वस्वभावः] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; सर्वेषाम् तत्कारकत्वस्वभावा P_1; सर्वेषा ⊔ कारकत्वस्वभावः M_1 46.61 °सन्निधानापेक्ष] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3^{pc}M_1M_2E$; °सन्निधानपेक्ष P_2; °सन्निध× ौतत्× ानापेक्ष P_3 46.61 नैकैकः] $M^{Y}P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_1M_2E_D$; नेकैकः A_1; नैकै+क+ः P_2; नैवैकः E_V

तेषां स्वभावभेदः। सर्वेषां च सामर्थ्ये ऽपि न कार्यानेकत्वप्रसङ्गः, परस्परसन्निधौ तदेककार्यनिर्वर्तनस्वभावत्वात्। 63

[३.११.५.७ अनेककार्यकर्तृत्वम्]

एवं च नानाभूतार्थक्रियाकरणे ऽपि। नानाभूततत्तत्सहकारिसन्निधौ नानाभूतानेककार्यकर्त्रेकस्वभावत्वात् क्रमेण नानाभूतार्थक्रियाकरणे ऽपि न स्वभाव- 66
भेदः। यथैकस्यैव चैत्रस्य लवनपचनभोजनाद्यनेककार्यकर्तुश्च तत्तद्द्रात्रादिसहकारिसन्निधौ तत्तल्लवनादिकार्यकर्तृस्वभावत्वात् क्रमेण लवनादिभावे ऽपि न स्वभावभेदः, तथाभूतस्वभावस्य तत्राक्रमेणैव भावात्। प्रदीपस्य ह्येकस्यैव वर्तिदाहतैलक्षपणस्वज्ञापनाद्यनेककार्यनिर्वर्तकैकस्वभावो ऽभ्युपगतो भवद्भिः, न तु कार्यभेदेन स्वभावभेदः, एकस्यैव विशिष्टस्वभावस्यानेककार्यनिर्वर्तनविरोधाभावात्। तद्वदत्राभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। तत्तत्सहकारिसन्निधौ 69 72

46.62 सामर्थ्ये ऽपि न कार्यानेकत्वप्रसङ्गः] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_2$; सामत्थ्येंपि न काय्योंनेकत्वप्रसंगः P_2; *om.* P_3; सामर्थ्येपि ⊔ र्यानेकत्वप्रसंगः M_1; सामर्थ्ये ऽपि न कार्यनेकप्रसङ्गः E 46.63 °धौ तदेककार्यनिर्वर्तन°] P_3; °धौ च तदेककार्यनिर्वर्तन° $M^{Y}P_1$; °धौ चैतदेककार्यनिवर्तन° A_1M_2; °धौ तदेककार्य्य ⊻ ⊻र्त्तन° P_2; °धौ च तदेककार्यनिवर्तन° M_1E 46.65 एवं च] Σ; क्रमेण E 46.65 °क्रियाकरणे] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2$E; °क्रियाकारणे P_2P_3 46.65 °भूततत्तत्सहकारि°] $A_1P_1^{pc}P_2^{pc}P_3M_2$; °भूततत्सहकारि° $M^{Y}M_1$E; °भूततत्तत् $P_1^{ac}P_2^{ac}$ 46.66 °कर्त्रेकस्वभावत्वात्] $A_1M_2^{pc}$; °कर्तृत्वस्वभावात् $M^{Y}M_1$; °कर्त्रेकत्व(प्रसंगः। नानाभूतानेककार्य्यकर्त्रेकत्व)स्वभावात् P_1; °कर्त्रेकत्वस्वभावात् P_2; °कर्त्रेकत्वस्वभावत्वात् P_3E; °कर्तृकस्वभावत्वात् M_2^{ac} 46.66 क्रमेण नानाभूतार्थक्रियाकरणे] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_2$E; क्रमेण तु नानाभूतार्थक्रियाकरणे P_2P_3; क्रम ⊔ भूतार्थक्रियाकरणे M_1 46.67 चैत्रस्य] Σ; वैचित्र्यस्य P_1 46.68 तत्तल्लवनादिकार्यकर्तृत्वस्वभावत्वात्] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$; तत्तल्लवनादिकार्यकर्तृत्वस्वभावत्वात् M^{Y}; तत्तल्लवनादि ⊔ कर्तृत्वस्वभावत्वात् M_1; तल्लवनादिकार्यकर्तृस्वभावत्वात् E 46.68 लवनादिभावे] Σ; लवनादिभेदे E 46.69 न स्वभावभेदः] $M^{Y}P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_1M_2$E; न स्वभावाभेदः A_1; +न+ स्वभावभेदः P_2 46.69 °स्वभावस्य] Σ; °स्वकार्य्यस्य P_1 46.69 तत्राक्रमेणैव] *conj.*; तत्र क्रमेणैव Σ 46.59–70 प्रदीपस्य ह्येकस्यैव] Σ; प्रदीपस्येकस्यैव P_3 46.70 वर्तिदाह°] $M^{Y}M_1$; वर्तिदहन° $A_1P_2P_3M_2$E; वर्तिताह° P_1 46.70 °द्यनेककार्यनिर्वर्तकैक°] $M^{Y}P_1P_3$E; °द्यनेककार्य्यनिर्वर्त्तनैक° A_1M_2; °द्यनेक×तैल×काक्ष×स्वभावस्यानेक°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1^{pc}P_3M_1M_2$E; °स्वभावस्य×⊻×नेक° P_1; °स्वभावस्या⊻नेक° P_2 46.72 °निर्वर्तन°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2$E; °निवर्त्तन° P_2P_3 46.72 तद्वदत्राभ्युपगन्तव्यम्] $M^{Y}P_2P_3^{pc}M_2^{ac}$E; तद्वदत्राप्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् A_1M_2; तद्वतत्राभ्युपगन्तव्यः P_1; तद्वदत्रा+भ्यु+पगन्तव्यम् P_3; तद्वदत्रा ⊔ व(प M_1^{ac})गन्तव्यम् M_1

तत्तदनेककार्यकरणस्वभावावियोगात् सर्वदैव स्थिरस्यापि भावस्य, सहकारिसन्निधानस्य पूर्ववत् क्रमिकत्वात्, क्रमेणानेककार्यनिर्वर्तने ऽपि न भेदः,
75 स्वभावाभेदादिति स्थिरस्यार्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वं क्रमेण युज्यत इति नार्थक्रियासम्भवाभावस्यात्र बाधकत्वम्, तस्याः स्थिरेष्वेव भावेषु सम्भवात्। यथा च क्षणिकस्यार्थक्रिया न सम्भवति, तथा विवेचितमस्माभिरागमविवेक इति
78 तत एवावगन्तव्यम्।

[३.११.६ भावानां स्थैर्यं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम्]

तत्र बाधकाभावात् स्थैर्यं भावानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमबाधितमेव। तत्र येषां हेतुः
81 प्रमाणेन सिद्धः, ते विनश्वराः, तदन्ये त्वविनश्वरा एवेत्यात्मनो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वे ऽप्यविनाशः सिद्धः, हेत्वभावात्। एतेन ज्ञत्वविरोधो ऽप्यात्मनः प्रत्युक्तः, तत्तद्विषयसन्निधौ तत्तद्ग्राहकैकस्वभावत्वेन पूर्ववत् स्वभावभेदाभा-

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46.74 पूर्ववत् See annotation to the translation.

46.83 पूर्ववत् See 46.43–78.

46.73 °कार्यकरणस्वभावा°] $A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; °कार्यकरणैकस्वभावा° M^Y; °कारणस्वभाव° P_2; °काऱ्यकारणस्वभावा° P_3 46.74 पूर्ववत् क्रमिकत्वात्] $M^YP_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1E$; पूर्ववक्रत्वात् A_1; पूर्ववत् क्रमेकत्वात् P_1^{ac}; पूर्ववत् एकत्वात् M_2 46.74 °निर्वर्तने] $M^YA_1P_1M_1M_2E$; °निवर्त्तने P_2P_3 46.74–75 न भेदः, स्वभावाभेदादिति] $A_1^{ac}P_3M_2$; न भेदस्वभावाभेदादिति M^YM_1; न भेदः स्वभेदाभेदादिति A_1^{pc}; भेदस्वभावाभेदात् इति P_1; न भेदः। स्वभावभेदादिति P_2; न भेदस्वभावो भेदादिति E 46.75 स्थिरस्यार्थक्रियाकर्तृत्वं क्रमेण] $P_1P_2P_3E$; स्थिरस्यार्थक्रमेण M^Y; स्थिरस्या ⊔ A_1; स्थिरस्य क्रियार्थक्रमेण M_1; स्थिरस्य ⊔ M_2 46.75–76 नार्थक्रियासम्भवाभावस्यात्र] $M^YA_1P_1^{pc}P_3M_2$; ना ≍क्रियासंभवो भावस्यात्र P_2; नार्थक्रियासंभवाभावस्यात्र न $P_1^{ac}M_1$; नार्थक्रियासम्भवस्यात्र E 46.76 बाधकत्वम्] $M^YA_1P_1M_1M_2E$; बाधकन् P_2P_3 46.76 तस्याः स्थिरेष्वेव भावेषु सम्भवात्] P_1; तस्या स्थिरेष्ववभावेषु सम्भवात् M^Y; तस्या स्थिरेषु भावेषु सम्भवात् $A_1M_2E_D$; तस्या स्थिरेष्वभावेष्वसंभवात् P_2P_3; तस्या स्थिरेष्वेवागमेषु सम्भवात् M_1; तस्याः स्थिरेषु भावेषु सम्भवात् E_V 46.80 तत्र येषां] Σ; तत्रैषां E 46.80 हेतुः] Σ; हेतु° P_1 46.81 विनश्व°] $M^YA_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_2E$; विनस्व° P_1; +वि+नश्व° P_2; अविनश्व° M_1 46.81 एवेत्यात्मनो] Σ; एवेत्यात्मभ्यो M_2 46.82 °नाशः] Σ; °नाश M_1 46.82 हेत्वभावात्] $P_1P_2M_1E$; हेत्वाभावात् M^Y; हेतुत्वभावात् A_1M_2; हेत्वभात् P_3; हेतुत्वाभावात् E_D^{vl} 46.83 प्रत्युक्तः] $P_1P_2P_3$; प्रागुक्तस् $M^YM_1M_2E$; प्र—क्तः A_1 46.83 तत्तद्विषय°] $M^{Yc}A_1^sP_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; तत्तद्विष×यो× य° M^Y; त+त्त+विषय° A_1

वात्। घटग्रहणात् पूर्वं तु तत्स्वभावाभावभ्रान्तधियां स्वभावभेदेन तद्विरो- 84
धभ्रमो भवेदित्येवं निरस्तः।

ततश्च ग्राहकस्याविनाशित्वाद् ग्राह्यस्य च वस्तुतो भावान्न मुक्तौ त- 87
योर्विनाशः, अपि तु सर्वज्ञत्वमेव युक्तम्, आवृतिस्वभावानां मलकर्ममा-
याख्यानामविद्यादीनां तदानीं निवृत्तत्वादनावृतस्य ग्राहकस्यावस्थितेः।

यदाहुः—

प्रभास्वरमिदं चित्तं प्रकृत्यागन्तवो मलाः। 90
तेषामभावे सर्वार्थं तज्ज्योतिरविनश्वरम्॥ इति॥ ४६॥

[३.१२ ज्ञानकर्तृत्वनाशः]

एवं सर्वनाशपक्षमाभास्येदानीं ज्ञानकर्तृत्वनाशपक्षं तिरस्कर्तुमाह— 93

46.87 भावान्न मुक्तौ तयोर्वि°] भावा—र्वि° A_1 46.88 °त्वादनावृतस्य ग्राहकस्याव-
स्थितेः] °त्वाद—वस्थितेः A_1 46.93 एवं सर्वनाशपक्षमाभास्येदानीं] ए—क्षमाभास्ये-
दानीं A_1; एवम् सर्व≍शपक्षमाभास्येदानीम् P_1; एवं सर्वनाशप ⊔ स्येदानीं P_3

46.90 –91 प्रभास्वरमिदं चित्तं ⋯ तज्ज्योतिरविनश्वरम् The first half-line is *Pramāṇa-vārttika* 2:208cd, the following half-line of which reads: तत्प्रागप्यसमर्थानां पश्चाच्छक्तिः क्व तन्मये।

46.83–84 स्वभावभेदाभावात्] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1$; भावाभेदाभावात् A_1; भावभेदाभावाद् P_1
M_2E 46.84 घटग्रहणात्] Σ; घटादिग्रहणात् P_2 46.84 तत्स्वभावाभावभ्रान्तधियां]
conj.; तत्स्वभावाभावभ्रांतधिया स्वभावाभावभ्रांतधियां M^{Y}; तत्स्वभावाभाव— A_1; त-
त्स्वभावभावान्तभ्र+म+धिया P_1; तत्स्वभावाभावभ्रान्तधिया $P_2P_3M_2$; तत्स्वभावाङ्भ्रान्त-
धियां M_1; तत्स्वभावभ्रान्तधिया E 46.86 ग्राह्यस्य च] $M_1A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; ग्राह्य च —
M^{Y}; ग्राह्य च P_1 46.86 वस्तुतो भावान्न] M_1; वस्तुनो भावान्न $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$;
वस्तुनो भावा— A_1 46.87 सर्वज्ञत्वमेव युक्तम्] $M^{Y}P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; स्सर्वज्ञत्वमेव युक्तम्
A_1; सर्वज्ञत्वयुक्तम् P_3 46.87 आवृतिस्व°] Σ; आवृतस्व° P_1 46.87–88 °मा-
याख्यानामविद्यादीनां] E; °मायाविद्यादीनां M^{Y}; °मायानामविद्यादीनां $A_1P_3M_1M_2$;
.°मायानां विद्यादीनान् P_1P_2 46.88 तदानीं] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E_V$; तदानीं च M^{Y}; त-
दींना E_D 46.88 निवृत्तत्वा°] Σ; निज्ञानकर्तृत्व≍त्तत्वा° P_2 46.88 °वस्थितेः]
Σ; °वस्थिते P_1 46.90 चित्तं प्रकृत्यागन्तवो] $M^{Y}P_1M_1M_2E$; चित्वं प्रकृत्यागन्तवो
A_1P_2; चि प्रकृत्यागन्तव्यो P_3(unmetrical) 46.93 तिरस्कर्तुमाह] Σ; निरसितुमाह
E

न च ज्ञानक्रियानाशः सर्वागमविरोधतः।

'न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्मन्तुर्मतेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते' इति श्रुत्यागमनिरस्तो ऽयं मुक्तौ ज्ञानक्रियानभ्युपगमपक्षः। न च सर्वागमविरुद्धं वस्त्वभ्युपगन्तुमुचितम्। यदाहुः—

एकस्य प्रतिभानं तु कृतकान्न विशिष्यते। इति।

अथ सन्तमप्यर्थं मलान्न पश्यतीति युक्तिबलेन तद्विरुद्धमपि वस्त्वभ्युपगम्यत इति, तत्राह—

सदीशे युक्तिबाधा च तयोर्नित्यत्वदर्शनात्॥ ४७॥

संश्चासौ प्रमाणसिद्धत्वादीश्वरश्च, तस्मिन् ज्ञानक्रिययोर्नित्यत्वदर्शनाद्युक्त्या-

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47 ab.] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; न च ज्ञानक्रियानाशः सर्वागमविरोधत इति M^{Y}; न च —क्रियानाशः सर्वागमविरोधतः P^{S}_{3}; न च ज्ञानक्रियानाशं सर्वागमविरोधततः P^{S}_{4}(unmetrical); न च ज्ञानक्रियानाश इति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ (E gives 47cd here immediately after 47ab) 47 cd.] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}M_1E^{1}$; सदीशे युक्तिबाधा च तयोर्नित्यत्वदर्शनादिति M^{Y}; सदीच्छे युक्तिबाधा च तयोर्नित्यत्वदर्शनात् $P^{S}_{3}M^{S}_{3}$; सवी(?)दीशे युक्तिबाधा च तयोर्नित्यत्वदर्शनात् P^{S}_{4}(unmetrical); सदीश इति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E^{2}$ (E gives 47cd after 47ab above in this accepted reading)

47.1 °लोपो विद्यते] —त A_1 47.2 सर्वागम°] सर्वा° P_2

47.1 न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्मन्तुर्मतेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते This is a blend of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.3.23 and 28. Also quoted in this form ad *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 1:64.

47.4 एकस्य प्रतिभानं तु कृतकान्न विशिष्यते *Ślokavārttika codanāsūtra* 150cd. Also quoted ad *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 1:64.

47.1 °र्मन्तुर्मतेर्वि°] Σ; °र्मतेर्वि° P_3 47.1–2 मुक्तौ ज्ञानक्रियानभ्युपगम°] M^{Y} $A^{c}_{1}P_2P_3M_2E$; मुक्तौ ज्ञानक्रियानभ्युप×भ्यु×+गम+ A_1; मुक्तावज्ञानक्रियाभ्युपगम° P_1 M_1 47.2 °विरुद्धं वस्त्व°] Σ; °वृद्धमवस्त्व° P_1 47.4 कृतकान्न] Σ; कृतत्वान् न P_1 47.5 सन्तमप्यर्थं] Σ; समन्तमप्यर्त्थन् A_1 47.5 मलान्न] M^{Y}; निर्मला न $A_1M_1M_2E$; निर्मल— P_1; अमला न P_2P_3 47.5 पश्यतीति] $M^{Y}P_1M_1$; मुक्तियुक्तिबलेन $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; मुक्तौ युक्तिबलेन E 47.5 तद्विरुद्धमपि] Σ; तद्विद्धमपि P_3 47.5–6 °पगम्यत इति] Σ; °पगम्य P_1 47.6 तत्राह] $M^{Y}M_1M_2E$; तत्राप्याह $A_1P_1P_2P_3$ 47.7 संश्चासौ] $P_1M_1M^{pc}_{2}$; स चासौ M^{Y}; सश्चासौ $A_1M^{ac}_{2}$; ⊔ श्चासौ P_3; सच्चासौ E 47.7 °श्वरश्च तस्मिन्] $M^{Y}A_1M_2E$; °शश्च तस्मिं $P_1P_2P_3$; °श्वरश्च तस्य M^{pc}_{1}; °श्वरश्चासौ तस्य M^{ac}_{1}

नुमानेन बाधास्य पक्षस्य। अयमर्थः—पदार्थसंग्रहवादिना तावदीश्वरस्य द्रव्यपदार्थ एव, तत्रापि चात्मपदार्थ एव संग्रहो वाच्यः, नान्यत्र, अत्यन्तविलक्षणत्वेन तदयोगात्। तदनन्तर्भावे हि तस्य पदार्थान्तरत्वं द्रव्यान्तरत्वं वा भवेदिति पदार्थानां षट्संख्या द्रव्याणां नवसंख्येत्यभ्युपगमविरोधः। अस्तु तदन्तर्भावः, किमतः? अतश्च विमत्यधिकरणभावापन्ना मुक्तात्मानः सर्वज्ञाः सर्वकर्तारश्च, आत्मत्वे सति धर्माधर्मशून्यत्वादीश्वरवदिति युक्त्यापि ज्ञानक्रियानाशपक्षः प्रतिक्षिप्तः। धर्माधर्मशून्यत्वं हि सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वाभ्यां व्याप्तमीश्वरे सिद्धं सत्, आत्मनां भवत् तद्रूपतां तदा प्रतिपादयतीत्येवं सर्व एवेश्वरसमा मुक्ता भवन्तीति न मुक्तौ ज्ञानकर्तृत्वनाशो युक्त इति॥ ४७॥

[३.१३ परस्यां प्रकृतौ लयः]

इदानीम् 'अव्याकृतादिषु' इत्यादिना पूर्वोद्दिष्टान् पक्षान् प्रतिक्षिपति—

[३.१३.१ लीनानां पुनरावर्तनम्]

उपादानेषु लीनानां पुनरावर्तनं

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48 ab. उपादानेषु लीनानां पुनरावर्तनं] $M_1P_1^sP_3^sM_3^sE$; उपादानेषु लीनानां पुनरावर्तनं यत इति M^Y; उपादानेषु— M_M^Y; उपादाने विलीनानां पुनरावर्तनं P_4^s; उपादानेषु लीनानामित्यादिना $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ (M_1E give 48abcd here all together)

47.10 अत्यन्त°] — P_1

47.18 अव्याकृतादिषु *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 2c.

47.7–8 °त्यत्वदर्शनाद्युक्त्यानुमानेन] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; °त्यत्वदर्शनाद्युक्तानुमानेन M^Y; —त्यानुमानेन P_1; °त्यवदर्शनादुक्तानुमानेन E 47.8 बाधास्य] Σ; बाधस्या M_2 47.9 चात्मपदार्थ एव] $M^YA_1P_1M_1M_2E$; चात्मपदार्थ एवं P_2P_3 47.9 वाच्यः, नान्य°] Σ; वाच्यरोर° P_2 47.11 द्रव्याणां] M^Y; द्रव्याणां वा Σ 47.11 °पगमविरोधः] Σ; —गम्यविरोधो P_1 47.12 °करणभावापन्ना] E; °करणाभावापन्ना $M^YA_1P_3M_1M_2$; °विकरणाभावापन्ना P_1; °कारणाभावापन्ना P_2 47.12 मुक्तात्मानः] $M^YP_1P_2P_3E$; मुक्तात्मनः $A_1M_1M_2$ 47.14 °त्वसर्वकर्तृत्वाभ्यां] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °सर्वकर्तृत्वाभ्यां M^Y; °त्वं सर्वकर्तृ ~त्वाभ्याम् P_1 47.15 व्याप्तम्] Σ; व्याप्यम् P_2 47.15 सत्, आत्मनां] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_1E$; सदात्मना A_1M_2 47.15 तद्रूपतां] Σ; तत्तद्रूपतां E 47.16 भवन्तीति] $M^YA_1P_1M_1M_2E$; भवन्ति P_2; भवन्ती P_3 47.16 ज्ञानकर्तृत्वनाशो] $M^YA_1P_1M_1M_2$; नाशो P_2; ज्ञानकर्तुश्च नाशो P_3; ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वनाशो E 47.18 इदानीम् 'अव्या°] P_3M_1E; तदानीमव्या° M^Y; इदानीं व्या° A_1M_2; इदानीमव्याकृमव्या° P_1; इदानिमव्या° P_2

भवतु जीवात्मनां कार्यत्वेन तदा तत्र परस्मिन्नकार्यात्मनि महाविभूत्यभिधाने घटादीनामिव मृदि लयो मोक्षः, किन्तु तस्मात् स्थानात्पुनः प्रलयोत्तरं सर्गारम्भ आवर्तनं परावृत्तिः। संसारप्राप्तिस्तेषां भवेदित्यर्थः। हेतुमाह—

यतः।

कारणस्याधिकारे ते विपर्यस्ता लयं गताः॥ ४८॥

कारणस्याधिकारः पुनः कार्यात्मना परावृत्तियोग्यता, परिणतिधर्मत्वादेव तेन रूपेण तस्याधिक्रियमाणत्वात्। तस्मिंस्तथाभूते यतो लीनास्ततः पुनरमुक्तजीववत् परावृत्तौ परिवर्तन्त इति व्यर्थो ऽत्र मुक्त्यर्थः प्रयासस्तल्लयवादिनामिति।

[३.१३.१.१ बद्धजीवत्वेनैव परावर्तते]

स्यादेतत्। यद्यपि प्रलये तत्र सर्व एव जीवात्मानो बद्धा अबद्धाश्च लीनाः, तथापि प्रतिसर्गमविद्यादिवासनायुक्तेन बद्धजीवात्मरूपेणैवासौ परावर्तते, न

48bcd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}$; यत इति $A_iP_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$ (but the readings of M_1E are reported here from above, where this unit is given in a block with the rest of 48ab) 48c. कारणस्याधिकारे ते] $P^{S}_{1}M_1$; कारणेनाधिकारे ते M^{Y}; करण ⊔ धिकारे ते M^{Y}_{M}; कारणस्याधिका ते P^{S}_{3}(unmetrical); कारणास्याधिकारे ते P^{S}_{4}; ⊔ रणस्याधिकारे ते M^{S}_{3}; यत्कारणाधिकारे ऽति° E 48d. गताः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_1M^{S}_{3}E$; गता इति M^{Y}; गतः P^{S}_{1}

48.2 °नामिव मृदि] $M^{Y\,c}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °नामृदि $M^{Y\,ac}$; °नामिव भूति° A_1M_2 48.3 हेतुमाह] Σ; *om.* M_2 48.5 कारणस्याधिकारः] Σ; कारणाधिकारः P_3 48.5 पुनः] Σ; *om.* M_2 48.5 °योग्यता] Σ; °योग्यतां P_3 48.6 तस्याधि°] Σ; तस्याथ P_2 48.6 °भूते यतो] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3E$; °भूते य× ते?× तो P_1; °भूते य एते M_1; °भूतः यतो M_2 48.7 पुनरमुक्तजीववत्] M^{Y}; पुनरपि मुक्ता जीववत् $A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; पुनरपि मुक्ता जिवत् P_2; पुनरपि अमुक्तजीववत् M_1 48.7 व्यर्थो] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; वृथा M^{Pc}_{2}; वृत्ते M^{ac}_{2} 48.7 मुक्त्यर्थः] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; मुक्त्यर्थ A_1M_2 48.10 स्यादेतत्] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; स्यादेततद् A_1; स्यादेतत्तद् P_1 48.10 प्रलये] $M^{Y}A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; प्रळये ते P_1; ब्रूये M_1 48.10 जीवात्मानो] $M^{Y\,c}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; जीवात्मनो $M^{Y\,ac}M_1$; जीवात्म--- P_2 48.10 बद्धा अबद्धाश्च] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2M_1E$; ⊔ द्धा अबद्धाश्च P_3; बद्धात् बद्धाश्च M_2 48.11 °युक्तेन बद्ध°] $M^{Y}P_1M_1E$; °युक्तेनाबद्धन° A_1; °युक्तेन बद्धो P_2P_3; °युक्तेनाबध्नन° M_2 48.11 °रूपेणैवासौ] $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °रूपेणासौ M^{Y}; °रूपेणैवास--- P_2 48.11 परावर्तते] $M^{Y}P_1M_1$; पुनरावर्तते A_1M_2; बद्धः परावर्तते P_2P_3E

त्वबद्धेन, परावृत्तिहेतोरविद्यादेस्तत्राभावादिति। तदयुक्तं, तस्यामवस्थायां 12
विभागाभावात्। अविभागावस्थैव कारणत्वम्। तत्रापि बद्धाबद्धयोर्विभागे,
विभागस्याविभागपूर्वकत्वात् तत्प्रकृत्यनुमानं स्फुटमेवेति। ततो न परत्वं
तस्याः प्रकृतेः, तत्प्रकृत्यन्तरसद्भावात्। प्रकृत्यन्तरे चाक्षेपप्रतिसमाधाने 15
पूर्वोक्ते एवेत्यनवस्था, न त्वविभागरूपता।

[३.१३.२ आत्मनाशः]

अविभागरूपत्वे ऽपि परमकारणस्य प्रागपि तथाभूतस्यैव च स्वरूपापरिमि- 18
तत्वेन भावाज्जीवात्मलये ऽपि तस्याधिक्यासम्भवात्, तत्र च जीवात्मनो
ऽनुपलम्भनात्—यदि परं स जीवात्मा प्रागुपलब्धो ऽर्थक्रियाकर्ता स्वरू-
पेणानुपलभ्यमानो ध्वस्त एव भवेदिति—आत्मनाश एव मुक्तौ प्रसक्तः। 21
अयमपरो ऽस्य दोषो ऽस्ति। यद्वक्ष्यति—

मूढानां ज्येष्ठमल्लास्ते येषां स्वात्मा विनश्यति। इति।

48.23 मूढानां ज्येष्ठमल्लास्ते येषां स्वात्मा विनश्यति *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 57ab.

48.12 परावृत्तिहेतो°] Σ; पुनरावृत्तिहेतो° P_2^{ac} 48.12 तत्राभा°] Σ; तत्रभा° P_1 48.12 तस्यामवस्थायां] Σ; तस्यामस्यामवस्थायां M^Y 48.13 °भागावस्थैव] Σ; °भावस्थैव A_1 48.14 °पूर्वकत्वात्] $M^Y P_1^{pc} P_2 P_3 M_1 E$; °पूर्वत्वात् $A_1^c M_2$; °पूर्व× ⌣×+त्व+ात् A_1; °पूर्वकत्वा × ⌣ ⌣× त् P_1 48.14 तत्प्रकृत्यनुमानं स्फुटमेवेति] $M^Y A_1 P_1 P_2 P_3 E$; तत्प्रकृत्यनुमानस्फुटमेवेति M_1; तत्प्रकृत्यनुमानं मामेवेति M_2 48.14 ततो न] Σ; ततो न तु P_2 48.15 °सद्भावात्] Σ; °संभवात् M_1 48.16 पूर्वोक्ते] $M^Y A_1 P_1 M_1 M_2 E$; पूर्वोक्तै P_2; प्र ⊔ P_3 48.16 एवेत्यनवस्था न त्वविभागरूपता। अविभागरूपत्वे] P_1; एवेति अनवस्था न विभागरूपता। अविभागरूपत्वे M^Y; एवेत्यनवस्था न त्वविभागरूप +ाविभाग-रूप+ त्वे A_1; वेत्यनवस्था न त्वविभागरूपा अविभागरूपत्वे P_2; ⊔ वेत्यावस्था न त्वविभागरूपा। अविभागरूपत्वे P_3; एवेत्यनवस्था न त्व ⊔ भागरूपत्वे M_1; एवेत्यनवस्था, न त्वविभागरूपा। अविभागरूपत्वे M_2; एवेत्यनवस्थानात्त्वविभागरूपा, अविभागरूपत्वे E 48.18–19 स्वरूपापरिमितत्वेन] Σ; स्वरूपस्यापरिमितत्वेन M_1 48.19 भावाज्जीवात्म°] $M^Y P_1 P_2 M_1 M_2 E$; भावाज्जीवान्म° A_1; सम्भावात् जीवात्म° P_3 48.19 तस्याधिक्यासम्भवात्] $M^Y P_2 P_3 M_1 E$; तस्याधिक्यसंभवात् $A_1 M_2$; तस्याधिक्यासम्भात् P_1 48.20 °नुपलम्भनात्] $M^Y A P_3 M_1 M_2 E$; °पलंभनात् P_1; °नुपलंभात् P_2 48.21 ध्वस्त एव] $M^Y A_1 P_1 P_2 P_3 E$; ध्वस्त M_1; ध्वंस्त एव M_2 48.21 भवेदिति—आत्मनाश] Σ; भवेदित्यनाश M^Y 48.22 °स्य दोषो ऽस्ति। यद्वक्ष्यति] M^Y; °स्य दोषोस्ति वक्ष्यति A_1; °स्य दोषो ऽस्तीति वक्ष्यति $P_1 P_3 E$; ⌣दोषोस्तीति वक्ष्यति P_2; ऽस्य दोषो स ⊔ M_1; ऽस्य दोषोस्ति। वक्ष्यति M_2

24 न त्वेतावता प्रोक्तदोषासम्भवो ऽत्र।

[३.१३.३ विरुद्धकार्ययोरेकोपादानत्वं नास्ति]

स्यादेतत्। किं कुर्मः?

27 प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रसङ्गः केन वार्यते।

इत्याशङ्क्याह— विपर्यस्ता इति। न प्रमाणवदेतत्, अपि तु विपर्यासो मिथ्याज्ञानमत्र वः। तथा हि—नैकस्माद् बोधरूपाद्उपादानकारणाच्चेतना-
30 चेतनविरुद्धकार्यद्वयोत्पत्तिर्युज्यते, विरुद्धयोरेकोपादानत्वायोगाद् भावाभावयोरिव। किं च प्रत्ययाप्रत्ययान्वयित्वात् तद्विकाराणां, परमकारणमपि चेतनाचेतनात्मकं स्यात्, न चैतन्मातुर्वन्ध्यात्वमिव ब्रह्मणापि शक्यमव-
33 स्थापयितुम्। अथ कश्चिद्गागस्तस्य चेतनः कश्चिन्नेति। उच्यते—यद्येवं, सभागत्वेन घटवत् कार्यत्वसिद्धौ पूर्वोक्तदोषतादवस्थ्यम्।

48.32 स्यात्] --- P_1 48.34 °सिद्धौ] --- P_1

48.27 प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रसङ्गः केन वार्यते *Ślokavārttika, śūnyavāda* 195cd (editions read प्रवाहः केन वार्यते).

48.24 न त्वेतावता प्रोक्तदोषा°] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E_V$; नन्वेतावता प्रोक्तदोष°. P_2; नन्वेतावता प्रोक्तदोषा° E_D 48.26 किं कुर्मः] $M^{Y}P_1M_1E$; किम्। किं कुर्म्मः A_1; किं किं कुर्मः $P_2P_3M_2$ 48.28 इत्याशङ्क्याह] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2$; इत्याह P_2E; ⊔ त्याशंक्याह M_1 48.28 विपर्यस्ता इति] Σ; विपर्यस्ता लयं गता इति M^{Y} 48.28 प्रमाणवदेतत्] $M^{Y}M_1$; प्रमाणवदेव तत् $A_1P_1P_2M_2E$; प्रमाणव× ताप्रोक्तदोषा× देव तत P_3 48.29 वः] Σ; मलः E 48.29–30 °पादानकारणाच्चेतनाचे°] $M^{Y}A_1^{ac}P_1P_3E$; °पादानकारणाच्चे° A_1^{ac}(eyeskip); °पाधानकारणाच्चेतनाचे° P_2M_2; °पादानकारणाच्चेतनाचे° M_1 48.30 °विरुद्ध°] Σ; × र्ᵕᵕम् ᵕ× प्ररु(?)द्ध° P_1 48.30 °द्वयोत्पत्तिर्युज्यते] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; °द्वये—पत्तिर्य्युज्यते P_2; °द्वयोत्प ⊔ M_1 48.30 विरुद्धयोरेको°] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3E$; विरुद्धरेकोधारेको° A_1M_2; ⊔ रुद्धयोरेको° M_1 48.31 किं च] Σ; किं तु M_1 48.31 प्रत्ययाप्रत्ययान्वयित्वात्] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_2E$; प्रत्य—प्रत्ययान्वियित्वा P_2; प्रत्ययाप्रत्ययान्वि P_3; प्रत्ययान्वयित्वात् M_1(eyeskip) 48.31 तद्विकाराणां] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; तद्विकारणां A_1P_2 48.32 चैतन्मातुर्वन्ध्यात्वमिव] $M^{Y}P_1P_3E$; चैतन्ममातुर्वन्ध्यात्वामिव A_1; चैतमात्म ᵕतु वन्ध्यात्वमिव P_2; चैतन्मा ⊔ त्वमिव M_1; चैतं मातुर्वन्ध्यात्वमिव M_2 48.33 कश्चिद्गागस्तस्य] P_1P_3E; कथंचिद्गागस्तस्य $M^{Y}P_2$; कप्रायश्चित्तभागस्तस्य A_1; कश्चिद्गागस्थस्य M_1; कः प्रायश्चिद्गागस्तस्य M_2 48.34 पूर्वोक्तदोषतादवस्थ्यम्] E; *om.* $M^{Y}P_1$(eyeskip); तत्कारणं पराकृतिस्सिद्धतीति पूर्वोक्तदोषस्य तादवस्थ्यम् A_1M_2; तत्कारणं परा प्रकृतिस्सिद्धतीति पूर्वोक्तदोषस्य तावदवस्थ्यं P_2; तत्कारणं परा प्रकृतिस्सिद्धतीति पूर्वोक्तदोषस्य तादवस्थ्यम् P_3; तत्कारणं पराकृतिस्सिध्यतीति पूर्वोक्तदोषतादवस्थ्यम् M_1

[३.१३.४ जीवात्मनां न कार्यत्वम्]

किं च जीवात्मनां कार्यत्वसिद्धौ तत्कारणं परा प्रकृतिः सिध्यतीति। तेषां च चेतनत्वान्न कार्यत्वम्।

[३.१३.५ आत्मनां न समन्वयः]

यच्चोक्तं समन्वयात् कार्यत्वमिति, तदप्ययुक्तम्, असिद्धत्वादात्मनां समन्वयस्य।

[३.१३.५.१ आत्मा न स्वात्मन एव ग्राह्यः]

समन्वयो हि ग्राह्यस्य कर्मतामापन्नस्य ग्रहीतुं युज्यते। न चात्मा स्वात्मन एव ग्राह्यो भवति, तत्र तस्य व्यापारविरोधात्। स हि ग्राहकत्वेन प्रत्यग्रूपतया सर्वदा प्रतिभासत इत्युक्तं प्राक्॥

स्यादेतत्। ग्राह्यसमन्वयो ग्राह्यतामापन्नस्यैव गृह्यते। यस्तु ग्राहकसमन्वयो ग्राहकरूपेणैव तस्मिन्नात्मनि भासमाने भासत इति।

[३.१३.५.२ नात्मस्वभावग्राहकस्वसंवेदनेन ग्राहकान्तरसंवेदनम्]

तदयुक्ततरम्, ग्राहकान्वयो ह्यनेकग्राहकप्रकाशपूर्वकः। न चैकैकात्मस्वभा-

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48.44 प्रत्यग्रूपतया] प्रं--पतया P_1 48.44 प्राक्] ⊔ M_1 48.43–44 स हि ग्राहकत्वेन प्रत्यग्रूपतया सर्वदा प्रतिभासत इत्युक्तं प्राक्] See sections 3.10.3.2 and 3.10.5.

48.36 किं च जीवात्मनां कार्यत्वसिद्धौ] P_3E; *om.* $M^\gamma P_1$(eyeskip); किञ्च जीवानां कार्यत्वसिद्धौ A_1M_2; किञ्च जीवात्मानां कार्य्यत्वसिद्धौ P_2; ⊔ नां कार्यत्वसिद्धौ M_1 48.36 तत्कारणं] Σ; तत्कारण॰ P_1 48.36 प्रकृतिः] $M^\gamma A_1P_1P_3M_2E_V$; कृतिस् P_2; प्रकृति M_1 48.36 सिध्यतीति] $M^\gamma P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; सिद्धति A_1P_3 48.36–37 तेषां च चेतनत्वान्न कार्यत्वम्] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; *om.* M^γ(eyeskip); तेषां चेतनत्वान्न कार्यत्वमिति प्रागुक्तम् M_1 48.39 यच्चोक्तं समन्वयात् कार्यत्वमिति] $A_1M_1M_2$; *om.* M^γ(eyeskip); यच्चोक्तमन्वयात् कार्यत्वमिति P_2P_3E 48.39 तदप्ययुक्तम्, असिद्धत्वादात्मनां] $M^\gamma A_1P_3M_2$; तदप्ययुक्तमसिद्धत्वादात्मना P_1; तदप्ययुक्तं सिद्धत्वादात्मनां P_2E_V; तदप्ययुक्तम् असिद्धत्वा ⊔ां M_1; तदयप्युक्त सिद्धत्वादात्मनां E_D 48.42 ग्राह्यस्य] $M^\gamma P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; ग्राह्य॰ A_1M_2 48.42–43 चात्मा स्वात्मन] $M^\gamma P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; चात्मा स्वात्मान A_1; चात्म स्वात्मन P_2 48.43 तत्र तस्य] $M^\gamma P_3E$; तत्रा ⊔ स्य A_1; तत्रास्य $P_1M_1M_2$; तत्र तस्या P_2 48.44 सर्वदा] Σ; सदा P_2 48.45 ग्राह्यतामापन्नस्यैव] $A_1P_1^{pc}$; ग्राह्यापन्नस्यैव $M^\gamma M_1E$; ग्राह्यताम् +ा+पन्न×म×स्यैव P_1; ग्राह्यतापन्नस्यैव P_2P_3; ग्राह्यतामपन्नस्यैव M_2 48.46–48 इति। तदयुक्ततरम्] $M^{\gamma c}A_1P_1P_2M_1M_2$; इ × त्युक्तं× ति तदयुक्ततरं M^γ; इत्युक्तम् तदयुक्ततरम् P_3; इति। तदुत्तरं E 48.48 °पूर्वकः] Σ; °पूर्वके M^γ 48.48 चैकैकात्म॰] $M^\gamma P_2P_3M_1$; चैत्रकैकात्म॰ P_1; चैत्रकैका॰ M_2; चैकात्म॰ E

वग्राहकस्वसंवेदने ग्राहकान्तरसंवेदनमस्ति, तस्य ततो ऽन्यत्वेन घटादिवत्परत्वात्। न ह्यात्मानः स्वसंवेदनमात्राः परस्परं संकीर्यन्ते, सर्वस्य
51 सर्वज्ञताप्रसङ्गाद्, इति प्रत्येकं स्वात्मसंवेदने कस्य कुत्रान्वयः?

[३.१३.५.३ सर्व आत्मानः सर्वज्ञग्राह्याः?]

यद्येवम्, सर्व एवात्मानः सर्वज्ञस्य ग्राह्यत्वमनतिक्रान्ताः, तत्स एव तेषु
54 ग्राह्येष्वन्वयं ग्रहीष्यतीति। तदयुक्तं, सर्वज्ञात्मनैव व्यभिचारात्। सो ऽपि हि स्वसंवेदनेन परात्मभ्यो भेदेनैतद्ग्रहीतृतया भासते यतः। न चागृहीतस्यान्वयः सम्भवतीत्युक्तम्।

57 न च तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वाद्विपरीतग्रहणमुपपद्यते। तद्, यथा तेनात्मान्तरेभ्यः स्वात्मात्यन्तानन्वितरूपो ऽसम्भवद्भ्रमेण स्वानुभवेन गृहीतः, तथैव

48.53 ग्राह्यत्वमनतिक्रान्ताः] ग्राह्य---न्तास् A_1 48.55–62 भासते यतः ⋯ भासनात् स्वात्मवत्] भासनात् स्वात्मवत् P_1^{pc}. Half of the missing text (up to परस्परं) has then been squeezed in between two lines in P_1^{pc}). 48.57–58 तेनात्मान्तरेभ्यः] — A_1

48.51 Testimonium in Jñānaprakāśa's *Pauṣkaravṛtti*, IFP T. 110, pp. 857–8: भगवान् रामकण्ठश्चाब्रवीत्। स्वात्मसंवेदने कस्य कुत्रान्वय इति।

48.56 –57 न चागृहीतस्यान्वयः सम्भवतीत्युक्तम् See 48.42.

48.50 ह्यात्मानः स्वसंवेदन°] $M^{Y}A_1P_2M_2$; ह्यात्मान स्वसंवेदन° P_1; ह्यात्मन स्वसंवेदन° P_3; ह्यात्माना स्वसंवेदन° M_1; ह्यात्मानः स्वयं वेदन° E 48.50 परस्परं संकीर्यन्ते] $M^{Y}P_2P_3$; पर---र्य्यन्ते A_1; परस्परं ⊔ न्त M_1; परस्परं कीर्यन्ते P_1M_2 E_D; परस्परं कीर्त्यन्ते E_V 48.50–51 सर्वस्य सर्वज्ञता°] Σ; सर्वज्ञत्वस्य सर्वदा E 48.51 °संवेदने] Σ; °सवेदने E_V 48.53–54 तत्स एव तेषु ग्राह्येष्वन्वयं] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; तत् स एव तेषु ग्राह्येष्वन्वय A_1; तत्सर्व एव तेष्वग्राह्येष्वन्वयं E 48.54 ग्रहीष्यतीति] P_2; ग्रहिष्यतीति $M^{Y}P_3$; ग्रहिष्यन्तीति A_1; गृहीष्यतीति P_1M_1; ग्रहीष्यन्तीति M_2E 48.54 सर्वज्ञात्मनैव] Σ; सर्वज्ञात्मनै ⊔ M_2 48.55 परात्मभ्यो] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; परा--- A_1; परमात्मभ्यो E 48.55 भेदेनैव तद्गृहीतृतया] $M^{Y}P_2P_3E$; भेदेनैव तद्गृहीतृतया M_1; ---नेतत् ग्रहीद्रतया A_1; भेदेनैतत् गृहीतृतया P_1M_2 48.55 यतः] $M^{Y}A_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1M_2$; यः E_D; *om.* E_V 48.57 तस्य] $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; तस्याः M^{Y}; --- P_1^{pc}; तस्या M_1 48.58 स्वात्मात्यन्तानन्वितरूपो] $A_1P_2P_3E$; स्वात्मात्यन्तान्वितरूपो $M^{Y}M_2$; स्वत्मात्य⊻नन्वितरूपो P_1^{pc}; स्वात्मात्यन्तानन्वितरूपे M_1 48.58 °सम्भवद्भ्रमेण] P_3; °संभवात् भ्रमेण $A_1P_1^{pc}E$; °संभवात्। भ्रमेण P_2; °सम्भवाभ्रमेण $M^{Y}M_2$; °संभवात् दभ्रमेण M_1 48.58 गृहीतः] Σ; गृहीतास् M_1

परात्मानः परस्परं भिन्नाः समन्वयविषयभावमतिक्रम्य वर्तमानास्तेन साक्षात्क्रियन्त इत्यदोषः। 60

[३.१३.५.४ समन्वयो नानुमेयः]

अत एव नानुमेयः, अनुमातुरनुमातृतया वैसादृश्येन भासनात् स्वात्मवत् परात्मनामप्यत्यन्तविसदृशतयैवानुमानात्। 63

[३.१३.५.५ न सत्तान्वयात् सत्त्वम्]

यद्येवमसन् आत्मा, अश्वविषाणवत् सत्तयानन्वितत्वादिति। नेह सत्तान्वयात् सत्त्वमात्मनाम्, अपि तु स्वरूपसत्त्वात् सत्तावत् परमकारणवद्वा। 66 तस्यापि हि न सत्तायोगात् सत्त्वं भवद्भिरेष्टव्यम्, कार्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्। किं तु स्वरूपसत्त्वमेवेति नाश्वविषाणतुल्यता।

[३.१३.५.६ समन्वयाभावे पदप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः प्रसज्यते] 69

कथं तस्यान्वयाभावे सर्वेषामनात्मनामात्मनां च सदित्येकपदप्रवृत्तिः? आ-

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48.62–63 स्वात्मवत् परा°] — A_1 48.66 सत्त्वमात्मनाम्] स—नाम् A_1

48.59 परात्मानः] A_1P_3; परात्मनः $M^{\gamma}M_2$; परमा— P_1^{pc}; प ≍त्मनः P_2; परमात्मनः M_1E 48.59 भिन्नाः] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; भिन्न° P_2 48.59 °विषयभावमतिक्रम्य] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °विषया— A_1 48.59 वर्तमानास्तेन] $M^{\gamma}M_1M_2E$; —र्त्तमानास्तेन A_1; वर्त्तमानास्ते P_2; वर्तमानास्तेनस्तेन P_3 48.60 क्रियन्त] $A_1M_1M_2E$; क्रियत $M^{\gamma}P_3$; क्रि(?)यान्त P_2 48.62 °मेयः, अनुमातुरनुमातृतया] $M^{\gamma}A_1M_1M_2$; °मेयोनुमाता अनुमातृतया P_2P_3; °मेयः, न मातुरनुमातृतया E 48.62 °दृश्येन भासनात्] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_2E$; °दृश्येनाभासनात् A_1; नात् P_1(eyeskip); °दृश्येन भासमानात् M_1 48.63 °प्यत्यन्तविस°] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3$; °पीत्यन्तविस° A_1E; °पीत्यन्तविश° P_1; °पीत्यत्यन्तविस° M_1; °पीत्य+त्य+न्तविस° M_2 48.63 °तयैवानुमानात्] Σ; °तयैवा+न+नुमानात् M_1 48.65 यद्येवम°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E_D$; यद्येव° P_2; यद्यैवम° E_V 48.65 सत्तयानन्वितत्वादिति] $P_1P_3^{pc}M_1M_2E$; सत्तानन्वितत्वादिति $M^{\gamma}P_3^{ac}$; सत्तयानान्वितत्वादिति A_1; सत्तयानन्वितत्वादि P_2 48.65 नेह] Σ; चेन्नेह M_1 48.65–66 सत्तान्वयात्] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3E$; सत्वान्वयात् A_1M_2; सत्तान्वयादिति M_1 48.66 स्वरूपसत्त्वात्] Σ; स्वरूपसत्त्वाद्देव M_1 48.67 हि न] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_1E$; न P_2P_3; भिन्न° M_2 48.67 सत्तायोगात्] Σ; सत्वायोगात् P_2 48.67 भवद्भिरेष्टव्यम्] Σ; भवत्भियेष्टव्यं A_1 48.67 किं तु] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; ≍न्तु A_1; अपि तु E 48.68 स्वरूपसत्वमेवेति] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; स्वरूपं सत्त्वमेवेति $M^{\gamma}E$; स्वरूप≍त्वमेवेति P_1 48.68 °विषाणतुल्यता] $A_1P_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1M_2E_V$; °विषाणातुल्यता M^{γ}; °विषाण× ≍×तुल्यता P_1 48.70 सर्वेषामनात्मनामात्मनां च] M^{γ}; सर्वेषामनात्मनां च $A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; सर्वेषामात्मनाञ्च P_1P_2

त्मपदप्रवृत्तिरपि चात्मनां कथम्? सापि विचार्यतामिति चेत्, तर्हि सत्ता-
72 न्वयप्रदर्शने को ग्रहो युक्तिविदग्धस्य। न चैकान्वयनिबन्धनैव सर्वत्रैकपदप्रवृ-
त्तिः, अक्षादिशब्दानामनेकरूपात्मके ऽप्यभिधेये प्रयोगदृष्टेः, पाचकादिश-
ब्दानां योगबलेन प्रवृत्तेरित्येवमत्रापि सम्भवाददोषः। यद्वात्रोक्त वदन्वयास-
75 म्भवे ऽप्यात्मनां सादृश्यनिबन्धनैवैकपदप्रवृत्तिः, घटानामिव घटशब्दस्य।
तथासन्निवेशविशेषात्मनो घटशब्दवाच्यत्वात्तस्य घटान्तरे ऽप्यविशेषात्।

[३.१३.५.६.१ घटानां घटत्वेनान्वयः?]

78 नन्वस्ति सर्वघटानां घटत्वेनान्वयः। यद्येवं घटत्वादुत्पत्तिस्तदन्वयाद्घटानां
प्रसज्यते। न च घटानां घटत्वादुत्पत्तिः, अपि तु मृदः।

[३.१३.५.६.२ समन्वयसादृश्ययोर्व्यत्यासः]

81 तस्मादन्यत् सादृश्यम्, अन्यो ऽन्वयः। सादृश्यं हि सामान्यमिहोच्यते।

48.76 °च्यत्वात्तस्य] °च्यत्व---स्य P_2 48.76 °प्यविशेषात्] —न् P_2

48.74 यद्वात्रोक्तवद् See 48.39–63.

48.70–71 सदित्येकपदप्रवृत्तिः? अत्मपदप्रवृत्तिरपि] $A_1P_3M_1M_2$; सदित्येकपदप्रवृत्तिः आत्मपद ⌣ ⌣ ⌣ ⌣ M^Y; सदित्येकपदप्र× ाप्ति× वृत्तिरात्मपदप्राप्तिरपि P_1; सदित्येकपदप्रवृत्तिरात्मपदप्र⌣ ⌣पि P_2; सदित्येकपदव्यक्तिरात्मपदप्राप्तिः। अपि E 48.71 चात्मनां] Σ; चात्मान+ा+ P_1 48.71 सापि विचार्यतामिति] Σ; सपि विचार्यस्तामिति M_1 48.71–72 सत्तान्वयप्रदर्शने] $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; सत्तान्वयप्रदने M^Y; सक्तान्वयवदप्रदर्शने P_1; सत्तान्वयादने M_1; सत्तान्यवप्रदाने E 48.72 को ग्रहो] Σ; केष्वेको गृहो M_1 48.72 युक्तिविदग्धस्य] Σ; युक्तिर्विदग्धस्य E 48.72 चैकान्वयनिबन्धनैव] M^Y $A_1P_3M_2E$; चैकान्वयनिबन्धनैव क स ⊔ P_1; चैकात्वयनिबन्धनैव P_2; चैकान्वय×स्य× +नि+बाधनैव M_1 48.73 अक्षादिशब्दानामनेकरूपात्मके] M^Y; वृक्षादिशब्दानामनेकरूपात्मके $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; अक्षादिशब्दानामनेकरूपान्विते M_1 48.73 °प्यभिधेये] Σ; °प्य+भि+धिये P_1 48.74 प्रवृत्ते°] M_1; प्रवृत्ति° Σ 48.74 यद्वात्रोक्त°] M^Y; यद्वा, उक्त° Σ 48.75 °निबन्धनैवैकपदप्रवृत्तिः] M^YA_1E; °निबन्धनैवैकपदवृत्ति P_1; °निबन्धनै×क×वैकपदप्रवृत्ति P_2; °निबन्धनैवैकपदप्रवृत्ति P_3M_2; °निबाधनैविकपदप्रवृत्तिः M_1 48.75 घटशब्दस्य] M^YP_1E; घटस्य $A_1P_2P_3M_1$; घटं M_2 48.76 तथासन्निवेशविशेषात्मनो] $M^YA_1P_1P_2P_3E$; त ⊔ न्निवेशाविशेषात्मनो M_1; यथा सन्निवेशविशेषात्मनो M_2 48.78 सर्वघटानां] $M^YA_1P_1^{r\circ}P_2P_3M_1M_2$; घटानां $P_1^{r\circ}E$ 48.78 यद्येवं] Σ; यद्येव M_1 48.79 न च घटानां] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; तेन च घटानां M^Y; न च घटा--- P_1; तेन च घटानां न E 48.79 मृदः] Σ; मृतस् A_1 48.81 °न्वयः] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °न्वयं A_1M_2

तदेकपदाभिलप्यत्वे हेतुः—यथायमपि घटो ऽयमप्ययमपीति। तच्च न तदवयवे भवति, यन्न कण्ठे बुध्ने वा घटबुद्धिः। नापि तत्कार्ये कर्परादौ तद्दृष्टं, कर्पराणां वैसादृश्येनैव बुद्धिविषयत्वात्। या त्वर्थस्य कार्ये प्रत्यवयवं चा- 84
न्यत्र विसदृशतरे ऽपि वस्तुनि तेनैव रूपेण सर्वत्रैवानुवृत्तिः, सो ऽन्वय उच्यते। स एव चैककारणत्वकल्पने प्रभवति, तथादृष्टत्वात्। घटशरावादिषु हि विसदृशतरेष्वपि, तदवयवेषु च कण्ठादिषु तत्कार्येषु च कर्परादिषु 87
सर्वत्र मृदन्वयदृष्टेर्मृत्कार्यत्वाविनाभावसिद्धिरिति भेदः सादृश्यसमन्वययोः। तदत्रान्वयाभावे ऽपि सादृश्यनिबन्धनैवैकपदप्रवृत्तिर्घटत इत्यदोषः। अत एव तत्र वृत्तिकार आह 'शिवश्चात्मनः समानजातीयः' इति। सादृश्यमेव 90
चेतनानामिह जातिरिति।

48.82–83 न तदवयवे] ⊔ वयवे M_1 48.87 °दिषु हि] °दि—हि P_2; °दि— P_3 48.89 °प्रवृत्ति°] — P_1 48.89 इत्यदोषः] इति अ ⊔ षः M_1

48.90 शिवश्चात्मनः समानजातीयः Sadyojyotiḥ's *vṛtti* on *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 1:2, p. 5, line 4.

48.82 °भिलप्यत्वे] M^{γ}; °भिलभ्यत्वे Σ 48.82 °यमप्ययमपीति] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1^{pc}M_1M_2$; °यमपीति $P_1^{ac}P_3E$; °प्ययमपीति P_2 48.83 कण्ठे बुध्ने वा घटबुद्धिः] P_2P_3E; कंठे बुद्धे वा न घटबुद्धिः M^{γ}; कण्ठे बुध्ने +न+ नाटबुद्धिः A_1; कण्ठे बुद्ध्ने न वा घटबुद्धिः P_1; कण्ठे बुद्धे न वा घटबुद्धिः M_1; कर्णे बुद्धेन नाबुद्धिः M_2 48.83 कर्परादौ तद्दृष्टं] $M^{\gamma}A_1^cP_1P_2P_3M_1E$; कल्पादौ तद्दृष्टं A_1^{ac}; कार्पादौ तद्दृष्टौ M_2 48.84 कर्पराणां] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_3M_1E$; कार्पराणां P_1M_2 48.84 °व बुद्धिविषयत्वात्] *conj. Isaacson*; °व घटविषयत्वात् $M^{\gamma}A_1M_1M_2E$; °व घटाविषयत्वात् P_1; °व घटाविषय(यं P_2^{ac}) त्व— P_2; °वं घटाविषयत्वात् P_3 48.84 या त्वर्थस्य] *conj. Sanderson*; यस्य त्वर्थस्य Σ 48.84 कार्ये] Σ; काय E_V (damaged type?) 48.84–85 °वं चान्यत्र विसदृशतरे] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_2$; °वपान्यत्र विसदृशतरे A_1; °वं चान्यत्रान्यविसदृशतरे M_1; °वं च सिद्धसदृशतरे E 48.85 तेनैव] $P_1^{pc}M_1$; तैनैव M^{γ}; येनैव $A_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_2$; हे(?)नैव P_1^{ac}; यैनैव P_2^{ac}; तेन E 48.85 सर्वत्रैवानुवृत्तिः] Σ; सर्वत्रौनुवृत्तिः $M^{\gamma ac}$ 48.86 प्रभवति] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1$; भवति A_1M_2E 48.87 कण्ठादिषु तत्कार्येषु च] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1M_2E$; *om.* A_1; कण्ठादितत्कार्य्येषु P_2P_3 48.87 कर्परादिषु] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; कल्पनादिषु A_1M_2 48.89 तदत्रान्वयाभावे] $M^{\gamma}A_1M_1M_2E_D$; तदत्राान्वयाभावे P_1; तत्रान्वयाभाव P_2; तत्रान्वयाभावे P_3; तदन्यत्रान्वयाभावे E_V 48.89–90 अत एव] Σ; अत एव हि M^{γ} 48.90 शिवश्चात्मनः समानजातीयः] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; शिवश्चात्मानः समानजातीया M^{γ}; शिवश्चात्मानस्समानजीतीय M_1 48.91 जातिरिति] Σ; स्थितिः इति E

[३.१३.५.७ समन्वयवद् सादृश्यमप्यग्राह्यम्?]

93 ननु सादृश्यमप्यग्राह्यात्मनो ऽस्य नैव ग्रहीतुं शक्यम्? सत्यम्, आत्मपदाभिधेयत्वादिवददूरविप्रकर्षेण व्यवहारार्थं वैसादृश्यपरिहारमात्रेण कथंचिदत्रोपचर्यते, न वस्तुतः। यदाहुः 'नेति नेत्यात्मगतिः'। इति सर्वमनवद्यम्।

96 [३.१३.६ जीवानां चेतनोपादाने ऽपि पुनः परावृत्तिदोषः]

इत्थं चेतनोपादानात्मकपरमकारणसम्भवे ऽपि मुक्तिं तत्प्राप्तिरूपां प्रति पुनः परावृत्तिदोष उक्तः।

99 [३.१४ प्रधानाहंकारादिलयः]

अनेनैवान्ये ऽपि प्रधानाहंकारादिलयवादिनः पूर्वोद्दिष्टाः प्रतिक्षिप्ताः 'उपादानेषु लीनानां पुनरावर्तनं यतः' इति॥

102 [३.१५ विलयः परमात्मनि]

इदानीं 'विलयः परमात्मनि' इति पक्षं प्रतिक्षिपति।

[३.१५.१ लीनानां परावृत्तिः]

48.95–97 वस्तुतः। यदाहुः ⋯ चेतनोपादान°] वस्तु ⊔ चेतनोपादान° M_1 48.97 तत्प्राप्तिरूपां] After this word, A_1's testimony breaks off, for folios 204–5 are missing.

48.103 विलयः परमात्मनि *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 2b.

48.93 सादृश्यमप्यग्राह्यात्मनो] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; दृश्यमप्य ⊔ नो M_1; सादृश्यमप्यग्राह्या आत्मनो M_2 48.93 ग्रहीतुं] $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2E_V$; गृहीतुं $M^{\gamma}M_1E_D$ 48.94 °धेयत्वादिवददूरविप्रकर्षेण] $A_1P_1^{pc}P_3M_1$; °धेयत्वादिवद्दूरं विप्रकर्षेण M^{γ}; °धेयत्वादि×द्द×वददूरविप्रकर्षेण P_1; °धेयत्वादिवर्द्दूरविप्रकर्षेण P_2; °धेयत्वाभिदिवद्दूरविप्रकर्षेण M_2; °धेयत्वददूरविप्रकर्षेण E 48.94 °हारमात्रेण] *conj.*; °चारमात्रेण $A_1P_2P_3M_2$ E; °वारमात्रेण $M^{\gamma}P_1$; °कारमात्रेण M_1 48.95 नेति नेत्यात्मगतिः] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3E_V$; नेति नेति ह्यात्मगतिर् A_1P_2; नेनेति ह्यात्मगतिर् M_2; नेति नेतीत्यात्मगतिर् E_D 48.97 °पि मुक्तिं] Σ; विमुक्तिं M_1 48.97–98 पुनः परावृत्तिदोष] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1^{pc}$; पुनःपुनरावृत्तिदोष P_3M_2E; ⌣ ⌣पुनरावृत्तिदो⌣ P_2; पुनः× पुरुष× +परा+वृत्तिदोषः M_1 48.100 अनेनैवान्ये] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; ⊔ न्ये M_1 48.100 प्रधानाहं°] *conj.*; प्राणाहं° $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1M_2E$; प्राणांह° P_2P_3 48.103 परमात्मनि' इति पक्षं] $M^{\gamma}P_3M_2E$; परमात्मनीति प्रतिक्षिप्तम् P_1; ⌣ ⌣मात्मनीति पक्षं P_2; परमात्म ⊔ पक्षः +म+ M_1

उपादानत्वसंसिद्धिर्वेदान्ते परमात्मनः।
उपादाने प्रलीनस्य ध्रुवं प्राग्वन्निवर्तनम्॥ ४९॥

समस्तजगदुपादानकारणत्वं परमात्मनो वेदान्तागमेषु प्रसिद्धमेव। तस्मिन्नुपादाने लीनानां प्रविष्टानामपि प्राग्वदवश्यं तत्स्वभावान्निवृत्तिः पुनः परावृत्तिरित्यर्थः। 3

[३.१५.१.१ ब्रह्मणो नोपादानकारणत्वम्]

ननु पूर्वोपन्यस्तवेदान्तदृशास्य समस्तस्य भेदात्मनो जगतो ऽविद्याविलसितत्वेनासत्यतया कार्यत्वासम्भवेन, कथं ब्रह्मणस्तदुपादानकारणत्वमत्र दोषहेतुत्वेन गृह्यते ? इति। 6

[३.१५.२ कथमसत्यता जगतः?]

उच्यते—कथमसत्यता तस्य जगतः? किंलक्षणं वा सत्यमुच्यते? 9

[३.१५.२.१ अबोधरूपत्वात्]

अत्राहुः—बोधरूपत्वमेव सत्यलक्षणम्। तदभावाद्घटादेरसत्यता, बोध्यास्ते न बोधात्मका यत इति। यदाहुः— 12

49abcd.] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$; उपादानत्वसंसिद्धिर्वेदान्ते परमात्मन इति M^{γ}; उपादानत्वसंसिद्धिरिति $P_1P_2P_3$; उपादानत्वं संसिद्धिरिति M_2 (M_1E give cd here immediately after 49ab) 49a. उपादानत्व°] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$; उपादान ⊔ ा° M^{γ}_{M}; उपादनत्व° P^{s}_{1}; उपादानत्वं M_2 49c. उपादाने] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; उपादान° M^{s}_{3} 49d. ध्रुवं प्राग्वन्निवर्तनम्] $P^{s}_{1}M_1E$; ध्रवं प्राग्वन्निवर्तनं M^{γ}_{M}; द्धुवं प्रा ⊔ न्निवर्त्तनम् P^{s}_{3}; द्धुवं प्राग्वन्निवर्त्तनं P^{s}_{4}; ध्रुवं प्रासन्निवर्तनम् M^{s}_{3}

49.5 ननु पूर्वो°] न—र्वो° P_1 49.6 °कारणत्वमत्र] °कारण— P_1 49.9 सत्यमुच्यते] स ⊔ मुच्यते P_3 49.11 तदभावाद्घटा°] तदभा— घटा° P_1; तदभावा—टा° P_2

49.1 °त्वं परमात्मनो] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; °त्वमात्मनो P_2 49.2 लीनानां प्रविष्टानामपि] *conj.*; लीनानामुपविष्टानामपि $M^{\gamma}P_3M_2E$; लीनानामवशिष्टानामपि P_1; लीनानामुपविष्ट—ामपि P_2; लीनानामप्रविष्टानामपि M_1 49.2–3 परावृत्तिरित्यर्थः] $M^{\gamma}P_1P^{pc}_{2}P_3M_2E$; पारावृत्तिरित्यर्थः P^{pc}_{2}; परावृत्यर्थः M_1 49.5–6 °विद्याविलसित°] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; विलसित° P_3 49.9 कथमसत्यता] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; कथम् सत्यता P_1 49.11–12 बोध्यास्ते न बोधात्मका] $M^{\gamma c}P_1P_2P_3M_1$; ×बे× बोध्यास्ते न वोधात्मका M^{γ}; बोध्यास्तेन वोधकात्मका M_2; वोधास्ते न बोद्धात्मिका E_D; बोधास्ते न वोद्धात्मका E_V

परेण वेदनं यस्य न संविद्यत एव तत्॥ इति।

[३.१५.२.१.१ वस्तु च स्यात् परवेद्यं चेति को विरोधः?]

ननु च वस्तु च स्यात् परप्रतिबद्धवेदनमपि; को विरोधः? तथा हि विचित्रस्वभावा भावाः। केचिदपरप्रकाश्याः, परे परविज्ञेया इति नैतावता वैचित्र्यमात्रेण सदसद्व्यवस्था सतां समुचिता, वैपरीत्यस्यापि सम्भवात्। असत्त्वे तु कारणं सत्ताबाधकं वक्तव्यम्, बाधकमन्तरेण सर्वभावानां सत्त्वमनुभवसिद्धं प्रेक्षावतां न त्यक्तुमुचितं यतः।

[३.१५.२.२ विचारासहत्वात्]

स्यादेतत्। परविज्ञेयानां सर्वथा परमाणुरूपतया स्थूलाद्यात्मकतयापि विचारयितुमशक्यत्वादवस्तुत्वेन स्वप्नवदविद्यारूपत्वम्। स्वनिरूपणाक्षमरूपत्वमेवाविद्यायाः स्वरूपं यतः। बोधात्मवस्तुनस्तु तदेकस्वभावतया तद्व-

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49.17 सतां समुचिता] —चिता P_1 49.22 °वदविद्यारूपत्वम्] °वद—रूपत्वम् P_1

49.13 परेण वेदनं यस्य न संविद्यत एव तत् Source unknown.

49.13 परेण वेदनं ⋯ परविज्ञेया इति] *om.* P_2(eyeskip) 49.13 संविद्यत एव तत्। इति] $P_3M_1M_2$; स विद्यत एव यदि M^Y(unmetrical); संवेद्यत एव यदिति P_1; संविद्यत एव E(unmetrical) 49.15–16 ननु च वस्तु च स्यात्⋯परविज्ञेया इति नैतावता] $M^YP_1P_3M_1M_2$; *om.* E 49.15 स्यात् परप्रतिबद्धवेदनमपि] M^YP_3; स्या परप्रतिब—दनमपि P_1; स्यात् परिप्रतिबन्धवेदनमपि M_1M_2 49.15–16 विचित्रस्वभावा भावाः] M^Y; विचित्रस्वभावाः P_1; विचित्रस्वभावः P_3; विचित्रस्वभावतायाः M_1; चित्रस्वभावाः M_2 49.17 सतां] $M^YP_2P_3M_1^{ac}E$; — P_1; *om.* M_1^{ac}; सदां M_2 49.17 सम्भवात्] $M^YP_1M_2E$; वि(?) ≃ न संभवाद् P_2; सम्भावाद् P_3; ⊔ भवात् M_1 49.18 सत्ताबाधकं] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; सत्रबाधकं E 49.18 सर्वभावानां] $M^YP_1P_2M_1M_2E$; सर्वभाभावानां P_3 49.19 न त्यक्तुमुचितं] $M^YP_2P_3M_2E$; न नित्य≃मुचितम् P_1; नित्यक्तुमुचितं M_1 49.21 °द्यात्मकतयापि] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °द्यात्मतयापि M_1 49.22–23 स्वनिरूपणाक्षमरूपत्वमेवाविद्यायाः] *conj.*; स्वरूपणाक्षमरूपत्वमेवाविद्यायाः M^Y; स्वनिरूपणाक्षमरूपत्वमेवाविद्याया P_1P_3; स्वनिरूपणाक्षमेवाविद्याया P_2; निस्वरूपेणाक्षमरूपत्वमेवाविद्याया M_1; स्वन्तिरूपणाक्षमरूपत्वमेवाविद्याया M_2; स्वनिरूपणाक्षमत्वे वाऽविद्यायास्स्वरूपम्, स्वनिरूपणक्षमत्वमेव विद्यायास् E_D; स्वनिरूपणाक्षमत्वं वाविद्यायाः स्वरूपम्, स्वनिरूपणक्षमत्वमेव विद्यायाः E_V 49.23 बोधात्मवस्तुनस्तु] $M^YP_1M_1M_2E$; बोधात्मकवस्तुनस्त्व P_2; बोधात्मकवस्तुनस्तु P_3 49.23 तदेकस्वभावतया] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; तदैकस्वभावतया E

स्थापकत्वेन स्वतः सिद्धेर्न तथात्वम्। इदमसत्त्वकारणं सत्ताबाधकमिति। 24

[३.१५.२.२.१ पुरुषस्यापराधं, न भावानाम्]

तत्र विचारः पुरुषप्रतिभात्मकः प्रमाणविशेषः। यदि च पुरुषप्रमाणमविद्यापस्माराक्रान्ततया प्रतिभावैकल्येन भावस्वभावनिरूपणासामर्थ्ययुक्तम्, किमेतावता भावैरपराद्धम्, येन तेन भावा असन्तः कथिताः। न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यतीति, पुरुषापराधस्तु भवति। 27

[३.१५.२.२.२ संशय एव युक्तः] 30

विचारयितुमशक्यत्वेन च भावानां तद्विषयः संशयो युक्तः, तत्साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावेन तस्य न्यायप्राप्तत्वात्, न त्वसत्तानिश्चय इति भावस्वभावविचारणे प्रवृत्तैः साधु तद्विचारः कृतः, संशयस्यैवागोपालाङ्गनाबालस्थ- 33

49.24 सिद्धेर्न तथात्वम्] सिद्धे—थात्वम् P_1 49.31 तत्साधक°] त—क° P_1

49.28–29 न ह्येष स्थाणोरपराधो यदेनमन्धो न पश्यतीति Yāska's *Nirukta* 1.16.

49.23–24 तद्भवस्थापकत्वेन] $M^{Y}P_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1M_2E_V$; तद्भवस्थाप×ㅗㅗ×त्वेन P_1; तद्भयवस्थापकत्वेन E_D 49.24 तथात्वम्] $M^{Y_c}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; ×य× तथात्वम् M^{Y}; —थात्वम् P_1 49.24 इदमसत्त्वकारणं सत्ताबाधकमिति] P_1E; इतीदमसत् कारणं सत्ताबाधकमिति M^{Y}; इदमस्त्वकारण—सत्ताबाधकमिति P_2; इदम् सत्वकारणम् सत्ताबाधकमिति P_3; इदमसत्वकारणं सत्तावाधकमिति चेत् न M_1; इदमसत्वकरणं सत्ताबाधकमिति M_2 49.26 तत्र विचारः] $P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; तत्र च विचारः $M^{Y}M_1$ 49.26 पुरुषप्रतिभात्मकः] P_1M_1; पुरुषः प्रतिभात्मजन्मकः M^{Y}; पुरुषप्रतिभात्मक° P_2; पुरुषप्रतिभाजक P_3; पुरुषप्रतिभाजन्मकः M_2; पुरुषप्रतिभात्मजन्मकः E 49.26 पुरुषप्रमाणमविद्या°] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; पुरुषो ऽविद्या° M_1 49.27 °सामर्थ्ययुक्तम्] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_2E$; °सामर्थ्यं युक्तं P_2; °सामर्थ्ययुक्तः M_1 49.28 °पराद्धम्] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2^{pc}E$; °पराद्धम् P_1; °प— P_2; °पराधं M_2^{ac} 49.28 येन तेन भावा] $P_1P_3M_1M_2$; येन नैतावता M^{Y}; येन तेन भाव P_2; येन तेनाभावा E; येन ते भावा *conj. Sanderson* 49.28 न ह्येष] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2E$; — P_1; नाह्येष P_2 49.29 °मन्धो] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2E_V$; °मन्न्यो P_1E_D 49.29 पुरुषापराधस्तु] $M^{Y}P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; पुरुषापरस्तु P_3 49.31 °त्वेन च भावानां] $M^{Y}E$; °त्वेन भावानां $P_1M_1M_2$; °त्वेनैव भावानां P_2P_3 49.32 त्वसत्तानिश्चय] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3E$; त्वसत्त्वानिश्चय M_1M_2 49.32–33 भावस्वभावविचारणे] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1$; भावः। स्वभावविचारेण M_2; भावत्वभावविचारेण E_D; भावस्वभावविचारेण E_V 49.33 प्रवृत्तैः] *conj.*; प्रवृत्तेः $M^{Y}P_1M_1M_2E$; प्रवृत्ते P_2P_3 49.33 साधु तद्विचारः कृतः] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; साधू तद्विचारः कुतः M_2 49.33 संशयस्यैवागोपाला°] $M^{Y_{ac}}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; संशयस्यौवागोपाला° $M^{Y_{ac}}$; संशयस्यैव गोपाला° E

विरस्थस्येत्थं सिद्धान्तीकृतत्वात्।

[३.१५.२.२.३ भावानामविचार्यत्वं नास्ति]

न च विचारयितुमशक्यत्वमेव भावानां, पूर्वं ज्ञानकाण्ड एव विस्तरेण विचारितत्वादिति नातो ऽपि तेषामसत्यत्वम्।

[३.१५.२.३ श्रुतितः सदसद्व्यवस्था]

ननूक्तं प्राक् ब्रह्मैव सत्यम्, असत्यास्तु भेदा इति—सिद्धार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेनापि श्रुतेः प्रमाणत्वात्—श्रुतितः सदसद्व्यवस्थेति। यद्येवं, प्रमाणवत्त्वादत्र श्रुतिवाक्यानामपि सत्यत्वे ब्रह्मैव सत्यमित्यद्वैतविरोधः, प्रमाणप्रमेयादिसत्तानिबन्धनत्वादद्वैतस्य। अथैतान्यपि श्रुतिवाक्यान्यसत्यान्येवोच्यन्ते। यद्येवमप्रमाणत्वादित्थमेषां ब्रह्मसत्यत्वसिद्धौ भेदासत्यत्वे च प्रमाणान्तरं वक्तव्यम्, न ह्यसत्यं प्रमाणं वन्ध्यासुतज्ञानमिव भवति यतः। प्रमाणान्तरे चाक्षेपप्रतिसमाधाने पूर्वोक्ते एवेत्यनवस्थितेर्न सत्याद्वैतसिद्धिः।

तत् परमार्थतो ऽभेदो ऽस्त्येवेति। कथमित्थम्? अद्वैतस्वभावान्ये-

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49.44 ह्यसत्यं] — P_2

49.33–34 °स्थविरस्थस्येत्थं] $P_1P_3M_1E$; °स्थविरस्येत्थं $M^{\gamma}P_2$; °स्थविरस्थस्य M_2 49.34 सिद्धान्तीकृत°] M^{γ}; सिद्धान्तित° $P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$ 49.36 विचारयितुमशक्यत्वमेव] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; विचारयितुं शक्यत्वमेव E 49.36 पूर्वं] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; पूर्व° P_2 49.37 तेषामसत्यत्वम्] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3E$; ते≍मसत्य— P_1; तेषां सत्यम् M_1; तेषामसत्यं M_2 49.39 ननूक्तं] $P_2P_3M_1M_2E_V$; ननूक्तं ननूक्तं M^{γ}; ननु +≍+ P_1; न तूक्तं E_D 49.39 असत्यास्तु भेदा इति] $P_1P_2P_3^{pc}M_1M_2E$; असत्या वस्तुभेदा इति M^{γ}; +अ+सत्यास्तु भेदा इति P_3 49.39–40 °कत्वेनापि] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °कत्वेनाप P_1 49.40 प्रमाणवत्त्वादत्र] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_2$; प्र≍णवत्वादत्र P_1; प्रमाणत्वांदत्र M_1E 49.41–42 °प्रमेयादिसत्तानिबन्धनत्वा°] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_2E$; °प्रमेयादिसक्ता अनिबन्धनत्वा° P_2; °प्रमेयादिसत्त अनिबन्धनत्वा° P_3; °प्रमेयाद्यसक्तानिबन्धवत्वा° M_1 49.42 श्रुतिवाक्यान्यसत्यान्येवोच्यन्ते] M^{γ}; श्रुतिवाक्यान्य—न्येवेत्युच्यंते P_1; श्रुतिवाक्यान्यसत्यान्येवेति उच्यन्ते P_2; श्रुतिवाक्यान्यसत्यान्यवेत्युच्यन्ते P_3; श्रुतिवाकयान्यन्यसत्यान्येवत्युच्यन्ते M_1; श्रुतिवाक्यान्यसत्यान्येवेत्युच्यते M_2; श्रुतिवाक्यान्यसत्यान्येवेष्यन्ते E 49.44 प्रमाणं वन्ध्यासुतज्ञानमिव] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2E$; प्रमाणम् वन्ध्यसुतज्ञानमिव P_3; प्रमाणवन्ध्यासुतज्ञान इव M_1; प्रमाणं वन्ध्यासु× य× तत्वज्ञानमिव M_2 49.45 चाक्षेपप्रतिसमाधाने] $P_1P_2P_3M_1^{pc}M_2E$; वाक्षेपप्रतिसमा× सा× धाने M^{γ}; चाक्षेप+प्रति+समाधाने M_1 49.45 पूर्वोक्ते] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1M_2E_V$; पूर्व्वोक्त P_1E_D 49.45 सत्याद्वैतसिद्धिः] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; सत्याद्वैतस्य सिद्धिः P_3 49.46 तत् परमार्थतो] M_1; परमार्थतो $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_2E$; परमार्त्थतो (यमविद्यारूप एव प्रमाणादिव्यवहार इति चेन्न स एवायं) P_2^{ac} 49.46 भेदो ऽस्त्येवेति] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; भेदो ऽस्त्यैवेति P_3

व तानीति कस्य ङ्क प्रमाणानि, द्वैतनिबन्धनत्वात् प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवस्थितेः। सत्यमेतत्परमार्थतो ऽयमविद्यारूप एव प्रमाणादिव्यवहार इति चेत्। ननु 48
स एवायं विचार्यते। प्रमाणानामसत्यत्वाद्दोषे ऽपि निश्चयो भवतः कुतः। अप्रमाणतश्च यदवगतं तदसत्यमेव द्विचन्द्रादिवदिति ब्रह्मणो ऽप्यसत्यत्वात्सर्वाभावो वेदार्थः साधु सुनिरूपितः प्रज्ञाशालिभिः। 51

नन्वविद्यारूपाण्यपि श्रुतिवाक्यानि विद्योपायभूतान्येवेति। इदं मुग्धश्रोत्रियप्रतारकमुच्यते। प्रमाणानामसत्यत्वे सर्वमेतन्मनोराज्यतुल्यम्। सत्यत्वे वा द्वैतपक्ष एव सत्य इति न श्रुतितो ऽपीत्थं सदसद्व्यवस्था युक्तेति। 54

[३.१५.२.४ भेदः स्वसंवेदनसिद्धः]

न च स्वसंवित्तिसद्धमवस्तु, अ-परवेद्यत्वाद्, ब्रह्मवत्। स्वसंवेदनेन च प-

49.50 ब्रह्मणो ऽप्यसत्यत्वात्] ब्रह्म--त्यत्वात् P_2 49.53 मनोराज्यतु°] म ⊔ तु° M_1

49.56 –65 Testimonium (quotation from Jñānaprakāśa's *Śivajñānabodhavṛtti*, pp. 77–

49.46–47 °भावान्येव] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; °भान्येव P_3 49.47 तानीति कस्य ङ्क प्रमाणानि] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3E$; तानीति कस्य त्वप्रमाणानि M_2; तानी ⊔ णानि M_1 49.47 प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवस्थितेः] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3E$; प्रमाणे मेयव्यवस्थितेः P_1; प्रमाणमेयव्यवस्थितेः M_1; प्रमाणमेव× य× व्यवस्थितेः M_2 49.48 °र्थतो ऽयमविद्या°] $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °र्थतोम्मविद्या° P_1 49.48–49 ननु स एवायं विचार्यते] $M^{\gamma c}M_1E$; ननु स एवायं ×व्य× विचार्यते M^{γ}; न स एवायं विचार्यते $P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 49.49–50 प्रमाणानामसत्यत्वाद्दोषे ऽपि निश्चयो भवतः कुतः। अप्रमाणतश्च] M^{γ}; प्रमाणानामसत्वदोषोपि निश्चयो भवतः कुतः अप्रमाणतश्च P_1; प्र⊻णानां असत्यत्वादेषो विनिश्चयो भवतः कुतः अप्रमाणतश्च P_2; प्रमाणानामस्त्यत्वादेषो पि निश्चयो भवतः कुतः अप्रमाणतश्च P_3; प्रमाणानां +अ+सत्यत्वे त्वेष निश्चयो भवतः अप्रमाणतश्च M_1; प्रमाणानामसत्यत्वादेषो ऽपि निश्चयो भवतः। कुतः प्रमाणतश्च M_2; प्रमाणानामसत्यत्वादेषो ऽपि निश्चयो भवतो ऽप्रमा। एतच्च E 49.51 सर्वाभावो] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_3^{pc}M_2E$; स ⊻भावे P_2; सर्वाभा+वो+ P_3; सर्वे भावो M_1 49.51 साधु सुनिरूपितः प्रज्ञाशालिभिः] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3$; साधुधु सुनिरूपितः प्रज्ञाशालि ⊔ M_1; साधु निरूपितः प्रज्ञाशालिभिः $M^{\gamma}E$ 49.52 नन्वविद्यारूपाण्यपि] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_2$ E; ⊔ अविद्यारूपाण्यपि M_1 49.52 विद्योपायभूतान्येवेति] $M^{\gamma}P_1E$; विद्योपाभूतान्येव P_2; विद्योपायभूतान्येव P_3M_2; विद्योपायभूतान्येवेतीति चेत्, तद् M_1 49.53 °प्रतारकमुच्यते] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °व्रताकमुच्यते M_2 49.54–57 द्वैतपक्ष... °मातृतया भिन्न एव प्रकाशते] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; द्वैतपक्ष एव प्रकाशते E(eyeskip) 49.54 द्वैतपक्ष एव सत्य इति] $P_2M_1M_2$; द्वैतपक्ष एवासत्य इति $M^{\gamma}P_1$; द्वैत एव सत्य इति P_3; द्वैतपक्ष एव E 49.56 स्दसंवित्तिसद्धमवस्तु, अ-परवेद्यत्वाद्] $P_2P_3M_2$; संवित्तिसद्धमवस्त्वपरवेद्यत्वाद् $M^{\gamma}P_1$; संवित्तिसद्धं वस्तु अपरवेद्यत्वाद् M_1 49.56 ब्रह्मवत्। स्वसंवेदनेन] P_2; ब्रह्मवित्त्वसंवेदनेन $M^{\gamma}M_2$; ब्रह्मवित् स्वयं वेदनेन P_1; ब्रह्मवत् स्वसंवेदने P_3; ब्रह्मवस्वसंवेदनेन M_1

57 रात्मभ्यः प्रत्येकं स्वात्मा परात्मानुमातृतया भिन्न एव प्रकाशते। तदभेदे हि सर्वमेवेदं ब्रह्मेति कस्तत्र कस्य किं कुर्यादित्यसंगतं विश्वं स्यात्। न च तत्र भ्रान्तिः सम्भवति। भ्रान्तमपि हि स्वप्नादिविज्ञानं "सर्वमालम्बने भ्रान्तं,
60 न स्वात्मनि"। आलम्बनं च बहिःस्थितम्, अन्यथा प्रतीयमानं, भ्रमविषयतामापतति। यत्पुनर्बोधैकस्वभावं वस्तु तद्यथैव चकास्ति तथैव सत्।

49.61 °विषयताम्] °वि--म् P_2

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8): तदुक्तं। सर्वमालंबने भ्रान्तं न स्वात्मनि कथञ्चनेति।
प्रपञ्चितं च परमोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तौ। तत्र किञ्चिल्लिख्यते। "न च स्वसंवित्सिद्धमवस्त्वपरवेद्यत्वात् ब्रह्मवत्। स्वसंवेदनेन च परात्मभ्यः प्रत्येकं स्वात्मा परात्मानुमातृतया भिन्न एव प्रकाशते। तदभेदे हि सर्वमेवेदं ब्रह्मेति कस्तत्र कस्य किं कुर्यादित्यसंगतं विश्वं स्यात्। न तत्र भ्रान्तिः संभवति। भ्रान्तमपि स्वप्नादिविज्ञानं
सर्वमालंबने भ्रान्तं न स्वात्मनि कथञ्चन
आलंबनं च बहिःस्थितमन्यथा प्रतीयमानं भ्रमविषयतामापतति। यत्पुनर्बोधैकस्वभावं वस्तु तद्यथैव चकास्ति तथैव सत् स्वसंवेद्यस्यातत्स्वभावत्वायोगात् तत्स्वभावत्वे वा स्वसंवेद्यमेवेति स्वसंवेदने भ्रान्त्यसंभवात् आत्मभेदः प्रत्येकं परात्मानुमात्रतया स्वसंवेदनेन सिद्धः सत्य एव श्रुतिरप्याह— तमेव भान्तमनु भाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं भाति" इति।

49.59–60 सर्वमालम्बने भ्रान्तं न स्वात्मनि कथञ्चन Source unknown. See note to the translation.

49.56–57 परात्मभ्यः] $P_2P_3M_1M_2$; परमात्मभ्यः $M^{\gamma}P_1$ 49.57 प्रत्येकं] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_2$; ⊔ा M_1 49.57 स्वात्मा परात्मानुमातृतया] $P_1P_2M_2$; स्वात्मा परमात्मानुमातृतया M^{γ}; स्वत्मा परात्मानुमातृतया P_3; स्वात्मपरात्मानुमातृतया M_2 49.58 सर्वमेवेदं ब्रह्मेति] $P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; सर्वमेवेदं ब्रह्मैवेति M^{γ}; सर्वमेदम् ब्रह्मेति P_1 49.58 कस्तत्र] $M^{\gamma}P_3M_1E$; ---स्+त+त्र P_2; कं तत्र M_2 49.58 °त्यसंगतं विश्वं स्यात्। न च] $M^{\gamma}P_1M_1M_2$; °त्यस---तं विश्वं स्यान्न P_2; °त्यसंगतम् विश्वं स्यान्न P_3; °त्यसंगतम्। बिम्बस्य न E 49.59 भ्रान्तिः सम्भवति] $M^{\gamma}P_3M_2E$; भ्रान्तिसम्भवति P_1P_2; भ्रान्तिस्स ⊔ M_1 49.59–60 भ्रान्तमपि हि स्वप्नादिविज्ञानं सर्वमालम्बने भ्रान्तं, न स्वात्मनि] P_1; भ्रांतमपि हि स्वप्नादिविज्ञानं +स+मालंबते भ्रां न स्वात्मनि M^{γ}; भ्रान्तमपि स्वप्नादिविज्ञानं सर्वमालंब---भ्रान्तन्न स्व--- P_2; भ्रान्तमपि स्वप्नादिविज्ञानं सर्वमालंबने भ्रान्तन्न स्वात्मनि P_3M_2; भ्रान्तिन्निस्वात्मनि यतः, भ्रान्तमपि हि स्वप्नादिविज्ञानं सत्यमालंबते M_1; भ्रान्तमपि स्वप्नादिविज्ञानं सर्वमालम्बते भ्रान्तं न स्वात्मनि E 49.61 °पतति] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; °पादयति E 49.61 °बोधैकस्वभावं] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3^{pc}M_2E$; ×स्वसंवेदने× बोधैकस्वभावं P_3; °बोधैकस्वभावे M_1

अस्वसंवेद्यस्य तत्स्वभावत्वायोगात्। तत्स्वभावत्वे वा स्वसंवेद्यमेवेति स्व-
संवेदने भ्रान्त्यसम्भवादात्मभेदः प्रत्येकं परात्मानुमातृतया स्वसंवेदनसिद्धः 63
सत्य एव। श्रुतिरप्याह

तमेव भान्तमनु भाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति। इति।

[३.१५.२.५ भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वम्] 66

नन्वितरेतराभावसिद्ध्यपेक्षत्वाद्भेदस्य भावविषयत्वाच्च प्रत्यक्षस्य कथं भेदः
प्रत्यक्षः। तदुक्तम्

आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्षम्। इति। 69

नेतरेतराभावसिद्ध्यपेक्षा भेदे, किं तर्हि सिद्धे भेदे तदितरेतराभावप्रतिपत्तिः।
सर्वैक्ये हि न कस्यचित् कुतश्चिदभाव इति घटार्थी पटदर्शनात् किमिति

49.65 तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति *Kaṭha* 5:15cd, *Śvetāśvatara* 6:14cd, *Muṇḍa* 2.2.11cd.

49.69 आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धृ विपश्चितः *Brahmasiddhi* 2:1ab.

49.61–62 तद्यथैव चकास्ति तथैव सत्, अस्वसंवेद्यस्य] P_1M_2; तद्यथैव चकास्ति तवैव सतः स्वसंवेद्यस्य M^Y; तद्यथै ⌣चक+ा+स्ति तथैव च सत् अस्वसंवेद्यस्ये P_2; तद्यथैव चकास्ति तथैव सत् अस्वसंवेद्यस्ये P_3; तत्थै ⊔ तथैव सदस्वसंवेद्यस्य M_1; तद्यथैव चकास्ति तथैव ततः स्वसंवेद्यस्य E 49.62 तत्स्वभावत्वे वा] $P_2P_3M_2E$; ⌣⌣⌣⌣⌣⌣ वा M^Y; तत्स्वभात्वे वा P_1; अतत्स्वभावत्वे न M_1 49.62–63 स्वसंवेदने] $M^YP_1M_1M_2E$; यत्पुन स्वसंवेदने P_3 49.63 परात्मानुमातृतया] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_2^{ac}E$; स्वा ⊔त्मानुमातृतया M_1; परमात्मानुमातृ(त्र M_2^{ac})तया × भिन्न एव× M_2 49.63 स्वसंवेदनसिद्धः] M^YM_1; स्वसंवेदनसिद्धम° P_1; स्वसंवेदनेन सिद्धः P_2P_3E; स्वसंवेदने सिद्धः M_2 49.65 तमेव भान्तमनु भाति] E; तमेव भ्रान्तमनु भाति M^Y; तमेवन्तमनु भान्ति P_1P_3; —मेवन्तमनु भान्ति P_2; तमेव+(भ्रान्त)+तमनु भान्ति M_1; तमेव तमनु भान्ति $M_1^{ac}M_2$ 49.65 भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति] M^YE; भासर्वमिदं भाद् P_2; भासा ⊔मिदम् भाति P_3; भासा सर्वमिदं भाति $P_1M_1M_2$ 49.67 °पेक्षत्वाद्भेदस्य] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_2E$; °पेक्षित्वा भेदस्य M_1 49.67 प्रत्यक्षस्य कथं] $M^YP_1P_2M_2E$; प्रत्यक्ष्यस्य कथं P_3; प्रत्यक् ⊔ M_1 49.70 °सिद्ध्यपेक्षा भेदे, किं तर्हि सिद्धे] $M^YP_1P_2P_3$; °सिध्यपेक्षाः भेदे किं तर्हि सिद्धे M_1; °सिद्धिपेक्षा(क्षो M_2^{pc}) भेदे। किन्तर्हि सिद्धे M_2; °सिद्ध्यपेक्षाभेदैक्यं। तर्हि सिद्धे E_D; °सिद्ध्यपेक्षा भेदैक्यं तर्हि सिद्धं E_V 49.70 °तराभाव°] $M^YP_2P_3M_2^{pc}E$; °तरे भाव° P_1; °तरभाव° M_1; × (ऽनुभान्ति सर्वं)× °तराभाव° M_2 49.71 सर्वैक्ये] $P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; लासर्वाइक्ये M^Y; स ⊔ M_1 49.71 कुतश्चिद्भाव इति] $M^YP_1M_1M_2E$; कुतश्चित् भेद इति P_2; भेद इति P_3 49.71 घटार्थी] $M^YP_1P_2P_3M_2E$; पटार्थः M_1 49.71 पटदर्शनात्] $M^YP_1P_3M_1M_2E$; घटदर्शनात् P_2 49.71 किमिति] $P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; किमिदमिति M^YM_1

72 निवर्तते? प्रमाणाप्रमाणविभागश्च न स्यात्, सत्तामात्राव्यभिचारात्सर्वज्ञानानामिति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धो भेद एवेति कथमसत्यत्वपाठमात्रेण बाध्यते।

[३.१५.२.६ जगदुपादानं ब्रह्म]

75 भवतु सत्यम्, तथापि ब्रह्मोपादानं ह्येतदिति श्रुतितस्तदुपादानं ब्रह्म भविष्यतीति। तर्ह्येतदेवात्रोक्तं वृत्तिकृता। किमर्थमाक्षेपः। अत्र चोक्तो दोष इत्याह—'उपादाने प्रलीनस्य ध्रुवं प्राग्वन्निवर्तनम्' इति।

78 ननु च 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपम्' इति च श्रूयते, तेन च रूपेण ब्रह्मणः परावृत्त्ययोगात् स्थूलरूपपरावर्तने ऽपि न तल्लीनानां भविष्यति परावृत्तिदोष इत्याह—

49.75 ब्रह्मोपादानं ह्येतत् Source unknown.

49.78 आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपम् = *Parākhyatantra* 14:89b (see also Goodall 2004: 378, fn. 827); but it is probably a Vedic quotation there: cf. Bhāsarvajña's quotation in the *Nyāyasāra* p. 565: आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च मोक्षे ऽभिव्यज्यते। It is also quoted as scripture by Sucaritamiśra ad *Ślokavārttika*, *śūnyavāda* 70 (p. 130). Cf. also *Tantrasadbhāva* 1:295cd: आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं न विभेति कदाचन This is in turn very close to *Taittirīyopaniṣat* in 2.4 and 2.9: आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विभेति कदाचन

49.72 °प्रमाणविभागश्च न] $M^{Y}P_{1}^{pc}M_{1}$; °प्रमाणविभाग+श्च न+ P_{1}; °प्रमाणताविभागश्च न $P_{2}P_{3}$; °प्रमाणतद्विभागश्च न $M_{2}E_{V}$; °प्रमाणतदविभागश्च E_{D} 49.72–73 °ज्ञानानामिति प्रत्यक्ष°] $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}$; °ज्ञानानाम् प्रत्यक्ष° M_{1}; °ज्ञानानामप्रत्यक्ष° E 49.73 भेद एवेति] $M^{Y}M_{1}M_{2}E$; भेदस्सत्य एवेति $P_{1}P_{2}$; भेदस्य(?)त्ववंवेति P_{3} 49.73 कथमसत्यत्वपाठमात्रेण बाध्यते] M^{Y}; कथमसत्यत्वं पाठमात्रेण साध्यते $P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}E$; कथं सत्यत्वं पाठमात्रेण साध्यते M_{1}; कथमसत्यम्। पाठमात्रेण साध्यते M_{2} 49.75 ब्रह्मोपादानं] $P_{1}P_{3}^{pc}M_{1}M_{2}E$; ब्रह्मोपादान M^{Y}; ब्रह्मोपा+दा+नं P_{3} 49.75 ह्येतदिति] $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}E$; ह्येततदिति P_{2} 49.76 तर्ह्येतदे°] $M^{Y}P_{1}M_{1}M_{2}E$; तर्ह्येतदे° P_{2}; तस्येतदे° P_{3} 49.76 किमर्थमाक्षेपः] $M^{Y}P_{1}M_{1}M_{2}E$; किमित्थं+मा+क्षेपः P_{2}; र्त्थाक्षेपः P_{3} 49.76 अत्र] *conj.*; उपादानेषु लीनानां पुनरावर्तनम् अत्र $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}$; उपादानेषु लीनानां पुनरावर्तनम् इति अत्र E 49.77 'उपादाने प्रलीनस्य ध्रुवं प्राग्वन्निवर्तनम्' इति] $M^{Y}M_{1}$; उपादान इति $P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{2}^{pc}E_{D}$; उपादान इत्यादि M_{2}^{ac}; उपादानेति E_{V} 49.78 आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो] $P_{1}P_{3}M_{1}^{pc}M_{2}E$; आनन्दं ब्रह्म° M^{Y}; आनन्दो ब्रह्मणो M_{1}^{ac} 49.78 च श्रूयते] $M^{Y}P_{1}P_{2}P_{3}M_{1}M_{2}$; श्रूयते E 49.79 भविष्यति] $M^{Y}P_{1}M_{1}M_{2}E$; भविष्यतीति $P_{2}P_{3}$ 49.80 इत्याह] $M^{Y}P_{1}M_{1}M_{2}E$; इत्यत्राह $P_{2}P_{3}$

विज्ञानमात्रमानन्दं वस्तुसत्यं न तत्र हि।
नैवंविधमुपादानं दृष्टं तन्त्वादि सूरयः॥ ५०॥

हे सूरयः पण्डिताः! तत्र ब्रह्मणि विज्ञानं परमार्थतो नास्ति, पटाद्युपादानानां तन्त्वादीनामिवोपादानकारणत्वात्॥ ५०॥

कथं तर्ह्येताः श्रुतय इति। आह— 3

भुवनत्वे निविष्टस्य तद्धि तस्योपपद्यते।
गुणतः

तद्विज्ञानरूपत्वं तस्य ब्रह्मणो भुवननिमित्तं भोगदातृतयापरिणतस्य गुणत उपचारतः कथ्यते, न मुख्यतः, भुवनस्थभोक्तृविज्ञानयोगात्, मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीतिवत्। 'विज्ञानं ब्रह्मणो रूपम्' इत्युपचारेण श्रुतयो व्याख्येया 3 इत्यर्थः।

तत्रसंस्थानां भोगिनां मुख्यलक्षणम्॥ ५१॥

50] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; विज्ञानमात्रमिति $P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 50 b. वस्तु°] M^{Y} $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; वुस्तु° P^{S}_{4} 50 d. दृष्टं तन्त्वादि सूरयः] $M^{Y}_{M}E_{V}$; दृष्टं तंत्वादि सूरय इति M^{Y}; दृष्टं तत्वादि सूरयः $P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$; दृष्ठं तत्वादि सूरयः E_D 51 abc.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$ ($M^{Y}M_{1}E$ give abcd together here); भुवनत्व इति $P_1P_3M_2$; भुवन इति P_2 51 a. भुवनत्वे निविष्टस्य] $M^{Y}P^{S}_{1}M_{1}E$; उ(?)वनत्वनिविष्टस्य M^{Y}_{M}; भुवनत्वे विनिष्टस्य P^{S}_{3}; भुवनत्वे विनिष्ठस्य P^{S}_{4}; भुवनत्वे विनिष्टस्य M^{S}_{3} 51 b. तद्धि तस्यो°] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$; ततस्यो° P^{S}_{4}(unmetrical); तत्स्थितस्यो° E 51 cd.] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}$; तत्रेति $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$ ($M^{Y}M_1E$ give 51 together above) 51 c. तत्रसंस्थानां] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}E$; त्रयसंस्थानं M^{S}_{3} 51 d. °लक्षणम्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; °लक्षणमिति M^{Y}

50.3 कथं तर्ह्येताः श्रुतय इत्याह] कथ ⊔ P_3

51.3 विज्ञानं ब्रह्मणो रूपम् No Vedic passage that we know of has exactly this formulation, but cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 3.9.28: विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म।

50.2 तन्त्वादी°] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_1E$; —त्वादी° P_2; तत्वादी° M_2 50.2 °कारणत्वात्] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °करणत्वात् P_1 50.3 इति। आह] $M^{Y}P_1M_1M_2E$; इत्यत आह P_2 51.1 तद्विज्ञानरूपत्वं] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; तद्विज्ञानरूपं M_1 51.1 तस्य ब्रह्मणो] $P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; ब्रह्मणस्तस्य M^{Y} 51.2 भुवनस्थभोक्तृ°] $M^{Y}P_1P_2M_1E$; भुवनस्थभोः P_3; भुवस्थभोक्तृ° M_2 51.4 इत्यर्थः] $P_2P_3M_2$; इत्यर्थः यदाहुः $M^{Y}P_1M_1E$

तत्र भुवने स्थितानां भोगिनामात्मनामेतन्मुख्यरूपम्, न ब्रह्मण इति॥ ५१॥

तर्हि तथाभूतभुवनप्राप्तिरूपो ऽस्माकं मोक्षो भविष्यतीत्याह—

भुवनस्य विनाशित्वं दृष्टत्वात् तद्विनाशतः।
तद्भोक्तृणामपि भवेत् तेनैषा न ध्रुवा गतिः॥ ५२॥

भुवनविनाशाद् दृष्टो भोक्तृविनाश इति सो ऽप्यध्रुवो मोक्षः॥ ५२॥

[३.१६ कैवल्यम्]

तदियता परमात्मलयपक्षं प्रतिक्षिप्याधुना कैवल्यमोक्षं प्रतिक्षिपति—

[३.१६.१ सांख्यमुक्तानां कर्मासङ्क्षयः]

[३.१६.१ तेषां गुणतत्त्वोर्ध्वभोग्यं कर्मावशिष्यते]

गुणतत्त्वोर्ध्वभोग्यस्य कर्मणो ऽनुपलब्धितः।
कैवल्यमपि सांख्यानां नैव युक्तमसंक्षयात्॥ ५३॥

52] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; भुवनस्येति $P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 52 b. दृष्टत्वात् तद्विनाशतः] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{3}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}$; दृष्टत्वात्तद्विनाशातः P^{S}_{1}(unmetrical); दृष्टं यत्तद्विनाशनः P^{S}_{4}; दृष्टत्वात् तद्विनाशने E 52 c. तद्भोक्तृणाम्] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}M_{1}E$; तत्भोक्तृणाम् $P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}$; तद्भोक्तृणाम् M^{S}_{3} 52 cd. भवेत् तेनैषा न ध्रुवा गतिः] $M^{Y}_{M}M_{1}E$; भवेत्तेनैषा न ध्रुवा गतिरिति M^{Y}; भवेतेनैषा न द्रुवा गतिः P^{S}_{1}; भवेत्तेनैषा न द्रुवातिः P^{S}_{3}(unmetrical); भक्तैर्नैषा न च र्द्रुवा गतिः P^{S}_{4}; भवेत् तेनैषा न ध्रुव ⊔ M^{S}_{3} 53] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; गुणतत्वोर्द्धभोग्यस्येति $P_1P_2P_3$; गुणतत्वोर्ध्वं भोग्यस्येति M_2 53 a. °भोग्यस्य] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}M_{1}E$; °भोगस्य $P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}$ 53 b. कर्मणो ऽनुपलब्धितः] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}E$; कर्म्मनो नुप ⊔ तः P^{S}_{3}; कर्मनोनुपल्लितः M^{S}_{3}(unmetrical) 53 c. सांख्यानां] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S^{c}}_{1}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; संख्यानां $P^{S^{ac}}_{1}P^{S}_{3}$ 53 d. युक्तमसंक्षयात्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}E$; युक्तमसंक्षयादिति M^{Y}; ⊔ क्तमसंक्षयात् M_1

51.5 भुवने स्थितानां] M_2; भुवनस्थितानां $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$ 51.5 भोगिनामात्मनाम्] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P^{c}_{3}M_2E$; ×भोगिनां× भोगिनामात्मनाम् P_3; भोगिनांम् M_1 51.6 तर्हि] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; न हि P_1 51.6 °भुवनप्राप्तिरूपो ऽस्माकं] P_3E; °भुवनप्राप्तिरप्यस्माकं M^{Y}; °भुवनप्राप्तिरूपो— P_1; °भुवन+प्राप्ति+रूपोस्माक P_2; °भुवनप्राप्तिरूप्यस्माकं M_1; °भुवनं प्राप्तिरूपो ऽस्माकं M_2 51.6 मोक्षो भविष्यतीत्याह] $M^{Y}P_1M_1M_2E$; मोक्ष भविष्यतीत्यत आह P_2; मोक्षो भविष्यतीति त्यत आह P_3 52.1 °विनाशाद् दृष्टो] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M^{ac}_{2}E$; °विनाशाददृष्टो M_1; °विनाशादृष्टो M^{ac}_{2} 52.1 °प्यध्रुवो] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2E$; °प्यद्धुवो P_1P_2 52.3 कैवल्यमोक्षं] Σ; कैवल्यम् मोक्षम् P_3

सांख्यानां मुक्तौ कर्मक्षयतो भोक्तृत्वनिवृत्त्यात्मकं यत् कैवल्यं तदयुक्तम्। कुत इत्याह—असंक्षयादिति। गुणतत्त्वोर्ध्वभोग्यस्य कर्मण इति सम्बन्धः। यद्यपि गुणभोक्तृत्वं निवृत्तं सांख्यमुक्तानाम्, तथापि गुणतत्त्वादुपरि सांख्यापरिदृष्टरागविद्यादितत्त्वविषयाणि कर्माण्यक्षीणानीति तद्भोक्तृत्वमनिवृत्तमेव यतः। कथं तेषां कर्मणां तदा न क्षय इत्याह—अनुपलब्धित इति। उपलब्धिर्भोगः। यदुक्तम् 'भोगो ऽस्य वेदना पुंसः' इति। तदभावो ऽनुपलब्धिः, ततः। क्रमेणोपर्युपरिस्थिततत्त्वविषयाणि कर्माणि भोक्तव्यानीति न तावत् तैस्तानि भुक्तानि यत इत्यर्थः।

ननु 'ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते' इति सांख्यज्ञानात् कथमक्षीणानि तान्युच्यन्ते? गुणपुरुषान्तरख्यातिमात्रफलं सांख्यज्ञानमिति तदुपरि कर्मक्षयस्य कः प्रसङ्गः? ननु गुणनिवृत्त्यैव बुद्ध्यादिकरणानामपि निवृत्तेः कथं तेषां करणैर्विनोपभोगः? न तु गुणप्रवृत्तिः करणसम्बन्धहेतुरात्मनाम्, अपि तु समलत्वे सति कर्माणि। यदुक्तं

53.3 °न्निवृत्तं सांख्यमुक्तानाम्…°क्षीणानीति तद्भोक्तृत्व°] *om.* P_3^{ac} 53.6 यदुक्तम्] ⊔ P_3 53.11 प्रसङ्गः] —गः P_1 53.13 °सम्बन्ध°] °स— P_1

53.6 भोगो ऽस्य वेदना पुंसः *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 1:12a.

53.9 ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते ऽर्जुन *Mahābhārata* 6.26:37ab (*Bhagavadgītā*).

53.1 सांख्यानां] $P_1^{pc}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; सांख्यासानां M^Y; संख्यानाम् P_1^{ac} 53.2 इत्याह] $M^YP_1M_1M_2$; इत्यत आह P_2P_3; इत्यत्राह E 53.3 °भोक्तृत्वं निवृत्तं] Σ; °भोक्तृत्वनिमित्तं P_2 53.3 तथापि] Σ; तथा P_3 53.4 °परिदृष्टरागविद्यादितत्त्व°] $M^YP_1P_2M_1E$; °परिदृष्टराग+विद्यादि+तत्वादि° P_3; °परिदृष्टपरिदृष्टरागविद्यादितत्त्व° M_2 53.4 °क्षीणानीति] $P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °क्षीणानि M^Y; °क्षीणानी P_1 53.5 यतः] Σ; अतः M_1 53.5 इत्याह] $M^YP_1M_1M_2E$; इत्यत आह P_2; इत्यत्राह P_3 53.6 भोगो ऽस्य वेदना] $M^YP_1P_3M_2E$; भोगेस्य वेदना P_2; भोगस्य वेदनां M_1 53.6 °पलब्धिः] Σ; °पलब्धस् P_2 53.8 तैस्तानि भुक्तानि] Σ; ×कै× +तै+स्थानि M_1 53.9 भस्मसात्कुरुते] $M^YM_1M_2$; भस्मस—रुत P_1; भस्मात् कुरुत P_2P_3(unmetrical); भस्मसात्कुरुते ऽर्जुन E 53.10 तान्युच्यन्ते] Σ; तान्युच्यते M^Y 53.11 गुणनिवृत्त्यैव] Σ; गुणनिवृत्येव M_1 53.11 बुद्ध्यादिकर°] $M^YP_1P_2P_3E$; बुद्ध्यादिकार° M_1; बुद्धादिकर° M_2 53.12 करणैर्वि°] Σ; कारणैर्वि° E_D 53.12 गुणप्रवृत्तिः] Σ; गुणः प्रवृत्तिः M_2 53.13 तु समलत्वे] M^Y; तु समत्वे $P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$ 53.13 सति कर्माणि] M^YP_1E; सति कर्मणि $P_2P_3M_2$; ऽसति कर्मणि M_1

कर्मतश्च शरीराणि विषयाः करणानि च। इति।

कर्माणि चोक्तानि तावत् तेषां सन्तीति करणानामप्यनिवृत्तेः, तत्र भोक्तृत्वे, शङ्काकेवलतैवेति। किं तर्हि सांख्यज्ञानात् तेषां निवृत्तम्? किमन्यन्निवर्त्यताम्? गुणभोक्तृत्वनिवृत्तिरेवेति॥ ५३॥

[३.१६.१.२ कर्म सर्वमेकमेव जन्म करोतीति साङ्ख्यैकदेशीयाः]

अत्र सांख्यविशेषदृष्ट्या परः सर्वकर्मक्षयं तेषां भोगेन दर्शयति—

कर्मैकजन्मकृत्सर्वम्

इह जन्मप्रायणमध्ये यत्कृतं शुभाशुभं कर्मजातं तत्सर्वं प्रधानोपसर्जनभावेनावस्थितं प्रायणाभिव्यक्तं युगपदेव सम्मूर्च्छितमेकमेव जन्म करोति। न तु जन्मान्तरे फलदानायावशिष्टं भवति प्रतिपालयति। क्रियारूपत्वात् कर्म-

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54a. कर्मैकजन्मकृत्] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P_1P^{s}_{1}M^{s}_{3}$; कर्मैकं जन्मकृत् P_2M_1E; कर्म्मैक⊻न्मकृत् P_3; कर्म्मेकजन्मकृत् P^{s}_{3}; कमैव जन्मकृत् P^{s}_{4}; कर्मैर्जन्मकृत् M_2 • सर्वम्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}M_1E$; सर्व M^{s}_{3}; सर्वमिति $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_2$ (M$_1$E and of course the *mūlapāṭha* sources give 54abcd here all together)

53.15 तेषां सन्तीति] तेष— P_1

53.14 कर्मतश्च शरीराणि विषयाः करणानि च *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 1:13ab.

53.14 कर्मतश्च] Σ; कर्मणश्च M_2 53.14 करणानि] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_1M_2$; कारणानि P_2E 53.15 करणानाम्] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1M_2$; करणनाम् P_1; कारणानाम् E 53.15–16 भोक्तृत्वे, शङ्काकेवलतैवेति] *conj.*; भोक्तृत्वे शंकाकेवलतेति M^{Y}; भोक्तृत्वे शङ्का—केवलतैवेति P_1E; भोक्तृत्वे का केवलतैवेति $P_2P_3M_1M_2$ 53.17 °भोक्तृत्वनिवृत्तिरेवेति] $M^{Y\circ}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °भोक्तृनिवृ × त्ते× त्तिरेवेति M^{Y}; °भो—त्तिरेवेति P_1 53.19 भोगेन] Σ; भोगे P_1 54.1 जन्मप्रायणमध्ये] $M^{Y\circ}$; जन्मप्रायणमध्यो $M^{Y\circ\circ}$; जन्मप्रयणमध्ये $P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E_V$; जन्मप्रयणमध्ये E_D 54.1 शुभाशुभं कर्म°] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1M_2$; — P_1; शुभाशुभकर्म° E 54.1 प्रधानोपसर्जन°] E; प्रधोपसर्जना° M^{Y}; प्रधानोपसज्जना×⊻× P_1; प्रधानोपसर्जना° $P_2P_3M_1$; प्रधानोपार्जना° M_2 54.2 °स्थितं] Σ; °स्थितिं M_1 54.2 प्रायणाभिव्यक्तं] *conj.*; प्रायेणाभिव्यक्तं M^{Y}; प्रयाणाभिव्यक्तं P_1P_3E; प्रायाणाभिव्यक्तं P_2; प्रयाणाभिव्यक्तिं M_1; प्रयाणाभिव्यक्तव्यं M_2 54.2 सम्मूर्च्छितमेकमेव] *conj.*; समुच्छ्रितमेकमेव $M^{Y\circ}P_1M_2E$; समुच्छ्रितमेक× मा× मेव M^{Y}; समुच्छितमेकमेव P_2; समु ⊔ तमेकमेव P_3; मुच्छ्रितमेकमेव M_1 54.2 न तु] $M^{Y}P_1M_1E$; न P_2P_3; ननु M_2 54.3 भवति] $M^{Y}P_2M_2E$; — P_1; भव ⊔ P_3; भवतीति M_1 54.3 प्रतिपालयति] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_2E$; °—तिपालयति P_1; प्रतिपादयति M_1

णो ऽनारब्धकार्यस्यानुपपत्तिरित्येकभविककर्मवादिनः। ततश्च प्रकृतजन्मनैव तेषां प्राक्तनसर्वकर्मक्षयो ऽनुमितो ऽभिनवकर्मक्षयश्च ज्ञानादिना जातः, तत्कुतो गुणतत्त्वोर्ध्वभोग्यकर्मसत्ता? इति। 6

[३.१६.१.३ अनेकजन्मकृत् कर्म]

एतन्निराकरोति—

न

नैष नियमः, किन्तु कानिचित् कर्माणि द्वितीयादिजन्मकर्तृण्यपि सन्ति। 9

कुत इत्याह—

उपादानलयश्रुतेः।

उपादाने प्रकृतौ कर्मणां लयः संस्काररूपेणावस्थानं श्रूयते यतः।

प्रकृतौ कर्म संस्कारस्थितं सर्वं ततस्तु नः। 12
तत्पाककालमासाद्य पुनर्भोगाय वर्तते॥ इति।

54b. न] *em.*; नेति नोपादानमिति श्रुतेः M^{Y}; नेति $P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; *om.* P_3 54b. उपादानलयश्रुतेः] *em.*; उपादानलयश्रुतेरिति M^{Y}; उपादान इति $P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$ Note that the *mūlapāṭha* manuscripts read the whole *pāda* together thus: नोपादानलयश्रुतेः] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{s}_{3}$; नोपादानलयश्रुते P^{s}_{4}; सोपादानलय ⊔ तेः M^{s}_{3}

54.5 °क्षयो ऽनुमितो] —नुमितो P_1 54.9 द्वितीया°] — P_1

54.12 –13 प्रकृतौ कर्म संस्कारस्थितं ⋯ पुनर्भोगाय वर्तते Source unknown.

54.3–4 कर्मणो ऽनारब्ध°] $M^{Y}P_1P_2M_1$; कर्म्मणो अनारब्ध° P_3; कर्मणोरनारब्ध° M_2; कर्मण आरब्ध° E 54.4 °त्येकभविककर्म°] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2E$; °त्येके भविकर्म्म° P_1; °त्येकभविकर्म्म° P_2 54.4 प्रकृतजन्मनैव] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2E$; प्रकृतिजन्मनैव P_1; प्रकृतजजनैव P_2 54.5 °नुमितो] Σ; °नुमिता P_2 54.5–6 जातः, तत्कुतो गुण°] $P_1P_2P_3M_2$; जातस्तद्भूतो गुण° M^{Y}; जातःस्तदिकुता गुण° M_1; जातस्तदुद्भूतः। गुण° E_D; जातः। तदुद्भूतो गुण° E_V 54.6 °सत्ता? इति। एतन्नि°] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3$; °सत्तेरिति। एतन्नि° M_1; °सत्केतत्येन्नि° M^{ac}_{2}; °स × क्केतत्ये× +त्ये त+ न्नि° M_2?; °सन्तत्यै तन्नि° E_D; °सन्ततिः। एतन्नि° E_V 54.12 °स्कारस्थितं सर्वं ततस्तु नः] *conj. Isaacson*; °स्कारस्थितः सर्वं ततस्तु सा न M^{Y}(unmetrical); —स्थितं(?) सर्वस्ततस्तु सा P_1; °स्कारस्थितस्सर्वन्ततस्तु नः P_2; °स्कारस्थितस्सर्वन्ततस्तु नः P_3; °स्कारस्थितः सर्वजन्तूनाम् M_1(unmetrical); °स्कारस्थितं सर्वम् ततस्तु न M_2; °स्कारस्थितः सर्वे इति ततस्तु E_D(unmetrical); °स्कारस्थितः सर्व इति ततस्तु E_V(unmetrical) 54.13 °कालमासाद्य] Σ; °कामो ऽसाद्य M_2 54.13 पुनर्भोगाय वर्तते] $P_2P_3M^{pc}_{2}$; पुनर्भोगाय प्रवर्तते $M^{Y}P_1E$(unmetrical); पुनर्भोगे प्रवर्तते M_1; पुनर्भोगाय वर्तन M^{ac}_{2}

न केवलमिहैवं कर्म श्रूयते, यावद्वेदे ऽपीत्याह—

इन्द्रत्वादिफलं वेदे ऽप्युच्यते तत् पृथक् पृथक्॥ ५४॥

'वाजपेयेन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेत' इति स्वाराज्यमिन्द्रत्वं, तत्फलं कर्म—आदिग्रहणात् स्वर्गादिफलं ज्योतिष्टोमादि, निषिद्धब्रह्महत्यादि नरकफलं च—श्रूयते। तत्पृथक् पृथगिति जन्म करोतीति सम्बन्धः, परस्परविरुद्ध-फलानां युगपदेकजन्मकरणासम्भवात्। न च नाशो ऽस्ति कर्मण इत्यवश्यं जन्मान्तरफलदानाय तानि प्रतिपालयन्तीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्यसम्भव एवै-कभविककर्मवादस्य। तदुक्तम्—

फलति यदि न सर्वं तत्कदाचित्तदैव ध्रुवमपरमभुक्तं कर्म शास्त्रीयमास्ते। इति।

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54 cd.] $M^{Y}P_3^{s}P_4^{s}M_1M_3^{s}$; इंद्रत्वादिफलं वेदे ऽप्युच्यते तत्पृथक् पृथगिति M^{Y}; उद्रीन्द्र-त्वादिफलं वेदे प्युच्यते तत् पृथक् पृथक् P_1^{s}(unmetrical); इन्द्रत्वादिफलमिति $P_1P_2P_3$ M_2E (E gives 54cd after 54ab above) 54 cd. This half-verse is the same as *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 3:89ab except that the latter contains no *api*.

54.17 पृथगिति जन्म] प्रथ— P_1 54.19 °यन्तीत्यभ्युप°] °य— P_1

54.15 वाजपेयेन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेत Source unknown; see annotation to the translation.

54.21 फलति यदि न सर्वं तत्कदाचित्तदैव ध्रुवमपरमभुक्तं कर्म शास्त्रीयमास्ते *Śloka-vārttika citrākṣepaparihāra* 26cd. Also quoted in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. 1, p. 166.

54.14 °हैवं] *conj. Isaacson*; °हैव Σ 54.15 °कामो यजेत' इति] $M^{Y}M_1M_2E$; °कांमा यजेतेति P_1; °कामो यजतेति P_2; °कामे यजतेति P_3 54.16 ज्योतिष्टोमा-दि] *conj.* (cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*); *om.* $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$ 54.16 निषिद्ध°] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_1E$; निषद्ध° P_2; निषिद्ध M_2 54.17 पृथक् पृथगिति] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1E_V$; प्रथक् प्रथ—P_1; पृथक् पृथगियति M_2; प्रथक् प्रथगिति E_D 54.18 कर्मण] Σ; कर्म्म P_1 54.19 जन्मान्तर°] Σ; जलान्तर° P_2 54.19 प्रतिपालयन्ती°] *conj. Sanderson*; प्रतिपादयन्ती° $M^{Y}M_1E$; प्रतिपादय— P_1; प्रदीपयन्ती° $P_2P_3M_2$ 54.19 इत्यसम्भव] Σ; इत्सम्भव M_1 54.20 °कभविककर्मवादस्य] $M^{Y}P_1^{pc}M_2E_V$; °कभविक+क+र्म्मवा-दस्य P_1; °कभविकर्म्मवादस्य $P_1^{ac}P_2$; °कभविककर्म्मवादास्य P_3; ⊔ र्मवादस्य M_1; °कभाविककर्मवादस्य E_D 54.21 सर्वं] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3^{pc}M_1M_2E_V$; सर्वेन् P_3^{ac}; सर्वविषयं E_D(unmetrical) 54.21 °त्तदैव] E_V; तदेव M^{Y}(unmetrical); °त्तदेव $P_1P_2P_3M_1$ M_2E_D 54.21 ध्रुवमपरमभुक्तं] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1E_V$; द्रुवम् परम् भुक्तम् P_1(unmetrical); ध्रुवमपरं भुक्तं M_2E_D(unmetrical)

नन्वनारब्धकार्यं कर्मैव न सम्भवतीत्युक्तम्। को वान्यथैतदाह? किन्तु सर्वेण धर्माधर्मात्मकेन पुरुषकर्मणा स्वफलानुगुणः प्रकृतिसंस्कार एव कार्यः, तथा दृष्टत्वात् कृष्यादेरपि पुरुषव्यापारस्य। स तु तेनाप्यारब्ध एव। संस्कारस्त्वसौ स्वपरिपाकापेक्षः, प्रतिबन्धकतीव्रकर्मफलभोगक्षयापेक्षया क्वचिद् विशिष्टभुवनभोगक्षयापेक्षया च, अविरुद्धकर्मफलसहकारिसहायः केवलो वा कस्मिंश्चिज्जन्मनि कदाचित् तत्फलं निक्षेपमिव पुरुषाय दास्यति। इत्यसर्वज्ञैः कर्मविपाकवैचित्र्यं नावधारयितुं शक्यत इति जन्मान्तरफलदकर्मसम्भवादुक्तवदकेवलितैव सांख्यमुक्तानामिति॥ ५४॥

[३.१६.२ कैवल्यविज्ञानकेवलित्वयोर्व्यत्यासः]

ननु कर्मक्षयाद् युष्मदागमे ऽपि केवलित्वमात्मनः श्रूयते, तत्कथमिति। आह—

54.23 °कार्यं कर्मैव] °का— P_1 54.25 तथा] — P_1 54.26 °भोगक्षया°] °भे— या° P_1 54.32 °क्षयाद् युष्मदागमे] °क्ष—गमे P_1

54.30 उक्तवत् See verse 53cd and commentary.

54.23 नन्वना°] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_1$; न त्वना° M_2; नन्वेतावता° E 54.23 को वान्यथैतदाह] $M^{\gamma}P_1^{pc}$; को वान्यथैतथाह P_1^{ac}; को वान्यथैतदाहि P_2; को वान्य ⊔ ाह P_3; को वान्यथेति तदाह M_1; को वात्यथैवाह M_2; को ऽन्यथैतदाह E 54.24 °धर्मात्मकेन] Σ; °धर्म्मात्मत्मेन P_3 54.24 °गुणः] $M^{\gamma}P_1P_2P_3M_2$; °गुणतः M_1; °ग्राहिणा E 54.25 स तु तेना°] $M^{\gamma}P_1E$; भोगस्तु तेना° M_1; स तु केना° $P_2P_3M_2$ 54.25–26 एव। संस्कारस्त्वसौ] $M^{\gamma c}P_1P_2P_3M_2E$; एव संस्कार×:× स्त्वसौ M^{γ}; व्य ⊔ त्वसौ M_1 54.26 स्वपरिपाकापेक्षः] Σ; सपरिपाकापेक्ष° M_2 54.26–27 क्वचिद् विशिष्ट°] Σ; क्वचिदविशिष्ट° M_1 54.27 °पेक्षया च, अवि°] M^{γ}; °पेक्षया अवि° P_2P_3; °पेक्षया— P_1; °क्षया वि° M_1; °पेक्षया वावि° M_2; °पेक्षया वि° E 54.27 °कर्म°] Σ; °धर्म° M_2 54.27 °सहायः केवलो वा क°] $P_1P_2M_1E$; °सहायः — M^{γ}; °सहायः केवले वा क° P_3; °स ⊔ केवलो M_2 54.28 तत्फलं] M_1M_2E; — M^{γ}; तत्फल° $P_1P_2P_3$ 54.29 कर्मविपाकवैचित्र्यं] $M^{\gamma}P_2M_1M_2E$; —पकवैचित्र्यान् P_1; कर्मविपाकवैचित्रन् P_3 54.29 शक्यत] Σ; शकयते M_1 54.30 °सम्भवादुक्तवदकेवलितैव] $M^{\gamma c}P_1$; °संभवादुक्तवदकेवलतैव $M^{\gamma ac}$; °संभवादुक्तवदेवाकेवलितैव P_2; °सम्भवादुक्तवदेव केवलितैव P_3E; °संभवादु ⊔ लितैव M_1; °सम्भवादुक्तव केवलितैव M_2 54.32 ननु कर्मक्षयाद्] $M^{\gamma}M_1M_2$; ननु कर्म्मक्ष— P_1; ननु कर्म्म निवृत्य P_2; ननु कर्म्मनिवृत्या P_3; ननु E 54.32 केवलित्वमात्मनः] P_1M_2E; केवलत्वमात्मनः M^{γ}; केवलित्वमात्मन $P_2P_3M_1$ 54.32 तत्कथम्] Σ; कथम् E

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रभुवने कैवल्यं सम्भवेत् पशोः।
विज्ञानयोगसंन्यासैर्भोगाद्वा कर्मणः क्षयात्॥ ५५॥

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रादिसंज्ञकनिवासस्थाने कलाभुवने विज्ञानेन मायापुरुषविवेकविषयेण, योगेन प्रत्याहाराद्यङ्गोपकृतेन चित्तजयात्मना, मायाविवेकफलेन संन्यासेन वा कर्मणः 'सर्वमेतदीश्वराय' इति ईश्वरार्पितसर्वकर्मणा, तत्फलविषयेण भोगेनैव वा सर्वकर्मक्षयात् सर्वथा भोक्तृत्वनिवृत्तिनिमित्तं कैवल्यं सम्भवति तत्रैव, न तु भवन्मुक्ताविति॥ ५५॥

[३.१६.३ कैवल्यं न मोक्षः]

ननु तदेव कैवल्यमस्माकं मोक्षो भविष्यतीति। आह—

55abcd.] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; अङ्गुष्ठमात्रभुवन इति $P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 55a. अङ्गुष्ठमात्रभुवने] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}M_{1}M^{S}_{3}E$; अंगुष्ठमात्रं भुवने P^{S}_{4}; कलातत्त्वोर्ध्वभुवने quotation in *Sārdhatriśatikālottaravṛtti*, p. 13 55 b. पशोः] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}E$; ⊔ M_1 55 c. °संन्यासै°] $M^{Y}P^{S}_{3}M_{1}E_{V}$; °सन्न्यासात्सै° P^{S}_{1}(unmetrical); °सन्यासै° P^{S}_{4} 55 d. कर्मणः क्षयात्] $M^{Y}_{M}P^{S}_{4}M^{S}_{3}{}^{c}E$; कर्मणः क्षयादिति M^{Y}; कर्मण क्षयात् $P^{S}_{1}P^{S}_{3}M_{1}$; कर्मक्षयात् $M^{S}_{3}{}^{ac}$(unmetrical)

55.1 विज्ञानेन माया°] विज्ञाने— P_1 55.2 Testimony of A_1 resumes on f.206r (ff. 204–5 apparently lost). 55.5 सम्भवति] स— P_1

55.1 °संज्ञकनिवासस्थाने] $P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; °संज्ञकानां निवासस्थाने M^{Y}; °संज्ञककानिवासस्थाने P_1 55.2 प्रत्याहाराद्यङ्गोपकृतेन] $M^{Y}P_1P_3M_2E$; —गो—तेन A_1; प्रत्याहाराद्यंगोपकृतेनि P_2; प्रत्याहार ⊔ पाकृतेन M_1 55.2 माया विवेकफलेन] $M^{Y}M_2E$; मायापुरुषविवेकफलेन A_1; मायापुरुषविवेकफलेन $P_1P_2P_3M_1$ 55.3 'सर्वमेतदीश्वराय' इति ईश्वरार्पितसर्वकर्मणा] $M^{Y}P_3M_1$; सर्वमेतदीश्वरायेदि—रार्प्पितसर्वकर्म्मणा A_1; सर्व—दीश्वरायेति। ईश्वरार्प्पितसर्वकर्म्मणा P_1; सर्वमेतदीश्वरायेति ईश्वरार्प्पितसर्वकर्म्मण P_2; सर्वमेतदीश्वरायेदीश्वरार्पितसर्वकर्मणा M_2; सर्वमीश्वरायैतदितीश्वरार्पितसर्वकर्मणस् E 55.4 भोगेनैव] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_2E$; भोगेन P_2P_3; भो ⊔ नैव M_1 55.4 °कर्मक्षयात् सर्वथा] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E_{V}$; °कं क्षयात्। सर्वधा P_2; °कर्मक्षयात् सर्वधा E_D 55.5 भवन्मुक्ताविति] $M^{Y}P_2P_3$; भवन्मुक्ता A_1M_2; भवतां मुक्ताविति P_1; भवतामिव मुक्ताविति M_1; भवदुक्ताविति E 55.7 तदेव] Σ; तदैवम् P_1 55.7 °स्माकं मोक्षो भविष्यतीति। आह] Σ; °स्माकमोक्षो भवतीत्याह P_2

जातं च तत्तमोभूरि गीतमात्मवधः फलम्।
उपादानलयस्त्वेवं दृक्क्रियागुणसंक्षयात्।
तदेषा महती भ्रान्तिरुत्पन्ना भवतां यतः॥ ५६॥

यत्तदपि कैवल्यं मुक्तिरिष्टा, तदपि हि मलसङ्गावादात्मनां प्रत्युत अकलावस्थावत् किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वकर्तृत्वयोरप्यभावात् फलमात्मनाश एव, भवतामपि गुणोपादानाव्यक्तलयो मोक्षो यतः॥ ५६॥ 3

[४ उपसंहारः]

एवं सांख्यपक्षमप्याभास्योपसंहर्तुं सर्वान् प्रत्याह—

[४.१ आत्मनाशः श्रेयोर्थिभिः परिहार्यः] 6

मूढानां ज्येष्ठमल्लास्ते येषां स्वात्मा विनश्यति।

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56 abcdef.] जातमिति $A_1P_1P_2P_3M_2$ 56 ab. जातं च तत्तमोभूरि गीतमात्मवधः फलम्] *conj.*; जातं च तत्तमोभूरि गीतमात्मवधे फलम् $M^{\gamma}M^{\gamma}_{M}$; जातञ्च तत्तमो भूरि गीतामात्मवधतः फलम् P^{s}_{1}(unmetrical); जातञ्च तत्तमोभूरि गीतमात्मपयः फलम् P^{s}_{3}; जातञ्च तन्तमोभूरि गीतमात्मवध फलं P^{s}_{4}(unmetrical); जातं च तत्तमोभूरि गीतमा ⊔ : फलम् M_1; जातं च तत्तमोभूरि गतमात्मपयः फलम् M^{s}_{3}; जातं मुक्त्यर्थमात्मायमित्थमात्मलयः फलम् E 56 c. उपादानलयस्त्वेवं] $M^{\gamma}M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M^{s}_{3}$; उपादानलयस्त्वेव M_1; उपादाने लयस्यैव E 56 d. °गुणसंक्षयात्] $M^{\gamma}M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1E$; ⊔ M^{s}_{3} 56 ef. तदेषा महती भ्रान्तिरुत्पन्ना भवतां यतः] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P^{s}_{1}M_1$; तदेषा महती भ्रान्तिरुत्पन्ना भवतां यत इति M^{γ}; तदेषा(≃ देषा M^{s}_{3}) महती भ्रान्तिरुत्पन्न भगवतां यतः $P^{s}_{3}M^{s}_{3}$(unmetrical); तदेषा महती भ्रान्तिरुत्पन्ना भवतावतः P^{s}_{4}; *om.* E 57 a. ज्येष्ठमल्लास्ते] $A_1P_1P^{s}_{1}P_2P^{s}_{3}M_1M_2M^{s}_{3}E$; ज्येष्ठमल्यास्ते M^{γ}; ज्येष्ठकल्पास्ते M^{γ}_{M}; जेष्ठमल्लास्ते P_3; ज्येष्ठमूलास्ते P^{s}_{4} 57 b. विनश्यति] $M^{\gamma}_{M}A_1P_1P^{s}_{1}P_2P_3P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M_2M^{s}_{3}$; विनश्यतीति M^{γ}; °पि नश्यति E (E gives the text of 57abcd together here)

56.1 यत्तदपि कैवल्यं] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; यत्तदप्यकैवल्य° P_2; यत्तदपि कैवलम् P_3 56.1 तदपि हि] $M^{\gamma}M_1M_2E$; तदापि +हि+ A_1; तदापि $A^{ac}_{1}P_1$; तदापि हि P_2P_3 56.1 मलसङ्गावादात्मनां] P_2P_3; मलसङ्गावादात्मना M^{γ}; मलसङ्गावादात्मनः A_1M_2 E; मलसत्भाव—नाम् P_1; मलसङ्गावा ⊔ त्मनां M_1 56.1–2 अकलावस्थावत्] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1M_2E$; कलावस्थावत् P_2; अकालावस्थावत् P_3; सकलावस्थावत् M_1 56.3 गुणोपादानाव्यक्तलयो] $A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; गुणोपादाव्यक्तलयो M^{γ}; गुणोपादानाव्यक्तकलयो P_2P_3 56.3 मोक्षो यतः] $M^{\gamma}P_3M_1E$; म्मोक्षो मतो यतः A_1; मोक्षो मते--- P_1; मोक्षो यतस्ततः P_2; मोक्षो मतो यतः M_2 56.5 °प्याभ्यास्यो°] $M^{\gamma}A_1P_1P^{rc}_{2}M_1M_2E$; °प्यभाxवxस्यो° P_2; °प्यभ्यास्यो° P_3

त एते सर्ववादिनो मूढप्रधानाः श्रेयोर्थिभिर्दूरतरं परिहार्याः, येषामश्रेयस्ये-
वात्मनाशे तत्सदृशे वा परश्रेयोबुद्धिः। अपुरुषार्थभूतः सर्वेषां मोक्ष इत्यर्थः।
3 तथा हि—

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयस्य वा ज्ञप्तेरभावात् सर्ववादिनाम्।
आत्मनाशसमो मोक्षो ज्ञत्वव्यक्तेः परत्र तु॥ इति।

6 ननु संक्रान्तिवादिनां नात्मनाशो विमुक्ताविति। आह—

ज्ञातॄणां पण्डितंमन्याः शिखासंक्रान्तिवादिनः॥ ५७॥

शिखा शक्तिः, तत्संक्रान्तिवादिनो मुक्तावपण्डिता एव, यतो नास्मात् प्र-

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57 cd.] ज्ञातॄणां पण्डितंमन्या इति E (E give 57cd together with 57ab above) 57c. ज्ञातॄणां पण्डितंमन्याः] $M^{Y}M^{Y}_{M}A_1M_1M_2M^{s}_{3}E$; ज्ञातृणाम् पण्डितंमन्याः $P_1P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}$; ज्ञात्राणां पण्डितंमन्याश् P_2; ज्ञातृणा पण्डितंमन्याश् P_3; ज्ञातॄणां पण्डितम्मन्या P^{s}_{4} 57d. °संक्रान्तिवादिनः] $M^{Y}_{M}A_1P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{4}M_1M_2M^{sc}_{3}$; °संक्रान्तिवादिन × ा× मि इति M^{Y}; °संक्रान्तवादिनः P_1P_2; क्रान्तवादिनः P_3(unmetrical); °संक्रान्तिवादनः $P^{s}_{3}M^{sac}_{3}$

57.2 इत्यर्थः] इत्य— P_1

57.4 –5 ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयस्य वा ⋯ ज्ञत्वव्यक्तौ परत्र तु Quoted by Rāmakaṇṭha as his own verse ad *Matangavidyāpāda* 5:60–1 and quoted (immediately followed by *Paramokṣa* 57ab) as belonging to the *Mantravārttikaṭīkā* in the *Śivayogasāra* (p. 33).

57.1 त एते] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2E$; त एवैते P_2; त एव ते P_3 57.1 सर्ववादिनो] $M^{Y}P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; सर्वादिनो A_1P_1 57.1 °प्रधानाः] $M^{Y}E$; °प्रथाना P_1; °प्रधाना $A_1P_3M_1M_2$; °प्रधान— P_2 57.1 श्रेयोर्थिभिर्दूरतरं] $M^{Y}A_1P_1M_1M_2E_V$; श्रेयोर्त्थि×ति×भिर्दूतः P_2; श्रेयोर्त्थिभिद्वरतः P_3; श्रेयोर्थिभिद्वरतरं E_D 57.1 परिहार्याः, येषामश्रेयस्ये°] $A_1P_3M_1M_2E$; परिहार्या एषामश्रेयसे° M^{Y}; परिहार्या येषाम्मश्रेयसे° P_1; परिहार्य्याः येषां ×म(?)× श्रयसै° P_2; परिहार्या येषामश्रयस्ये° P_3 57.2 तत्सदृशे वा] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P^{pc}_{3}M_1M_2E$; तत्। सदृशैव P_2; तत्सदृशै वा P^{pc}_{3} 57.2 परश्रेयोबुद्धिः] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E_V$; परमश्रेयोबुद्धिर् A_1; पुरश्रेयोबुद्धिर् M_2; परश्रेयोबुद्धिः E_D 57.4 ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयस्य] $M^{Y}P_3M_1M_2E$; ज्ञातुज्ञेयस्य $A_1P_1P_2$ 57.5 °समो मोक्षो] $M^{Yc}A_1P_1P_2P^{pc}_{3}M_1E$; °समो +मो+क्षो M^{Y}; °समो मोक्षे+ा+ P_3; °संमोक्षो M_2(unmetrical) 57.5 °व्यक्तेः परत्र तु] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2$; °व्यक्तौ परत्र तु $M^{Y}P_1E$ 57.6 ननु संक्रान्ति°] $M^{Y}E$; ननु संक्रान्त° $A_1P_1P_3M_2$; ननु संक्र° P_2; संक्रान्ति° M_1 57.6 नात्मनाशो] Σ; मात्मनाशो M^{Y} 57.6 विमुक्ताविति। आह] $M^{Yc}A_1M_2E$; +वि+मुक्तावित्याह M^{Y}; —त्याह P_1; विमुक्तावित्यत आह P_2; विमुक्तावि ⊔ त आह P_3; विमुक्तावित्यह M_1 57.7 शिखा शक्तिः, तत्संक्रान्तिवादिनो] Σ; *om.* M_1(eyeskip) 57.7 मुक्तावपण्डिता] Σ; मुक्तापण्डिता P_1 57.7 नास्मात्] Σ; नस्मात् A_1

सङ्गान्मुच्यन्त इत्युक्तम्—

शम्भुरेव हि तत्रापि सर्वं वेत्ति करोति च। इति॥ ५७॥ 9

[४.२ सर्वेष्वप्यागमेषु प्रामाण्यम्]

यद्येवं सर्वेषामेव मोक्षशास्त्राणामुक्तवद्बाधितत्वात् परस्परविरोधाच्च किमप्रामाण्यमेव? नेत्याह— 12

वस्तुन्यूनत्वमन्येषाम्

न हि सर्वेण प्रमाणेन सर्वार्थेन भवितव्यमित्यल्पार्थप्रकाशकत्वेन प्रत्यक्षादिवदेवान्यान्यपि प्रमाणान्येव। कथं स्वल्पार्थदर्शित्वमेषामित्याह—

रागाद्यूर्ध्वमभाषणात्।

रागविद्यादि तत्त्वजातं च तद्, ऊर्ध्वं प्रक्रियया गुणादिभ्य ऊर्ध्वं च तत्। 3

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58 a. वस्तुन्यूनत्वमन्येषाम्] $M^{\gamma}_{M}P_1P^{s}_{1}P^{s}_{3}P^{s}_{4}M_1M^{s}_{3}E$; वस्तुन्यूनत्वमन्येषामिति $M^{\gamma}P_2P_3$; वस्तुन्यूनत्वमेषां A_1M_2(unmetrical) (M_1 gives the text of 58ab together here; E gives the text of 58abcd together here) 58 b. रागाद्यूर्ध्वमभाषणात्] $M^{\gamma}_{M}A_1P_1P^{s}_{1}P_3P^{s}_{3}$; रागादूर्ध्वमभाषणादिति $M^{\gamma}E$; रागदूर्द्धमभाषाणात् P_2; रागादूर्ध्वमभाषणात् $P^{s}_{4}M_2$; रागादूर्ध्वंमभाषणादिति M_1; रागाद्यूर्ध्व ⊔ भाषणात् M^{s}_{3}

57.11 बाधितत्वात्] बाधि— P_1

57.9 शम्भुरेव हि तत्रापि सर्वं वेत्ति करोति च *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 29ab.

57.8 मुच्यन्त] P_3; मुच्यत Σ 57.11 °णामुक्तवद्] $A_1P_1P_2P_3$; °णां मुक्तवद् $M^{\gamma}M_1M_2E$ 57.11 परस्परविरोधाच्च] $A_1P_2P_3M_1M_2E$; परस्परं विरोद्धाच्च M^{γ}; परस्परविरोधाच्छि P_1 57.11–12 किमप्रामाण्यमेव? नेत्याह] P_1M_1; किं तत्प्रामाण्यं नैवेत्याह M^{γ}; किमप्रामाण्यमेवन्नेत्याह P_3; किं प्रामाण्यम् एवं नेत्याह $A_1P_2M_2E$ 58.1 भवितव्यमित्यल्पार्थप्रकाशकत्वेन] E_V; भवितव्यमितीत्यल्पार्थप्रकाशकत्वेन M^{γ}; भवितव्यमित्यल्पार्थप्रकाशत्वेन $A_1P_2P_3M_2E_D$; भवितव्य×≍≍× +मित्य+ पल्पार्त्थप्रकाश≍त्वेन P_1; भवितव्यमित्यतुल्पार्थप्रकाशत्वेन M_1 58.1–2 प्रत्यक्षादिवदेवा°] $M^{\gamma}A^{c}_{1}P_3M_1M_2E$; प्रत्यक्षादियदेवा° A^{ac}_{1}; प्रत्यक्षादिवादेवा° P_1; प्रत्यक्षादिवा° P_2 58.2 स्वल्पार्थदर्शित्वमेषामित्याह] E; स्वल्पार्थदर्शित्वेमेषामित्याह M^{γ}; स्वल्पार्थदर्शित्वमेषामित्याह $A_1P_1M_1M_2$; स्वल्पार्त्थदर्शित्वमेषामित्यत्राह P_2P_3 58.3 ऊर्ध्वं प्रक्रियया] *conj.*; ऊर्ध्वप्रक्रिया $M^{\gamma}P_3M_2E$; ऊर्ध्वप्रक्रियाया A_1M_1; ऊर्द्धप्रक्रियया P_1P_2

ऊर्ध्वशब्दसमानार्थो ऽयमूर्ध्वशब्दः। तस्य रागाद्यूर्ध्वसमस्ततत्त्वजातस्यानुक्तेर्न्यूनदर्शित्वं तेषाम्।

6 [४.३ आगमान्तरैः प्राप्यानि फलानि]

यद्येवमागमान्तरैः किं प्राप्यत इति? आह—

तेन मायानतीतत्वाज्ज्ञातारः सद्मसु स्थिताः॥ ५८॥

येन रागाद्यूर्ध्वं तैर्न दृष्टं तेन मायातत्त्वादधस्ते ज्ञातारो दर्शनान्तरमुक्तास्त-
9 त्त्वभुवनस्कन्धेषु लीनाः। कस्य कस्मिन् लय इति चेत्, तदेतत्प्रदर्शितमागमप्रामाण्योपन्यासेन ज्ञानकाण्डे॥ ५८॥

[४.४ अस्मादेव शास्त्रात्पररूपं श्रेयः]

12 उपसंहर्तुमाह—

इत्येवं वादिगीतानि फलान्युक्तानि लेशतः।
तत्साधनेषु शिष्याणामप्रवृत्तिफलं प्रति॥ ५९॥

58cd.] Σ; तेन मायानतीतत्वादिति E (but E gives 58cd in the form we have accepted, above, together with 58ab) 58d. सद्मसु स्थिताः] $M^Y_M M_1$; सद्मसु स्थिता इति M^Y; सत्मसु स्थिताः $A_1^{ac} P_1 P_1^S P_2 P_3 P_3^S P_4^S$; सात्मसुस्थिताः $A_1^c M_2 M_3^S$ 59cd. शिष्याणामप्रवृत्तिफलं प्रति] $M^Y_M A_1 P_2 P_3 P_4^S M_1 E$; शिष्याणामप्रतीतिफलं प्रतीति M^Y; शिष्याणाम् प्रवृत्तिफलम् प्रति $P_1 P_1^S P_3^S M_3^S$ (unmetrical); शिष्यमाणः प्रवृत्तिफलं प्रति M_2

58.8–9 °स्तत्त्वभुवन°] —भुवन° P_1

58.9–10 तदेतत्प्रदर्शितमागमप्रामाण्योपन्यासेन See introduction to the *Kiraṇavṛtti* pp. xxi–xxv.

58.3–4 गुणादिभ्य ऊर्ध्वं च तत्। ऊर्ध्वशब्दसमानार्थो ऽयमूर्ध्वशब्दः] M^Y; ⏑णादिभ्य ऊर्द्धञ्च तदूर्द्धं शब्दसमानार्त्थोयमूर्द्धशब्दस् P_1; गुणादिभ्य उ—ञ्च तदूर्द्धसमानार्थोयमूर्द्धशब्दस् P_2; गुणादिभ्य ऊर्ध्वञ्च तदूर्ध्वं समानार्थोयमूर्ध्वशब्दस् $A_1 P_3 M_2$; गुणादिभ्य ऊर्ध्वं च तत्। ऊर्ध्व+:+ शब्दसमानोयमूर्ध्वशब्दः M_1; गुणादिभ्यस्तदूर्ध्वं चितः। ऊर्ध्वशब्दसमानार्थो ऽयमूर्ध्वशब्दः E_V; गुणादिभ्यस्तदूर्ध्वं चित ऊर्ध्वं शब्दसमानार्थो ऽयमूर्ध्वशब्दः E_D 58.4 रागाद्यूर्ध्व°] $M^Y P_1 P_2 P_3 M_1$; रागाद्यूर्द्धं A_1; रागादूर्ध्व° M_2; रागादूर्ध्वं E 58.4–5 °नुक्तेर्न्यूनदर्शित्वं] $P_1 P_3 M_1 E$; °नुक्ते न्यूनदर्शित्वं $M^Y P_2 M_2$; °नुक्तेर्न्यूनदर्शितत्वन् A_1 58.8 रागाद्यूर्ध्वं] $M^Y P_3 M_2$; रागादूर्ध्वं $A_1 M_1 E$; रागाद्यूर्द्ध P_1; रागद—र्द्धन् P_2 58.8 तैर्न दृष्टं तेन] Σ; नैर्न्न दृष्टान्तेन P_1 58.8 °धस्ते ज्ञातारो] Σ; °यस्ते ज्ञातां ⊔ राग° M_1 58.9–10 तदेतत्प्रदर्शितमागम°] $A_1 P_1 P_2 P_3 M_2$; तदेतत्प्रदर्शितमस्यागम° M^Y; प्रदर्शितमागम° M_1; तदेतत्दर्शितमागम° E 58.10 °न्यासेन] P_3; °न्यासे $M^Y A_1$; °न्यासे स्वेन $P_1 M_1 E$; °ज्ञानसेन P_2; °न्यासो M_2

सर्ववादिसिद्धानि फलानि मुक्तिलक्षणान्येव संक्षेपेणोक्तानि। कमर्थं प्रत्युक्तानीति चेत्, एतदुक्तं— फलसाधनं शास्त्रमनवधार्य निकृष्टफले प्रवर्तन्त इति। श्रेयोर्थिभिरेवायोगान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदेनात्रैव प्रवर्तनीयम्। अस्माद्धि 3
पररूपं श्रेयः सम्पद्यत इति।

एता रौरववृत्तिकृत् कथितवान् दीक्षाक्रमे कारिकाः
सर्वान्यागममोक्षदूषणगता गाम्भीर्यतो नैव याः। 6
स्वल्पज्ञैरवगाहिताः किल यतस्तद्रामकण्ठस्त्विमं
श्रीनारायणकण्ठसूनुरकरोदासां विवेकं स्फुटम्॥

59.1 संक्षेपेणोक्तानि] Σ; संक्षेपोक्तानि M^{Y} 59.1–2 कमर्थं प्रत्युक्तानीति] *conj.*; किमर्थं प्रत्युक्तमिति $M^{Y}P_3E$; किमर्थं प्रत्युक्तानि A_1M_2; किमर्त्थम् प्रत्युक्ता ×नीति× नि किमर्त्थम् प्रत्युक्तानीति P_1; किमर्थं प्रत्युक्तिमिति P_2; किमर्थं ⊔ त्युक्तानीति M_1 59.2 चेत्, एतदुक्तं] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_3M_2E$; चेतदुक्तं P_2; चेत्तदुक्तं M_1 59.2 °फलसाधनं] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2P_3E$; °फलसाधन° M_1; फल ⊔ नं M_2 59.2 °मनवधार्य] $M^{Y}P_1P_2P_3M_1E$; °मवधार्य A_1M_2 59.2 °फले प्रवर्तन्त] $M^{Y}A_1M_1M_2E$; °फलप्र× ास्य× वर्त्तन्त P_1; °फले प्रवृत्तत P_2; °फले प्रवर्त्तत P_3 59.3 °रेवायोगान्ययोग°] $A_1P_2P_3M_2$; रेव योग° $M^{Y}P_1$; °रेवान्ययोग° M_1; °रायोग° E 59.3 °त्रैव] $M^{Y}P_1P_2M_1M_2E$; °त्रै A_1; °त्रैत्रैव P_3 59.4 पररूपं] $M^{Y}P_1M_1E$; परं $A_1P_2P_3M_2$ 59.4 श्रेयः] Σ; निःश्रेयसं E 59.4 सम्पद्यत] $M^{Y}M_1$सम्पाद्यत $A_1P_2P_3M_2E$; सगुप्यत P_1 59.5 एता रौ°] $M^{Y}A_1P_3M_1M_2$; एत+त्+ रौ° P_1; एतद्रौ° E 59.5 °कृत् कथितवान् दीक्षाक्रमे कारिकाः] $M^{Y}P_3$; °कृत् कथितवत् दीक्षाक्रमे कारिकास् P_1; °कृत्कथित+व+ान्दीक्षाक्रमे कारकास् P_2; °कृत्कृतधिया दीक्षाक्रमे कारिकारिकास् A_1(unmetrical); °कृत्कथितवान्मोक्षक्रमे कारिका M_1; °कृतधिया दीक्षाक्रमे कानिकास् M_2(unmetrical); °कृन्मतधिया दीक्षाक्रमात् कारिकाः E 59.6 सर्वान्या°] Σ; सर्वन्या° M_1 59.6 °गता] $M^{Y}P_2P_3E$; °गताः A_1M_2; °गतात् P_1M_1 59.6 याः] Σ; या A_1 59.7 किल] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2M_2E$; ⊔ ल P_3; किलं M_1 59.7 °कण्ठस्त्विमं] $M^{Y}A_1P_1P_2^{pc}P_3M_1E$; °कण्ठ(राश्रेयस्संपाद्यत इति)स्त्विमन् P_2; °कर्णमन्तस्त्विमं M_2^{ac}(unmetrical); °कण्ठमन्तस्त्विमं M_2^{pc}(unmetrical) 59.8 श्रीनारा°] M^{Y}; तन्नारा° $A_1P_1P_3M_1M_2E$; तान्नारा° P_2 59.8 °रकरोदासां विवेकं] $A_1P_1M_2E$; °करोदासां विवेक° $M^{Y}P_3$; °करोदासां विवेक° P_2; °राक्रिरा (रचिता) दासां विवेक° M_1 • Colophon: इति श्रीमद्भट्टनारायणकण्ठात्मजश्रीभट्टरामकण्ठविरचिता परमोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तिः समाप्ता] E (E_D adds शुभमस्तु); परमोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तिः समाप्ता $M^{Y}M_1M_2$; उ परमोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तिस्समाप्ता उ शुभमस्तु A_1; उ ब्रह्मविद्यायै नमः —मोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तिस्समाप्ता। उ श्रीमत् श्वेत ≍नमः उ दक्षिणामूर्त्तये नमः P_1; इति परमोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तिस्समाप्ताः— हरि ओम्—श्रीशिवकामसुन्दर्यै नमः P_2; परमोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तिस्समाप्तः। उ P_3

इति श्रीमद्भट्टनारायणकण्ठात्मजश्रीभट्टरामकण्ठविरचिता
परमोक्षनिरासकारिकावृत्तिः समाप्ता॥

TRANSLATION

1 Introduction: verse 1

So having shown with this much (*iyatā*) [of his commentary on the *Raurava*] that the [placing of] the hand of Śiva [on the initiand] is paramount,[79] [Sadyo-

[79]Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of the expression *iyatā* in this very first sentence of the text makes clear that Sadyojyotiḥ's *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* was not envisaged as a complete text, but rather as part of a larger one. For an account of the various parts of this larger whole, known as the *Rauravavṛtti*, and the likely order in which they fell, see Introduction, section 6.

Is this sentence claiming that the whole of the *Rauravavṛtti* up to this point, or just its previous section, has established the supremacy of *śivahasta*? Rāmakaṇṭha uses the expression *tad iyatā* three other times in this text, and many times in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, the *Kiraṇavṛtti* and the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti*, in exactly this construction (i.e. *tad iyatā* + absolutive + *adhunā*/*samprati* + present tense verb—here *āha*—the subject of which is either the author of the text being commented on, or the *pūrvapakṣin* who is speaking at that point) to refer just to the previous section. Thus there may have been more than one part of the *Rauravavṛtti* preceding the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*.

The placing of the hand of Śiva on the initiand, one of the subsidiary elements (*aṅga*) of initiation, is usually the last part of *samayadīkṣā* (see, for example, *Parākhyatantra* 15:13 and the note thereon, *Tantrāloka* 15:548c–9, and *Dīkṣottara* T.17, p.907, T.127, p.42, T.150, p.86); but some texts nevertheless speak of it as salvific. When, for example, the topic of the placing of *śivahasta* is reached in the *kriyāpāda* of the *Mṛgendratantra* (7:14), Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha quotes a passage which ends with the following statement *pāśacchedakaraḥ kṣemī* [C; *kṣaumī* ed.] *śivahasta iti smṛtaḥ*. It seems then that the placing of *śivahasta* was, for some texts, such a defining moment within *dīkṣā* that it could stand for *dīkṣā* itself.

Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha attributes the just mentioned passage to the *Rurusaṃhitā* (*yathoktaṃ rurusaṃhitāyām*); it is quite likely that it is the very passage that Sadyojyotiḥ comments on in the part of the *Rauravavṛtti* that immediately precedes the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, and to which part Rāmakaṇṭha refers in this first sentence as showing that the placing of the hand of Śiva is paramount. That part of the *Rauravavṛtti* is lost, and the passage attributed to the *Rurusaṃhitā* is not found in the surviving parts of the *Raurava*. Hence it is not clear whether the placing of the hand of Śiva being paramount means simply that that part of Śaiva initiation in which the initiator lays his hand on the initiand is its paramount constituent, or whether it means that Śaiva initiation is a path superior to

jyotiḥ] now (*adhunā*) states in his verses (*kārikābhiḥ*) the meaning of the following two and half sūtras [of the *Raurava*], in order to show first (*tāvat*) that the fruits proclaimed in other systems—both congruent and non-congruent [with Śaiva Siddhānta]—are different from the later to be described[80] fruit of Śaiva initiation:[81]

The path which (*yāṃ gatim*),[82] as a result of delusion, those

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that of all other religions.

[80]For where it will be described, see note 91. The purpose of the word *tāvat* is to contrast this first task of expounding and refuting the conceptions of liberation taught in other systems with the subsequent task of expounding the Śaiva Siddhānta conception of liberation.

[81]The following five lines are not found in what survives of the *Raurava*. They are cited by Madhyārjuna, an author of a much later period, and attributed by him to the *Sarvajñānottara*; but they are not found there, and he is frequently wrong in his identification of scriptural sources. Rāmakaṇṭha certainly seems to have regarded them as belonging to the *Raurava*, for on the one hand he identifies them here and throughout this (sub-) commentary as the verses on which the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* comments, and, on the other, he regards the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* as (part of) a commentary on the *Raurava*. As evidence for this second claim, see for example: (1) the very last lines of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, where he refers to the verses of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* as written by the *rauravavṛttikṛt*, the author of the commentary on the *Raurava*; and (2) Rāmakaṇṭha's remark at *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:20cd (p. 47): *darśitam ācāryeṇa rauravavṛttau paramokṣanirāsakārikābhiḥ*. See also the following two pieces of evidence (cited by GOODALL 1998: xxi): *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 1:15 (lines 29–30), *pradarśitaṃ rauravavṛttiviveke paramokṣanirāsakārikāsv asmābhiḥ*, and *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:55 (p. 95), *darśitaṃ asmābhir vistareṇa rauravavṛttiviveke paramokṣanirāsakārikāsu*, where the expression *rauravavṛttiviveke paramokṣanirāsakārikāsu* can be understood as 'in [that part of] the *Rauravavṛttiviveka* (i.e. the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*) [that comments] on the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikās*.'

The editions and one of our manuscripts follow the citation of the five lines here with *iti rauravasūtram*.

For a possible explanation of the non-occurrence of these five lines in the surviving portions of the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha*, see note 912.

The citation in Madhyārjuna's *Siddhāntadīpikā* includes a sixth line, *sarveṣāṃ kugatir jñeyā tathyam īśvarabhāṣitam*. Professor SANDERSON (conversation, vi.2003) suspected this of being an artificial completion: what reason could Rāmakaṇṭha have had for quoting the passage in a truncated form other than that a line that would neatly complete its sense did not exist or had already been lost in his time? That he did quote the last line, it subsequently dropping out during transmission, is precluded by his compound *sārdhasūtradvayasya* ('two and a half sūtras') immediately after the quotation.

[82]The *Siddhāntadīpikā* reads here *ye* for *yāṃ*. This results in a superficially cleaner text: all of the correlatives can then refer to people, which means they are smoothly picked up

learned in Sāṅkhya and Yoga follow, the Vedic path which[83] those learned in the knowledge of Vedānta accept, those who are devoted to Pāñcarātra,[84] the Yogins and the Great Lords,[85] those

in Madhyārjuna's sixth line by *sarveṣām*. But if we read *ye* here (and if the *ye* in the fifth line is taken as referring to people), then *pravadanti* in that fifth line lacks an object. Given, furthermore, that the authenticity of the sixth line is in doubt (see previous note), and given that this passage is in *aiśa* Sanskrit, we have judged it more likely that the *yām* transmitted in all of the manuscripts and in the editions is original. We thus have some relative pronouns referring to people and some to paths.

[83]Understanding a *yām*, or reading again the one in the first line, to go with *gatiṃ vaidikīm*.

[84]In the second *kārikā* of Sadyojyotiḥ's text, he begins listing the fruits of other systems that he will go on to refute. We have no way of knowing precisely which of the fruits listed by Sadyojyotiḥ he saw as connected with which of the people listed in these two and a half verses of the *Raurava* on which he was commenting. The *Raurava* lists only nine or ten groups of people (depending on whether the compound below, *yogimaheśvarāḥ*, was intended as a *dvandva* or not); Sadyojyotiḥ lists twice as many fruits. But the first four fruits that Sadyojyotiḥ lists in verse 2 seem to map exactly, in the order they are given there, on to the people listed thus far in the *Raurava*: *sāṅkhyavidvāṃsaḥ—kaivalyaṃ, yogavidvāṃsaḥ—sattvasambhogaḥ, vedāntajñānavidvāṃsaḥ—vilayaḥ paramātmani, pāñcarātraratāḥ—avyākṛtādiṣu laya eva vikāriṣu*. For Rāmakaṇṭha's exposition of these fruits, see his commentary to verse 2. When commenting on many of the fruits listed after that by Sadyojyotiḥ, Rāmakaṇṭha correlates with the fruit a particular word used in the *Raurava* to refer to a group of people. He does not do so for any of the four people listed so far, probably because the correlation is obvious enough.

[85]Rāmakaṇṭha takes this as a *dvandva*: see *eta eva yogipadena sūtrakṛtā nirdiṣṭāḥ* in his commentary to 3a, and *etad eva cādhikyaṃ sūtrakṛtā maheśvarapadenoktam* in his commentary to 4a. He claims that Sadyojyotiḥ puts forward *mahāgaṇo maheśasya* ([becoming] a chief attendant of the Supreme Lord) in 3a as the fruit of Yogins, and *ādhikyaṃ parameśānāt* (superiority of the Lord) in 4a as the fruit of *maheśvaras*.

Professor SANDERSON suggested (conversation, vi.2003) that the meaning intended by the author of the *Raurava* may have been simply 'foremost among Yogins', or 'Yogins among the Māheśvaras' (as equivalent in sense to *māheśvarayoginaḥ*), i.e. Yogins who are Śaivas but not initiated. The fruit Sadyojyotiḥ describes as *mahāgaṇo maheśasya* ([becoming] a chief attendant of the Supreme Lord) would be appropriate for such non-initiated Śiva-worshipping Yogins.

We cannot know how Sadyojyotiḥ understood it. But a small piece of evidence against him having taken it as a *dvandva* is that, as mentioned above, the first fruits that Sadyojyotiḥ lists in verse 2 map in exactly that order on to the first people listed in the *Raurava*. Next in the *Raurava* comes *yogimaheśvarāḥ* followed by *pramāṇakartṛtva* and the next two of these clearly correlates with *pramāṇakartṛtva*; hence if Sadyojyotiḥ is still following the order of the *Raurava*, he took *yogimaheśvarāḥ* as referring to one group of people whose fruit he names as *mahāgaṇo maheśasya*. Our translation of these two and a half verses fruits in Sadyojyotiḥ's list are *mahāgaṇo maheśasya* and *akartā sarvavedyavit*. The second

who have agency (*kartṛtva*, i.e. authorship) of the *Pramāṇa* scriptures, those whose agency belongs to fire,[86] [those] agents [who hold that liberation is brought about by the transference] of powers, those agents who are devoid of Impurity (*-amala-*),[87] and [paths] which other expounders of liberation, who [like all of the above] are non-perfected as a result of [their] Impurity,[88] proclaim...[89]

1) Fruits as taught [in other systems] (*yaduktaphala-*) are set out

follows the interpretation of Rāmakaṇṭha.

[86]We have no idea how the author of the *Raurava* intended this compound to be understood. Rāmakaṇṭha understands it as consisting of two elements, *pramāṇakartṛtva* and *āgneyakartṛtva*, and we take him to have understood the first of these as we have translated it, i.e. as a *bahuvrīhi* (*pramāṇeṣu kartṛtvaṃ yasya*), based on his remark (section 2.7), *ta eva hṛdayapramāṇādigranthakartṛtvenātra sūtrakṛtā pramāṇakartṛtvapadenopakṣiptāḥ*, 'It is they who are alluded to in [our root text] by the author of the [*Raurava*]*sūtra* with the word *pramāṇakartṛtva*, as being the authors of the [group of] texts beginning with the *Hṛdayapramāṇa*'. He identifies these people as those who advocate the fruit named by Sadyojyotiḥ as *akartā sarvavedyavit*; for Rāmakaṇṭha's exposition of this view, see his commentary on 3b.

He identifies the people referred to by the second component of this compound, *āgneyakartṛtva* (*āgneyakartṛtvena caite sūtrakṛtā nirdiṣṭāḥ*, 'And the [proponents of this fruit] are indicated by the author of the sūtra as having agency that belongs to fire', see note 204), as those who advocate the fruit named by Sadyojyotiḥ as *samatvaṃ tejasāṃ nidheḥ*, which he explains as meaning 'becoming the same as the sun or fire.' For Rāmakaṇṭha's exposition of this view, see his commentary on 3d.

[87]The meaning of *kārakāḥ* is obscure. See pp. 65–67 above for the idea that it could originally have read *kārukāḥ*, the name of a group of atimārgic Śaivas. But Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary confirms that he read *kārakāḥ*.

He identifies the *viśikhākārakas* as Pāśupatas who hold the doctrine of *śikhāsaṅkrānti* (*ete ca śikhāsaṅkrāntivādinaḥ pāśupatāḥ sūtrakṛtā viśikhākārakatvenoktāḥ*), which maintains that liberation consists in the powers of the Lord being transferred into the liberated soul. For his exposition of this view see his commentary to verse 7. The term *śikhāsaṅkrānti*, which he is probably taking from Sadyojyotiḥ who uses it in verse 57, is analysed by Rāmakaṇṭha in his commentary to that verse as meaning the doctrine that liberation consists in 'transference of [the Lord's] powers (*śikhā*).'

He identifies the *amalakārakas* as those who hold that liberation consists in the fruit named by Sadyojyotiḥ as *nirmalatvaṃ ca kevalam*, a lack of impurity alone, not omniscience or omnipotence. For his exposition of this view see his commentary to verse 4b.

[88]*Malāsiddhā* is a slightly awkward compound (which however we can make sense of by taking it as *malena hetunāsiddhāḥ*). Somdev VASUDEVA suggested that it may be a corruption of *malāviddhā*; M[Y]'s *mahāsiddhā* is also possible.

[89]These two and a half verses do not form a complete sentence, consisting just of a list of paths and members of certain traditions: see note 81.

(*-varṇanam*) [in this *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*] as different from the fruit of the true ritual, whose various subsidiary elements have just been explained [in the previous part of the *Rauravа*].[90]

Fruits taught in other systems (*tantrāntaragītāni*) are set out [below] as different from the later to be taught[91] ***fruit*** of the ritual known as initiation, [that fruit being] the manifestation of omniscience and [omnipotence],

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[90]Or perhaps: in the previous part of the *Rauravavṛtti*. We have conjectured *-vyatirekeṇa* for *-vyatirekāya*; that Rāmakaṇṭha read the former is indicated by *-bhedena* in his commentary to this verse and arguably by *vyatirekeṇa* in the first sentence of the text. We have also conjectured *ukta-* for *uktaṃ*; for *tantrāntaragītāni phalāni varṇyante* in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary, where *-gītāni* reflects *ukta-*, suggests that Rāmakaṇṭha was not reading a verse in which the *varṇana* is *ukta*, but rather one in which the *phala* is *ukta*.

We take *yadukta-* as synonymous with *yathokta-*, though this is admittedly not a frequent usage. If it is deemed implausible, then we have a problem of a hanging *yat*, lacking a co-relative. We considered the possibility that it may be picked up in verse 59 by *tatsādhaneṣu*, and that Rāmakaṇṭha may be suggesting this in the last sentence of his commentary on the present verse. But it would be surprising for Sadyojyotiḥ to use a relative-correlative structure spanning such a large distance; and the referent of *tat-* in that verse is stated in the first half of the verse (*phalāni*).

Another possibility is to separate *yat* from the following compound: this removes the need to take *yadukta-* in the sense of *yathokta-*, but leaves the problem of the hanging relative. The latter could be addressed by understanding a *tat* in this way: *yad uktaphalavarṇanam*, [*tat*] *tatphalavyatirekeṇa*: 'The setting out [below] of fruits taught [by other traditions] is [a setting out of fruits that are] different from the fruit of the true ritual ....' But this is far from a completely satisfactory solution, and it seems to us quite possible that we have a third corruption in the verse. Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary fortunately gives us the means to repair two corruptions, but is not explicit enough to enable us to see what he read for the part of the verse that is transmitted as *yadu-* in some sources and *yat tū-* in others. We suspect *yatho-* as a possibility. *Paśū-* also occurred to us: 'fruits taught by bound souls'.

Professor SANDERSON (2006a: 47, note 11) cites this verse (with *-vyatirekāya*, *uktam*, and *phalasādhanam*, which seems just to be a typo for *phalavarṇanam*) and translates: '[Next] an account of the rewards taught [in other systems] as opposed to that of the true initiation whose various ancillaries have [just] been described.'

[91]We regard it as likely that this cross-reference and the similar one above, in the first line of the text (*dīkṣāphalasya vakṣyamāṇasya*), are referring not to a subsequent part of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* but to the *Mokṣakārikā*. The *Mokṣakārikā* can be known to have come after the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* (see section 68 of the Introduction). The fact that Rāmakaṇṭha has just referred back to the previous text within the *Rauravavṛtti* means that it is not unlikely that he should refer forward to a subsequent text within it. And although Sadyojyotiḥ refers tangentially to his own view of liberation in verses 31–32 and 39, it is not so likely that these would be referred to as descriptions of the fruit;

one's own [innate] qualities, when all bonds cease. [This ritual], ***whose subsidiary elements*** such as the [placing of] the hand of Śiva [on the initiand] have been taught previously,[92] is qualified [in the verse] by [the word] ***true*** because it is the cause of liberation with exclusion of 'non-connection' and of 'connection with other'.[93] And he will state the purpose of describing the various fruits in the summary [verse] beginning, 'In order to accomplish those'.[94]

2 Exposition of *Pūrvapakṣa*s

To this end, he introduces[95] those [fruits] in order:

2) Isolation, enjoyment of *sattva* [alone], dissolution into the Supreme Self, dissolution into transforming [material causes], namely *avyākṛta* and the like, and lower [ones].

3) A chief attendant of the Supreme Lord; a non-agent who knows all objects of knowledge; agency and yet being instigated [to act]; becoming the same as the treasury of light.

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whereas this topic is central to the *Mokṣakārikā*. Furthermore the way that the fruit is described here as *aśeṣabandhanivṛttau svaguṇasarvajñatvādyabhivyaktiḥ* resembles the way that it is described in *Mokṣakārikā* 44cd: *malādipāśavicchittiḥ sarvajñānakriyodbhavaḥ*. Thus we take it that this sentence refers to the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* as describing the fruits proclaimed in other systems, and to the *Mokṣakārikā* as teaching the fruit of Śaiva initiation.

[92] *Uktapūrvāṇi* reflects *nirūpitam* in the verse.

[93] The causal relationship between the initiation-ritual and liberation, which is expressed by the ritual being described as the 'true' one, is such that the ritual's non-connection with liberation is excluded (it cannot fail to produce liberation in a soul undergoing it), and liberation's connection with anything other than this ritual is excluded (the paths of other traditions cannot produce liberation).

'Excluding non-connection' and 'excluding connection with something else' are often given as two of the three possible senses of *eva* (see KAJIYAMA 1973). Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, uses the expression *ayogānyayogavyavacchedanena* (DK; *anyayogāyogavyavacchedanena* KSTS) in analysing an *eva* in the *Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 1:4. Rāmakaṇṭha uses it to analyse an *eva* in his commentary on the last verse of this text.

[94] Rāmakaṇṭha refers here to the last verse of the text (59) where Sadyojyotiḥ states that the purpose has been to prevent students from acting in order to accomplish those fruits.

[95] *Uddiśati* implies more than is conveyed by 'names' or 'states', *uddeśa* being a technical term for the initial mention of the topics that will subsequently be elaborated; the first listing of what is on the agenda.

4ab) Superiority to the Lord; and just being devoid of Impurity.

2.1 Isolation: verse 2a'

Isolation: It is well known that (*hi*)[96] a relation with Primal Matter (*prakṛti*), which is characterised by the three qualities (*guṇa*), is the cause of the soul's non-isolation. And this [relation that causes non-isolation] is not just any kind of relation; because [if it were]—given that both of them are all-pervading so that [some kind of a relationship between them] (*tasya*)[97] exists even when the soul is in a state of Isolation—being like that (i.e. being in a state of Isolation) would be impossible. Rather it is an experiencer-experienced type [of relation], which is beginningless and characterised by the non-perception of a distinction between [experiencer and experienced][98]—for

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[96]For Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of *hi* to express the obviousness of the contention, see note 460.

[97] *Tasya* = *sambandhamātrasya.*

[98]We take *viveka* here in the sense of *bheda*, and analyse *avivekapratipattiḥ* as *vivekapratipatter abhāvaḥ.*

The experiencer confuses himself with *prakṛti*, the experienced, and thus regards himself as subject to change. A commonly used example is that of the moon (= the experiencer) being reflected in water (= the experienced / the *buddhi*), and thus appearing to undergo change because of the ripples in the water. See, from the Sāṅkhya section of the *Bhogakārikā* (75cd): *bhogye bhogaḥ prabhoś chāyā yathā candramaso jale* | 'Experience is the reflection of the self in the experienced, like [the reflection] of the moon in water'.

For the point that the cause of *saṃsāra* cannot be any kind of relation between the soul and *prakṛti*, but must be an experiencer-experienced one, or as it is phrased in this case, a seer-seen one, see the following by Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha (*Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:15ab):

idaṃ ca te praṣṭavyāḥ—draṣṭṛdṛśyayoḥ saṃyogaḥ saṃsārahetus tatpūrvakaś ca viyogo 'pavargakāraṇam iti yad ucyate tatra saṃyogas tāvat puṃspradhānayor draṣṭṛdṛśyalakṣaṇa eva, na parasparāśleṣarūpa ubhayor apy amūrtatvena tādṛśasyānupapatteḥ. pradhānaṃ ca na svato dṛśyam apratyakṣatvena tasyeṣṭatvāt. na ca mahadahaṅkārādirūpeṇa pariṇater draṣṭā tad draṣṭuṃ śaknoti. tataś ca katham anayor ādyaḥ saṃyogaḥ, tadabhāvāc ca kathaṃ tatpūrvako viyogaḥ. evaṃ ca saṃyogaviyogānupapatter akāraṇatvam eva puruṣārthaṃ prati pradhānasya.

'And these [Sāṅkhyas] should be asked the following. When [you] say that contact between the seer and the seen is the cause of *saṃsāra*, and the separation that follows that is the cause of the highest good, the contact, firstly, between the soul and Primal Matter must be characterised by seer and seen; it cannot be of the nature of mutual embracing, because such [contact] is impossible, given that both of them are immaterial. And Primal Matter cannot be seen itself, since it is held to be imperceptible. And neither can the seer see it as a result of [its] transformation into the intellect, the *ahaṅkāra* etc.

the state of being an experiencer consists of non-discrimination in cognition [of experiencer and experienced]. As they have said, 'Experience is non-discrimination in cognition [of the soul (*puruṣa*) and *sattva*].'[99] For Primal Matter, though presenting herself as an object of experience, does so like a skillful courtesan, using the soul's connection with the powers of ignorance, pride and the like[100]—which are defilements obtained due to the force of *tamas*—in such a way that cognitions of aversion towards her particular transformations[101] do not arise in the [soul]. For otherwise[102] it would undesirably follow that there would be no *saṃsāra*, because there would be no experience, because no bond other than this[103] is established.[104] And this alone[105] is *saṃsāra*, which is taught to be the opposite of Isolation.

But when, as a result of knowledge of the self or yoga, discrimination

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And so how can there be an original contact between these two? And given the absence of that, how can there be the separation that follows it? And thus because neither contact nor separation are possible, Primal Matter must be a non-cause with regard to the aims of the soul.'

In this passage, as in ours, it is stressed that the relation must involve experiencing (or seeing); but the intention is different in the two cases. Rāmakaṇṭha's Sāṅkhya points out that if it did not, Isolation would be impossible. Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha is at this point refuting Sāṅkhya; that the relation must involve seeing enables his refutation on the grounds that there can in fact be no seer-seen relationship between the soul and Primal Matter.

[99]This is a quotation of part of *Yogasūtra* 3.35, which begins *sattvapuruṣayor atyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ*. We have emended *pratyayāviveko* to *pratyayāviśeṣo* against the evidence of all our witnesses, for sense and since not only the editions of the *Yogasūtra*, but also all the citations of the sūtra that we have found, read *pratyayāviśeṣo*.

[100]The full list of the *kleśa*s of Sāṅkhya and Yoga is given in *Yogasūtra* 2.2.3: *avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ pañca kleśāḥ*.

[101]When read as applying to the case of the courtesan, the word *vikāra* signifies her gestures and facial expressions.

[102]I.e. if she did not present herself in this way, and cognitions of aversion towards her transformations arose.

[103]There are three possible referents for the *tat-* depending on how far back we see it reaching: an experiencer-experienced relation with *prakṛti* (*bhoktṛbhogyarūpasambandha*); absence of discrimination between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (*pratyayāviśeṣa*); or *prakṛti*'s seduction of the soul.

[104]This final point distinguishes the Sāṅkhyas from the Saiddhāntikas, for whom other bonds such as *mala* and evolutes of *māyā* above the twenty-five *tattva*s accepted by the Sāṅkhyas account for *saṃsāra*.

[105]I.e. this experience (*bhoga*) that results from *prakṛti* presenting herself to, and attracting, the soul. Or *sa* could refer to the first two alternatives considered for the *tat* above: *bhoktṛbhogyarūpasambandha* or *pratyayāviśeṣa*.

of the soul from that cognition[106] shines forth because of [the soul's] own nature, which is light uncoloured by anything else, then non-discrimination is destroyed by that [light-nature], simply because [the latter] is the opposite [of non-discrimination],[107] so *saṃsāra* too, consisting of that [non-discrimination],[108] does not arise for that [soul], so Primal Matter ceases to

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[106]Evidence for the two readings *tasmāt pratyayāt* and just *tasmāt* is evenly balanced. The latter is found in all witnesses except M^{Y} and is perhaps easier to interpret. It could either mean 'discrimination of the soul from that [*saṃsāra*]', or, if we understand the previous sentence as equating *saṃsāra* with one or more of the following—*bhoga* given by *prakṛti*, *bhoktṛbhogyarūpasambandha* or *pratyayāviśeṣa*,—it could mean the discrimination of the soul from any of them.

We have tentatively adopted the *lectio difficilior*, partly because M^{Y} can be seen on countless occasions to be the only witness to preserve the correct reading. It might be argued against its reading here that we would expect the discrimination to be between the soul and *prakṛti*, not between the soul and any cognition, but the latter kind of restriction accords with the *Yogabhāṣya*, when it comments on the sūtra (3:35) that was partially cited above by Rāmakaṇṭha with the words *pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ*, namely, *sattvapuruṣayor atyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ, parārthatvāt. svārthasaṃyamāt puruṣajñānam.*

In the course of commenting on this sūtra, the *Yogabhāṣya* reads: *tayor atyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ, puruṣasya darśitaviṣayatvāt. sa bhogapratyayaḥ sattvasya parārthatvād dṛśyaḥ. yas tu tasmād viśiṣṭaś citimātrarūpo 'nyaḥ pauruṣeyaḥ pratyayaḥ, tatra samyamāt puruṣaviṣayā prajñā jāyate.*

'Experience is non-discrimination in cognition of these two which are completely unmixed. [It takes place] because the soul is something to which objects are shown. This [cognition], which is of the nature of experience (*bhogapratyaya*), is an object of perception, [it is not the perceiver,] because *sattva* is for the sake of something other than itself [i.e. the seer, and since *sattva* is for the sake of the seer, *bhoga* is for the sake of the seer, so is different from it]. But as for the cognition that is directed towards the soul, which is different (*anyaḥ*), distinct from that [experience-cognition], and of the nature of consciousness alone—by restriction to that, insight which has the soul as its object, arises.' (The translation is influenced by Vācaspatimiśra's sub-commentary.)

Thus it is stressed that *bhogapratyaya* is different from the soul and different from *pauruṣeyaḥ pratyayaḥ*. For the soul to discern itself, it has to turn away from this *bhogapratyaya* and restrict itself to *pauruṣeyaḥ pratyayaḥ*. The *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* sentence would thus be quite in line with this if it spoke of the discrimination of the soul 'from that *pratyaya*'. What within the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* can *tasmāt pratyayāt* be picking up and referring back to? *pratyayāviśeṣaḥ*. This has been equated with *bhoga* in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*; and with *bhogapratyaya* in the *Yogabhāṣya*.

[107]As darkness is destroyed by light, simply because the latter is the opposite of the former.

[108]This equating of *saṃsāra* with *aviveka* provides some evidence for taking *sa* above to be referring back to *pratyayāviveka* or *pratyayāviśeṣa*.

be experienced altogether. When that happens, he [attains] liberation, the Highest Isolation. So say the foremost of those learned in this tradition.

2.2 Enjoyment of *sattva*: verse 2a'

He states another fruit with the words ***Enjoyment of sattva.*** The [soul's] relation with Primal Matter is beginningless.[109] Everyone accepts the soul to be an experiencer. And its being an experiencer is not secondary.[110] For if it were, that [property of being an experiencer] could not exist in it [at all], for a property produced by something else cannot be connected with an eternal property-possessor.[111] Or if [the soul] could be connected [somehow with that property], it would not be the experiencer,[112] so who would be bound or who would be liberated? Thus the property of being an experiencer must be accepted to be an essential nature [of the soul].

And there can be no destruction of a permanent essential nature that is beginningless,[113] because [if there could, the thing which has that nature would also be destroyed, so] the same consequence would also apply to the soul in Isolation (i.e. if its *bhoktṛtva* were destroyed it too would be destroyed) so [you Kaivalyavādin] would be a nihilist (i.e. someone for whom no self survives). And from this very impossibility of a [beginningless, permanent nature] being destroyed, it follows that a relation of experiencer and experienced between the soul and Primal Matter must be accepted even in liberation. It is just that prior to [liberation], because of the malign nature

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[109]This was also asserted by the Sāṅkhya opponent in the previous section.

[110]I.e. is not a contingent and temporary condition of it, but is rather part of its nature.

[111]If a property-possessor is eternal, so must its properties be. It cannot temporarily, as a result of causes external to it, have properties that do not belong to it innately. Therefore, if you accept that it is an experiencer, you must accept that to be an experiencer is part of its essential nature.

[112]Since the property of being an experiencer, being produced by something external to the soul, would not belong to it.

[113]Up to this point he has made two claims: (1) the soul's relation with *prakṛti* is beginningless; (2) the soul's property of being a perceiver (*bhoktṛtva*) is part of its essential nature (*svabhāva*). The soul's relation with *prakṛti* and its *bhoktṛtva* are effectively the same (since the relation is a *bhoktṛbhogyasambandha*) and can be treated as one thing; hence he talks in this sentence of one thing which is both beginningless and an essential nature.

Does the characterisation of the *svabhāva* as *nitya* not make the word *anādeḥ* redundant? Perhaps the nuance intended by *nitya* is merely that the *svabhāva* necessarily lasts as long as the thing it is the nature of.

of beginningless karma, Primal Matter in the form of drops of pleasure interrupted by suffering and delusion was the [soul]'s object of experience; but now, in liberation, because of the termination of all karma, which is the cause of that [prior state], she is an object of enjoyment in the form of pure, uninterrupted, unexcelled and unbounded *sattva*-natured pleasure. Thus those who, it is claimed (*kila*), have attained this [liberation] are taught to be Enjoyers of *sattva*. This is the foundation of those learned in this Āgama.[114]

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[114]This passage is summarised in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (A p.146, B pp.78–79, C p.28): *anye tu puruṣāṇām anādir eva prakṛtisambandho bhoktṛtvaṃ ca. na cānāder nityasya svabhāvasya vināśo* [*vināśo* AB; *svabhāvavināśo* C] *yuktaḥ. tasmān muktāv api bhoktṛbhogyasambandhaḥ puṃprakṛtyor eṣṭavyaḥ. kevalaṃ tv anādikarmakṣayān muktau śuddhanirantarānatiśayānavacchinnasattvātmasukharūpā sā bhogyā bhavatītyāhuḥ. te ca sattvabhujaḥ kathyante. teṣāṃ ca guṇabhuvane sthitiḥ.*

'Others, however, [claim] that the connection of souls with Primal Matter is beginningless, as also is the condition of being an experiencer. And it is not possible for a permanent nature which is beginningless to be destroyed. Therefore in the liberated state too one should accept that there is a relation of experiencer and experienced between souls and Primal Matter. It is just that (*kevalam*) in the liberated state, because of the destruction of beginningless karma, she [viz. *prakṛti*] becomes, they say, experienceable as pure, uninterrupted, unexcelled and unbounded *sattva*-natured pleasure. Those [who attain this state] are called "enjoyers of *sattva*", and they attain a world in the *tattva* of *guṇa*.'

It is also paraphrased in *Śaivapaṛibhāṣā* 5, p.156 (mentioned in Professor SANDERSON's annotation): *kecit tu sattvabhuktir eva muktir ity āhuḥ. tathā hi puruṣasya prakṛtibhoktṛtvam anādi. śāditve tataḥ pūrvaṃ puruṣasyāpi sattve mānābhāvena tasyāpi sāditvaprasaṅgāt. na cānāder nivṛttiḥ kalpayituṃ yuktā, puruṣasyāpi nivṛttyāpatteḥ. tato muktidaśāyām apy asyaiva* bhoktṛtvam. iyāṃs tu bhedaḥ, yat saṃsāradaśāyāṃ karmavaśena duḥkhamohāntaritasukharūpā prakṛtir bhogyā, muktau karmaṇām abhāvān niratiśayānandātmakasattvarūpā prakṛtir bhogyeti. etad api bhogajanyatvājanyatvavikalpena bhāṭṭamatanirāsenaiva nirastam.*

'But some teach that liberation is just enjoyment of *sattva*. To explain: The soul's experience of Primal Matter is beginningless. If it had a beginning, then since there would be no evidence for the existence of the soul either prior to that, it would undesirably follow that the [soul] too had a beginning. And it cannot be supposed that the beginningless [experience of Primal Matter] ceases, because from that it would follow that the soul too ceases. Therefore this [soul]* continues to be an experiencer even in the state of liberation. But there is this much difference: in the state of *saṃsāra*, as a result of karma, Primal Matter is experienced as pleasure interrupted by suffering and delusion, [whereas] in liberation, as a result of the absence of karma, Primal Matter is experienced as *sattva* in the form of unsurpassed bliss. This too is refuted through the [earlier] refutation of the Bhāṭṭa view by the dilemma of whether experience [of *sattva*] is produced or not produced.'

* The *eva* is awkward. We could to take it to be *bhinnakrama*, qualifying *bhoktṛtvam*; but we wonder whether *asyaiva* is a corruption of *asty eva*.

This view of liberation seems not to have left much of a mark in surviving śāstric sources. We note that neither Rāmakaṇṭha nor those two authors cited above who draw on his passage identify the school, possibly because it had already become obscure in their time.

JOHNSTON (1937: 35–36) argues that the original Sāṅkhya view was that *apavarga* was reached by residing in *sattva* alone. He maintains that 'the expression *sattvastha*, whose meaning in the *Gītā* has given rise to controversy and which recurs frequently in the epic, is used to indicate one who has reached salvation by abiding in *sattva* alone' (1937: 35, note 1).

For an example of the term in that meaning, see *Mahābhārata*, *Śāntiparvan* 188:2c–4b:

> *maharṣayo jñānatṛptā nirvāṇagatamānasāḥ* ‖
> *nāvartante punaḥ pārtha muktāḥ saṃsāradoṣataḥ* |
> *janmadoṣaparikṣīṇāḥ svabhāve paryavasthitāḥ* ‖
> *nirdvandvā nityasattvasthā vimuktā nityaṃ āśritāḥ* |
>
> These great sages, sated by knowledge, focussed on nirvana, do not return [to *saṃsāra*] Pārtha; they are liberated from *samsāra*'s blemishes, cleansed of the faults associated with birth, firmly centred in their own nature; they transcend opposites and remain permanently liberated, residing eternally in *sattva*.

We also find the expression *sattvavān* in the *Mahābhārata* to refer to one who has attained liberation. See for example *Śāntiparvan* 277:25:

> *kṣutpipāsādayo bhāvā jitā yasyeha dehinaḥ* |
> *krodho lobhas tathā mohaḥ sattvavān mukta eva saḥ* ‖
>
> The embodied soul in this [world] who has conquered the states of mind such as hunger, thirst and the like, as well as anger, greed and delusion—, such a one is certainly liberated, retaining [only] *sattva*.

This liberation taught by early Sāṅkhya thinkers is probably what Sadyojyotiḥ characterises as *sattvasambhoga*.

Apart from the occurrences of the view in the epic, JOHNSTON cites accounts of it in the *Buddhacarita* and the *Carakasaṃhitā*. See for example (*śarīrasthāna* 36):

> *rajastamobhyāṃ yuktasya saṃyogo 'yam anantavān* |
> *tābhyāṃ nirākṛtābhyāṃ tu sattvavṛddhyā nivartate* ‖
>
> This connection [of the soul with sense faculties and the objects of the senses] is unending for those connected with *rajas* and *tamas*; but it ceases when those two cease as a result of the growth of *sattva*.

This view is clearly very different from that of classical Sāṅkhya, according to which the three *guṇas* are inseparable, liberation involving separation from all three.

JOHNSTON asserts (1937: 35) that though 'primitively salvation may have been conceived as heaven, the *devaloka*', those passages which give most detail claim that only when *sattva* is still mixed with traces of *rajas* does it lead to heaven; *sattva* by itself yields *apavarga*.

2.3 Dissolution into the Supreme Self: verse 2b

The words ***Dissolution into the Supreme Self*** denote the fruit of another tradition [namely Advaita Vedānta, whose proponents teach the following]. From scripture (*āgamāt*) consisting of such revealed statements as (*iti śrutilakṣaṇāt*), 'All of this is indeed *brahman*',[115] 'In this [*brahman*][116] there exists no plurality',[117] [scripture] which has authority with regard to established objects,[118] and which, because it was not created by a [fallible] human being, is stronger than scriptures other than those [revealed statements] (*tadanyāgamebhyaḥ*), [*brahman*] is known (*pratipannasya*). [We] understand (*avagatiḥ*) from that [scripture] alone (*tata eva*) that [this] *brahman*—which is undelimited consciousness beyond the sphere of any other means of knowledge,[119] its nature consisting in the several qualities, such as the Highest

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[115] *Chāndogyopaniṣat* 3.14.1.

[116] Śaṅkara, both in his commentary to the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* and *Kaṭhopaniṣat*, takes *iha* as *iha brahmaṇi*.

[117] *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.4.19b, *Kaṭhopaniṣat* 4:11b.

[118] The Vedāntin stresses that the Vedas are a means of knowing established objects (*siddhārthas*), i.e. facts, for this was disputed by the Mīmāṃsakas. For the latter, Vedic scripture states not facts but injunctions (*vidhis*), which are things to be accomplished (*sādhyas*, *kāryas*). In other words it concerns *dharma*, not *brahman*. Upaniṣadic statements about *brahman* are simply of the nature of praise (*arthavāda*), the purpose of which is to provoke the listener into performing certain rituals. (See the following words of Rāmakaṇṭha's Vedāntin in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:4a: *kārye 'rtha iva ca siddhe 'py arthe vedasya prāmāṇyam. nopaniṣadbhāgasya karmakāṇḍavākyaikavākyatayārthavādatvam, api tu pramāṇatvam evātra*, 'The Vedas are authoritative also with respect to an established object, just as they are [as you Mīmāṃsakas hold] with respect to something to be accomplished. It is not the case that [, as you hold,] the Upaniṣadic part is [mere] praise, forming as it does one text with the [clearly injunctive] statements of the ritual part; rather it is certainly a means of knowing this [established object].')

As support for their view, the Mīmāṃsakas adduced the principle that to be a *pramāṇa* is to reveal things that are previously unknown, *anadhigatārthagantṛ*, that fall beyond the reach of any of the other means of knowledge, *pramāṇāntarāgocara*. *dharma* is clearly such a thing—there is no way other than scripture to know that by performing a certain ritual one will reach heaven—but surely, argued the Mīmāṃsakas, established entities such as *brahman* fall within the range of other means of knowledge. The Vedāntin response was that the Vedas are authoritative with respect to *brahman*, even though it is a *siddhārtha*, because its identity with the Self or the world, as expressed in such statements as *tvaṃ brahmeti* or *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma*, cannot be known by other means. See *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* ad 1.1.1 and 1.1.4, *Brahmasiddhi* p. 22,19ff., and *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 3:64, 3:84ab, 3:92c–93, 3:98.

[119] If it were the object of another means of knowledge, it would follow that it was not validly revealed by scripture, because, as mentioned in note 118, both Mīmāṃsakas and

Bliss, proclaimed in that scripture—is real, and that things other than it, which are plural, are unreal, in that their single essence is that they are produced by ignorance and other [causal factors in the chain of creation derived from ignorance].[120]

Thus they say:[121]

> The sages proclaim that this (i.e. *brahman*) is established through scripture.

And we need not fear that this understanding [that *brahman* alone is real and plurality unreal] is, like such a [statement] as 'one should sprinkle

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Vedāntins held that valid means of knowledge must give knowledge of things unknown by other means (*pramāṇāntarānadhigata*). See for example the first words of Maṇḍanamiśra's auto-commentary on *Brahmasiddhi* 1:1: *vedānteṣu vipratipadyante vipaścitaḥ: kecid aprāmāṇyaṃ manyanta, ātmanaḥ pramāṇāntarasiddhatve teṣām anuvādakatvāt*, 'The learned disagree about [the validity of] the Upaniṣadic statements: some maintain that they are invalid, because, since the Self is established by other means of knowledge, they [merely] re-iterate'; and *Brahmasiddhi* p. 23,1–2.

Vedāntin authors do, however, occasionally claim that *brahman* is known also through direct perception as well as scripture. See for example Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2: *na dharmajijñāsāyām iva śrutyādaya eva pramāṇaṃ brahmajijñāsāyām. kiṃ tu śrutyādayo 'nubhavādayaś ca yathāsambhavam iha pramāṇam, anubhavāvasānatvād bhūtavastuviṣayatvāc ca brahmajñānasya* (p. 89). 'For those desiring to know *brahman* (i.e. Vedāntins), revealed scripture and the like (i.e. *itihāsa*, *purāṇa* and *smṛti*) are not the only means of knowledge, as they are for those desiring to know *dharma* (i.e. Mīmāṃsakas). Rather both revealed scripture and the like, and experience and the like (i.e. inference), as and where possible, are a means of knowing this [*brahman*], because knowledge of [*brahman*] leads to direct experience, and has as its object an accomplished fact.'

The seeming contradiction with the many statements to the effect that *brahman* is known only through scripture is removed by the explanation that only in liberation do we have direct perception of it. As to the statements to the effect that the Self is *svayamprakāśa* or *ahampratyayaviṣaya*, these are said to refer to the Self as conditioned by the body and sense faculties, not to *śuddhabrahman*.

[120] We are uncertain what the *ādi* refers to. One possibility is *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha*. Another is Primal Matter and its evolutes: the various faculties, the *tanmātras* and the *bhūtas*. These predominantly Sāṅkhya categories were nevertheless accepted by Vedāntins as an explanation of the world of *vyavahāra*.

The Vedāntin summarises this sentence later in the text with the words, *nanūktaṃ prāk ... śrutitaḥ sadasadvyavastheti*, 'Have [I] not stated above that what is real and what not real can be determined from revealed scripture?'.

[121] *Brahmasiddhi* 1:2ab. The second half of the verse reads: *bhedaprapañcavilayadvāreṇa ca nirūpaṇām.*

with fire',[122] invalid on the grounds that it is refuted by direct perception etc. [which might seem to be] means of knowing the existence of plurality;[123] for plurality—since it is not proved to be the object of direct perception, as it depends on the establishment of mutual non-existence, [whereas direct perception] grasps merely the [existence of an] object[124]—is unreal, being

[122]This stock example is frequently used by Rāmakaṇṭha: see for example *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 6:18, *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 3:79cd, 3:88, and *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 146c–147b. For an early use, see *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 3.2.4.

[123]Rāmakaṇṭha fills out this argument a little in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, when commenting on 1.4ab, *sarvaikatvaprasiddhau tu pramāṇaṃ nāsti kiñcana* | 'There is absolutely no means of knowledge that can prove the oneness of everything.' Rāmakaṇṭha provides the following reason: *pratyakṣānumānayor akṣaliṅgāśrayatvena bhedaviṣayatvataḥ pratyuta tadbādhakatvāt*; 'because direct perception and inference, since they have plurality as their object in that they are based on sense data and inferential marks, on the contrary, refute that [oneness].' Thus the *ādi* in our text refers to *anumāna*, which refutes oneness because it functions on the basis of a plurality of inferential marks.

The Vedāntin response to this argument in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* is the same as that about to be stated in this text: *sattāmātraviṣayatvāt tayor atrābādhakatvam*; 'Because these two (i.e. direct perception and inference) have as their object existence only, they do not refute [oneness].'

[124]The notion of plurality 'depends on the establishment of mutual non-existence' in that it depends on the assumption that the thing one is looking at now, a pot for example, is *not* some other thing, a cloth. This assumption cannot be arrived at through direct perception, according to this Vedāntic position of Maṇḍanamiśra, because direct perception yields purely positive knowledge that an object is present, not any negative knowledge about what it is not. See *na ca vastumātrād anavagṛhītabhedād bhedasiddhiḥ, ekasminn api tatprasaṅgāt. tasmāt pauruṣeyīm apekṣāṃ na vastv anuvartate. ato na vastusvabhāvaḥ* (*Brahmasiddhi* p. 49). 'And plurality is not proved from the mere object, whose difference has not been grasped, for then [plurality] would undesirably accrue (*tatprasaṅgāt*) even to a single thing. Therefore [plurality] depends not on the thing, but on a relationship imposed by human beings. Therefore it is not the nature of a thing'.

Rāmakaṇṭha will discuss this during the refutation of Vedānta below (section 3.15.2.5), in a passage beginning *nanv itaretarābhāvasiddhyapekṣatvād bhedasya, bhāvaviṣayatvāc ca pratyakṣasya, kathaṃ bhedaḥ pratyakṣaḥ*. 'But plurality depends on mutual non-existence (*abhāva*) having been established, and direct perception has existence (*bhāva*) as its object. So how can plurality be directly perceptible?' See also *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:53c'd (p. 91, 6–7): *nanv itaretarābhāvasavyapekṣatvād bhedasya, abhāvāviṣayatvāc ca pratyakṣasya, na bhedaḥ svasaṃvitpratyakṣagamyaḥ*.

Maṇḍanamiśra maintains not only that plurality depends on mutual non-existence having been established, but also that mutual non-existence (*itaretarābhāva*) depends on plurality having been established. See for example *Brahmasiddhi* 2:11ab: *nāsminn ayaṃ nāyam ayam iti bhedād vinā na dhīḥ* | 'Without plurality [having been established] one could not have the cognition, "This is not in this, and it is not this".' Since neither plurality nor mutual non-existence can be established except by presupposing the other, plurality,

postulated through mere ignorance, like the horns of a hare. Thus [Maṇḍanamiśra] has said:[125]

> They say that direct perception is something that affirms [, never something that denies].[126]

And this being so,[127] because individual souls too [as well as plurality in general] are false—since they are muddied by ignorance[128] despite having as their essence the Supreme Self, which is real and was taught above[129] to be proved through a self-validating means of knowledge[130]—true awakening knowledge does not arise for them, who are just like figments of a dream experience (*svapnānubhavavṛttīnām*) common to a sleeping person. Therefore the mass of plurality that goes by the name of *saṃsāra*, for which an awakener (*bodhaka*) does not arise in that form[131] is by its nature beginningless.

But sometimes through the sequence taught in the scriptural passage beginning with the words, 'The Self should be known',[132] one attains very

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concludes Maṇḍanamiśra, is unreal. See MESQUITA (1990: 119ff.) for a discussion of this view of Maṇḍanamiśra's.

[125] *Brahmasiddhi* 2:1a. Rāmakaṇṭha also quotes this in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:53c'd (p. 91) with the rest of its half-verse: *na niṣeddhṛ vipaścitaḥ*.

[126] And hence it cannot grasp plurality.

[127] The *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (A p. 148, B p. 81, C p. 30) draws on this passage: *māyāvādinas tu 'sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma', 'neha nānāsti kiñcana' ityādiśrutisiddhasya brahmaṇa eva satyatayā tadanyeṣāṃ ca bhedarūpāṇām avidyānirmāṇaikasāratvenāsatyatvāj jīvātmanām api pramāṇasiddhaproktasatyabhūtaparamātmasāratve 'py avidyākaluṣitatvena bhrāntatvāt svapnānubhava iva saṃsārābhidhāno bhedaprapañcaḥ svarūpato 'nidaṃpratha-maḥ syāt.*

[128] The phrase *jīvānām avidyākaluṣitatvam* is used by Maṇḍanamiśra at *Brahmasiddhi* p. 12,2.

[129] In the citation of *Brahmasiddhi* 1:2ab; or in the Vedāntin's first sentence in which *brahman* was said to be known from such scriptural statements as the two cited.

[130] I.e. Vedic scripture. It is self-validating because it is neither validated nor contradicted by any sense evidence. See, e.g., *Ślokavārttika, codanāsūtra* 47.

[131] I.e. in the form of true awakening knowledge, *tāttvikaprabodha*. We analyse the compound as *tadrūpeṇānupajātaṃ bodhakaṃ yasya*.

[132] *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 2.4.5 and 4.5.6 contain the instruction *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ—śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*. Hence we take it that the sequence referred to by Rāmakaṇṭha is that of the three Vedāntic stages of hearing the scriptural teaching (*śravaṇa*), thinking about it (*manana*) and meditating on it (*nididhyāsana*). The phrase *ātmā jñātavyaḥ* is cited in the *Brahmasiddhi* ad 3:171–173, p. 151 (and many times in the *Tattvasamīkṣā*) but we have not found it in any scriptural source.

powerful[133] knowledge. As a result the cause of false notions,[134] which is the opposite of this [very powerful knowledge],[135] is uprooted. As a result of this, the awakening of the Supreme Self, in which all false notions cease, and which rests in its own nature alone,[136] comes about, just as for someone who has just woken from sleep, taking the form of the dissolution of the previous stream of the individual soul.[137] This alone is the highest liberation. Such is the tenaciously held view of some.[138]

[Objection:] Surely it is Transformationist Vedānta that the author of the commentary [on the *Raurava*][139] intends to be introduced here [by his label 'Dissolution into the Supreme Self'], not the doctrine of Illusionism; for that (i.e. Transformationist Vedānta) accords with the refutation that he

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[133] E_V silently emended the reading *prodbaṇa* of its only source, E_D, to *prodbala*, which would be a *hapax legomenon*. *Prolbaṇa*, the reading of M^Y, which we have accepted, is also unparallelled, but the distribution of the readings of the manuscripts appears to presuppose it, and the word *ulbaṇa* at least is well-attested in the required meaning.

[134] Viz. *avidyā*.

[135] And hence automatically removed by it, as darkness by light.

[136] Harunaga ISAACSON commented that it is surprising to have the *paramātmabodha* described as resting in its own nature, a qualification that would be more natural of the *paramātman*; he suggested the possibility that *svarūpamātrapratiṣṭho* is a corruption of *svarūpamātrapratiṣṭhā* ('which is an abiding in the [Supreme Self's] nature alone'), one explainable by attraction to the gender of the masculines both before and after it. If so, it is a corruption that occurred prior to the writing of the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, for the parallel passage from that text given in note 138 indicates that its author, Trilocanaśiva, read *svarūpamātrapratiṣṭho*.

[137] It is possible that *jīvātmanaḥ* is not to be construed with *pūrvapravāhavilayarūpaḥ*, and that the sentence means 'knowledge of the Supreme Self ... comes about for the individual soul, just as for someone who has just woken from sleep, taking the form of the dissolution of the previous stream [of notions that constitutes *saṃsāra*].' But in all the other places in the text where Rāmakaṇṭha speaks of dissolution it is individual souls that are dissolved. Furthermore to maintain that individual souls experience knowledge of the Supreme Self would contradict the contention above that true awakening knowledge does not arise for them, and the way that they were compared above to mere figments within the dream of the sleeping person.

[138] Alternatively *graha* may denote an obsession that possesses the Vedāntins in the manner of a spirit.

The *Siddhāntasamuccaya* passage continues: *kadācid 'ātmā jñātavyaḥ' ityādyuktakrameṇa samyajjñānodayāt tatpratipakṣabhūtabhrāntikāraṇapronmūlanena tiraskṛtākhilabhrāntiḥ paramātmabodhaḥ suptaprabuddhasyeva svarūpamātrapratiṣṭho jīvātmanaḥ pūrvapravāhavilayo bhavati. saiva parā muktir ity āhuḥ.*

[139] I.e. Sadyojyotiḥ. The reason for his being referred to in that way is given in section 6 of the Introduction.

will state with the words, 'It is well established that [the Supreme Self] is the material cause' (*upādānatvasaṃsiddhiḥ*).[140]

[Response:] True, [Transformationist Vedānta] accords with the [refutation]. But it is not taught to be the principal [teaching] in the Upaniṣads by the foremost of those learned in this spiritual [tradition].[141] And [in fact] revealed scriptures do not accord with it. Furthermore I will explain [in the commentary] on that very [verse] the way in which [Transformationist Vedānta] accords with the refutation.[142]

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[140]Verse 49a.

[141]Rāmakaṇṭha's admission that despite having himself presented illusionism, it is transformationism that is presented and refuted by Sadyojyotiḥ, and his explanation that illusionism is what is taught by the foremost Vedāntins, have been commented on by SANDERSON (1985: 210, note 41 and 2006a: 68–73). He argues that if Sadyojyotiḥ had been aware of illusionism he would have refuted it, committed as he was to defending his own view against all serious opposition. He sees Sadyojyotiḥ's apparent ignorance of illusionism as evidence that he was writing before this doctrine, which was introduced by Śaṅkara and Maṇḍanamiśra, had become established in the orthodox brahminical community, and he uses this as one of several arguments for dating Sadyojyotiḥ to 675–725 (2006a: 73). By the time that Rāmakaṇṭha was writing, transformationism had been pushed into obscurity by illusionism; hence his treatment of illusionsim despite its absence in the text he was commenting upon, and hence his explanation that in his time transformationism was not regarded as primary (2006a: 72).

On which Vedāntin authors was Sadyojyotiḥ's knowledge of Vedānta based? Given that he characterises Vedāntin liberation as consisting in dissolution into the Supreme Self, both in this text and in the *Svāyambhuvavṛtti* (ad 2:2), SANDERSON (2006a: 70–71) argues that he may have been basing himself on Bhartṛprapañca. The latter's works are now lost, but see the fragments gathered together by HIRIYANNA (1924), especially the following two (p. 447): *asya hi vijñānātmanaḥ paramātmany apyayo vaktavyaḥ* (*apyaya* is a synonym of *vilaya*) and *dvividho mokṣaḥ: 'sminn eva śarīre sākṣātkṛtabrahmā mukta ity ucyate, na brahmaṇi līnaḥ; tasya śarīrapātottarakālaṃ brahmaṇi layo dvitīyo mokṣaḥ*, 'There are two kinds of liberation: one who directly perceives *brahman* in this very body is known as liberated, [but] he has not dissolved into *brahman*; the second liberation is the dissolution of him into *brahman* after the death of his body'. SANDERSON (2006a: 70) also cites a further fragment that describes the Supreme Self as *sarvaikatva*, a compound that Sadyojyotiḥ uses in this characterisation of Vedānta at *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* 1:4ab.

[142]The implication is that the accord is not perfect and that the refutation actually implies that despite appearances Sadyojyotiḥ has the illusionist view in mind. We take this to be a reference to section 3.15.2.6. Rāmakaṇṭha there implicitly defends Sadyojyotiḥ's treating of transformationism by having the Vedāntin opponent retreat, in response to the Siddhāntin's objections, from illusionism to transformationism. It seems that Rāmakaṇṭha considers a refutation of transformationism to be relevant to refuting illusionism since illusionism in the end has to fall back on transformationism. Rāmakaṇṭha admits that Sadyojyotiḥ's refutation is concerned primarily with transformationism, but that is

2.4 Dissolution into the Supreme Material Cause: verse 2cd

The words ***Into avyākṛta and the like*** introduce the fruit of another scriptural [tradition].

> That into which the minute[143] perceivers of sense fields (i.e. souls) come to rest, together with their karma

is taught to be *avyākṛta*.[144] With regard to the question of where they come to rest,[145] some say:[146] 'You [Saiddhāntikas], because of seeing in this [world] that pots and the like, which are continuous with clay, are effects of clay,

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only because illusionism, when all of its arguments for the unreality of the world have been refuted, has to rely on transformationism in order for non-duality to be preserved.

[143]Literally, 'the more minute'. It is possible that the comparative form *aṇīyāṃsaḥ* is intended to have the force of a superlative. In this Pāñcarātrika view, as we shall see, souls are neither all-pervading nor immaterial, hence it may be in their 'most minute' form that they come to rest in *avyākṛta*.

[144]Rāmakaṇṭha gives the whole verse in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 15:8 (reference mentioned in Professor SANDERSON's annotation):

> *yad āhur vedāntavidaḥ:*
> *avyākṛtaṃ tṛtīyaṃ syād yad āhur bahudhānakam |*
> *yatra tiṣṭhanty aṇīyāṃsaḥ kṣetrajñāḥ karmabhiḥ saha ||*
>
> • *yad āhur bahudhānakam*] conj.; *yam āhur bahudhānakam* ed.

Rāmakaṇṭha explains that the adjective *tṛtīyam* expresses that *avyākṛta* is 'third' after *avyakta* and *svasthāna*: *tad avyaktasvasthānābhyām tṛtīyasmin sthāne 'vasthānam.*

Bahudhānakam, which we conjecture to mean literally 'having many seeds' (*avyākṛta* contains the whole universe in seed-form according to the Pāñcarātra view outlined below), occurs in a list of synonyms of *prakṛti* given in the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* ad *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 22: *prakṛtiḥ pradhānam brahma avyaktam bahudhānakam māyeti paryāyāḥ.* It also occurs in a verse of unknown origin quoted in the *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* (ad 1:8, p. 38,20–21, mentioned in Professor SANDERSON's annotation): *vivṛtāvivṛtaṃ bahudhānakaṃ caitanyam.*

[145]This has already been answered in the immediately preceding sentence: they come to rest in *avyākṛta*. So perhaps the intention of this question could be characterised as, 'what is *avyākṛta*?'

[146]Who are these 'some' (*kecit*)? Rāmakaṇṭha does not, in this text, identify the proponents of the view he is about to elaborate. In the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad 15:8, as we saw in the footnote before last, he attributes the just cited verse to *vedāntavidaḥ*. But in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad 15:7, he attributes to *pāñcarātrāḥ* a verse that he draws on in his exposition below. Indeed the bulk of the evidence suggests that not only Rāmakaṇṭha, but also Kṣemarāja and Trilocanaśiva, regarded the view presented below as a Pāñcarātra one: see notes 157 and 160. Does this mean that Rāmakaṇṭha regarded these Pāñcarātrikas

hold that [conglomerations of] the body and the sense faculties too,[147] which are continuous with pleasure and [pain and delusion], are effects of Primal Matter, which is composed of pleasure and [pain and delusion].[148] [On that much we Pāñcarātrikas agree with you, but you] should in exactly the same

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as one kind of Vedāntin, as Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins teaching a type of *pariṇativedānta*? No, for elsewhere he names the two groups separately: *eṣa ca prasaṅgo vedāntavidāṃ pāñcarātrāṇāṃ ca samānaḥ* (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:67cd); he regards the Pāñcarātras as a separate group from the Vedāntins, but sees them as both susceptible to the same unwanted consequence.

The common ground that Rāmakaṇṭha sees in the two views is identified in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:54 (p. 91). He there gives as the view of the 'Pariṇativedāntavids' and 'Saṃhitāpāñcarātras' that souls arise from, and dissolve into at liberation, a Supreme Cause that is their material substrate; the difference between them is just that the former term this Supreme Cause *brahman* and the latter term it Nārāyaṇa. The unwanted consequence to which Rāmakaṇṭha thus sees them as both susceptible (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:67cd) is that their teaching of the dissolution of the individual soul makes their liberation effectively no different from the utter annihilation taught by the Cārvākas. In our text (section 3.15.2.6) both Vedāntins and Pāñcarātras are said to be subject to a different unwanted consequence, that of re-entry into *saṃsāra* after liberation. See SANDERSON (1985: 211, note 57) for more on the close association of 'emanationist monism' and 'Vaiṣṇava-Pāñcarātra theism'.

What then are we to make of Rāmakaṇṭha's attribution (in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad 15:8) of the verse cited above to the Vedāntins? It seems that the verse was held to be authoritative by both the Vedāntins and the Pāñcarātras, and it is possible that Rāmakaṇṭha's characterisation of the view he is about to expound below as the answer of 'some' indicates that that answer is just one understanding of what is meant by souls coming to rest in *avyākṛta*, a Pāñcarātra one; the Vedāntins presumably gave a different account.

[147]I.e. all that constitutes human beings apart from their immaterial souls. For *kāryakaraṇa* in the meaning of 'body and sense faculties', see WATSON (2006: 194, note 218). See also the following phrase from section 2.13 of this text, where *kāryakaraṇa* and *śarīrendriya* seem to be being used synonymously: *-duḥkhaśarīrendriyanivṛttau prakṛṣṭatarakāryakaraṇalābhataḥ*.

[148]It may seem surprising that *pradhāna* is referred to as consisting of *sukhādi* rather than *sattvādi*, but see WATANABE (2011: 566, note 38) for evidence of the interchangeability of the two trios *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas* and *sukha*, *duḥkha*, *moha*.

The occurrence of *anvaya* in *ekasadanvayasambhavāt* in the *tathā* clause below, which parallels this *yathā* clause, indicates that Rāmakaṇṭha could have expressed *mṛdanviteṣu* and *sukhādyanviteṣu* as *mṛdanvayeṣu* and *sukhādyanvayeṣu*. But *anvaya* in this exposition of the Pāñcarātra position and in its refutation below does not have the sense of 'concomitance' that it often does in philosophical Sanskrit. The Pāñcarātra argument is that if things have *anvaya* with X, they all have X as their material cause. Concomitance would not be the kind of relation from which such a conclusion could be deduced; from the fact that wherever person A goes, person B also goes, it does not follow that A's going shares the same material cause as B's going.

The clearest statement of what *anvaya* means in this argument comes in section 3.13.5.6.2: *yā tv arthasya kārye pratyavayavaṃ cānyatra visadṛśatare 'pi vastuni tenaiva rūpeṇa sarvatraivānuvṛttiḥ, so 'nvaya ucyate*; 'That (*yā*) continuity (*anuvṛttiḥ*) of a thing (e.g. clay) in an effect (e.g. a pot), and in each of the parts (e.g. the neck and bottom of a pot), [and] elsewhere even in quite dissimilar objects (e.g. clay dishes), in every case in that very form (i.e. in the form of clay)—that is called *anvayaḥ*.' To have *anvaya* with something thus means to be continuous with it, as clay pots and dishes, and all of their parts, are continuous with clay. *Anvaya* is that relation that holds between all things that derive from the same material cause, and between those things and their material cause. Perhaps the non-technical meaning of the word from which this usage developed was 'family' or 'lineage'; pots are in the same lineage as the clay from which they arise, and as other vessels that derive from that clay. For a lengthy discussion of the concept, see Introduction, section 3.

In the case of pots, which serve as the example in this inference, one can observe their continuity with their pre-existing material cause, the lump of clay from which they derive; but in the case of conglomerations of body and senses, we cannot perceive their material cause, the triple-natured Primal Matter. Hence when we translate *sukhādyanviteṣu* in this sentence as 'continuous with pleasure, pain and delusion' we do not mean to imply that pleasure and the like can be perceived somewhere outside of psycho-physical conglomerations. The sense is rather that these conglomerations are thoroughly pervaded by pleasure and the like, as pots are thoroughly pervaded by clay (not in the sense of logical pervasion but in the sense that clay exists throughout the whole area taken up by the pot). It is this that enables the inference that they have a material cause consisting of pleasure and the like.

The passage quoted above continues: *ghaṭaśarāvādiṣu hi visadṛśatareṣv api tadavayaveṣu ca kaṇṭhādiṣu tatkāryeṣu ca karparādiṣu sarvatra mṛdanvayadṛṣṭer mṛtkāryatvāvināmbhāvasiddhiḥ*; 'For since we perceive continuity with clay in all of the following—pots, dishes and such like although they are very different, and their parts such as their necks, and their effects such as pot-sherds—we can establish that [continuity with clay] is logically concomitant with being an effect of clay.' Since those things that we know to be effects of clay can be seen to have continuity with clay, logical concomitance can be established between continuity with clay and being an effect of clay. Once the logical concomitance has been established in this case where the prior material cause can be perceived, it can be extended to cases such as psycho-physical conglomerations, whose prior material cause cannot be perceived.

This meaning of *anvaya* (/ *samanvaya*), and this argument that sees possession of *anvaya* as entailing possession of a single material cause, occur in Sāṅkhya sources. The earliest example is probably the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, ascribed to Vārṣagaṇya (see Introduction, note 20 and FRAUWALLNER 1958: 264); this *Ṣaṣṭitantra* passage is explained in the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* p. 314,7–14 and has been translated by FRAUWALLNER (1958: 268) and MOTEGI (2010: 371). (FRAUWALLNER renders *anvaya* as 'Übereinstimmung'; MOTEGI as 'homogeneity'.) The argument is referred to in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 15 with the words *bhedānām ... samanvayāt*, and elaborated by the commentators. A Sāṅkhya opponent in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* gives the argument in verse 14, and it is elaborated both in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (p. 21,5ff.) and in the unknown commentary, the first fragment of which

way (*yathā … tathaiva*) hold that selves and Primal Matter, because of the possibility (*-sambhavāt*) of their having continuity with the same Existent,[149]

has been edited and translated by HARIMOTO and KANO (2008: 16–20). A Sāṅkhya opponent puts a version of the argument in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 5.2.23: *ekaprakṛtīdaṃ vyaktam, vikārāṇām anvayadarśanāt. mṛdanvitānāṃ śarāvādīnāṃ dṛṣṭam ekaprakṛtitvam. tathā cāyaṃ vyaktabhedaḥ sukhaduḥkhamohānvito dṛśyate. tasmāt samanvayadarśanāt sukhādibhir ekaprakṛtīdaṃ viśvam iti.* 'This manifested world has a single material cause, because we find that [its] transformations have a continuous nature. We observe that dishes and the like, which [all] have continuity with clay, have a single material cause. And likewise these various manifested objects [in the world] are observed to have continuity with pleasure, pain and ignorance. Therefore, because we see [that manifested objects have] continuity, this world has a single material cause through (i.e. in the form of) pleasure and the like.' This is paraphrased by Dharmakīrti at *Vādanyāya* p. 65,13–66,2: *ekā prakṛtir vyaktasya, vikārāṇām anvayadarśanāt. mṛdanvayānāṃ śarāvādīnāṃ dṛṣṭam ekaprakṛtikatvam, tathā ca ayaṃ vyaktabhedaḥ sukhaduḥkhamohasamanvito gṛhyate. tat sukhādibhir ekaprakṛtir iti.* We are grateful to Dr Toshikazu WATANABE for drawing our attention to all of these references.

As mentioned above, and as elaborated in more detail in the Introduction (p. 28), this meaning of *anvaya* is different from the more common meaning of 'concomitance', where it is usually paired with *vyatireka*. It is worth pointing out here that *anvaya* is also used in a third sense, where again it is usually paired with *vyatireka* and so in that respect resembles the common usage, and yet where it can be rendered as 'continuity', and so in that respect resembles our usage. *Anvaya* in this third sense is used, along with *vyatireka*, to establish that two things are different. Thus it is argued by Advaita Vedāntins that the self or consciousness is not the same as the objects of consciousness, because the *anvaya* of the former is associated with the *vyatireka* of the latter: as consciousness of blue is followed by consciousness of yellow etc., the continued presence (*anvaya*) of consciousness, associated with the discontinuity (*vyatireka*) of the blue and yellow etc., establishes that consciousness is not the same as its objects. For many examples of this usage in Advaita Vedānta, see HALBFASS (1991: 162–182); for an example in Nyāya, see *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, p. 496,6–7, which has been translated by WATSON and KATAOKA (2010: 324). See also STAAL (1960: 54–55), STAAL (1966: 648), CARDONA (1967–68) and CARDONA (1981). We are very grateful to Dr Gianni PELLEGRINI for pointing us to several of these references. Although this usage overlaps with ours in that it can be rendered as 'continuity', it is not the same: (1) It is not a relation possessed by a plurality of effects that all have the same thing (e.g. clay) running through them; rather it is possessed by just one thing. (2) It is not capable of yielding a conclusion about the material cause of the thing that has it. (3) Its use is to establish the difference of the thing that has it from the associated things that have *vyatireka*.

[149]If the mere possibility of their having continuity is regarded as too weak an argument, a slightly different translation could be proposed: 'because they arise (*-sambhavāt*), having continuity with the same Existent'. This may be considered problematic on the grounds that the Pāñcarātrika is then assuming what he is setting out to prove. This problem could be avoided in two ways: by understanding *ekasadanvaya* to be pointing merely to the fact

even though they are different, have the same cause. Otherwise (*vā*) you should say that (*iti*) it is not the case here,[150] because there is no [significant] difference [between the two cases].[151]

Their (i.e. selves' and Primal Matter's) cause is the Highest Prakṛti, known as Mahāvibhūti, because she is the cause of sentient and insentient things.[152] She alone transforms directly into 'four-naturedness', which characterises the Lord;[153] into perceivers of sense fields who are [relatively] powerless; and into Avidyā, which is insentient. Avidyā,[154] for her part, having

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that they (viz. souls and Primal Matter) can all be qualified by the word *sat*, 'existent'; or by understanding it to mean 'continuity with the same thing, namely exist[ence].' On this last interpretation the point would just be that souls and Primal Matter have in common that they exist; this alone would be being put forward as evidence that they arise from the same underlying cause. This interpretation receives some support from the fact that in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* Rāmakaṇṭha gives the Pāñcarātra *hetu* as *sattādinānvitatvāt*, 'because they have continuity with existence and such like' (see note 708).

[150]I.e. in the case of conglomerations of body and sense faculties. If you deny that selves and Primal Matter both arise from the same material cause, then you should deny that psycho-physical conglomerates all rise from the same material cause.

Interpreting the *iti* in this way is forced, but the best we can do with the text as it stands. It would be smoother if the *iti* were not there.

[151]In both cases there is *ekānvaya*, so in both cases there should be *ekakāraṇakatva*.

[152]The function of the 'because' clause is to explain why she is the *Highest* Prakṛti.

[153]The entry in *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa* II for *cāturātmya*, written by RASTELLI, states that 'four-naturedness', the own-form of Viṣṇu, denotes His power to manifest Himself in the form of the four *vyūhas*, and also signifies the unity of these four. She cites *Sātvatasaṃhitā* 7:3b, and *Pārameśvarasaṃhitā* 7:480b and 10:347c.

[154]We hesitated over whether to adopt *vidyā* or *avidyā*, both here and in the previous sentence, but decided on the latter, after examining the following passages pointed out to us by Professor SANDERSON. The first is a brief refutation of a Kashmirian Pāñcarātra position in the *Śivadṛṣṭi* (6:16–19):

> *pāñcarātravidaś cānye vadanti pariniṣṭhitam |*
> *brahmāsti vāsudevākhyaṃ sa eva jagadīśvaraḥ || 16 ||*
> *vidyāvidye dvayaṃ cāsya sādhanaṃ samavasthitam |*
> *avidyayā jagat kuryād vidyayā mokṣayet paśūn || 17 ||*
> *tābhyāṃ na cāsyoparāgaḥ prabuddhatvāt prabhutvataḥ |*
> *tathānyeṣāṃ svātmanaiva vidyayā jagadātmatā || 18 ||*
> *na cāvidyā bādhikāsya yataḥ sādhanaṃ asya sā |*
> *proktaṃ bhagavato vīryeṇety ādyais tattvadarśanaiḥ || 19 ||*
>
> And others, who know the Pāñcarātra, say that a perfect *brahman* exists, called Vāsudeva, and that is He who is the Lord of the universe. Vidyā and Avidyā, the two of them, are His instrument: with Avidyā He creates the universe; with Vidyā He liberates bound souls. He is not coloured by them,

because He is awakened and because He is all-powerful. Similarly, for others, [He is held] to be the soul of the universe by means of His Vidyā, which is His very self. And it is not the case that Avidyā occludes Him, since She is His instrument. This is what has been taught by the primordial [beings] who saw the truth through the power of God.

Here both *vidyā* and *avidyā* are powers of the Lord, but it is *avidyā* with which he creates the universe. The second passage, from a speech of Viṣṇu's in the *Mahābhārata*, speaks in fact only of *vidyā* as the causative power of Vāsudeva (*Śāntiparvan* 326:64–70):

vidyāsahāyavantaṃ mām ādityasthaṃ sanātanam |
kapilaṃ prāhur ācāryāḥ sāṅkhyaniścitaniścayāḥ || 64 ||
hiraṇyagarbho bhagavān eṣa chandasi suṣṭutaḥ |
so 'haṃ yogagatir brahman yogaśāstreṣu śabditaḥ || 65 ||
eṣo 'haṃ vyaktim āgamya tiṣṭhāmi divi śāśvataḥ |
tato yugasahasrānte saṃhariṣye jagat punaḥ |
kṛtvātmasthāni bhūtāni sthāvarāṇi carāṇi ca || 66 ||
ekākī vidyayā sārdhaṃ viharişye dvijottama |
tato bhūyo jagat sarvaṃ kariṣyāmīha vidyayā || 67 ||
asmanmūrtiś caturthī yā sāsṛjac cheṣam avyayam |
sa hi saṅkarṣaṇaḥ proktaḥ pradyumnaṃ so 'py ajījanat || 68 ||
pradyumnād aniruddho 'haṃ sargo mama punaḥ punaḥ |
aniruddhāt tathā brahmā tatrādikamalodbhavaḥ || 69 ||
brahmaṇaḥ sarvabhūtāni carāṇi sthāvarāṇi ca |
etāṃ sṛṣṭiṃ vijānīhi kalpādiṣu punaḥ punaḥ || 70 ||

Teachers whose certainty has been fixed by Sāṅkhya [knowledge] call me, who am in company with Vidyā, the "eternal one in the sun", "Kapila". Lo, I am Hiraṇyagarbha, the Lord praised in scripture, the way of yoga that is spoken of in the teachings on yoga, O Brahmin. It is I who, becoming manifest, remain permanent in the heaven. Then, at the end of a thousand aeons, I again resorb the universe, making all creatures—those that move and the still—rest in me. Alone, [only] with Vidyā, I remain, O Brahmin; then once again I create the universe with Vidyā. The one who is the fourth of my forms invariably creates all the rest. For [to explain:] he is [or 'I am'?] called Saṃkarṣaṇa and this very [form of myself] engendered Pradyumna; from Pradyumna I [became] Aniruddha. [This is] my ever repeated creation. And from Aniruddha then [came] Brahmā, born of the primordial lotus. From Brahmā [come forth] all creatures—those that move and the still. Know this to be the creation, ever repeated at the beginnings of each age.

There are some uncertainties here (notably whether the 'fourth form' refers to Brahmā or rather to Saṃkarṣaṇa); but what is plain is that Vidyā is not here an evolute and lowly instrument of the creator God (as is the entity of which Rāmakaṇṭha speaks), but instead a power inseparable from him, even when the universe has been resorbed.

The following verse from the *Haravijaya* (47:55) is addressed to Vidyā as the goddess:

prāptābhisandhiparatām anuvṛttilagna-
gauṇasthitiḥ sthitasitātiśayād abhīkṣṇam |
vidyeti sarvabahulākhilasṛṣṭisaṃjñā
sāṅkarṣaṇe nigaditā kila śāsane tvam ||

• *sthitasitātiśayād*] ed.; *sthitimitā viṣayā/viṣayād* Ka • *-srṣṭi-*] Ka; *-dṛṣṭi-* ed. • *sāṅkarṣaṇe*] conj. SANDERSON (1985: 211, note 57); *saṅkarṣaṇī* ed.; *sāṅkarṣaṇī* Kha

We record the readings of Ka and Kha as they are reported in footnotes to the edition; it is not possible to infer from there whether Ka read *viṣayā* or *viṣayād*.

We are far from certain of the meaning, but we offer the following very tentative translation.

Having become intent on your will [to create] (*abhisandhipara-*), [you] whose existence in the *guṇa*s sticks [to all your evolutes] because of *anuvṛtti*,* full with all things (*sarvabahulā*), named the creation of all, you, because of permanently having a preeminence of steadfast *sattva* (*sthitasitātiśayāt*) are taught, it appears (*kila*), in the Sāṅkarṣaṇa** tradition to be Vidyā.

* We take this to have a meaning closely related to *anvaya* in our text: her existence continues in her evolutes in the way that the existence of clay continues in pots.

** Rāmakaṇṭha distinguishes in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* between the Sāṅkarṣaṇapāñcarātras and the Saṃhitāpāñcarātras. He characterises the former as Antaḥkaraṇacaitanyavādins, i.e. as holding that it is the *buddhi* that is the seat of consciousness and that there is no individual soul separate from that (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:51, p. 87–88). For the latter see note 146.

Here Vidyā does seem to be connected to the creation of the universe, but since she is identified with the goddess herself, it is perhaps unlikely that she is the insentient (*jaḍa*) evolute referred to at this point of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*.

Is there any evidence for an evolute *vidyā* having existed in some form or other of the Pāñcarātra as a counterpart either to the Śaiva *śuddhavidyā* or to the lower, impure *vidyā*? For the higher entity the answer appears to be no, and no lower *vidyā* is alluded to in TORELLA's account of 'The *kañcuka*s in the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava Tantric Tradition' (1998). But there is one odd passage in the *Jayākhyasaṃhitā*'s account of the thread used in initiation onto which a ladder of the *tattva*s of the cosmos was to be superimposed which may be quoted here (16:131ab, 132c–134):

avyaktaliṅgasūtraṃ tu prāgavidyākalātmakam |
[...]
tatrasthāṃ cintayet sarvām abhinnāṃ tattvavardhanīm || 132 ||
tatrodbhavās tu ye vipra pāśabandhātmakā dṛḍhāḥ |
rāgeṇa rañjitāś citrā avidyāsaṃpradīpitāḥ || 133 ||

vicchinnāś caiva kālena niyatā vyāpakās tathā |
tattvasaṅkhyākrameṇaiva grathayet tad vijecchayā dvijecchayā ‖ 134 ‖

RASTELLI, quoting in fact 16:131–134b (1999: 159), does what she can with this passage, translating (all but the last half-line) as follows:

> Der Faden, der das Merkmal des Unentfalteten (*avyakta*) trägt, hat einen kleinen Teil (*kalā*) des [in] früheren [Geburten erworbenen] Nichtwissens zum Wesen, [...] In ihm soll er sich die ganze, ungeteilte [Urmaterie], die die *tattvas* wachsen läßt, vorstellen. Jene aber, die dort entspringen (d.h. die *tattvas*), o Priester, haben das Wesen von Fesseln und Bindungen, sind fest, durch Begehren gefärbt, mannigfaltig, durch Nichtwissen entflammt, werden durch die Zeit zerstört und begrenzt und sind alldurchdringend.

It is possible that this fragment of text in its present context now means to most readers something like what RASTELLI has translated. But, as SANDERSON has demonstrated (2009: 67, note 77), the passage is probably in fact calqued upon a Śaiva cliché about the principles of *kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga* and *niyati* which we find in differing forms in early *Siddhāntas* notably *Kiraṇatantra* 1:16c–18:

tayodbalitacaitanyo vidyākhyāpitagocaraḥ ‖ 16 ‖
rāgeṇa rañjitaś cāpi pradhānaṃ ca guṇātmanā |
buddhyādikaraṇānīkasambandhād badhyate paśuḥ ‖ 17 ‖
tato niyatisaṃśleṣāt svārjite 'pi niyamyate |
kālena kālasaṅkhyānakāryabhogavimohitaḥ ‖ 18 ‖

Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha 1:9c–10:

kalā saṃśleṣam āyāti śivecchānuvidhāyinī ‖
kalodbalitacaitanyo vidyādarśitagocaraḥ |
rāgeṇa rañjitaś cāpi buddhyādikaraṇais tataḥ ‖

and *Svacchanda* 2:39c–41b:

malapradhvastacaitanyaṃ kalāvidyāsamāśritam ‖
rāgeṇa rañjitātmānaṃ kālena kalitaṃ tathā |
niyatyā yamitaṃ bhūyaḥ puṃbhāvenopabṛṃhitam ‖
pradhānāśayasampannaṃ guṇatrayasamanvitam |

(cf. also *Haravijaya* 6:126). In SANDERSON's restitution of this passage of the *Jayākhyasaṃhitā* (for which he adduces the readings of an old Nepalese manuscript), we therefore find instead:

avyaktaliṅgasūtraṃ tu ***rāgāvidyākalātmakam*** |
[...]
tatrasthāṃ cintayet sarvām abhinnāṃ tattvapaddhatim ‖ 132 ‖
tattvodbhavās tu ye vipra pāśā bandhātmakā dṛḍhāḥ |
rāgeṇa rañjitāś citrā avidyāsaṃpradīpitāḥ ‖ 133 ‖
vicchinnāś caiva kālena ***niyatyāvyāpakās tathā*** |

The relevant part of SANDERSON's translation reads (2009: 68, note 77):

become the *buddhi* and the *manas*, becomes the subtle elements when She is non-distinguished, and when she is distinguished[155] becomes the [five] elements and the [ten] faculties of sense and action.[156] It is She (*parā prakṛtiḥ*) who, in this sequence, transforms herself in this way and that way, and is thus Supreme. This they say: "The Lord Vāsudeva is the Highest Prakṛti, the Foremost Vibhūti, and Becoming itself. He Himself becomes, has become and will become."[157]

> He should meditate upon the entire sequence of Tattvas as residing undivided therein. This thread, [which embodies] the subtle body [of the candidate], comprises Rāga, Avidyā, and Kalā (*rāgāvidyākalātmakam*). [...] They arise, O brahmin, from the Tattvas. They are coloured because they have been dyed with [the red-ness of] Rāga. They are illuminated by Avidyā, circumscribed by Kāla, and made non-pervasive by Niyati.

As SANDERSON observes on the following page (2009: 68):

> Even the substitution of *avidyā* for the Śaivas' *vidyā* does nothing to dilute the obviously Śaiva character of the set, since *vidyā* in that context is indeed a form of nescience (*avidyā*), being understood as the limited power of knowledge that characterizes bound souls, enabling them to cognize the objects presented by the faculties, as opposed to the pure, all-encompassing knowledge (*śuddhavidyā*) that operates above *māyātattvam*; and this understanding is maintained in the passage in the *Jayākhya*, because it speaks of the bonds as being 'illuminated' by *avidyā*.

Thus it is conceivable, but far from certain, that some form of the Pāñcarātra once knew an evolute *vidyā*. We are not aware, however, of any other evidence in the surviving literature (for accounts of creation in surviving sources of the Pāñcarātra see, e.g., RASTELLI 1999: 3ff. and CZERNIAK-DROŻDŻOWICZ 1998) and are therefore inclined to favour reading *avidyā* here on the strength of the evidence of the above-quoted passages.

[155]See *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 38a–c:

> *tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣās tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ |*
> *ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ.*

BRONKHORST (1994: 312) translates, 'The *tanmātras* are the *aviśeṣas*. From those five [arise] the five elements; these are known as the *viśeṣas*'.

See also *Yogabhāṣya* ad 2:19 (pointed out to us by H. N. BHAT), where the *aviśeṣas* are said to be the five *tanmātras* and the *ahaṅkāra*. The *viśeṣas* produced from the *tanmātras* are the five elements; the *viśeṣas* produced from the *ahaṅkāra* are the *manas* and the ten faculties of sense and action.

[156]We regard *bhūtā, indriyatvena* to be the minimum repair to the text necessary to restore a plausible sense (the closest sources to this are $A_1 P_2$ and P_3). However we are still left with the unsatisfactoriness that we expect another word after *indriyatvena* such as *ca*, *bhūtā* or *bhavati*.

[157]Professor SANDERSON's annotation points to the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 15:7:

Thus perceivers of sense fields are said to reside (*tiṣṭhantīti*)[158] in [Him] alone, because they are an effect [of Him], since they are non-pervading, in that they are minute.[159] Since individual souls, as a result of a continuous sequence of [bondage by] ignorance and karma, rise from that very material cause, which has transformation as its property, the Highest Good is their dissolution into it as a result of destruction of this [ignorance and karma], its plurality of effects coming to rest, its nature being the Highest Cause.' Such is the mistaken understanding of some.[160]

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yad āhuḥ pāñcarātrāḥ:

bhagavān vasudevo 'sau guṇebhyaḥ prakṛtiḥ parā |
avyaktaṃ nityam āhus taṃ param asmān na vidyate ||

and Kṣemarāja's *Svacchandatantroddyota* ad 11:180ab: *pāñcarātrair... 'bhūta eva sa svayaṃ bhavati' ityādi jñānam upadiśyate.* See also *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 17.60c–61b: *kecit punaḥ 'bhagavān vāsudevaḥ parā prakṛtir jyāyasī vibhūtiḥ' ityādyabhyupagamād guṇakāraṇaṃ pradhānam evāvyaktābhidhānaṃ prāpyaṃ manyante pāñcarātrāḥ.*

[158]In the verse quotation at the beginning of this exposition of the Pāñcarātra position. It is equally possible that the *iti* is intended not in this sense, but to end the speech that was begun with *kutra tiṣṭhantīty atra kecid āhuḥ*; for the *iti* before *keṣāñcid durabhyupagamaḥ* (at the end of the paragraph) could be performing some function other than closing that speech.

[159]In order to interpret this sentence as saying something different from the next one, we take it as speaking not of souls coming to rest in Him at liberation, but rather of their residing in Him even while they are in *saṃsāra*, as pots reside in their clay-nature even before they are dissolved back into undifferentiated clay.

That the sentence gives non-pervasion as a reason for being an effect, implying that a material cause must be pervading, is surprising. It would certainly not be acceptable to a Naiyāyika, for whom atoms are material causes. So we considered understanding *vyāpakatvena* instead of *avyāpakatvena* (by dissolving *sandhi* differently), and taking both *aṇīyastayā* and *vyāpakatvena* to refer to Vāsudeva: 'reside in [Him] alone, since He is all-pervading, in that He is subtle'. The fact, however, that it is perceivers of sense-fields, not Vāsudeva, who are described as *aṇīyāṃsaḥ* in the half-verse at the beginning of this Pāñcarātrika section, a half-verse being echoed in this sentence, makes it unlikely that *aṇīyastayā* would refer here to Vāsudeva. Since the Pāñcarātrika is addressing himself to those of a Saiddhāntika / Sāṅkhya persuasion (see *bhavadbhiḥ* in line 54), perhaps he does not feel the need to worry about this Naiyāyika objection.

[160]Cf. *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (A p. 147–148, B p. 80, C p. 29): *pāñcarātrāś ca guṇavyatiriktāyā nārāyaṇākhyāyāḥ parasyāḥ prakṛteś cidacitāṃ vastūnāṃ* [*cidacitāṃ vastūnāṃ* conj.; *citaś citāṃ vastūnāṃ* A; *cidacitoḥ vastūnāṃ* B; *cida* ⊔ C] *sarveṣāṃ sākṣāt parampara yā cotpattiḥ; teṣāṃ ca jīvānām avidyākarmānubandhena saṃsāraḥ, jñānādinā tatkṣayataḥ samupaśāntakāryabhedarūpe tasmin paramātmani kāraṇe layaḥ paraṃ śreya* [*kāraṇe layaḥ paraṃ śreya* conj.; *kāraṇalayaparaśreya* A; *kāraṇalayaḥ paraśreya* B; *kāraṇe layaḥ praḷaya* C] *iti vadanti. yad āhuḥ*

2.5 Dissolution into Primal Matter, Egoity and the like: verse 2cd

From the mention [by Sadyojyotiḥ] of ***and the like*** in '[Dissolution into] *avyākṛta* and the like', those who hold [that liberation is] dissolution into *prakṛti* [are intended, and] from the words[161] ***and lower*** [***ones***],[162] those, by contrast (*tu*), who are situated lower, [namely those] who hold [that liberation is] dissolution into egoity and such like, [are intended]. [All these are] Tauṣṭikas. Thus it has been said:

> And nine [varieties of] contentment are named: four internal ones called *prakṛti*, *upādāna*, time and fate (*bhāgya*); and five external ones due to abstaining from objects.[163]

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bhagavān vāsudevo 'sau guṇebhyaḥ prakṛtiḥ parā |
avyaktaṃ vyaktam āhus taṃ paraṃ asmān na vidyate || iti*

* Also cited by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* with *nityam* for *vyaktam* (see note 157) and by Madhyārjuna in the *Siddhāntadīpikā* (T. 284, p. 100) with *vyaktam*.

[161] We take *ity ataḥ* in the sense of *ity anena*. It is possible however that the sense of *ity anena* is conveyed just by *iti* and that the *ataḥ* is to be taken with *adhaḥ* in the sense of 'lower than it (i.e. than *prakṛti*)'.

[162] The full half-verse (2cd) reads *avyākṛtādiṣv arvāk ca laya eva vikāriṣu*, 'Dissolution into transforming [material causes], namely *avyākṛta* and the like, and lower [ones]'.

[163] *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 50. The fullest commentary on this *kārikā* is that of the *Yuktidīpikā*. *Prakṛtituṣṭi* is said there to be the state of mind in which one remains content that it is *prakṛti* that will in time lead one to liberation. It entails regarding one of the eight productive principles (*prakṛti*), namely *pradhāna*, *ahaṅkāra*, *buddhi* or one of the five *tanmātras*, as supreme. Its result is conquering and then dissolving into one of these eight productive principles. The second internal contentment, *upādānatuṣṭi*, involves resting satisfied with, and therefore conquering and dissolving into, one or other of the sixteen *vikṛtis*, namely the gross elements and the faculties of sense and action. The third and fourth internal contentments entail resting satisfied with the idea that liberation will necessarily come in time (*kālatuṣṭi*), or due to fate (*bhāgyatuṣṭi*). These four contentments also have the names, respectively, of *ambhaḥ*, *salila*, *ogha* and *vṛṣṭi*. (They are justified by *nirvacana* in the *Yuktidīpikā*.)

The five external contentments, whose names vary in the commentaries, but which, according to the *Yuktidīpikā*, are *sutāra*, *supāra*, *sunetra*, *sumārīca* and *uttamābhaya* (according to Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvakaumudī*, they are rather *pāra*, *supāra*, *pārapāra*, *anuttamāmbhaḥ*, and *uttamāmbhaḥ*), arise from becoming aware of five kinds of fault in the enjoyment of objects of the senses, respectively the faults of *arjana*, *rakṣaṇa*, *kṣaya*, [pra-

]*saṅga*, *hiṃsā*. In procuring objects (*arjana*) one undergoes great suffering. One manages to obtain some, but in keeping them (*rakṣaṇa*), one suffers. Having kept them, they may get destroyed (*kṣaya*), which causes suffering. When separated from them one suffers because of attachment (*saṅga*) to them. The last involves the realisation that enjoyment of objects of the senses entails harm to others (*hiṃsādoṣa*). When one becomes aware of the suffering caused by each of these kinds of fault, the corresponding kind of external contentment arises.

None of these *tuṣṭi*s constitutes or can lead to liberation for the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* commentators, for it is their position that true liberation can only arise through knowledge.

Although the nine *tuṣṭi*s are among the fifty *pratyaya*s of *buddhitattva* (see *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 46), their fruit is not necessarily dissolution (*laya*) into *buddhitattva*, but rather, in the case of *prakṛtituṣṭi* at least, dissolution into whatever *tattva* one holds to be supreme.

Rāmakaṇṭha's brief account of the Tauṣṭikas gives prominence to *prakṛtituṣṭi*, for he mentions explicitly only *prakṛtilaya* and *ahaṅkāralaya*, two possible fruits of *prakṛtituṣṭi*. That he singles out these two from the various fruits of *prakṛtituṣṭi* accords with the *Yuktidīpikā*, which also takes *pradhānalaya* as the paradigmatic case of *prakṛtilaya*, but then also gives some prominence to *ahaṅkāralaya*.

The term *tauṣṭika*, used to describe the adherents to these nine *tuṣṭi*s, appears not to be at all common. We find it, however, twice in Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvavaiśāradī*, once ad *Yogasūtra* 1.16 and once ad 1.19, from which we quote the relevant sentence: *bhūtendriyeṣu vā vikāreṣu prakṛtiṣu vā 'vyaktamahadahaṅkārapañcatanmātreṣv anātmasv ātmakhyātis tauṣṭikānāṃ vairāgyasampannānām*. 'The identification with self of what is not-self—either the transformations, [namely] the gross elements and the faculties, or the productive principles, [namely] *avyakta*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and the five *tanmātra*s—[arises] in the Tauṣṭikas, who have attained dispassion.'

Vācaspatimiśra here makes explicit that, in his understanding, all the *tuṣṭi*s result from the predominance of one of the eight propensities of the intellect (*buddhidharma*), namely dispassion (*vairāgya*). This is made explicit only for the first of the *tuṣṭi*s in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 45, which begins with *vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ*.

Prakṛtilaya is the subject of an illuminating recent article by Angelika MALINAR (2010), who gives a thorough overview of its occurrences in Yoga and Sāṅkhya sources, and discerns the following differences between the two schools in their attitude towards it. The *Yogasūtra* and its commentaries (apart from that of Vācaspatimiśra, which in fact takes a Sāṅkhya stance) take the *prakṛti* that is dissolved into to be only the highest, unmanifest *prakṛti*, beyond the created world; Sāṅkhya sources take it to be any of the eight *prakṛti*s (productive principles).

Although for both schools it is a temporally finite state, the length of a soul's stay in it can, for Sāṅkhya authors, be reckoned within the temporal framework that structures the created world. For Yoga authors, by contrast, it cannot: the world and its temporal framework has been left behind, and the production of karma has ceased.

The *Yogasūtra* and its commentaries, being more positive in their evaluation of *prakṛtilaya*, present it as a yogic achievement that is extremely close to liberation. The *Yogabhāṣya* (ad 3.26) actually asserts that those who are dissolved in *prakṛti* 'exist in the realm of liberation' (*mokṣapade vartante*, cited at MALINAR 2010: 141). Hence MALINAR characterises the state as one in which 'liberation has been reached on the spatial level,

2.6 A Chief Attendant of the Supreme Lord: verse 3a

The words ***a chief attendant of the Supreme Lord*** denote another fruit, [namely] the obtaining of the same world as, or the vicinity of [the Lord].[164]

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but not on the temporal level' (p. 143). Sāṅkhya sources, by contrast, far from regarding the state as close to liberation, tend to see it as characterised by darkness (*tamas*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) on the part of those who see what is not the self as the self. That Vācaspatimiśra's commentary on the *Yogasūtra* falls into this camp is apparent from the sentence of his cited above. He sets himself apart from the other Yoga commentators in asserting that the *Yogasūtra* (1.19) mentions it not as something praiseworthy, but as something to be abandoned (*heya*). This attitude, characteristic of Sāṅkhya, can be seen in the *Māṭharavṛtti*, which asserts (on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 48, cited by MALINAR on p. 147) that the Yogin who is merged in one of the eight *prakṛtis* thinks he is liberated, but is not: that is an error (*viparyaya*) on his part. The Yoga commentaries, apart from that of Vācaspatimiśra, do not use the language of error. They see *prakṛtilaya* not as the result of mistaking *prakṛti* for the self, but as an attainment achieved by those Yogins who have developed sufficient dispassion (*vairāgya*) towards all of the principles below *prakṛti* to have gone beyond them. What is needed to pass beyond this state to full liberation is dispassion even towards this highest *prakṛti*.

Difference in attitudes towards dispassion (*vairāgya*) is what accounts, to a large extent, for the different attitudes towards *prakṛtilaya*. Since for Sāṅkhya authors knowledge alone brings about liberation, and since they thus downgrade the value and importance of dispassion—an indispensable means of liberation in Yoga—, those states such as *prakṛtilaya* that are brought about by dispassion are also downgraded.

MALINAR points out that the *Yuktidīpikā*'s stance actually falls between the Sāṅkhya attitude and the Yoga attitude. It stands apart from the other Sāṅkhya sources by classing *prakṛtilaya* as a contentment (*tuṣṭi*), and by not characterising it as a state of ignorance (*avidyā*) and darkness (*tamas*) that results from self-deceit (*abhimāna*). But it does not, as the Yoga sources do, regard it as 'like liberation'. For its Sāṅkhya attitude to contentments is that they involve being content with less than the full goal of *kaivalya*, and that they are based on a lack of philosophical rigour. For the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, then, *prakṛtilaya* results from premature contentment and insufficient reasoning.

See VASUDEVA (2004: 173–8) for a discussion of *prakṛtilaya* as possible model for the Śaiva concept of *pralayakevalatva*.

[164] A commonly found list gives four grades of theistic 'liberation': *sālokya*, *sāmīpya*, *sārūpya*, and *sāyujya* (some passages in which this gradation occurs or is referred to are mentioned by GOODALL 1998: xxxvii–xxxix, note 85). And the *Mataṅga* actually gives a seven-fold list (*yogapāda* 5:63ff).

E and P_3 read *sālokyasāmīpyādi-*, which, being less well attested than the reading without *ādi*, we have not accepted. But if it is original, then assuming that Rāmakaṇṭha does not have in mind the eccentric seven-fold list, the *ādi* probably refers only to *sārūpya* ('having the same form as', i.e. looking exactly like), for unless *sāyujya* be taken to mean something like 'inseparable companionship of' rather than 'union with' it does not seem to denote a state compatible with becoming an attendant of the Lord. For more on *sāyujya*

As is said in the *Pauṣkara*,[165]

> Liberation in this system is not attained through other *dīkṣās*;[166] through them [one attains] the state of being a chief among the attendants [of the Lord].[167]

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see GOODALL 2004, note 889 on p. 397.

[165]The verse does not occur in the South Indian *Pauṣkara*; probably it is from the older *Pauṣkarapārameśvara*, a few folios of which survive in a ninth-century manuscript in Cambridge (see GOODALL 1998: xli–xliv).

[166]*Dīkṣā* is perhaps used here in the sense of an initiation taken at the beginning of a particular religious observance (*vrata*) or perhaps in the sense of the *vrata* itself; for see the following verse from the characterisation of the system (*mata*) termed *śaiva* in Rājaśekharasūri's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (as quoted in appendix III to the *Gaṇakārikā*, p. 36, where it comes just after the mention of Bhāsarvajña; it also occurs in the *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, Guṇaratnasūri's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra, ad v. 12, p. 76):

> *śaivīṃ dīkṣāṃ dvādaśābdīṃ sevitvā yo 'pi muñcati |*
> *dāsī dāso 'pi bhavati so 'pi nirvāṇam ṛcchati ||*
>
> One who follows the twelve-year Śaiva "initiation" and then relinquishes it becomes a female or male servant [of God]; and that person [then] attains [ultimate] liberation.

It seems plausible that *dāsaḥ* is intended as equivalent in sense to *mahāgaṇo maheśasya* in our text, and *mahāgaṇapatiḥ* in *Pāśupatasūtra* 1.38 (quoted in the next footnote).

[167]This is a frequently alluded to goal of *paurāṇika* religion; see, for example, *Brahmapurāṇa* 35:28 and Ur-*Skandapurāṇa* 12:26, 14:29, 20:3, 24:65, 25:20, 33:117, 69:82. See also *Niśvāsamukha* 1:113, 3:105, 3:106 and *Śivadharmaśāstra* 11:54 (numbered verse 417 on p. 151 of the Naraharinath edition).

The *Pāśupatasūtras* speak of becoming a *mahāgaṇapati*: *ity etair guṇair yukto bhagavato mahādevasya mahāgaṇapatir bhavati* (1.38). This is not considered to be the mere fruit of an early stage of the practice; it occurs, according to Kauṇḍinya, for a *siddha* who has attained the final goal of going beyond suffering and of becoming connected with the qualities of the Lord. See *Pañcārthabhāṣya* ad 5.41: *pūrvoktena vidhinā japtavyam. na tu duḥkhāntagatena gaṇapativat*, '[The formula] should be muttered according to the earlier mentioned prescription. But not by one who has reached the end of suffering like a Gaṇapati' (cited and translated by BISSCHOP 2005: 15); and ad 1.38: *yadā guṇair yuktaḥ prāptaiśvaryaḥ siddhas tadā mahāgaṇapatir bhavati* (BISSCHOP 2005: 7).

The author of the sūtras may well have intended *mahāgaṇapati* to refer to a 'great chief attendant'. But Kauṇḍinya, for whom this perhaps suggested a lowly *paurāṇika* goal, gives the forced interpretation that it means 'Lord of the great collection [of bound souls]': see *atra mahāgaṇo nāma paśugaṇaḥ* ad 1.38 (BISSCHOP 2005: 7). Kauṇḍinya also does not take *bhagavato mahādevasya* in the sūtra (given above) to go with *mahāgaṇapatiḥ*, as one might expect; his motivation was probably partly to avert the impression that *gaṇa* means an attendant of Mahādeva. We thank Peter BISSCHOP for the references in the last two

It is those (i.e. the advocates of this fruit) that are referred to by the author of the [*Raurava*]*sūtra*[168] with the word 'Yogi'.[169]

2.7 An Omniscient Non-Agent: verse 3b

The words ***A non-agent who knows all objects of knowledge*** denote the fruit of another tradition. The fact that the Lord is an agent of actions, first of all, has been demonstrated on the ground that otherwise effects such as bodies, faculties and worlds (*tanukaraṇabhuvanādi-*) would be impossible to account for.[170] And that being the case, the impossibility otherwise of effects is not now capable of establishing agency in liberated souls. If [you say that] the proof of their agency is [not through the impossibility of effects otherwise, but] due to them being liberated, like the Lord, that [inference] is incorrect, because it provides no example [of something liberated and an agent], because it is not established that the Lord is liberated. For things which were bound are liberated. So the Lord and perfected [souls] are completely different in this respect. As the Venerable Avadhūta says in the *Vaṭayakṣiṇī*:[171]

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paragraphs.

Sadyojyotiḥ's inclusion of *maheśasya* may have been echoing *mahādevasya* in *Pāśupata-sūtra* 1.38, or he may simply have wished to exclude being a *gaṇa* of some deity other than Maheśa (Śiva). Note, for instance, that Ur-*Skandapurāṇa* 69:72 speaks of becoming a *mahāgaṇapati* of Vindhyavāsinī.

[168]In view of *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* 10:105–106, this mention of 'the author of the [*Raurava*]*sūtra*' should refer to Ruru, who transmited a resume of the scripture of Śiva.

[169]As to why the word 'Yogi' suggests those who attain *sālokya* or *sāmīpya*: could it be that those who attain these goals enjoy a special sort of connection (*yoga*) with the Lord? See also Professor SANDERSON's remark, mentioned in note 85, that becoming a chief attendant of the Lord is an appropriate fruit for non-initiated Śiva-worshipping Yogins.

[170]This proof that the Lord is an agent of actions has not occurred in this text, thus we must assume that it was given in a lost previous part of the *Rauravavṛtti*. See section 6 in the Introduction.

[171]We know of no text by this name, and the reading here is not certain. The word seems garbled in most witnesses; *vaṭayakṣinyāṃ* is the reading of our best manuscript and at least makes sense (a *vaṭa* tree is the kind of place where Yakṣiṇīs might live). But why a text would be known by this name is not obvious. Professor SANDERSON's annotation records that on the basis of E_D's reading alone, *vyāsākṣiṇyāṃ*, he conjectured *vidyāsākṣiṇyāṃ*. The parallel passage in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (see note 174) reads in this place *padayakṣiṇyāṃ*.

Avadhūta may be a name for a number of ascetics in different traditions; but it is possible that many of the stray verses ascribed to an Avadhūta in tantric sources are all by the hand of the same man, perhaps an *ācārya* of the tradition to which Rāma-

Although the duties of the Highest Śiva towards perfected [souls]

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kaṇṭha ascribes the position presently being outlined, namely that which based itself on the *Pramāṇa* scriptures. It is possible, furthermore, that they are by the hand of the Avadhūta of whom a surviving work has been published by GNOLI (1958), the sixty-five-verse *Bhagavadbhaktistotra* in *vasantatilakā* metre. As GNOLI points out (1958: 215), two verses of this *stotra* (17 and 21) appear quoted by Yogarāja in his commentary on the *Paramārthasāra*, and these led us (through BANSAT-BOUDON and TRIPATHI 2011: 103) to the discovery of GNOLI's edition. GNOLI further points out quotations of verses 36 and 46 in *Yaśastilaka* 5 and 6 (pp. 255 and 272). (We note that verse 36 appears also in the *Prameyaratnamālā* ad 2:12 (p. 102) followed by *ity avadhūtavacanāt.*) The earliest attestation he records (*ibid.*) is the repeated quotation of verse 29 by Abhinavagupta. We can add that verses 31–32, a pair of verses about the efficacity of worship even for those without the usual qualifications, are quoted (with variants, including *mugdhā* for *lubdhā*) by Vaktraśambhu in his *Mṛgendrapaddhatiṭīkā* (IFP T. 1021, p. 155). Those two verses refer to the salvific nature of Śaiva initiation, but it is difficult to determine the author's religious affiliation more narrowly within Śaivism from this *stotra*.

Two verses in *anuṣṭubh* ascribed to Avadhūtācārya and Avadhūtaguru respectively are quoted in the *Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:14 and ad *yogapāda* 62 (in other words, a little earlier than Abhinavagupta, as GNOLI's introduction mentions). The first appears in the context of recidivism in Vedānta (and is quoted again, with variants, in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*), and the second formulates the celebrated comparison of the irreversible alchemical transformation of something into gold with the irreversible transformation of the soul in initiation (for numerous other instances of this image, see GOODALL 2004: 402–3, note 904). Finally, the following somewhat riddling quotation appears in Trilocanaśiva's *Somaśambhupaddhatiṭīkā* in the discussion of Somaśambhu's opening verses:

> *avadhūtadevenāpy uktam:*
> *gauṇaṃ grāhaṇikaṃ grānthaṃ maulaṃ vā vigrahaṃ vinā |*
> *śaktir deho 'paraḥ svasthaḥ svādhikāraṃ karoti kaḥ || iti.*
>
> • *gauṇaṃ grāhaṇikaṃ grānthaṃ maulaṃ vā vigrahaṃ vinā*] conj.; *gauṇaṃ grāhaṇikaṃ grānthaṃ mamaulaṃ vā vigrahaṃ vinā* T_1; *gauṇaṃ grāhanikaṃ grānthaṃ* ⊔ *laṃ vā vigrahaṃ vinā* M; *gauṇagrāhanikagranthamamalaṃ vigrahahaṃ vinā* P_1 • *-paraḥ svasthaḥ*] conj.; *-parasvasthaṃ* M; *parasvakta-* T_1; *-parassvakta* P_1 • *-kāraṃ karoti kaḥ*] T_1M; *kārakarā* P_1
> (We use here the sigla of the forthcoming edition of S. A. S. SARMA (EFEO).)

Given that this quotation follows immediately upon a quotation of *Mṛgendratantra, vidyāpāda* 3:14 (about *śakti* performing the rôle of a body), we guess that the verse may mean:

> Leaving aside secondary(?) (*gauṇam*) [types of] body, adopted(?) ones (*grāhaṇikam*), ones made of the knot (*granthi*) [that is *māyā*], [and] ones connected with the root cause (viz. karma), *śakti* is another [sort of] "body". Who can perform his own functions resting within himself [i.e. without resorting to at least a body as an instrument]?

have ceased, they have not ceased towards other [souls]. But the duties of the perfected [soul] towards everyone have ceased completely. That is the difference [between them].

And the soul has no agency prior [to liberation] either. Rather that belongs to Primal Matter alone, as in the Sāṅkhya position. So because there are no means of knowledge for agency in liberation,[172] there is certainly non-agency [at that time].

The soul's being a knower, on the other hand, is established through experience prior [to liberation] to be part of its nature.[173] But this [property of being a knower] comes to have everything within its scope at liberation, because of its obstructive covering (i.e. Impurity) not existing [any more]. Thus according to those learned in this scriptural tradition, the liberated soul is a non-agent who knows all objects of knowledge.[174] It is they who

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To conclude: it seems not impossible that these verses, as well as the *Bhagavadbhaktistotra*, should all have been by the hand of the same man, and perhaps the *Vaṭayakṣiṇī* too was his.

[172] A soul's agency in liberation, as argued before the words of Avadhūta, follows neither from *arthāpatti* (*anyathānupapatti*) nor inference. If it were an agent prior to liberation, then perhaps some argument could be made that this agency could not cease at liberation, but now even that has been ruled out.

[173] We can infer from this sentence that according to this position our being an agent (prior to liberation) is not established through experience. Our sense of agency, the proponent of this position would have to assert, is not arrived at through *anubhava*, but through some false kind of knowledge such as superimposition (*adhyāropa*).

[174] Trilocanaśiva draws on this passage in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* when he is commenting on Rāmakaṇṭha's *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* 3ab (edited in GOODALL 1998 xxii): *mantreśaṃ śuddhavidyāyāṃ ye sarvajñam anīśvaram*. GOODALL translates, justifying in a footnote his rendering of *anīśvaram* (p. xxiii): 'Those [who hold that to be liberated is to be] a Mantreśa who is omniscient [but] incapable of acting [are located] in the *tattva* of pure knowledge.'

Trilocanaśiva regards this half-verse as speaking of those who are said in our text to teach that the liberated soul is *akartā sarvavedyavit*; he identifies them as the Mahāvratas, and comments: *mahāvratāś ca sāṅkhyapakṣavat baddhadaśāyām apy ātmano na kartṛtvaṃ, muktau ca siddhānāṃ sarvajñatvam eva, sarvakartṛtvaṃ tu parameśvarasyaivety abhyupagacchanti. yad uktam padayakṣiṇyām: 'paramaśivaḥ siddhān* [em.; *paramaśivasiddhāt* AB; *paramaśivasya siddhān* C] *praty uparatādhikāro 'py anyeṣv anuparatādhikāraḥ, siddhaḥ punar ekāntena sarvata evoparatādhikāra iti bhedaḥ' iti. evambhūte ca vidyātattvānta evādhvani tattvāntarāṇy uparitanasaṃjñāyā* [A; *tatvāntarāpra ... ratanasaṃjñāyā* B; *tatvāntarāṇy uparitanasaṃjñāyāṃ* C] *kathayanti. paramārthatas tattattattva*[AB; *paramārthatas tatva* C]*vāsināṃ iva sarvakartṛtvānabhyupagamāt, te vidyāyām evāvasthitā ity uktam 'vidyāyāṃ tu mahāvratāḥ' iti.*

are alluded to in [our root text] by the author of the [*Raurava*]*sūtra* with the word *pramāṇakartṛtva*,[175] since they composed the [group of] texts beginning with the *Hṛdayapramāṇa*.[176]

2.8 Agency, and yet Being Instigated [to act]: verse 3c

The words ***Agency, and yet being instigated*** [***to act***] denote [the fruit of] another scriptural tradition. This is the meaning: Just like being a knower, being an agent is also the very nature of the soul. Agency is not in fact

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'And the Mahāvratas maintain that selves are not agents even while bound, as in the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas, and that in liberation perfected [souls] have only omniscience, omnipotence belonging only to the Lord. As is said in the *Padayakṣiṇī*: "Although the duties of the Highest Śiva towards perfected [souls] have ceased, they have not ceased towards other [souls]. But the duties of the perfected [soul] towards everyone have ceased completely. That is the difference [between them]." The[ir] universe being thus [one] that ends only with the principle of [pure] knowledge, they call other [lower] *tattvas* by the name of higher ones. [But] ultimately, like those who reside in the various [other lower] *tattvas* [supposing them to be at the top of the universe], because they do not admit omnipotence, they remain in [the level of pure] knowledge itself, as has been taught [above in the half-verse ending] 'But the Mahāvratas [rest] in *vidyā*'. The verse mentioned at the end was cited by Trilocanaśiva at the end of his account of the Pāśupatas: see note 235.

[175]We take it, based on this sentence, that Rāmakaṇṭha understood this compound as 'those who have agency (*kartṛtva*, i.e. authorship) of the Pramāṇa scriptures'.

[176]These texts, which are referred to elsewhere, but seem not to have survived, were the scriptures of the Mahāvratas, a group of ascetics that are the subject matter of SANDERSON's (2006b) ground-breaking study. They belonged to the Atimārga, but set themselves apart from the other principal Atimārgic group, the Pāñcārthika Pāśupatas, by their belief in an ascending hierarchy of Rudra worlds and by adopting the observance of the skull (*kapālavrata*, *mahāvrata*) (SANDERSON 2006b: 163ff.).

Their scriptural corpus, to which Rāmakaṇṭha refers here, consisted of eight texts, *Pañcārthapramāṇa*, *Śivaguhyapramāṇa* (or *Guhyapramāṇa*), *Aṅkuśapramāṇa*, *Hṛdayapramāṇa*, *Vyūhapramāṇa*, *Lakṣaṇapramāṇa*, *Ākarṣapramāṇa* and *Ādarśapramāṇa*, these names being given, for example, in the *Niśvāsa* (*Guhyasūtra* 7:243–246ab) and the *Svacchandatantra* (10:1132b–1135b): see SANDERSON 2006b: 170–171. Kṣemarāja says of the *Hṛdayapramāṇa*, the one text whose name Rāmakaṇṭha gives, that it contained six further Pramāṇas, which were mainly concerned with ritual, and that these were extracted from the *Hṛdayapramāṇa* by Musulendra, a disciple of Lakulīśa (SANDERSON 2006b: 171 and 176–177).

All that has so far come to light of the entire corpus is seven verses of the *Pañcārthapramāṇa*, quoted by Kṣemarāja ad *Svacchandatantra* 1:41–43 (see SANDERSON 2006b: 175).

appropriate for *prakṛti*, because she is the cause [of action]. For it is one thing to be a cause,[177] the nature of which is to undergo a change of form (*svarūpānyathābhāvarūpam*), which[178] is invariably concomitant with undergoing transformation and [other properties such as impermanence] because it is the very nature of insentient things,[179] [and] which is established by direct perception in milk, curd, and [subsequent phases of this transformation], and it is another to be an agent, which consists in autonomy,[180] because of being the cause of the action and the inaction of all the other *kārakas* (i.e. factors which cause action),[181] [acting] with a desire to attain as fruit the

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[177]The following definition of a cause makes it clear that we are talking especially of material causes (*upādānakāraṇa*). The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (where the context is not an exposition of the view that liberation consists in being an agent that is impelled, but Rāmakaṇṭha's own refutation of Sāṅkhya) actually reads, in place of *anyad dhi kāraṇatvam, anyad dhy upādānakāraṇatvam* (ad 1:56): *na, jaḍatvenopādānakāraṇatvaṃ tatra tasyāḥ* (= *prakṛteḥ*), *na kartṛtvam. anyad dhy upādānakāraṇatvaṃ svarūpānyathābhāvarūpaṃ jaḍavastusvabhāvatayaiva pariṇāmitvādyavyabhicāri kṣīradadhyādiṣv adhyakṣasiddham, anyac ca kartṛtvaṃ hitāhitaprāptityāgaphalalipsayā sarvānyakārakapravṛttinivṛttikāraṇatvena svātantryātmakaṃ cidvastvavyabhicāri svasaṃvedanasiddham.*

[178]The three 'which's in this sentence all refer to 'being a cause'.

[179]Being the own nature of insentient things is here given as a reason for being concomitant with undergoing transformation. The unstated assumption must be that undergoing transformation is also the own nature of insentient things. Thus any other properties, such as being a cause, that are also the own nature of insentient things, must be concomitant with undergoing transformation.

If to be a cause is the own nature of insentient things, then it would seem that all insentient things are causes. This is perhaps acceptable for Naiyāyikas, for whom insentient atoms continually regroup to form new objects, but is it acceptable to Rāmakaṇṭha? We would be surprised if it were, for in his Sāṅkhya-derived view of the universe, some evolutes go on to produce further evolutes, but others, such as the elements (*mahābhūtas*), do not.

If we want to rescue Rāmakaṇṭha from this implication, we could take *jaḍavastusvabhāvatayaiva* as *jaḍavastuna eva svabhāvatayā* with the *eva* emphasizing *jaḍavastu-* more than *svabhāvatayā*. The meaning would be 'because [being a cause] is the nature of *in*sentient things', implying not that it is the nature of every insentient thing, but that it is never the nature of sentient things. The concomitance with *pariṇāmitva* is not jeopardised on this interpretation. Even if *kāraṇatva* occurs only in some insentient things, since all of the insentient things in which it occurs are *pariṇāmi*, it will be concomitant with *pariṇāmitva*.

[180]Cf. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.54, *svatantraḥ kartā.*

[181]For example when one causes the body to move or to stop moving. The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (see previous note) defines the agent as that which is autonomous, and later works of *vyākaraṇa* discuss what is meant by autonomy. The *Vākyapadīya* (3.7.101cd [*sādhanasamuddeśa*]) characterises it, as here, as the cause of the *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* of the other *kārakas*. This characterisation becomes standard in later grammatical works.

appropriating of what is beneficial and the rejection of what is not beneficial. [This agency is] invariably concomitant with sentient things[182] [and] is established through self-awareness.[183] I will teach this [in my commentary]

In the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:56–57) Rāmakaṇṭha deals, in considerably more detail than he does here, with this topic of the self, not *prakṛti*, being the agent. In support of his contention that an agent is the *sarvānyakārakapravṛttinivṛtti-kāraṇa* he quotes there (ad 1:56) (as well as three times in the *Mataṅgavṛtti*—ad *vidyāpāda* 6:31, 6:67 and 26:35–36) the following verse:

> *pravṛttau ca nivṛttau ca kārakāṇāṃ ya īśvaraḥ |*
> *apravṛttaḥ pravṛtto vā sa kartā nāma kārakaḥ ||*
>
> The controller of the *kārakas* with regard to their action and cessation, whether it is inactive or active, is the *kāraka* known as the agent.

We do not know its source. See also the following sentence (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:56), *kartṛtvaṃ tāvad idaṃ sarvānyakārakapravṛttinivṛttihetutvena svātantryātmakaṃ śarīrendriyaspandaṃ prāṇādiprayatnaṃ ca vidadhat sarvam eva kṛṣyagnihotrādidṛṣṭādṛṣṭaphalaṃ karma kurvad anubhūyamānam ātmano na vidyata iti na śakyate vaktum*; 'Now this agency, consisting of autonomy in that it is the cause (*hetu*) of all the other *kārakas*' activity and cessation, is experienced to bring about movement in the body and senses, and effort with respect to the vital energy etc., and [is experienced to] bring about all actions, whether their fruits are visible as in the case of agriculture, or invisible as in the case of the Agnihotra sacrifice. [This being so] it cannot be said that it does not exist for the self.'

[182]We follow M^{Y}'s reading here, *cidvastva-*, against the evidence of all other witnesses (which transmit *śivatvā-*), because its sense is required to provide the contrast with *jaḍavastva-*, and because it is the reading of the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (given in note 177).

Note that whereas Rāmakaṇṭha wrote above *anyad dhi kāraṇatvaṃ ... jaḍavastusvabhāvatayaiva pariṇāmitvādyavyabhicāri*, he appears to have written here simply *anyac ca kartṛtvaṃ ... cidvastvavyabhicāri*. The lack of parallelism, combined with the fact that nothing can be concomitant with sentient things, as concomitance is a relation that holds between properties, is enough to raise the question of whether text has dropped out here, i.e. whether Rāmakaṇṭha actually wrote for *cidvastvavyabhicāri* something like *cidvastusvabhāvatayaivāpariṇāmitvāvyabhicāri*. The loss of text could be explained as eyeskip from one *tv* to another *tv*, although the former is part of the ligature *stv*. But the fact that the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* reads *cidvastvavyabhicāri* makes it more likely that Rāmakaṇṭha is here simply being imprecise.

[183]*Svasaṃvedanasiddham* contrasts with *adhyakṣasiddham*: that something is a material cause is known by the perception of the eyes and other external sense organs; that one is an agent is known by self-awareness. Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1;56): *śarīrādikāraṇāntaraprerakatvena pratyagrūpatayādhyātmaṃ jñātṛtvavad anubhavāt*; 'Because [agency] is experienced internally and reflexively—in the same way that being a knower is—since it impels the other *kārakas* such as the body.'

An opponent in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:56) objects to Rāmakaṇṭha's claim that agency is known through self-awareness (*svasaṃvedanasiddham*), on the grounds that it is not of the nature of consciousness. Rāmakaṇṭha rejects that it is not of the nature of consciousness: *dāhakatvam iva savitṛprakāśād bodhātmanaḥ kartṛtvam avibhinnam eva svasaṃvedanasiddham*; 'Just as [the sun's] power to burn [is non-different] from the sun's shining, so agency, being in fact non-different from consciousness, is established through self-awareness.' He lends credence to the idea that the self's agency is not separate from its consciousness by comparing the self to the sun, its consciousness to the sun's shining (*prakāśa*), which after all is a frequent metaphor for consciousness, and its agency (*kartṛtva*) to the sun's power to burn (*dāhakatva*), which after all is a kind of agency and is not separate from the sun's shining.

The objection to which Rāmakaṇṭha is responding there is perhaps what motivates him, in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad 6:31 for example, to mention that agency is not separate from consciousness in the same sentence as he claims that agency is known through self-awareness: *tad eva cātmatvaṃ tac ca* [Ṛ, Ṝ; *tasya* ed.] *kartṛtvaṃ tasya caitanyenāviyuktam eva svātmani svasaṃvedanapratyakṣeṇa svadehaceṣṭādihetutvena siddham.*

For the idea that agency and consciousness are the same, see the definition of *caitanya* in *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa* II, p. 253. In the parallel passage, Rāmakaṇṭha (ad *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* 1:56) supports the identity of these two by citing *Mokṣakārikā* 25d–26b:

> *sarvajñānakriyārūpā śaktir ekaiva śūlinaḥ |*
> *kriyā tridhā tu vāmādyā gītā vyāpārabhedataḥ ||*
>
> 'Śiva's power is one, having the form of omniscience and omnipotence. But [his] action is proclaimed to be threefold, Vāmā, [Jyeṣṭhā and Raudrī] in accordance with the distinction between [three] activities.'

See GOODALL (1998: 329–330, note 491) for detailed comments on Vāmā, Jyeṣṭhā and Raudrī.

Just as Rāmakaṇṭha claims of the self and consciousness that they are known both through self-awareness, a kind of non-conceptual (*avikalpaka*) cognition, and verbalizing cognition (*parāmarśa*), a kind of conceptual (*savikalpaka*) cognition (see WATSON 2006: 209–332), so he claims the same of agency. See (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:56) *nāvidyamānaṃ puṃsaḥ kartṛtvaṃ iti śakyaṃ vaktum, vidyamānaṃ ca tat, nityātmasvabhāvatvāt kṛtaṃ mayetyādi sarvakālagatatvena ca parāmarśaviṣayatvāj jñātṛtvavan nityam abhyupagantavyam.* 'It cannot be said that the agency of the soul is non-existent; and being existent (*vidyamānam ca tat*), it must be accepted to be eternal because it is the own nature of the eternal self and because, like the fact of being a knower, it is the object of verbalizing cognition (*parāmarśa*) as existing in all [three] times, [as exemplified by the cognitions mentioned in the verse], "I did it, [I am doing it, and I will do it]".'

on the *Mantravārttika*.[184] And the author of the commentary[185] has already proved through inference too, in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*[186] and other [texts], that selves have agency.

Objection: Is it not the case that if selves had agency they would be subject to transformation, since they would be of the nature of movement?[187]

[Response:] No, because it is not proved that agency is of the nature of movement. For movement is action, and an agent is not characterised by action,[188] for [if it were] it would undesirably follow that there would be an infinite regress in postulating a further agent [of that action, and so on]. Rather [an agent] is just the cause of [action / movement] (*tatra*), because we see that movement in [the conglomerate of] body and sense faculties[189] results from nothing other than the capacity of that [agent].[190] How can movement, which is of the nature of action, a pervader of insentient things, occur in an agent, [a concept that is] concomitant with being sentient and being all-pervading? And to be a *kāraka* (i.e. a factor that causes action) is not to be of the nature of movement but to be connected with a particular

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[184]The *Mantravārttika*, as stated in section 6 of the Introduction, was part of Sadyojyotiḥ's *Rauravavṛtti*. As GOODALL has pointed out (1998: xxvi), Rāmakaṇṭha's use of the future tense here to refer to his commentary on the *Mantravārttika* suggests that he regarded the *Mantravārttika* as coming after the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*.

[185]I.e. Sadyojyotiḥ. The reason for his being referred to in that way is given in section 6 of the Introduction.

[186]Verses 17–19 (ed. FILLIOZAT; 15–17 ed. DVIVEDI).

[187]The unexpressed assumption that agency is of the nature of movement is explicitly stated in the parallel sentence in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:57c): *puṃsaḥ kartṛtve pariṇāmitā spandātmakatvāt kartṛtvasya*; 'If the self were an agent it would undergo change, because agency is of the nature of movement.'

[188]It may sound strange to assert that an agent is not characterised by action; surely an agent acts. Rāmakaṇṭha certainly accepts that an agent acts, but what he denies is that action, which he regards as equivalent to movement, belongs to the agent; rather it belongs to insentient things. The agent is not the locus, but rather merely the cause, of action. This will be clarified below.

Witnesses other than M^{Y} M_1 and P_1 suggest the addition of *kartṛtvam* after *kartuḥ*: 'and the agent's agency does not consist in being of the nature of action'. But the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (see *na ca kriyā rūpaṃ kartuḥ* in note 190) seems to support the reading of M^{Y} M_1 and P_1 that we have adopted.

[189]For the meaning of *kāryakaraṇa* as 'body and sense faculties', see note 147.

[190]The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:57d) reads: *na spandātmakaṃ kartṛtvam, kriyārūpatvāt spandasya. na ca kriyā rūpaṃ* [ed. *kriyārūpaṃ*] *kartuḥ, api tu tatra śaktatvam ayaskāntamaṇer ivāyaḥspandajanane*. This is translated in footnote 393.

power, like [the *kāraka*-nature] of magnets and the like.[191] I have taught that elsewhere:[192]

> Consciousness's[193] agency, which is its power to [bring about] the action of movement in something insentient, is established in / of its very nature[194] to be devoid of movement,[195] like [the 'agency' of] a magnet, because [consciousness is] all-pervading.[196]

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[191]Aghoraśiva borrows some of the wording of this passage, as he often does of Rāmakaṇṭha's works, in his commentary on *Bhogakārikā* 75c–76.

[192]The following verse is also quoted by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:57d. There too he introduces it with the words *ity uktam asmābhir anyatra*. We do not know its source.

[193]The form in which this verse is quoted in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* is the same as here with the one exception that it reads *kartṛtātmanaḥ* for *kartṛtā citaḥ*. For Rāmakaṇṭha consciousness and the self are the same thing (see WATSON 2006: 333–382).

[194]The precise sense of *svataḥ siddhā*, assuming these words are to be construed together, is not certain. One possibility is that the expression refers to Rāmakaṇṭha's view, stated above, that agency is known by self-awareness (*kartṛtvaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddham* above = *kartṛtā svataḥ siddhā* here). But if the contention of this verse is established by *svasaṃvedana*, it would not need to be supported by the *hetu*, *vyāpteḥ*. Hence we regard it as preferable to take *svataḥ* in the sense of *svasmin* or *svabhāvataḥ*. The point would then be either that consciousness's agency is established to exist in consciousness itself, not in *prakṛti*, or that consciousness does not need any secondary factor (*upādhi*) to help it exercise its power. (The only reason it needs a body and sense faculties is because of *mala*, and it remains an agent even without these).

[195]Because of the phrase in the sentence introducing this verse, *na ca spandātmakataiva kārakatvam*, we take *kartṛtā* as the subject of this verse and *aspandarūpeṇa siddhā*, in the sense of *aspandarūpatveṇa siddhā*, as the predicate.

[196]Note that in this argument the example, the magnet, does not contain what appears to be the *hetu*, namely all-pervasion; hence we have to take *vyāpteḥ* as applying only to consciousness (*citaḥ*) and not to the magnet. The precise rôle of the magnet in this argument is clarified in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*.

The context in which this verse is cited there (ad 1:57d) is similar to its context here in that there too the verse comes after an opponent has given the objection that if the self were an agent it would be subject to change (*pariṇāmin*), since agency consists of movement. Rāmakaṇṭha replies, as here, that it is action, not agency, that consists of movement; agency is rather the capacity to bring about action, just like a magnet has the capacity to bring about movement. He then cites the verse. An opponent objects that because magnets and the like are insentient (*jaḍa*), it is not established either that they are agents or that they are unchanging (*apariṇāmin*). Rāmakaṇṭha responds that this is no problem because the mention of the magnet was intended merely to show that to be a *kāraka* does not entail moving, but is just to have a certain power.

And[197] this agency of [soul]s is established to have beginninglessly involved being instigated by the Lord.[198] And there can be no destruction of something beginningless, so liberated Śivas,[199] [who as in your Saiddhāntika view are] omniscient and omnipotent, are [nonetheless] instigated by the Supreme Lord. So [say] those learned in this tradition.[200]

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[197]The verse concluded the answer to the objection that to be an agent means that one moves and is thus subject to transformation; and the exponent of this fruit now takes up his argumentation from where he had left it before the objection. He had there claimed that agency can be known to exist in the soul both by self-awareness and inference.

[198]The opponent reiterates this point below (section 3.3): *īśvaraprayojyatvaṃ tv anādy ātmanāṃ, kathaṃ tadā vyāvartate*; 'But (*tu*) for souls to be instigated by the Lord is beginningless, [so] how can it cease then (i.e. at liberation)?'

[199]The editions read *muktāḥ śivāḥ* for *muktaśivāḥ*, and the latter might be regarded as an unlikely *karmadhāraya*. But all of our manuscripts read it, and Rāmakaṇṭha uses it elsewhere, for example *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* ad verse 3, *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 3:118cd. Indeed it has the flavour of a technical term in Śaiva Siddhānta, contrasting with *paramaśiva*.

[200]It seems to be these people that are referred to in verse 2cd of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* (edited by GOODALL 1998: xxii): *vidyeśatattve pūrve tatpreryam īśvaram eva ye*, which GOODALL translates as 'Those [who hold that to be liberated is to be] a lord subject to the command of Him [are located] in *īśvaratattva*' (1998: xxiii). Indeed the fact that the *īśvaratva* conveyed by the word *īśvaram* has the connotation of (*sarva-*)*kartṛtva* (as can be determined from the context; see GOODALL's footnote 52 on p. xxiii) makes the formulation exactly parallel to *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam*.

It is not certain which scriptural sources Rāmakaṇṭha was drawing on in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* when deciding to which *tattva*s the various rival religions should be assigned. The *Sarvajñānottara* is a good candidate, however, for it is the only old Siddhānta we know of to have such an account. The fact, furthermore, that in its account it refers to *īśvaratattva* with the unusual term *vaidyeśvaraṃ tattvam*, and that verse 2cd of the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, cited above, uses the similar term *vidyeśatattve*, increases the likelihood that he was drawing on the *Sarvajñānottara*. If that is the case, then it seems that he regarded the Somasiddhāntins as holding this view that liberated souls are agents, yet impelled by the Lord. For it is the Somasiddhāntins who are assigned in the *Sarvajñānottara* to the *tattva* that he says in the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* is reached by those who hold this view. See *Sarvajñānottara* 14:4cd: *vaidyeśvaraṃ nāma tattvaṃ somasiddhāntavādinaḥ*; 'Those who hold the Somasiddhānta [reach] the *tattva* called Vaidyeśvara.' More of this *Sarvajñānottara* passage is given in note 235.

To return to the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* sentence given at the beginning of this note: It is not impossible that the sense of the *pūrve* there is that those who hold this view are the 'first' among those who can reach *īśvaratattva*. For Trilocanaśiva, in his *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, includes at this level one other group, the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins. He first describes the present view:

anye punaḥ siddhasya sarvajñatvaṃ sarvakartṛtvaṃ cābhyupagamya parame-

2.9 Becoming the Same as the Treasury of Light: verse 3d

The words ***Becoming the same as the treasury of light*** denote the fruit of another tradition,[201] since to become the same as the sun or to fire[202] and such like is taught in various revealed scriptures such as the *Mahopaniṣat*.[203]

śvarapreryatvam icchanti.

• *sarvajñatvaṃ sarvakartṛtvaṃ cābhyupagamya*] conj.; *sarvajñatvam abhyupagamya* AB; *sarvajñatvaṃ sarvakartṛtvasyābhyupagamya* C

'But others, accepting that the perfected [soul] is omnipotent as well as omniscient, hold that he is [nevertheless] instigated by the Lord.'

He then describes the view of the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins (the relevant passage is given in note 215) and assigns them both to *īśvaratattva*.

[201]Professor SANDERSON's annotation records that *tejasāṃ nidhi* may refer to the world (*bhuvana*) known as *tejīśa / tejeśa*, which is the highest possible station (*paramaṃ padam*) of the Vaimala subsect of the Pāśupatas. He also pointed out (conversation vi.2003) that since *tejonidhi* is used of the sun, this could have been the fruit not of the Vaimalas, but of the Sauras.

The Sauras are indeed mentioned as one out of three proponents of this view by Trilocanaśiva in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, along with Āgneyas and Vaiṣṇavas (A p.144, B p.76, C p.19): *anye tv āgneyasauravaiṣṇavādayo 'gnyādidevatāsāmyaṃ mokṣaḥ. tataḥ paraṃ prāpyasthānaṃ nāstīty āhuḥ* [*prāpyasthānaṃ nāstīty* C; *prāpyasāṃsidhy* A; *na prāpyasthānam astīty* B]. *teṣām api brahmāṇḍāntaryatatattadbhuvanadevatāprāptir eva syāt. tatas te 'pi bhūtasiddhā eva.*

'Yet others—Āgneyas, Sauras, Vaiṣṇavas and the like—[teach that] liberation is sameness with deities such as Fire. They claim that there is no station to be reached higher than that. They too can merely reach deities in various Worlds within [this lowest of the levels of our cosmos,] the Brahmāṇḍa. Therefore they too are ones whose level of attainment is within the [five *mahā*]*bhūtas* (the lowest tranche of the cosmos).'

[202]It is clear from the refutation of this *pakṣa* that *ādityāgni-* is to be translated as a *dvandva* compound and not as, for example, 'the fire of the sun', because a similar compound is there (section 3.2) used with a dual ending: *agnyādityasamayoḥ*.

[203]The first *adhyāya* of the *Mahopaniṣat* has the character of a patchwork of earlier Upaniṣadic quotations (many of them identifiable in the *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣat*); the subsequent chapters relate a story in *anuṣṭubh* metre in which philosophical discussion is embedded. The first *adhyāya* ends with the following passage:

tasya madhye mahān arcir viśvārcir viśvatomukhaḥ |
tasya madhye vahniśikhā aṇīyordhvā vyavasthitā ||
tasyāḥ śikhāyā madhye paramātmā vyavasthitā |
sa brahmā sa īśānaḥ sendraḥ so 'kṣaraḥ paramaḥ svarāṭ ||

In the middle of the [heart] is a great flame (*arcis*), the flame of the universe

And the [proponents of this fruit] are indicated by the author of the sūtra as 'having agency that belongs to fire' (*āgneyakartṛtvena*).[204]

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facing in all directions. In the middle of that is a more subtle flame of fire (*vahniśikhā*); it stands upright. In the middle of that flame (*śikhāyāḥ*) is situated the Supreme Self. That is Brahmā, that is Īśāna, that is Indra; that is the Supreme Imperishable Self-Luminous One.

In our text, the *ādi* in *mahopaniṣadādiṣu* may refer to *Sauratantras*, of which only the *Saurasaṃhitā*, recently discovered by Diwakar ACHARYA, has come to light. The *Ādityahṛdaya* is another text that reflects the notion that the highest reality is the sun. That this text preceded Rāmakaṇṭha by several centuries is confirmed by a reference to it (unless it is a reference to another mantra-text of the same name) in the fourth *ucchvāsa* of Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita* (p.178,6).

When Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha articulate this view as holding that the soul becomes the *same as* the 'treasury of light' / the sun or fire, are they speaking of numerical or just qualitative identity? In other words do they think that in this view the soul dissolves into the sun / fire, or that it remains as an individual?

The latter is suggested by the word *sama*, as opposed to a word such as *laya*, which would be a typical way for Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha to express the former. And this is confirmed by both Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's refutation of the position. According to Sadyojyotiḥ (verse 9ab) these souls continue to be impelled by those above them, which implies that they are still individuals. Rāmakaṇṭha's refutation adds the consideration that if the opponent means by 'fire' or the 'sun' the omniscient and omnipotent one, then his position is exactly the same as the Saiddhāntika's. Obviously it would not be the same position if the opponent envisaged the soul as dissolving into this omniscient, omnipotent being.

But whether the *Mahopaniṣat* envisaged continued individuality rather than merging with the 'Supreme Imperishable Self-Luminous One' is another matter.

[204]Rāmakaṇṭha analyses the *Rauravasūtra*'s *pramāṇāgneyakartṛtva* as consisting of two elements, *pramāṇakartṛtva* and *āgneyakartṛtva*, both of which we take him to have understood as *bahuvrīhis*, for it would be very odd to refer to people as *kartṛtvas*. But since we know so little about the position being expounded here and its proponents, either from this text or from elsewhere, we are not sure whether Rāmakaṇṭha is likely to have understood *āgneyakartṛtva* as 'having agency that belongs to fire', 'having agency that is the same as [that of] fire', 'having agency like fire' etc. All we have to go on is his remark that these people teach *ādityāgnyādisamatā*. Another possibility for *āgneyakartṛtvena* here would be 'by whom there is the claim [that the nature of liberation] is sameness with fire', taking *āgneya* as *agnisamatā*, and *kartṛtvena* as *vāditvena*. It is in this sense of *vādin* that we take Rāmakaṇṭha to have understood the word *kāraka* in the *Rauravasūtra*'s *viśikhāmalakārakāḥ* (see note 211); but given that Rāmakaṇṭha seems clearly to have taken *kartṛtva* in the compound *pramāṇakartṛtva* to mean agency (in the sense of authorship; see note 175), it is perhaps unlikely that when we read the same word again to produce the compound *āgneyakartṛtva* we should have to understand it in a very different sense.

2.10 Superiority to the Lord: verse 4a

The words ***Superiority to the Lord*** denote another position. The Lord has not ceased to be a bound soul,[205] because he is linked to such bonds as [holding] office, since he is accepted to have *laya*, *adhikāra* and *bhoga*.[206] As

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Note that we could translate here not as 'are indicated by the author of the sūtra as ...', but as 'are indicated by the author of the sūtra with [the word] ...'

[205]We take it that the string of text beginning *yad āhuḥ* and ending with *iti ca* is parenthetical, so that the ablative ending of *anapāyāt* gives a reason for the *nyūnaḥhāvaḥ* that comes after that string. For the sake of readability though, we split the English into three sentences.

[206]Or perhaps, 'since He accepts [the rôles of] *laya, adhikāra* and *bhoga*'.

These are three rôles or states that the Lord assumes. In *laya*, in which he is referred to by the name Śiva and said to be *śakta*, his power to act remains latent; in *bhoga*, in which he is referred to by the name Sadāśiva and said to be *udyukta*, his power to act is ready to bring about effects but does not do so; and in *adhikāra*, in which he is referred to by the name Iśvara and said to be *pravṛtta*, he exercises his agency in, for example, the creation of the world. The three states are also correlated with a further trio, that of *śānta / niṣkala*, *sakalaniṣkala* and *sakala* (see, for example, *Kiraṇatantra* 3:24 and *Parākhyatantra* 2:97c–99b). Perhaps only in the *Matańgapārameśvara* does this neat set of homologisations not apply (see GOODALL 2004: 192, note 180, where it is observed that *adhikāratattva* corresponds in the *Matańgapārameśvara* rather to Sadāśiva), and *laya*, *bhoga* and *adhikāra* are used there as the names of the top three *tattva*s of the universe (see, e.g., *vidyāpāda* 2.14).

The precise meanings of the two compounds *layādhikārabhogābhyupagamena* and *adhikārādibandhayogataḥ* are not certain. The first problem is whether *adhikāra* is used in each of the compounds in its technical meaning to denote one of the trio of *laya, bhoga, adhikāra*, or whether in a less technical sense. The second is how to avoid interpreting the two compounds as simply saying the same thing.

Bhoga in the first compound is only supported by one witness, M^{Y}, and it comes in the wrong order (the usual order is *laya, bhoga, adhikāra*). Better supported is *layādhikārābhyupagamena*, but this is unsatisfactory for the following reasons. If we take *adhikāra* there in its technical sense as one of the trio, then the omission of *bhoga* becomes problematic: we would expect either for it to be mentioned explicitly, or for there to be an *ādi* between *adhikāra* and *abhyupagamena*. If we take it in its non-technical sense of 'duty', 'responsibility' or 'office', then we would expect an *ādi* between *laya* and it (as in the compound below *-layādyavasthādhikārāt*). The *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*'s paraphrase of this compound with *layabhogādyadhikārābhyupagamena* (see note 208) suggests that it took *adhikāra* to be used here in its non-technical sense. But rather than emending our compound to *layādyadhikārābhyupagamena*, we have tentatively preferred to take the reading of M^{Y} (which is indeed not infrequently the only witness with the correct reading) and accept the small problem of the eccentric order.

In the second compound, *adhikārādibandhayogataḥ*, we can take *adhikāra* in either the technical or non-technical sense. If we take the former option, the *ādi* will refer to *laya* and

they say,

> Favouring and Concealing are two bonds of Sadāśiva.

and

> Sadāśiva is the foremost of the bound souls.[207]

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bhoga. We are then faced with the problem of finding something in the meaning of this compound that is not stated in the earlier one. Emphasizing *bandha* is a possible solution: the Lord is a bound soul because he has bondage in the form of these three rôles, because these three rôles are accepted. The alternative, which we have tentatively preferred, is to take *adhikāra* in the sense of *adhikāramala*, that kind of impurity that results from holding office (which is often said in Saiddhāntika texts to explain why even extremely elevated souls such as Mantramaheśvaras are not liberated), for that is how the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* paraphrase of this passage seems to take it (see *adhikāramalasyāvaśyakatayā* in note 208). Thus we have to interpret the *ādi* as implying that according to this opponent the Lord has not only the bondage assosciated with holding office, i.e. that associated with him entering the three states of *laya, bhoga, adhikāra*, but also some other kind of bondage. We do not know what that would be.

[207]Both of these quotations, as spotted by Professor SANDERSON, are cited by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 3:1–3 (p. 44). The first quotation, with *dharmau hi* in place of *pāśau tu*, is cited in the *Śiśuhitavivṛti* ad *Kiraṇatantra* 1:13 by Tryambakaśambhu when he is defining *kriyāśakti* (IFP T. 1102, p. 13): *kriyā punaś ca dvividhā: anugrahasvabhāvā tirobhāvasvabhāvā ceti; tathā coktaṃ 'anugrahatirobhāvau dvau dharmau hi sadāśive' iti.* [*-tirobhāvau dvau* conj.; *-tirobhāvādyau* ms].

It is clear from Rāmakaṇṭha's refutation of this position below that he regarded both as quotations from authoritative Saiddhāntika scriptures.

We have not found the second, but the first occurs in the *Nayasūtra* of the *Niśvāsa*. It may there be being quoted from an earlier source, however, because it is immediately followed by a somewhat tendentious interpretation. It is claimed to mean not that these two bonds afflict Sadāśiva, but rather that these two bonds that afflict souls in *saṃsāra* (the first two, incidentally, in a longer list of bonds) are in the control of Sadāśiva. The passage in question runs as follows (*Nayasūtra* 1:83–89b, f. 31v):

> *pāśadharmaṃ vada śīghram etan me saṃśayo mahān |*
> *īśvara uvāca*
> *anugrahatirobhāvau dvau pāśau tu sadāśive* || 83 ||
> *nāstikyaṃ ca tirobhāvaḥ śuṣkatarkāvalambanam |*
> *tarkabhāvasamāyukta ayuktaṃ kurute bahu* || 84 ||
> *ayukta[kārī puruṣo narakeṣu prapacyate] |*
> *(tiryagyo)«nim anuprāptaḥ» [paśu]yoniṣu jāyate* || 85 ||
> *janme janme vimūḍhātmā tirobhāvagatiṃ vrajet |*
> *tirobhāvaś ca kathito 'nugrahaṃ ca nibodha me* || 86 ||
> *śraddadhāno dharmavataḥ śubhakarmasu ceṣṭate |*

Therefore [the Lord] is lower than a perfected soul in whom all bondage has ceased, who has no responsibility [as the Lord does] in the states beginning with *laya*, who is permanently beyond limiting factors [and thus] more excellent (*prakṛṣṭatarāt*).[208]

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vidyānveṣī svargagatiḥ svargaloke tu krīḍate ‖ 87 ‖
tatraiva tu paribhraṣṭo jāyate cottame kule |
śivaśaktinipātena dīkṣājñānaṃ prayacchati ‖ 88 ‖
so 'nugrahaḥ smṛto [hy eva«ṃ» dā]tā caiva sadāśivaḥ |

• 83ab *-dharmaṃ vada śīghram etan me saṃśayo mahān*] K; *-dharma vada śīghra ⏑⏑ me saṃśayaḥ ⏑ hān* N; *-dharma vada śīghra ¯ me saṃśayo mahān* W • 83c *-tirobhāvau*] K; *-tirobhāva* NW • 89a *-nugrahaḥ*] K; *-nugraha* NW

[The apparatus is incomplete. Where N is illegible and the text that of K only, the text is enclosed in square brackets. Where the text is that of W only, it is enclosed in round brackets. Guillemets enclose editorial restitutions.]

'Quickly tell me the nature of the bonds; this* is a [matter of] great doubt for me. The Lord spoke. Favouring and Concealment are two bonds [directly under the control] of Sadāśiva. Lack of faith and reliance upon dry logic are 'Concealment'. One who has been steeped in logic* does much wrong. A man who does wrong is cooked in the hells, [and] having attained an animal [re]birth, is then [re]born to non-believers (*paśuyoniṣu*). In one birth after another* the deluded soul attains an existence of 'Concealment'. 'Concealment' has been related; listen to me [giving you an account of] 'Favouring'. One who has faith and [good] morals* engages in good acts. Eager to acquire knowledge, he is one whose destiny is heaven; he sports in heaven. And [if/when] fallen [from] there, he is [re-]born in an excellent family. [God] bestows [upon him] the knowledge of initiation after/by means of a descent of Śiva's grace. This is held to be 'Favouring'; the bestower is Sadāśiva.'

* The asterisks in the translation point up linguistic oddities in the text that could be classed as *aiśa*: the first is a case of a neuter pronoun in apposition with a masculine noun, the second of anomalous *sandhi*, the third is of transference of a stem in *-n* to one in *-a*, and the fourth is a case of a genitive of a stem in *-vat* used as though it were a nominative.

Had Rāmakaṇṭha taken this quotation from the *Niśvāsa*, he would have been able to explain away the implication of the Lord's bondage in the same way as this *Niśvāsa* passage. The fact that he does not, using a different strategy (in section 3.4.1.3), weighs in favour of him taking the quotation from a different source.

[208]The *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* paraphrases this section of our text (ad 4:48, p. 236): *anye tu—śivād ādhikyaṃ mokṣaḥ. parameśvarasya layabhogādyadhikārābhyupagamenādhikāratvam malasyāvaśyakatayā paśutvam anivāryam eva. muktānāṃ tu layādyadhikārābhāvena sarvabandhottīrṇatvāt prakṛṣṭatvam. tad uktam:*

anugrahatirobhāvau dvau pāśau tu sadāśive | *iti*
paśur ādyaḥ sadāśivaḥ | *iti ca*

But other [commentators on this *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*] claim that the liberation of the Pātañjalas is alluded to here [with the words 'Superiority to the Lord'].[209] They cannot avoid [the charge of interpreting Sadyojyotiḥ] to say the same thing more than once, because the [liberation of the Pātañjalas] has been mentioned already, along with that of the Sāṅkhyas, with the word 'Isolation'. For there is no difference between the liberation of the two [traditions], for in both cases it is of the nature of separation from *prakṛti*—it is for precisely that reason that [Lord Krishna] said, 'Sāṅkhya and Yoga are one'—rather their paths [alone] are different. For in one case the path to [liberation] is knowledge; whereas in the other it is practice. So that is enough of this lengthy [digression on the wrong view of other commentators].

And it is this very superiority that is indicated by the author of the sūtra with the word 'Maheśvara'.[210]

2.11 Just Being Devoid of Impurity: verse 4b

The words ***And just being devoid of Impurity*** [express the view that] liberation is nothing more than the cessation of Impurity, not the manifestation of omniscience and [omnipotence] as well; for there are no means of knowing the existence of those prior [to] liberation when they are [supposedly] unmanifest. For manifestation [happens only] of something [already] existent. Such is the opinion [of the proponents of this view]. As the author of the sūtra says, 'The impurity-less people.'[211]

—iti vadanti.

[209]We have found no other textual evidence that proponents of the Yoga School held this view that the liberated soul becomes superior to the Lord.

[210]In all the other places where Rāmakaṇṭha ends his exposition of a position by correlating it with a word from the *Rauravasūtra* it is simply the opponents who he says are indicated by that word. Here he says that the word conveys their doctrine, namely the superiority of liberated souls to the Lord. How does the word convey such a sense? Perhaps through an understood etymology of *mahān īśvara*, 'great lord', or even *īśvarāt mahān*, 'greater than the Lord'.

[211]We take it that *kāraka* is used here in a sense similar to, but slightly weaker than *vādin*: 'those who teach a lack of impurity', 'those who make [the sound] "free from impurity"'. The sense could perhaps be captured, in a more colloquial register, by 'the impurity-less wallahs'. Alternatively *kāraka* could mean agent: 'those agents who are devoid of Impurity.'

We have not come across this view elsewhere and are uncertain of its proponents. It is one of only two positions discussed in this text that Trilocanaśiva does not include in his *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (the other being *ādhikyaṃ parameśānāt*). Nor does Rāmakaṇṭha include it in his *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*. See pp. 65–67 for the argument that it may

2.12 Agency in the Perfected Soul, Indifference in the Lord: verse 4cd

4cd) It is in the perfected [soul] alone that there is agency; in a Lord, indifference.

It is well known that (*hi*)[212] the Lord is engaged in creating the universe for the sake of others. When He sees that a perfected [soul], having reached a state of omnipotence,[213] is equal to Himself, he understands (*avagamya*) that His own agency is at that very time different [from the soul's], so that there is a potential problem of chaos regarding all of the functions [of creation etc.] as a result of the possibility of more than one agent; and that because of [this potential problem] [His agency] is rather (*pratyuta*) an actual (*eva*) cause for the non-accomplishment (*-anirvāhakāraṇam*) of the aims of others. Bringing to a close that [agency of His], He becomes indifferent [towards the creation of the world etc.], [sufficient] unto Himself.[214] The perfected [soul] on the other hand, grasping that the Lord, because of his disinterestedness, has abandoned the bringing about of the aims of others, and realising that without an omnipotent being no aims of others would be accomplished, takes on, because of compassion alone, the rôle of doing everything. So say those who hold that the Lord is eternal [not in the sense that the same being continues to be the Lord forever, but] in the sense that a stream [of ever changing water is eternal].[215]

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have been the view of the Vaimalas, a group of atimārgic Śaivas.

[212]For this meaning of *hi*, see note 460.

[213]Literally, 'whose condition has reached the level of omnipotence'.

[214]It is difficult to be certain about the precise sense of *svātmanā*. A parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (see next footnote) reads ... *upasaṃhṛtya svātmārāma eva bhavati*. Our translation assumes *svātmanā* to convey the same kind of idea as *svātmārāma* ('taking pleasure [only] in Himself').

[215]See *Tattvasaṅgraha* 57cd (ed. FILLIOZAT; DVIVEDI 55ab) where Sadyojyotiḥ dismisses what Aghoraśiva interprets to be this same view: *nāpi ca śivasya śakter athavābhāvo nimittasya*: 'And neither is Śiva or his power [destroyed]. Otherwise there would be no cause.' Aghoraśiva introduces this half-verse with the words, *ata evānāditvena nityatvān*. Aghoraśiva introduces this half-verse with the words, *ata evānāditvena nityatvān mokṣanimittabhūtasya śivasya śaktyātmanas tadaiśvaryasya vā nāśo na sambhavati. tataś ca tannāśena mukte tadaiśvaryotpattir iti yat pravāheśvaravādibhir ucyate tad ayuktam ity āha.* '[Sadyojyotiḥ] says: That is precisely why neither Śiva, the cause of liberation, nor His sovereignty, which is His power, can be destroyed, because they are eternal, since they had no beginning. And therefore what the proponents of a stream of Lords teach is wrong, namely that because of the destruction of the [Lord's sovereignty], His sovereignty arises

in a liberated soul.'

In the third chapter of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* during a discussion of the Mīmāṃsaka idea that scripture is eternal and that the Lord's *aiśvarya* arises from following the *dharma* taught in that scripture, the view of *pravāhanityeśvaravāda* is put forward as a way of accomodating these Mīmāṃsaka ideas while at the same time preserving the idea that scripture is composed by the Lord. Rāmakaṇṭha writes (ad 3:54c–55): *pravāhanityeśvaravādināṃ hīśvaraḥ sargavat śāstraṃ nirmāya tāvad eva jagatkṛtyaṃ vidhatte yāvat tadvihitaśāstrād arthānuṣṭhānena īśvaro hy anyaḥ siddhaḥ. tasmiṃs tv āgate niyogivat svavyāpāraṃ sarvaṃ śāstraṃ copasaṃhṛtya svātmārāma eva bhavati. tataḥ siddheśvaro 'sadāsthayā evānena jagatkṛtyam upasaṃhṛtam ity avagatya niśākālaṃ pratīkṣya sargavat śāstraṃ nirmāya jagatkṛtyaṃ tāvad racayati yāvat punas tadvihitaśāstrād anuṣṭhānakrameṇeśvaro 'nyaḥ siddha ity evam anyo 'nyaś ceti sargasaṃhāravat śāstram anityam api pravāhato nityatvāt īśvarakartṛkam eva.*

'For [to explain] (*hi*), for those who claim that the Lord is eternal in the way that a stream is, the Lord creates scripture just as He creates creation, and He performs the functions [necessary for the maintenance] of the universe exactly until another Perfected soul [becomes] the Lord by performing what is taught in the scripture composed by that [first Lord]. And when that [second Lord] has arrived, He [viz. the first Lord], like a functionary, brings to a close all His activities, as well as His scripture, and remains delighting [only] in Himself. Then the [second] Lord who was a perfected being, grasping that He [viz. the first Lord] has brought to a close [His performance of] the functions of the universe out of disinterest, waits for a period of resorption and then creates scripture just as He creates creation, and He performs the functions of the universe until again another perfected being [becomes] the Lord by due performance [of what is taught] in the scripture that He [viz. the second Lord] has composed, and so too another [follows] and another. And thus, like creation and resorption, scripture too, although non eternal, since it is eternal in the way that a stream [of water is eternal], does have the Lord as its author.'

Note that some of the terminology of our passage is echoed here: compare *upasaṃhṛtya ... svātmanā bhavati* (*Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*) with *upasaṃhṛtya svātmārāma eva bhavati* (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*); *anāsthayā* (*Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*) with *asadāsthayā* (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*); *samastakṛtya-* (*Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*) with *jagatkṛtyam* (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*). But the view has been slightly modified in the context of the discussion of a new scripture being composed in each cosmic cycle: whereas the account of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* leaves open the possibility of there being many consecutive Lords within a single cosmic cycle, according to this account there is one new Lord per cycle.

Later in the same chapter of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* the Pravāhanityeśvaravādin re-enters the discussion ad 3:118c–119b (*nanu muktaśivavat tasyāpīśvarāntarād aiśvaryam iti pravāhanityeśvaravādinaḥ*; 'Surely those who claim that the Lord is eternal in the way that a stream is say that the [Lord]'s sovereignty too, just like that of liberated Śivas, arose from a yet earlier Lord.'); and ad 3:142ab.

Trilocanaśiva, in the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* section of his *Siddhāntasamuccaya* writes:

> *pare tu pravāhanityeśvaravādinaḥ siddha eva sarvakartṛtvam āropya paramaśivo maheśvaratvād uparataḥ, ayam anyasminn ity āhuḥ. teṣām īśvaraprerya-*

2.13 Existing in a *bhuvana* in the Stars: verse 5ab

5ab) Existing[216] in a *bhuvana* in the stars, having obtained a good body and sense faculties.

The soul's connection with a body and sense faculties,[217] just like its condition of transmigrating in a stream, is certainly beginningless. [218] That being so, because there can be no destruction of something beginningless, it

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tvasiddher vastuta īśvaratattve 'vasthānam.

• *sarvakartṛtvam āropya paramaśivo maheśvaratvād uparataḥ, ayam anyasminn ity āhuḥ*] conj.; *sarvakartṛtvam īśvare 'py anyasminn ity āhuḥ* AB; *sarvakartṛtvam āropya paramaśivo maheśvaratvādyupa×ri×te+a+to nyasminn ity āhuḥ* C

'Yet others, who hold the view that the Lord is [only] eternal in the way that a stream of water is, teach that the Supreme Śiva hands over His omnipotence to a perfected [soul] and withdraws from his rôle as God; this [perfected soul then hands it over] to another [perfected soul]. These (i.e. these Pravāhanityeśvaravādins as well as the preceding group who teach that liberated souls are impelled by the Lord) actually come to rest in *īśvaratattva*, because it is established that they are impelled by the Lord.'

In the last sentence *teṣām* refers not only to these Pravāhanityeśvaravādins, but also to the people whose view was expounded immediately before this (text given in note 200); Trilocanaśiva does not assign the latter separately to a *tattva* but waits till after he has expounded the view of the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins and then groups them together. The view expounded before this teaches explicitly that liberated souls are impelled by the Lord, but why does Trilocanaśiva think that the same applies to the Pravāhanityeśvaravādins? Perhaps because, according to his exposition of them, they have omnipotence and the responsibilities for creation etc. that go with it, handed over to them by the Lord.

[216]The printed editions and M^{Y} (in two of the three places where it gives this part of the verse) read *sthitiḥ* for *sthitaḥ*. The former reading receives some support from the word *avasthānam* in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary. It also has the advantage that these verses tend to list fruits rather than attributes of the person who attains the fruit. In other words we tend to have to understand 'Liberation is', not 'The liberated person is'. (See the other two positions described in this very verse.) But the masculine ending on *satkāryakaraṇopetaḥ* renders *sthitiḥ* impossible unless we resort to further emendation. Furthermore, we have already had one other verse that mixes description of liberation and description of the liberated person: verse 3.

[217]For 'body and sense faculties' as the meaning of *kāryakaraṇa*, see note 147.

[218]The soul incarnates differently in each life, but its property of being a transmigrator has been with it uninterruptedly without beginning. Similarly it is connected with a different body and senses in each life, but it has never not been connected with some body and senses.

Sense has compelled us to conjecture *puruṣasya* for *puruṣaḥ* both here and in the parallel passage in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (given in note 220). The corruption may have arisen

follows that there can be no means of knowing the non-existence of the body and senses in liberation, so liberation is just (*kevalaṃ*) existence for souls ***in a bhuvana in the stars***, i.e. in the area of the star-configurations, due to obtaining a highly elevated body and senses on the cessation of their painful bodies and senses that are observed in *saṃsāra* and that are caused by karma. This is the mistaken conception[219] of some.[220]

2.14 Cessation of Cognition and Agency: verse 5c

5c) Cessation of cognition and agency.

Agency ceases in liberation given that there is no desire or impulse towards action (*prayatna*) [then,] because there is no cognition (*buddhi*).[221] And there is no cognition etc., because of the absence [in liberation] of [all]

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independently in both texts. It could have been caused by the presence of an adjective in the nominative (*anādiḥ*) right before *puruṣasya*, or by the prior corruption of *-bandhaḥ* to *-baddhaḥ*, an extremely common confusion in Grantha manuscripts, and one found in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* witnesses at this point.

[219]We take *abhisandhiḥ* to be used synonymously with *abhiprāyaḥ*.

[220]This passage is summarised in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* as follows (A p.144, B p.76, C p.19): *kecit punar ātmavādino 'nādir eva puruṣasya* [*puruṣasya* conj.; *puruṣaḥ* BC; *puruṣaṃ* A] *kāryakaraṇaiḥ* [*em.*; *kāryakāraṇaiḥ* ABC] *pravāhataḥ saṃsārabandhaḥ* [*-bandhaḥ* AC; *-bandha-* B]. *tasyānādeḥ śarīrendriyayogasya vināśābhāvāt, kevalaṃ parivasthānaṃ mokṣam āhuḥ. dṛśyamānaduḥkhaśarīranivṛttyāvaśiṣṭakarmataḥ prakṛṣṭataraśarīrayogena nakṣatramārge*

'But some Ātmavādins teach (*āhuḥ*) [the following]: The soul's sequential saṃsāric connection with a body and sense faculties is certainly beginningless. Because there is no destruction of that beginningless connection with a body and sense faculties, liberation is just the residing in the area of the star-configurations with connection to a highly elevated body—as a result of karma that remains—, through the cessation of the painful body that is currently observed.'

[221]Impulse depends on desire, and desire depends on cognition; hence in the absence of the last of these, the first two will both be absent. Since the soul's agency consists in its possessing impulse, when impulse ceases, its agency ceases.

nine qualities [of the self].[222] As they have said,[223] 'The Highest aim of people (*apavarga*) is complete escape from the nine [particular qualities of the self]: cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, traces, *dharma* and *adharma*.'[224]

2.15 Cessation of Everything, as advocated by the Buddhists: verse 5d

5d) And another [view is that liberation] is the cessation of everything.

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[222]The flow of argument appears slightly unsmooth. The first sentence justifies the cessation of agency with the absence of desire and impulse, which is in turn accounted for by the absence of cognition. Thus in the next sentence what we require is a justification just of the absence of cognition. But what we get is a justification of the absence not only of that, but also of desire and impulse (among other things). This makes redundant the point in the first sentence that the absence of desire and effort results from the absence of cognition.

Perhaps the explanation is that although the second sentence only needs to justify the absence of cognition, the justification for that also happens to include a justification of the absence of desire and impulse. It is also possible that Rāmakaṇṭha intends the 'etc.' (*-ādīnām*) in the second sentence to denote primarily the six of the nine qualities that have not been mentioned yet.

Only *kartṛtvanāśa* from the verse is explicitly mentioned and justified. Perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha assumed that the reader would take his mention of the absence of *buddhi* as equivalent to, or as a justification of *jñānanāśa*.

[223]The quotation seems to be a mixture of the list of qualities of the self found in Vaiśeṣika texts, and *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.22: *tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ*.

[224]Jayanta Bhaṭṭa explains (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. 2, p. 430,3–9) that the word 'complete' (*atyanta*) is included here because otherwise it would be implied that during times of cosmic absorption (*pralaya*), souls experienced *apavarga*. The escape from suffering at such times is not complete, because when the next creation begins, souls whose karma has not been used up become linked with bodies, and hence their suffering begins again.

Although Rāmakaṇṭha does not name the proponents of this view anywhere in this text, he names them in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (introducing 1:66) as Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas: *yo 'pi buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārāṇāṃ navānāṃ ātmaguṇānām atyantābhāvo mokṣa iti naiyāyikavaiśeṣikair ucyate ... so 'py ayuktaḥ*; 'And as for the complete absence of the nine qualities of the soul—consciousness, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, *dharma*, *adharma* and latent impressions—which is taught by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas as liberation, that is also incorrect'.

Cf. *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (A p. 146, B p. 78, C p. 27) *buddhisukhaduḥkhecchāprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārāṇāṃ navānām ātmaguṇānāṃ atyantābhāvo mokṣa iti*.

Because the single nature of consciousness is to perceive, and because being a perceiver exists in dependence on perceived objects, then since it is also the case that (*ca*) perceived objects have unreal natures (*avasturūpatvāt*) because they cannot by any means exist in [the form of either of two exhaustive] alternatives such as atomic / subtle or gross, [long or short, one or many,][225] the fact of being a perceiver too, [since] it is dependent on them (i.e. perceived objects), is false. This being the case, [the fact of being a perceiver, i.e. consciousness,] is destroyed through nothing more than the rise of a [correct] cognition that refutes it. So say those who hold [that liberation is like] the extinction of a flame.[226]

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[225]The other pairs very frequently encountered in this kind of Yogācāra-Mādhyamika argument, and probably intended to be included by the *ādi*, are *dīrgha / hrasva, eka / aneka*. An alternative interpretation is perhaps suggested, however, by a remark of Rāmakaṇṭha's Vedāntin opponent below (section 3.15.2.2): *paravijñeyānāṃ sarvathā paramāṇurūpatayā sthūlādyātmakatayāpi vicārayitum aśakyatvād avastutvena svapnavad avidyārūpatvam*; 'Things that are known by others do not in any way stand up to analysis, either as being of the nature of atoms or as being gross etc.; therefore, being unreal, they are of the nature of ignorance, just like [things perceived in] a dream.' Since it is clear there that the two alternative possibilities are that things are of the nature of atoms, or they are *sthūlādi*, perhaps here too we should take it that *sthūlādi*, as one unit, stands in opposition to *aṇu*. For more on how to interpret *sthūlādi* there, see note 759.

[226]For the argument that external objects could be neither atomic nor gross, see Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhibhāṣya* ad v. 1, paragraphs 13–19, pp. 115–125; *Viṃśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi* 12 and Vasubandhu's auto-commentary ad loc.; Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* 1–5 and Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1967ff.

The term *pradīpanirvāṇavādin* appears not to be used by the Buddhists themselves and is rarely used by non-Buddhists other than Śaivas. Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha uses it in the *Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:26. Rāmakaṇṭha uses it in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:67ab.

For examples in Buddhist texts of similar arguments to the one here, see the following: (1) Ratnākaraśānti, as in Rāmakaṇṭha's presentation, having established the unreality of external objects through the impossiblity of them existing in either of two forms, goes on to argue that *grāhakatva* too, since it depends on the *grāhya*, is false (*bhrānta*). This Yogācāra passage from his commentary on the *Hevajratantra* was supplied to us by Harunaga ISAACSON, who is currently preparing an edition of the text.

> *prakāśo hi vijñapteḥ svarūpam. yasyāsau svabhāvo na bhavati na sa prakāśate, virodhāt. tasmāt prakāśamānaṃ nīlapītādi na vijñānabāhyo 'rthaḥ kiṃ tarhi vijñānasyaivātmabhūtaḥ pratibhāsa ābhāsa ākāraḥ, sajātīyavikalpāhitavāsanopahatāc cittād eva nānākārasya vijñānasyotpatteḥ, tadyathā svapne. uktaṃ cāryalaṅkāvatāre:*
>
> *bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālair vikalpyate*
> *vāsanāluṭhitaṃ cittam arthābhāsaṃ pravartate*

(*Laṅkāvatārasūtra, sagāthaka* 154c–155b)

iti. luṭhitam upahatam.

api ca nedaṃ nīlādikaṃ bāhyo 'rthaḥ, ekānekasvabhāvavirahāt. na hi tad ekam, bhāgabhedena pratibhāsanāt. nāpy anekaṃ paramāṇuśaḥ, paramāṇor ayogāt. tathā hi yady asau sāṃśaḥ sa kathaṃ paramāṇuḥ. atha niraṃśaḥ, tadā saṃyuktāḥ paramāṇavaḥ sarvātmanā saṃyogāt parasparam abhinnadeśāḥ syur iti sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syāt, gajo 'pi, girir api, sāgaro 'pi, pṛthivy api.

[...]

tasmān nāsti vijñānabāhyo grāhyo 'rthaḥ. tadabhāvāt tadapekṣaṃ grāhakatvam api vijñānasya nāstīti sarvathā dvayaṃ nāsti, grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ ca. asati dvaye dvayapratibhāsā bhrāntir asti. saiva bhrāntir abhūtaparikalpaḥ. tasya cābhūtaparikalpasya tena dvayena śūnyatā rahitatā vijñaptimātratā nityam asti.

For shining forth is the nature of consciousness. That which does not have this nature (i.e. does not have consciousness as its nature), does not shine forth, because this would be contradictory. Therefore blue objects, yellow objects and other such things, when they shine forth (i.e. appear to consciousness), are not objects outside consciousness; they are rather a reflection, an appearance, an image that is the nature of consciousness itself. For consciousness in its various forms arises only out of a mind that has been struck by the traces laid down by notions of like kind, just as [can be observed] in dreams. And this has been taught in the *Āryalaṅkāvatāra*:

> There is no 'external object', as children imagine there to be.
> [Rather] the mind, buffeted by traces, acts, having the appearance of objects.

'Buffeted' [here means] 'struck'.

Furthermore, a given thing, something blue, for example, cannot be an external object for the reason that it cannot have a nature that is either single or plural. For it is not one, since it appears divided into parts. Nor can it be several as [a conglomeration of] atoms, since the atom is [an] impossible [notion]. To explain: if that [atom] has parts, then how can it be an a-tom; and if it is without parts, then atoms joined together would be utterly joined, so would occupy the same space as each other, with the result that every conglomeration, even an elephant, a mountain, the ocean or the earth, would be the size of one atom.

[...]

Therefore there is no perceived object that is external to consciousness. And since that does not exist, consciousness's condition of being a perceiver, which depends upon it, is impossible too, and so the pair, perceiver and perceived, are quite without existence. Since these two do not exist, what exists is error that has the appearance of this duality [of perceiver and perceived]. This error is the imagining of what does not exist. And the fact that this

2.16 Cessation of Everything, as advocated by the Cārvākas: verse 5d

But others, because of their lack of intelligence (*jāḍyāt*), hold this same position [of the cessation of everything] in the following form (*evam*): consciousness arises from the elements alone, and perishes along with those same

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imagining of what does not exist is empty of this pair, devoid [of them], i.e. its being mere consciousness—this always exists.

Thus both here and in Rāmakaṇṭha's presentation we find (A) an argument for the falsity and non-existence of perceived objects, (B) the contention that the condition of being a perceiver (*grāhakatva*) is dependent on the existence of perceived objects, and (C) the conclusion that both the perceived and the perceiver are false and do not exist. There is an important difference, though, in that Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist takes the disappearance of *grāhakatva* to entail the disappearance of consciousness (*caitanya*), since he regards the former as the single nature of the latter. This is certainly not the case for Ratnākaraśānti, for whom *vijñaptimātratā* exists permanently, devoid of perceiver and perceived. Thus Rāmakaṇṭha uses this Yogācāra manner of argumentation to yield a conclusion more characteristic of the Vaibhāṣikas, namely *nirvāṇa* as the complete cessation of the stream of consciousness.

(2) A passage from Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā* gives two views, the first that of *sākāravādin* Yogācāras, and the second that of *nirākāravādin* Yogācāras. The first claims that there is neither perceiver nor perceived (*na kasyacid grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ vā*) – the reason that a relation of perceiver and perceived is determied is that it appears through conceptualisation (*kalpanayā tu grāhyagrāhakabhāva iti vyavasthāpyate*) – hence what is real is just image-containing cognition that is free of the imagined relation of perceiver and perceived (*tataḥ parikalpitagrāhyagrāhakabhāvarahitaṃ vijñānaṃ sākāraṃ* [*em.* KAJIYAMA (1965: 424); sākāra ed.] *satyam*).

The second claims that essential cognition is unstained by the taints of any images, resembling a clear crystal (*sakalākārakalaṅkānaṅkitaṃ śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśaṃ vāstavaṃ vijñānam*) – the reason that images, despite being false, appear, is that they are manifested by ignorance (*ākārās tv amī vitathā evāvidyayā darśitāḥ prakāśante*) – hence there is no perceived, and so the condition of being a perceiver, which is dependent on the perceived, is also non-existent (*tasmād grāhyaṃ nāma nāsty eva; grāhyābhāvāt tadapekṣayā yad grāhakatvaṃ vijñānasya tad api nāstīti*).

Here too we can recognize much that is in Rāmakaṇṭha's argument, but here too there is the difference that cognition is not equated with the condition of being a perceiver. In both of the *Tarkabhāṣā* views cognition (*vijñānam*) is real despite perceiver (and perceived) being unreal. The former exists in *nirvāṇa* but the latter does not. The difference between the two views is just that images are real and occur in *nirvāṇa* for the *sākāravādin*, but are not and do not for the *nirakaravadin*.

[elements],[227] so just through the cessation of the body, everything ceases.[228]

2.17 Conclusion of the exposition of fruits of systems non-congruent with Śaiva Siddhānta: verse 6

And thus, having presented the fruits well-known in other systems [non-congruent with Śaiva Siddhānta],[229] [Sadyojyotiḥ] concludes:

> 6) But liberation of these kinds (*evam*) is [merely] imagined by the disputants according to their own doctrines. For [they], blinded by delusion, have not seen at all [that liberation is] becoming equal to the true Lord.

All of these various [disputants] (*tais taiḥ*), being ***blinded by delusion***, [i.e.] their eye of consciousness being afflicted by ignorance, ***have not seen***

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[227] This is a very close paraphrase of a sentence that occurs twice in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* (2.4.12 and 4.5.13) and is frequently quoted in philosophical literature by Cārvāka *pūrvapakṣins*. See, for example, *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5e (p. 54 FRAUWALLNER ed.): *athāsmin arthe brāhmaṇam bhavati: 'vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati, na pretya saṃjñāsti' iti*; *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 1, p. 647: *'vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati, na pretya saṃjñāsti' iti vedamūladarśanāt*; *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, p. 268; and *Tantrālokaviveka* ad 6:16.

[228] That Sadyojyotiḥ did indeed intend the final *pāda* of the verse under discussion (*sarvanāśas tathāpare*) to denote both the Buddhist position and this Cārvāka position (that consciousness ceases when the body ceases) is supported by the fact that his verse 43 addresses itself to the Buddhist position and his verses 44–46 address themselves to this Cārvāka position.

[229] *Tantrāntara-* here means not precisely systems other than Śaiva Siddhānta, for it does not include those non-Saiddhāntika systems that Sadyojyotiḥ will introduce in the next verse as holding three non-Saiddhāntika versions of the view that liberation is becoming the same as the Lord. Rāmakaṇṭha refers to those three as *samānatāntrikas*, denoting not Saiddhāntikas, but those non-Saiddhāntikas that, despite holding the view of *īśvarasamatā* and hence belonging to the same wider religion, interpret it differently from the Saiddhāntikas. At the beginning of the text Rāmakaṇṭha refers to the fruits to be examined as *samānāsamānatantrāntaragītāni*, 'proclaimed in other systems—both congruent and non-congruent [with Śaiva Siddhānta]'. That clarifies that there are two kinds of *tantrāntaras*, and that the kind intended here are the *asamānatantrāntaras*.

In introducing verse 8 Rāmakaṇṭha groups together those he terms here *tantrāntaras* with those he terms (in introducing verse 7) *samānatāntrikas*, referring to the whole group as *tantrāntaras*. Thus whereas *tantrāntara-* here means *asamānatantrāntara-*, there it means *samānāsamānatantrāntara-*.

the fruit termed liberation, known only through the teachings of the Lord, consisting in becoming equal to the true Supreme Lord. Therefore ***liberation*** of these kinds is [merely] imagined by them according to their own fancies.

2.18 Becoming Equal to the Lord: verse 7

Now he responds to those who belong to systems congruent [with his own]:

> 7) And becoming equal [to the Supreme Lord, the nature of which is] the manifestation [of his qualities],[230] which is superior, [because] it is beyond the range of the scriptures of the bound, to the positions that [becoming equal to Śiva is to be explained as] the rise of, the transference of or possession by [the Lord's qualities], is not proclaimed as such [by the proponents of those positions].[231]

Becoming equal to the Supreme Lord, the nature of which is the ***manifestation*** of [His] qualities, omniscience and [omnipotence], which is ***superior***, [in other words] supreme, is ***not proclaimed*** [as such by rival theologians]. Superior to what? [As an answer to] that he says, ***to the positions that*** [***becoming equal to Śiva is to be explained as***] ***the rise of, the transference of or possession by*** [***the Lord's qualities***].

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[230]I.e Sadyojyotiḥ's own view of liberation.

[231]We take it that the most natural interpretation of the verse would be that *īśvarasamatābhivyakti* is not proclaimed as superior to these other positions [because] it is beyond the range of the scriptures of the bound, where *baddhavācām agocarā* is a *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa* that explains why the proponents of these other positions do not recognise *īśvarasamatābhivyakti* as the superior view. Rāmakaṇṭha, however, does not take it in that way; it is evident from the following remark at the end of his commentary, *iyam abhivyaktisamatā vakṣyamāṇā baddhavācām agocaratvāt parā*, that he takes *baddhavācām agocarā* as a *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa* that explains why *īśvarasamatābhivyakti* is superior to the other views. Note that, on either interpretation, those whom Rāmakaṇṭha describes in his introduction to the verse as *samānatāntrikas* are said in the verse, by implication, to be 'bound'.

The editions (both in the verse and the commentary) lack a *na* and read *buddhi-* for *baddha-*, giving the meaning that *īśvarasamatābhivyakti* is proclaimed as superior, being beyond the reach of the intellect. But the *na* is found (both in the verse and the commentary) in all manuscripts and in a citation of this verse in the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* (ad 4:48): *samatā ca samutpattisaṅkrāntyāveśapakṣataḥ | nābhivyaktiḥ parā gītā baddhavācām agocarā || iti.*

2.18.1 The Rise of the Lord's Qualities

Because the properties of omniscience and [omnipotence] do not exist in the condition of a bound soul, and because [therefore] scriptural passages [about] becoming equal to the Supreme Lord at liberation[232] would be impossible otherwise, the qualities of omniscience and [omnipotence], that are the same as [the qualities of] the Supreme Lord, [are postulated to] arise then for the first time in the bound soul.[233] This position that equality [comes about through] the rise [of the Lord's qualities] is accepted by some.[234]

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[232]There are plenty of such scriptural passages in the *Siddhāntas*. This sentence may be referring to these, or it may be referring to lost passages in the scriptures of Kālamukhas, who, according to Rāmakaṇṭha (see note 234) were the proponents of this view.

[233]Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:58: *yair muktau śivasamatvaśrutyanyathānupapattyāsyātmanaḥ sarvajñatvādy utpadyata* [B; *upapadyata* E_K] *ity ucyate tān pratikṣipati.*

[234]When Rāmakaṇṭha refers to this view in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *kriyāpāda* 8:10c–12b), he attributes it to the Kālamukhas: *pūrvasiddhapaśutvanirvṛttyā yā puṃsaḥ śivasamānasya dharmasyābhivyaktiḥ sā muktir ucyate. na tv asata eva tasyotpattir yathā kālamukhāḥ* [*kālamukhāḥ* Ū, Ṛ; *kālāmukhāḥ* ed.] *prāhuḥ.*

In his *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (chapter 5, p.156) Śivāgrayogin attributes this Upattivāda to the Mahāvratins (*tatra mahāvratina utpattyā sāmyam upagacchanti*), and SANDERSON (2006b: 179–181) uses that to argue that the Kālamukhas are none other than the Mahāvratins / Mahāvratas. To the evidence of the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* can be added that of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, whose author Umāpati also attributes the *utpattisamatāpakṣa* to the 'Mahāvratas' in one place and to the 'Mahāvratins' in another (see note 238). As additional support for the identification of the two, SANDERSON (2006b: 181–182) points to instances of the pairing of Pañcārtha and Kālavaktra (a synonym of Kālamukha) where he expects the first two divisions of the Atimārga to be the intended referents. He could also have pointed to passages that he cites elsewhere (2004: 1–2) from the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, *Śrībhāṣya*, *Jñānaratnāvalī* and *Bṛhatkālottara*, which when giving the four divisions of the followers of Śiva's scriptures name the Kālavaktras / Kālamukhas in the place where other lists of the four divisions give the Mahāvratas or Lākulas.

But not all evidence points to the equating of the Kālamukhas and the Mahāvratins / Mahāvratas. If Śivāgrayogin and Umāpati read the *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage ad *kriyāpāda* 8:10c–12b, cited above, and it is likely that they did given their familiarity with other parts of Rāmakaṇṭha's oeuvre, then we can conclude that these two sixteenth-century authors equated the two groups of ascetics. But whether Rāmakaṇṭha equated them is another matter. We know from the *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage that he regarded the Kālamukhas as holding this view of Utpattivāda, but it is likely that he regarded the Mahāvratas as holding the view of *akartā sarvavedyavit*. For as we saw in the exposition of that position above, he attributes it to the authors of the Pramāṇa scriptures. That Rāmakaṇṭha took these to be the Mahāvratas is likely given that in a passage from the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 3:137–8, cited by SANDERSON 2006b: 178) he mentions that the Mahāvratas recognise the universe to extend from earth to Dhruva, and we know this

to be the teaching of the Pramāṇa scriptures from many passages given by SANDERSON (2006b: 169ff.). Furthermore Rāmakaṇṭha outlines the view of *akartā sarvavedyavit* in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 118–122 and attributes it to the Mahāvratas.

If he regards the Mahāvratas as the proponents of *akartā sarvavedyavit*, then it is difficult to see how he could have regarded them as the same group to whom he attributes Utpattivāda, namely the Kālamukhas. For he regards Utpattivāda as the view of co-religionists (*samānatāntrikas*: see his introduction to this verse 7 of our text), and *akartā sarvavedyavit* as the view of a group falling outside his own religion.

Three other pieces of evidence do not fit the equating of Mahāvratins / Mahāvratas and Kālamukhas. (1) The *Siddhāntasamuccaya* attributes to the Mahāvratas not Utpattivāda, but indeed the view of *akartā sarvavedyavit*; and it gives Utpattivāda as a separate view. It does not name the proponents of the latter, but it locates them in *māyātattva*, whereas it locates the Mahāvratas in *vidyātattva*. So Trilocanaśiva saw the Mahāvratas as a separate group from the holders of Utpattivāda; and the two views do seem hard to reconcile given that that ascribed to the Mahāvratas denies any agency in liberation whereas Utpattivāda asserts omnipotence. (For Trilocanaśiva's treatment of the view of *akartā sarvavedyavit*, see note 174, where it can be seen that he summarises Rāmakaṇṭha's exposition of the *akartā sarvavedyavit* view, citing the same verse that Rāmakaṇṭha cites, and names the proponents as *mahāvratāḥ*. For his treatment of Utpattivāda, see note 238.)

(2) The *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, Guṇaratnasūri's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (p. 78), maintains a fourfold classification of ascetics into Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Mahāvratas and Kālamukhas, hence he regarded the last two as separate groups of people. He also cites a verse to that effect: *te ca śaivādibhedena caturdhā bhavanti. tad uktam*:

> *ādhārabhasmakaupīnajaṭāyajñopavītinaḥ |*
> *svasvācārādibhedena caturdhā syus tapasvinaḥ ||*
> *śaivāḥ pāśupatāś caiva mahāvratadharās tathā |*
> *turyāḥ kālamukhā mukhyā bhedā ete tapasvinām ||*

'And they are fourfold in accordance with the division into Śaiva and the rest. Thus it has been said:

> Ascetics, who may have an *ādhāra*,* and who may wear ashes, a loincloth, matted hair, and the sacred thread, in accordance with the differences between their various observances etc., are fourfold. These principal divisions of ascetics are Śaivas, Pāśupatas, those who observe the Mahāvrata and, fourth, Kālamukhas.'

*The term *ādhāra* might refer to a temple or dwelling to which such ascetics might be attached or it might refer to a begging receptacle.

(3) Jayanta Bhaṭṭa regards the Kālamukhas and Mahāvratins as distinct, as is evident from this remark in his *Āgamaḍambara* (p. 188): *tad ime śaivapāśupatakālamukhā mahāvratinaś ca yathāsukham āsatām.*

2.18.2 Transference of the Lord's Qualities

And similarly others[235] hold the position of equality through transference, i.e. that at liberation the qualities of the Supreme Lord are transferred into

[235] As Rāmakaṇṭha will make clear in the next sentence, he takes the holders of this view that the qualities of the Lord are transferred at liberation to be 'Pāśupatas'. He attributes it to the same group of people in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:62 (*pāśupatās tu muktasyeśvaraguṇasaṅkrāntes tatsamatvam āhuḥ*), the *Matangavṛtti* ad *kriyāpāda* 8:10c–12b, and the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 129. The *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (chapter 5, p. 156) also attributes it to the Pāśupatas (*pāśupatāḥ saṅkrāntyā sāmyam upagacchanti*), as does the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* (see note 238).

Trilocanaśiva says of these people that they can only reach *māyātattva* (*Siddhāntasamuccaya* A p. 149, B p. 82, C p. 31): *pāśupatāḥ punar māyāvyatiriktaṃ malam anabhyupagacchanto dīkṣājñānādinā sarvabandhakṣaye sati parameśvarāt siddhe sarvajñatvādiguṇasaṃkrāntitas tatsāmyaṃ muktir ity āhuḥ. teṣāṃ tu paramārthato malāparijñānāt tadvināśābhāvena māyātattva evāvasthitiḥ. yac chrūyate:*

pāśupatās tu māyāyāṃ vidyāyāṃ tu mahāvratāḥ | iti.

'The Pāśupatas, next, not recognising the existence of *mala* as anything different from *māyā*, teach that liberation is sameness with the [Lord] as a result of transference of the qualities of omniscience and [omnipotence] into the perfected soul from the Lord when all the bonds are destroyed as a result of initiation, knowledge and the like. But ultimately they remain just in *māyātattva* because, since they do not recognise *mala* it does not cease [for them]. As has been taught in scripture:

The Pāśupatas reach *māyā*[*tattva*], but the Mahāvratas reach *vidyā*[*tattva*].'

The verse cited at the end occurs in the *Kriyākāṇḍakramāvali* of Somaśambhu as *vratoddhāravidhi* 8ab (BRUNNER 1977: 553). It has also been quoted by Madhyārjuna in his *Siddhāntadīpikā* (IFP T. 801 [=A], p. 75 and IFP T. 112 [=B], pp. 140–1) as part of a group of verses on the same subject belonging to the beginning of the fourteenth chapter (on *mṛtadīkṣā*) of the *Sarvajñānottara*. The quotation is collated here against the early Nepalese ms of the *Sarvajñānottara*, NAK MS 1-1692, NGMPP A 43/12 (=N), f. 30v, which omits the crucial half-line.

uktaṃ ca sarvajñānottare:
jñānacaryānvito bauddho buddhitattvam avāpnuyāt |
tāmase jinabhaktās tu pauruṣe brahmavedinaḥ || 3 ||
kevalārthavidaḥ kālaṃ prāpnuvanti jitendriyāḥ |
vaidyeśvaraṃ nāma tattvaṃ somasiddhāntavādinaḥ || 4 ||
pāśupatās tu māyāyāṃ vidyāyāṃ ca mahāvratāḥ |
nāpnuvanti mṛṣāmuktāḥ śaivaṃ padam anāmayām || 5 || iti.

• *sarvajñānottare*] B; *śrīmatsarvajñānottare* A • 3a. *jñānacaryānvito bauddho*] em.; *jñānācāryonvito bauddho* A; *jñānācāryānvito bauddho* B; *jñānacaryānvito bauddhā* N • 3c. *tāmase jina-*] B; *tāmase jita-* A; *tāmasaṃ jñita-* N • 3d. *pauruṣe brahmavedinaḥ*] em.; *pauruṣema brahmavedinaḥ* A unmetrical; *pauruṣe brahmavādinaḥ* B; *pauruṣaṃ brahmavedina* N • 4a. *kevalārthavidaḥ*] conj.; *kevalorthavidaḥ* A; *kevalārdhavidaḥ* B; *kevalarthavidiḥ* N • 4b. *jitendriyāḥ*] AB; *jitendriyā* N • 4c. *vaidyeśvaraṃ nāma tattvaṃ*]

the [soul] like the fragrance of musk into a cloth or such like. And these Śikhāsaṅkrāntivādins,[236] the Pāśupatas, are mentioned by the author of the sūtra as 'the Power[-transference] people' (*viśikhākārakatvena*).[237]

AB; *vaidyeśvarāgurutatva* N • 4d. *-vādinaḥ*] conj.; *-vāsinaḥ* AB; *-vedinaḥ* N • 5ab.] om. N • 5a. *pāśupatās tu*] B; *paśupatās tu* A • 5b. *mahāvratāḥ*] B; *mahāvrataḥ* A • 5c. *nāpnuvanti mṛṣāmuktāḥ*] conj.; *nāpnuvamṛjiṣā yukto* A; *nāpnuvanmṛjuṣā yuktāś* B; *prāpnuvanti mṛṣā yuktāḥ* N • 5d. *śaivaṃ padam anāmayam*] B; *śaivaṃ padaṃ nāmayam* A (unmetrical); *taiddhare rathagāminaḥ* N

'The Buddhist who has knowledge and good conduct attains the *tattva* of *buddhi*. The devotee of the Jina [is placed] in *tamas*. Those who know *brahman* [are placed] in the *tattva* of the [bound] soul. The Kevalārthavits [=Pāñcārthikas according to Aghoraśiva], their faculties controlled, attain [the *tattva* of] Time. Those who hold the Somasiddhānta [reach] the *tattva* called Vaidyeśvara. The Pāśupatas, however, [are] in *māyā* and the Mahāvratas in [pure] knowledge. Falsely liberated, these do not attain the faultless Śaiva state.'

The only evidence that the half-line belongs to the *Sarvajñānottara* is Madhyārjuna's quotation. Several other factors weigh against its inclusion. It is not found in any of the witnesses of the *Sarvajñānottara* so far consulted. It is not commented on by Aghoraśiva. If Aghoraśiva is correct that the Kevalārthavits are the Pāñcārthika Pāśupatas, then its inclusion would entail their being treated twice and assigned to contradictory locations. And it seems to have been inserted in the wrong place: we would expect it before 4cd, given that Vaidyeśvara is the name given to *īśvaratattva* in the *Sarvajñānottara* (see, e.g. 27:30 [=29 in the first verse numeration of the Tanjore edition]).

[236]Sadyojyotiḥ refers to these opponents with this label, Śikhāsaṅkrāntivādin, in verse 57. One might imagine it to mean 'those who hold [that liberation is like] the transference of a flame', or, given the prominence of the *śikhā* and its removal in the Pāśupata initiatory rite taught in the *Saṃskāravidhi* discovered and published by ACHARYA (2007: 35–36 and 46–47, particularly verses 85 and 87), 'those who hold that [liberation is achieved] by transference [of Śiva-hood] through the topknot'. But Rāmakaṇṭha analyses the term in his commentary to v. 57 as 'those who teach a transfer of powers [at liberation]', telling us that *śikhā* here means *śakti*.

[237]On this translation of *kāraka* see note 211. Or it could mean agent: 'agents [who hold that liberation is brought about by the transference] of powers.' It seems that Rāmakaṇṭha assumes the existence of a noun *viśikhā* (rather than the adjective *viśikha*) and that he treats *viśikhā* as equivalent to *śikhā*, which, as stated in the previous note, he defines as a term meaning *śakti*.

2.18.3 Possession by the Lord's Qualities

Still others,[238] [hold] the position of possession, i.e. that a perfected [soul] at the time of [liberation] is possessed by the qualities of the Supreme Lord that remain in their own substrate (i.e. in the Lord),[239] as a person [is possessed] by the planet-spirits.

Superior to those other views of becoming equal to the Lord is this [view of ours] of equality through manifestation, that will be taught,[240] because it

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[238]The *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (chapter 5, p.156) attributes this *āveśapakṣa* to the Kāpālikas (*kāpālikāḥ samāveśena sāmyam upagacchanti*) and the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* (ad 4.48ab, p.231–2) to the Kāpālas. The *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* passage reads: *nanv atra pāśupatāḥ śivaguṇasya sārvajñyādeḥ muktāv aṇau saṅkrāntim āhuḥ. kāpālās tu tasya samāveśam āhuḥ. mahāvratās tu tadānīm eva tasyotpattim āhuḥ ... tad uktam abhiyuktaiḥ:*

yathā kastūrikāmodaḥ paṭādiṣu tathātmani |
śivasya †tad†guṇā muktau saṅkrāmanti †tathā† svayam ||
iti pāśupatā muktiṃ svakīyāṃ paramāṃ viduḥ |
nijāśrayasthitair eva tadānīm aiśvarair guṇaiḥ ||
svayam āviśyate siddhaḥ puruṣas tu grahair iva |
itthaṃ caiva tu kāpālās tatsāmyaṃ muktim ūcire ||
śivatulyaṃ pūrvam eva samutpadyata ity ataḥ |
utpattisamatāpakṣo mahāvratibhir ucyate || iti.

(The first of these verses appears in the *Sarvamatopanyāsa* (T.284, p.17), and there its second half reads: *śivasya tu guṇāḥ muktau saṃkramanta udīritam.*)

The *Siddhāntasamuccaya*, having asserted that the Pāśupata Saṅkrāntivādins can only reach *māyātattva* (see note 235), places the Utpattivādins and the Āveśavādins at that level too (A p.149–150, B p.82–83, C p.31): *kecid utpattisāmyamokṣavādinaḥ śivaprasādāt siddhe sarvajñatvādi syād ity āhuḥ. apare parameśvarāveśāt siddhe sarvajñatvādi syād ity āhuḥ. teṣām api samalatvena pāramārthikasvaguṇavyaktyabhāvāt tatraivāvasthitiḥ syāt.*

[239]That this *āveśapakṣa* involves the qualities of the Lord affecting the soul *while remaining in their own substrate* is what distinguishes it from the *saṅkrāntipakṣa*. For when in the course of the rejection of the *saṅkrāntipakṣa* (27cd and commentary ad loc) it is maintained that the qualities of the Lord affect the soul while remaining in their own substrate, the doubt arises as to whether this is any different from the *āveśapakṣa*. Note also that the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*'s short characterisation of the *āveśapakṣa* quoted in the previous footnote qualifies *aiśvarair guṇaiḥ* with *nijāśrayasthitaiḥ*.

What is not clear is whether it was envisaged that the Lord and His qualities affect the soul from a distance, or whether (a small part of) the Lord Himself, along with His qualities, enters the liberated soul.

[240]This could either be a reference forward to the *Mokṣakārikā* or to some places in the course of this text's refutation of *saṅkrāntivāda* in which Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha defend their own view of Abhivyaktivāda: verses 31, 32, 38–42, and the commentary ad loc.

is ***beyond the range of the scriptures of the bound.***

3 Refutation of *Pūrvapakṣa*s

Thus, having introduced the fruits of other systems, he refutes them in an order [that accords with] their meaning.[241]

3.1 Enjoyment of *sattva*; Existing in a *bhuvana* in the Stars: verse 8

8) The pair, an experiencer of *sattva* and an inhabitant [of a *bhuvana*] in the stars, are liable to destruction, [for] in [this] world [any] experiencer and inhabitant of [this] *bhuvana* is seen to be liable to destruction.

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[241]Sadyojyotiḥ does not refute the positions in the order in which he has introduced them; hence Rāmakaṇṭha's remark. But precisely what Rāmakaṇṭha means by *arthakrama* is not clear. The order of refutation is as follows: (1) *sattvasambhoga*, (2) *tārakābhuvanasthitiḥ*, (3) *mahāgaṇo maheśasya*, (4) *samatvaṃ tejasāṃ nidheḥ*, (5) *akartā sarvavedyavit*, (6) *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvaṃ*, (7) *ādhikyaṃ parameśānāt*, (8) *nirmalatvaṃ ca kevalam*, (9) *siddha eva kartṛtvam audāsīnyaṃ maheśvare*, (10) *śivasamatāsamutpatti*, (11) *śivasamatāveśa*, (12) *śivasamatāsaṅkrānti*, (13) *sarvanāśaḥ*, (14) *jñānakartṛtvayor nāśaḥ*, (15) *avyākṛtādiṣv arvāk ca laya eva vikāriṣu*, (16) *vilayaḥ paramātmani*, (17) *kaivalyam*. The order of the first nine could perhaps indicate an advancement of goals from the lowest upwards, each one coming closer to the goal of the Saiddhāntikas. But then we have the goals of the three religions closest to that of the Siddhānta (that Rāmakaṇṭha terms the *samānatāntrikas*) coming before those of religions as distant from Śaiva Siddhānta as the Buddhists and Cārvākas. A second possibility is that *artha* means *arthagaurava*, 'difficulty of meaning', implying that he first refutes those that can be refuted rapidly and then turns to those that require more detailed and complicated argumentation. But this too does not fit for the order of the whole list: the longest refutation of all is that of the Saṅkrāntivādins (number 12) and the refutation of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas (number 14) is cursory. A third possibility is that *arthakrameṇa* means 'in an order [that accords with Sadyojyotiḥ's own particular] purpose', the point being that, for example, if he refutes one position and then another can be refuted in the same way, he deals with it then. He does this on three occasions: verse 8, 9ab and 9cd. But apart from the ordering of these six refutations, we do not see how that of the rest of the list serves a purpose of Sadyojyotiḥ's.

It is possible that Rāmakaṇṭha was prompted to include this remark simply because of the different order of refutation from that of the initial listing, without having in mind a single principle of meaning or purpose that accounts for the whole order of refutation.

The pair, an experiencer of sattva and an inhabitant** [**of a bhuvana**] **in the stars**,* [which constitute] fruits, ***are liable to destruction**,*[242] [for] someone such as Devadatta, who is an enjoyer and dweller in [this] *bhuvanas* ***is seen to be destroyed.

3.1.1 Enjoyment of *sattva*

[Objection:] Surely to be an enjoyer is nothing other than to be a knower, which is the very nature of the person. In that case how can [such a thing], which is not a product of karma, be destroyed? We [already] said this above.[243]

[Response:] If that is the case,[244] the soul should become absolutely omniscient then (i.e. at liberation), not a knower of *sattva* alone, because there is no reason for a difference [between *sattva* and the other constituents of material existence in respect of their knowability].[245] Thus let our position alone remain.

3.1.2 Existing in a *bhuvana* in the Stars

Objection: With regard to that [position of Enjoyment of *sattva*] (*atra*), it may well be the case (*evam*) [that the fruit is perishable], but how can the dweller-in-a-*bhuvana*'s relationship with a *bhuvana* and with [a body and

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[242]The Sanskrit here is a little awkward: *dvaya* is relatively rarely attested as an adjective in non-Vedic Sanskrit (some examples occur at *Mahābhārata* 12.229:13ff.), so we have avoided the smoother but less likely translation of *dvayam api phalam* as 'the two fruits'. The variant *viphalam* for *api phalam* is not impossible: 'The pair ... are without real fruit, it being the case that they are liable to destruction.' But the distribution of readings has led us, tentatively, to favour *api phalam*. Rāmakaṇṭha's motivation for adding in *phalam* at that point of the sentence may have been that he wanted to avoid the implication that the enjoyer or the inhabitant—i.e. their souls—are liable to destruction, and to clarify that it is the fruits that they attain, their respective states, that come to an end.

[243]In section 2.2: *na ca tad bhoktṛtvam aupādhikam ... iti bhoktṛtvaṃ svābhāvātmakam eṣṭavyam. na cānāder nityasvabhāvasya vināśo yuktaḥ.*

Sadyojyotiḥ has asserted that the enjoyer of *sattva* is liable to destruction, but that does not address the opponent's earlier point that to be an enjoyer is a person's own nature, so cannot be destroyed.

[244]I.e. if to be an enjoyer is nothing other than to be a knower.

[245]If the opponent means *jñātṛtva* by *bhoktṛtva*, then Rāmakaṇṭha accepts that that is indeed the nature of the soul and hence cannot be destroyed. The problem then with the opponent's position is that this *jñātṛtva*, which at liberation should be unlimited, is restricted to *sattva*.

senses][246] cease, [when his various *bhuvanas*, bodies and senses are] beginningless in the way that [the parts of water in] a stream [are beginningless]?[247]

[Response:] [That relation] with karma or its various fruits[248] [can cease] precisely because of its *stream-like* beginninglessness.[249] But something that is eternal in an immutably fixed way (*kūṭasthanityaḥ*) cannot be caused to cease. That is the ultimate truth.

3.2 A Chief Attendant of the Supreme Lord; Becoming the Same as the Treasury of Light: verse 9ab

9ab) Those who become the same as a chief of the attendants [of the Lord] or Fire, [since they] are impelled, do not have their wishes completely fulfilled.

In this [half-verse] the two positions [that Sadyojyotiḥ introduced as] 'A chief attendant of the Supreme Lord' [and] 'Becoming the same as the treasury of light' are refuted. Someone who has become the same as[250] a chief of the attendants [of the Lord], first of all, has not had his wishes completely fulfilled, because, due merely to the existence of a status above [that of being the same as a chief of the attendants], he is linked to a further desire to attain it. So how can he be liberated? One should regard [souls] that have become the same as fire [or] the sun as likewise [having unfulfilled wishes because of the existence of a status above them].[251]

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[246] We have taken the *ādi* to refer to *kāryakaraṇa* because the earlier argument for this position (section 2.13) stressed the soul's connection with a succession of bodies and senses (*kāryakaraṇaiḥ ... sambaddhaḥ*).

[247] This opponent distinguishes his position from that of the Sattvabhuk in that the soul has not beginninglessly been an enjoyer of *sattva*, but it has been beginninglessly connected with succession of *bhuvanas*, bodies and senses.

[248] In particular *bhuvanas*, bodies and senses.

[249] The text is awkward here and Harunaga Isaacson pointed out to us that it would read more smoothly if *karmabhis tattatphalair vā* were not there. He suggested that it may have been a marginal or interlinear gloss of *bhuvanādibhiḥ* (in the previous sentence) that was mistakenly taken by a subsequent copyist to be part of the text.

[250] One might have expected Rāmakaṇṭha to understand *gaṇendrāgnisamau* as *gaṇendraś cāgnisamaś ca*, but he takes the first element as *gaṇendrasamaḥ*.

[251] Rāmakaṇṭha comments explicitly on the verse's *asampūrṇamanorathau*, but not on *preryau*. His argument seems slightly different from that of the verse. The fact that these

You might say that (*atha*) there is some other[252] [entity called sun or fire] imperceptible to the likes of us:

> And the omniscient and omnipotent One can be referred to as Fire, the Sun and such like.[253]

If that is the case then [the view] that liberation is becoming the same as that is simply our view, so there is no fault [in it].[254]

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two groups of souls have unfulfilled wishes follows, according to the verse, from the fact that they are impelled, but according to the commentary from the existence of a status above them, which they thus necessarily desire to attain.

The difference becomes less significant if one adds the assumption that those of a higher status (which presumably here means primarily the Lord) impel those of lower status. Rāmakaṇṭha may well have held such an assumption, for he correlates *seśvaratva* ('having a Lord [above oneself]') with *preryatva* in his *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 4:55 (p. 100,7). For *seśvara* or *seśa* in this meaning, see *Parākhya* 1:15, 1:95, 2:122.

[252]I.e. other than the visible sun or visible fire.

[253]We take it to be slightly more likely that Rāmakaṇṭha is here quoting a half-verse from elsewhere than that he himself switches to verse. If he composed it himself why would he not have composed a full verse? Thus we do not take *ucyate* as coordinated with *atha*. We do not know the source of the verse.

[254]Cf. *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (A p. 149, B p. 82, C pp. 31–2): *paurāṇikās tu sāṅkhyoktavat prakṛtyāditattvajātaṃ prakṛtipuruṣādhiṣṭhātāraṃ ṣaḍviṃśatikam īśvaraṃ cābhyupagamya tatsālokyādirūpāṃ tadgaṇeśvaraprāptiṃ caiva parāṃ* [*parāṃ* B; *paramāṃ* A; *parā* C] *muktim āhuḥ. teṣāṃ vastutaḥ preryatvāt tadūrdhvavastvaparijñānāc ca na* [*na* BC; *om.*A] *parā muktiḥ. yad uktaṃ paramokṣaṇirāsakārikāsu*:

gaṇendrāgnisamau preryāv asaṃpūrṇamanorathau | ityādi.
evaṃ paramādityāgnyādisāmyamokṣavādino 'pi tattadbhuvaneṣu tattatsālokyādirūpāṃ muktiṃ vrajantīty arthataḥ siddham eva.

'The Paurāṇikas, accepting both *prakṛti* and the other principles as taught by the Sāṅkhyas, and also the Lord as the twenty-sixth principle who oversees *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, teach that the highest liberation takes the form of attaining the same world as that [Lord], or [proximity to, or yet closer relations with Him] and becoming a chief among his attendants. Because ultimately they are impelled, and because they do not recognise [levels of] reality above those [worlds], they do not achieve the highest liberation. As is taught in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*: "Those who become the same as a chief of the attendants [of the Lord] or Fire, [since they] are impelled, do not have their wishes completely fulfilled" etc. In the same way, those who teach that liberation is becoming the same as the Supreme Sun, Fire and the like reach a liberation that consists in attaining the same world as [, proximity to, etc.,] that [Sun, Fire and the like] in various worlds. That [although not stated explicitly] is certainly established from context.'

3.3 An Omniscient Non-Agent; Agency, and yet Being Instigated [to act]: verse 9cd

9cd) And a non-agent has likewise obviously (*hi*)[255] not accomplished his aims, because he is not the same as the Lord.

Through this [half-verse] the two positions mentioned [by Sadyojyotiḥ] with the words 'A non-agent that knows all objects of knowledge' [and] 'Agency, and yet being instigated [to act]' are rejected.[256]

The word ***likewise*** [is to be understood as follows]. Just as those who become the same as a chief of the attendants or as Fire have been said not to have their wishes completely fulfilled, likewise these two also, though omniscient [unlike the two just mentioned], are not liberated, because their wishes are not completely fulfilled, because, as a result of not obtaining a state of agency equivalent to [that of] the Supreme Lord, they possess a desire for it.[257] For liberation is simply the attaining of one's own nature, and we have taught[258] that agency, just as much as being a cogniser, is the very nature of the soul; so how can [a soul] be liberated when it has not attained that (i.e. its full nature, including unlimited agency equivalent to that of the Lord)?

[Opponent:] [What you say] may be the case (*astv evam*) in regard to

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[255] On Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of *hi* where it cannot mean 'for' or 'because', see note 460.

[256] Does Sadyojyotiḥ really intend *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam* to be refuted here? Since he mentions only a *non*-agent, it may appear unlikely that he means to include a view whose description includes the words *kartṛtve 'pi*. But the view of *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam* is refuted by him nowhere else. Rāmakaṇṭha sees a reference to it in verse 28b with the words *tadadhiṣṭhānam*; but Sadyojyotiḥ does not seem to intend that verse as a refutation of whatever he means by *tadadhiṣṭhānam*. So unless Sadyojyotiḥ omits to refute this postion altogether, Rāmakaṇṭha may be right that it is intended here. It is not impossible, after all, that Sadyojyotiḥ uses the word *akartā* to mean 'not a [complete] agent'. Cf. the use of *akriyaḥ* at *Sarvajñānottara* 28:4 to refer to the bound soul. The *a-* prefix, as is well known, does not have to mean 'completely without': cf. *anudara* = *slim*-waisted.

[257] *-Hetoḥ* is glossing *yataḥ*, and *parameśvarasamakartṛtvapadāprāpti-* is glossing *neśasamaḥ*.

[258] In section 2.8, in a passage beginning, *jñātṛtvavat kartṛtvam api puṃsaḥ svabhāva eva*. Rāmakaṇṭha was there writing not as the Siddhāntin in fact, but as the proponent of *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam*. But that he was using his own arguments was clear both from parallel passages in other texts of his, and from such tags in that passage as *iti vakṣyāmo mantravārttike*.

this [other position] (*atra*):[259] but (*tu*) for souls to be instigated by the Lord is beginningless, [so] how can it cease then (i.e. at liberation)?[260]

[Response:] Because it is caused by bondage, like *kalā*.[261] But as a result of it not ceasing [in your liberation] this [soul] too,[262] just like the Vidyeśvaras,[263] is certainly not liberated because he is instigated [to act].

3.4 Superiority to the Lord: verses 10–11ab

He reveals the position [denoted by] 'Superiority to the Lord' to be false.[264]

3.4.1 Absence of means of knowing superiority

10a) There are no means of [knowing] superiority.

sādhanāsattvam means there are no means of knowing. For no high state of selves, [arising] from attaining the manifestation of one's own pure and most excellent qualities, namely omniscience and omnipotence, is conceivable through means of knowledge, on attaining which, [selves] could be described as superior to the Lord in liberation.[265]

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[259]This is the response of someone who holds the second position that the soul, though an agent, is instigated by the Lord. Because he accepts that the soul is an agent, the Siddhāntin's argument about the soul not realising his nature as an agent is not so applicable to him as it is to the other position of being an omniscient non-agent.

[260]The opponent restates here what he already maintained at the end of section 2.8: *tac ca kartṛtvaṃ teṣām anādy eveśvaraprayojyatayā siddham. anādeś ca vināśo na sambhavati.*

[261]The example of *kalā* is given because it is parallel to being instigated by the Lord in three ways: it is caused by bondage (by *māyā* in particular, but its existence also depends on *mala* and karma), it is beginningless, and yet it ceases.

The *iti* marks the end of the answer to the question.

[262]I.e. one who though an agent is instigated, as well as omniscient non-agents.

[263]The Vidyeśvaras are omniscient, but they are instigated by the Lord (to create the impure universe) and hence although they are held by Rāmakaṇṭha to have powers of knowledge equal to that of the Lord, their powers of action are slightly inferior to the Lord's: see *Kiraṇatantra* 3:25c–27 (and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on 3:27ef), 4:7ff., Aghoraśiva's *Tattvasaṅgrahaṭīkā* ad 41, and VASUDEVA (2004: 163, note 51).

[264]*Ābhāsayati* is here used in the sense of 'reveals to be an *ābhāsa*'.

[265]That liberated souls attain omniscience and omnipotence *is* accepted by Rāmakaṇṭha; what he denies is that this entails entering a state that is in any way superior to that of the Lord.

For the conjecture of *varṇyeta* for *varṇyate*, see note 507.

3.4.1.1 The Lord's entry into *laya*, *bhoga* and *adhikāra* Objection: We have said[266] that the Lord is inferior to perfected [souls] because [the former] enters into states of *laya*, [*bhoga* and *adhikāra*].

[Response:] Now what is this entry into states? If [you say that] it is a separate thing,[267] that we do not accept, because God is unitary. If [you say that] it is a transformation of qualities,[268] that too, because of the problem of non-sentience [of anything that is transformed] has already been refuted[269] and will be refuted.[270] If [you say that] it is apparent but illusory transformation (*vivṛttiḥ*),[271] that is also not the case, because it would not be real [on that view]. [Finally] how could it (*asya*) be the nature of the [Lord]?[272]

It is just that the power to act[273] resting[274] in the agent alone, causing, by

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[266]In section 2.10.

[267]I.e. if to enter into a state means to become something different.

[268]The fact that a change of *avasthās* is here considered to be a transformation of qualities recalls the discussion of three kinds of *pariṇāma* in the *Yogabhāṣya* ad 3.13: *dharmapariṇāma*, *avasthāpariṇāma* and *lakṣaṇapariṇāma*.

[269]He seems to be referring to a prior refutation of the idea that God can have qualities that are transformed, on the grounds that non-sentience would result. We have certainly not had such a refutation in this text. In section 2.8 (4.94–95 of the edition) Rāmakaṇṭha associated non-conscious things (*jaḍavastus*) with the property of being transformed, though that was not a refutation of anything; if the target of this cross-reference is not that, then it must be a lost prior section of the *Rauravavṛtti* or *Rauravavṛttiviveka* (see section 6 of the Introduction).

[270]Verse 34cd reads *tataś ca pariṇāmitvād doṣānīkaṃ samāpatet*, commenting on which Rāmakaṇṭha writes *yad rūpaṃ pariṇāmi tad acetanaṃ mṛdādi*. So the reference may be to that, but those words from the commentary occur as a parenthesis in a larger sentence stating that the qualities of the Lord, if transformed, would become subject to a host of faults such as non-sentience that will be explained later. So it is possible that the passage referred to there is also what is referred to here. We think that what is referred to there is a future section of the *Rauravavṛtti* or *Rauravavṛttiviveka* (see note 433).

This sentence made no sense in the two previous editions of the text, which both read *kathaṃ dharmapariṇatisthāpy ācaitanyadoṣeṇa* for *atha dharmapariṇatiḥ sāpy ācaitanyadoṣeṇa*. The readings we have adopted on manuscript evidence were conjectured by Professor SANDERSON.

[271]The more common Sanskrit word with this meaning is *vivartaḥ*; indeed E_V reads here *atha vivartaḥ, so 'pi na*. But every manuscript reads *sā* not *so*, as does E_V's source, E_D, which means that even the one occurrence of *so* is a silent conjecture. A feminine word is thus to be preferred.

[272]That it is the nature of the Lord we take to be a fourth possible answer to the query 'What is this entry into states?'—an answer that Rāmakaṇṭha regards as too obviously wrong to require any refutation other than this rhetorical question.

[273]Rāmakaṇṭha now states his own doctrine.

[274]The word *-avasthitā*, if it is original, seems to have been used to reflect the fact that

suppressing what has to be done, the Śiva state to shine, becomes at such a moment (*tatra*) something whose non-essential attribute is to be expressible by a term such as *laya*. When that same [power to act] is ready to bring about effects [but] has not produced transformations, [i.e.] effects, then, causing the Sadāśiva state to appear, it enables [the Lord / the Lord's *kriyāśakti*] to be denoted by words such as *bhoga*. But when it has produced a mass of effects, of course (*khalu*), then, revealing the Īśvara state, it enables the use of words such as[275] *adhikāra*.[276] Therefore it is nothing other than[277] [the Lord's] power of action to which the linguistic usage of plurality (i.e. the use of the different words *laya*, *bhoga* and *adhikāra*) is [applied] in this [system], owing merely to [the power of action's] dependence on a plurality of secondary factors, namely various effects.[278] [The power of action] is not

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we have here an explanation of the *avasthās*.

[275]Rāmakaṇṭha has qualified each of the words *laya, bhoga* and *adhikāra* with *ādi*. This is because other words are used to denote the same trio, for example *śānta / niṣkala, sakalaniṣkala* and *sakala*; or *śakta, udyukta* and *pravṛtta*. See note 206.

[276]Comparison with the previous two sentences reveals that the transmitted versions of this sentence have become corrupted through transposition of two strings of text within it. The version found in M^{Y} P_1 P_3 and E, for example, would mean, 'But when it has produced a mass of effects, revealing the *adhikāra* state, it then enables the use of words such as Īśvara.' But if Rāmakaṇṭha is being consistent throughout these three sentences we want the Īśvara state to be that which is revealed, and *adhikāra* to be the word whose usage is enabled. Could the inconsistency of the transmitted versions not be original? We have rejected those versions not only because they deviate from the pattern of the first two sentences, but also from considerations of meaning: these sentences should be explaining, or rather explaining away, the use of the words *laya, bhoga* and *adhikāra*, which might otherwise be taken to indicate the Lord's inferiority. The use of the word Īśvara is not so relevant in the wider context. Furthermore, there are more problems with the transmitted versions than just that the words *adhikāra* and *īśvara* appear to be in the wrong places: in all witnesses apart from M_1, the *tadā* appears to be misplaced; and in all witnesses the *ādi* comes after *īśvara*, when we would expect it to come after *adhikāra*. These two facts are further pointers to the conclusion that *tadeśvara* and *dhikāra* became transposed at a very early stage of the transmission.

[277]The point of the *eva* is that the different words do not refer to different things, but to what is at all times nothing other than *kriyāśakti*.

[278]It is *kriyāśakti*'s effects, i.e. the things it brings about, that delimit it secondarily. For its current relation to them determines whether we regard it as being in *laya, bhoga* or *adhikāra*. It itself is completely single and unchanging, but when it is engaged in bringing about effects we talk of it as in a state of *adhikāra* etc. Any implication that it is something different in each of these three states is conventional, not real.

For the point that the plurality of *śakti* should be seen just as a plurality of its effects, see *Mṛgendratantra, vidyāpāda*, 3:14cd: *tasyāḥ* (= *śakteḥ*) *bhedā ye 'pi vāmādayaḥ syus te*

really plural, because of the impossibility of the two positions of apparent or [genuine] transformation with regard to it (*atra*).[279] Thus [our] teacher[280] who is skilled in the analysis of [this] good *śāstra*, in as much as (*yad*) he says:[281]

> For '[the Lord's] body and that which has the body' is an expression based on difference (*leśād uktiḥ*) for His power and that which has the power.[282]

That is precisely why God is not plural, because this tradition, even though it has five streams, is single.[283] Rather it is only the [particular]

'pi proktāḥ kṛtyabhedena sadbhiḥ.

[279]If the text is not corrupt then these two positions must be being envisaged as implying a real plurality (of *kriyāśakti*). How this is so of the *vivartapakṣa* is not obvious, but perhaps even it is seen as accepting plurality insofar as it is a strategy for explaining it away.

[280]I.e. Sadyojyotiḥ.

[281]*Tattvasaṅgraha* 52cd (ed. FILLIOZAT; 50ab ed. DVIVEDI).

[282]Part of the point of the verse is the same as that of *Mṛgendratantra*, *vidyāpāda*, 3:14ab (*itthaṃ śaktiḥ kurvatī dehakṛtyaṃ dehābhāvād ucyate dehaśabdaiḥ*), namely that although the Lord in fact has no body, words for a body are used as a way of referring to what is actually His *śakti*, since the latter brings about the kind of effects that are usually associated with a body.

From the way that Rāmakaṇṭha introduces the verse, it is clear that he sees it as making the same point as the preceding prose, namely that the words *laya*, *bhoga* and *adhikāra* are used of the Lord's *kriyāśakti* (which is nevertheless single). Hence he seems to take these three words as names of particular 'bodies' of the Lord.

FILLIOZAT (1988: 156) takes *leśād uktiḥ* as 'une dénomination en bref'. But this does not seem completely satisfactory, given that *mūrtis tadvāṃś ca* is no briefer than *śaktiśaktimān*. We take it that *leśāt* means *bhedāt*, the ablative being one that includes the sense of an absolutive (*lyablope pañcamī*): *bhedam āśritya*, 'resorting to difference' (cf. note 913). When one talks of the Lord and his body / bodies, one might be thought to imply difference (between Him and His body or between His different bodies), but this difference is merely on the level of language. In fact all of these 'bodies' just refer to His *śakti*, which is not different from Himself.

[283]'That is precisely why' could mean 'because *kriyāśakti* is single despite producing a plurality of effects and being referred to by *laya* etc.', or 'because the *mūrtis* of the Lord are just a way of referring to his *śakti*, and hence ultimately single and non-different from him.' From either of these the conclusion, 'God is not plural', follows straightforwardly, but how do they connect with the point about the five-streamed tradition being single? If we take the first meaning, then the five streams of the one tradition are envisaged as different effects of the Lord's one *kriyāśakti*.

If we take the second, then the five streams are thought of as connected with the

form of God (*tat-*) that is being worshipped [that is different], in accordance with the difference between his five functions, creation, maintenance and the rest.[284] Otherwise, because of the unwanted consequence of a plurality of traditions within this [five-streamed tradition],[285] just like [the plurality] of the Kaulas, the Mahāvratas and such like (which are indeed separate traditions, from each other and from us),[286] there would be a conflict with [passages in] our scriptures [that teach] the oneness [of our five-streamed

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five faces. Sources which divide the Śaiva tantric canon into five streams assign the *Gāruḍatantras* to the east face, the s to the west face, the *Vāmatantras* to the north face, the *Dakṣiṇatantras* to the south face and the *Siddhāntas* to the upper face of Śiva: see, e.g., *Śrīkaṇṭhīyasaṃhitā* 106ff, the text of which is given by HANNEDER 1998 in Appendix 1, *Pratiṣṭhālakṣaṇasārasaṅgraha* 2:107ff, and *Pūrva-Kāmika* 1:21ff; for detailed annotation on Abhinavagupta's treatment of this topic, see HANNEDER 1998:195–227. The *Niśvāsa* at one place (*Guhyasūtra* 12:17c–18; see SANDERSON 2001: 29–30, note 32) assigns the four lower faces to four Atimārga traditions: the Pramāṇa system, the Vaimalas, the Kārukas and the Pañcārthas., but this archaic account is exceptional.

[284]This is a further instantiation of the general point that plurality lies on the side of that which is brought about (here, creation etc.), not on the side of that which brings it about.

For a correlation between the five functions and the five 'faces' of Śiva, see *Mṛgendratantra, vidyāpāda*, 3:8.

[285]If we take 'otherwise' (*anyathā*) to mean 'if *kriyāśakti* were plural', which is plausible if the *ata eva* at the beginning of the previous sentence means 'because *kriyāśakti* is single', then the 'unwanted consequence of a plurality of traditions' follows from regarding each tradition as taught by a different *kriyāśakti*. Alternatively we can take 'otherwise' to mean, 'if the particular form being worshipped were really a different deity from the other forms'. To take it to mean just 'if God were plural' would make the thinking rather too circular: in the previous sentence he said that because the tradition is single God is not plural; in this sentence he would be saying that if God were plural, tradition would be plural.

[286]Rāmakaṇṭha puts the view that the teachings of all five streams were composed by Śiva, but that those of the Kaulas and Mahāvratas were not, also at *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 1:10: *śivajñānapadena kaulamahāvratādinirāsas teṣām asarvaviṣayatvena vaiśeṣikāder iva sarvajñakṛtatvābhāvāt. param ity anena srotontarebhyo vāmadakṣiṇagāruḍabhūtatantrebhyo 'sya viśeṣas teṣāṃ śivakṛtatve 'pi siddhipradhānatvenāparatvāt.* GOODALL (1998: 177) translates, 'By the word *śivajñāna* the [teachings of the] Kaulas, Mahāvratas and [Pāśupatas and] so on are excluded, because, like those of the Vaiśeṣikas and others, they were not created by the omniscient [Lord], for they do not have everything as their subject. The distinction of this knowledge of Śiva from the other streams of the *Vāma, Dakṣiṇa, Gāruḍa* and *Bhūta* tantras [is taught] by the word 'supreme', for these, although they were created by Śiva, are lower, because they are principally concerned with [the attainment of] supernatural powers'.

tradition].[287] And thus, because the perfected [soul]—given that he is not accepted to have the states beginning with *laya* that were mentioned—is not seen to be an agent [in the full sense of creating the universe, liberating souls etc.],[288] he should not be termed superior, but on the contrary inferior to the Lord.

3.4.1.2 Śakti is superior to Śiva [Opponent:] Now [we shall give a different argument for why the perfected soul is superior to the Lord]. As is stated in this verse—

> Salutations to you, that [power (*śakti*)] without which even the [Lord] is not omnipotent—[289]

that Supreme Lordliness which the Lord Himself possesses, [namely] the power of omniscience and [omnipotence] in the form of light untainted by secondary delimiting factors, is accepted to be higher than the position of the Supreme Lord [Himself and] attainable by the perfected [soul].[290]

[Response:] That is not correct, because no difference between the power and the thing that has that power (viz.. the Supreme Lord) is established,

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[287]For the unity of the Śaiva canon, see *Mṛgendratantra, vidyāpāda, upodghāta* 23; *Niśvāsamukha* 1:46 and 1:52, *Guhyasūtra* 1:4 of the *Niśvāsa*, and *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 5:1ff., especially 5:6.

[288]The perfected soul does of course, for Rāmakaṇṭha, possess agency (*kartṛtva*), in fact omnipotence (*sarvakartṛtva*), but for the perfected soul it is a power that, though manifested (*abhivyakta*), is not exercised, whereas in the case of the Lord it is.

[289]This half-verse is quoted in the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, p. 42, ad *vidyāpāda* 3:1–3, in the same context. See also the following similar verse quoted in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 15–16:

> *yā tvaṃ kartuḥ kriyāśaktir īśvarasya yayā vinā* |
> *tasyāpi kartṛtā naiva caṇḍi tasyai namo 'stu te* ||

[290]Professor SANDERSON's annotation notes that Rāmakaṇṭha's use of the compound *nirupādhijyotīrūpā* indicates that he may have the following verse in mind, which is quoted by Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭha (*Spandakārikāvivṛti*, p. 129) as from the *Tattvagarbhastotra* of Pradyumnabhaṭṭa (in the Spanda lineage), and by Utpaladeva in the *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti* (pp. 94 and 101) as an illustration of the views of the Śāktas:

> *yasyā nirupādhijyotīrūpāyāḥ śivasaṃjñayā* |
> *vyapadeśaḥ parāṃ tāṃ tvām ambāṃ nityam upāsmahe* ||
>
> We venerate daily (*nityam*) you, mother (*ambām*), the supreme one to whom, being of the form of light untainted by secondary delimiting factors, reference [may be made] by [use of] the name Śiva/Śivā (*śivasaṃjñayā*).

because differences [based on] language are [merely] postulated [and do not reflect any real difference]. Just like the power that consists in omniscience and [omnipotence], the Lord too has that [power] as His nature, so it is not possible that one should be higher than the other: [their] natures are not separate.[291] But we do not reject that there is a linguistic difference [between the two]. And it is not as if from that [linguistic difference] one can establish the way things are.[292] In such [reasoning] as (*ity evam*), 'The power [of omniscience and omnipotence] itself has an enlivening force (*śaktatvam*), and to this belongs an excellence, and to this belongs a most excellent state, which is Liberation', there is no end to the plurality of excellences expressed by such suffixes as *tara* (more) and *tama* (most), so there would be an infinite regress with regard to liberation.[293] For there is never an end to the merely verbal pluralities that can be imagined.[294] Therefore it must be accepted that in liberation [the soul] becomes exactly equal to the Lord, not superior [to Him].

3.4.1.3 The scriptural assertions that the Lord is a bound soul

The power to act in order to favour or conceal, since it is a power of action

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That Śakti is higher than Śiva is a view well attested in the literature of the Śāktas, but that the perfected soul is superior to Śiva is a different point, and Rāmakaṇṭha's attempt to insert it into this Śākta context is not entirely convincing. Even if *sarvajñatvādiśakti* is higher than the Lord, surely it is *parameśvaraprāpya* just as much as it is *siddhaprāpya*. No reason is given for why the perfected soul's possession of the power of omniscience and omnipotence should be any different from the Lord's. Without the power of omniscience the perfected soul too would not be omniscient, so following the logic that was applied to the Lord, the power should be superior to the position of the perfected soul (*siddhasthāna*).

[291] *Ex conj.* This conjecture, *nānyonyordhvatā yuktety*, is an emended version of the reading of M^{Y}. Alternatively, one could follow the line of thought suggested by the reading of M_1 and conjecture *nānyonyabhidā yuktety*, 'it is not possible to differentiate the one from the other'.

[292] One would perhaps expect the text to read, *śābdo bhedo na bādhyate, na tu tato 'rthasthitiḥ*.

[293] If, naively assuming that different words must refer to different things, we separate the Lord's power as though it were something higher than the Lord himself, then we could go on postulating supreme properties within supreme properties, each one higher than the next such that an infinite number of stages up the hierarchy would still not give us liberation.

[294] Literally '... never a non-flowing forth of imagined, merely verbal plurality.' See *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda*, 3:1–3, p. 42: *kalpitavyapadeśamātrabhedasya na kvacid apy aprasṛtir iti yatkiñcid etat*.

of a certain kind, is not of the nature of a bond, because it is not dependent on factors outside itself.[295]

As for the state of being a bound soul that was attributed to the Lord,[296] that, which by postulating a differentiation that he arrogates to Himself (*ābhimānika*) is for the sake of illustrating that further powers shine forth,[297] should be explained with an awareness [that it is] metaphorical, after examining the entire tradition, like Lord Sadāśiva's existence on a throne as interpreted in the *Mantrabhāṣya* [commenting] on the phrase [in the VYOMAVYĀPI-MANTRA] 'to him who rests on the throne of yoga'.[298] One should not

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[295]The text here returns to the opponent's original formulation of his position ad verse 4 where he quoted two verses, the first naming 'favouring' and 'concealing' as two bonds of Sadāśiva.

The contention of this sentence that they are not bonds because they are a particular kind of agency could be interpreted either as implying that no agency is a bond or that normal agency is, but the particular kind involved in favouring and concealing is not. We prefer the latter, since elsewhere Rāmakaṇṭha contrasts the Lord's agency with that of bound souls, on the grounds that the former does not depend on factors that manifest that agency; that is what we take to be expressed by *anaupādhikatvāt* in this sentence. See *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 40c–51b: *paśūnāṃ jñānakriye maladruddhatvāt kalādivyañjakāpekṣe viṣayeṣu pravartete iti. parameśvarasya tv anādyanāvṛtatvān na te vyañjakāpekṣe iti sarvadā sarvārthe*; 'The knowledge and action of bound souls, because they are blocked by Impurity, operate towards objects in dependence on *kalā* and the like, which manifest [that knowledge and action]. But because the Lord has never at any time been covered [by Impurity] (*anādyanāvṛtatvāt*), his two [powers of knowledge and action] do not depend on manifesting factors; thus they at all times [operate] with regard to all objects.' See also *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 3:11 for the view that just as a magnet can cause iron filings to move without having any senses, so the Lord can act without depending on instruments.

[296]We cannot take this sentence as continuing to address only *anugrahatirobhāvau dvau pāśau tu sadāśive*, because after this Rāmakaṇṭha writes *yad vā paśur ādyaḥ sadāśiva iti*, which clearly introduces a *second* analysis of that second quotation. Neither is it satisfactory to take this sentence as leaving the first quotation and turning to the second, because all he has done so far with the first is to deny that favouring and concealing are bonds, which begs the question of why they are said in scripture to be bonds. Hence we take it that in this sentence he addresses the attribution of bondage to the Lord found in both quotations.

[297]'Further powers' we take to refer to such powers as favouring and concealing. The general point we take to be that as the Lord 'descends' from the Śiva to the Sadāśiva state He is postulated to take on a certain differentiation in that different powers of His begin to become manifest; it is this manifestation of further powers, implying as it does a certain differentiation, that is pointed to by the scriptural description of Him as a bound soul.

[298]The *Mantrabhāṣya* seems to be a name for chapter 10 of the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha*—the *Siddhāntadīpikā* repeatedly refers to it in that way—which explains various mantras, including the VYOMAVYĀPIN. *Yogapīṭhasaṃsthitāya* is one element of the latter,

hang on obstinately to knowledge based on the meanings of individual words, as a child does. Thus enough of conversing with those who have not sat down to study properly with their teachers, [and] who are full of meanings of scriptures that their own imagination has produced.

Alternatively, the [sentence] 'Sadāśiva is the foremost of the bound souls' is not a case of metaphorical usage, because it means the Sadāśiva who requires further purification.[299] For to explain: At initiation the manifestation of Śivahood—specifically [his] power of action, preceded sequentially by the destruction of [the soul's] Impurity, for a [soul that is thereby] raised above *vidyātattva*—, brought about (*kriyamāṇā*) in accordance with the distinction between the gross, the subtle and the supreme, causes [the soul] to reach the three tattvas of *īśvara-*, *sadāśiva-*, and *śiva-*, which are in reality non-different [from each other], [but] different in terms of differences in the various (*aneka*)

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and is commented on in verse 21 and 22:

> *yogo 'sya śivasadbhāvaḥ sadā śivam anāmayam |*
> *tasmin vyavasthito yasmād yogapīṭhaḥ sa ucyate ‖ 21 ‖*
> *anādiśivasadbhāvayogayuktaḥ sadāśivaḥ |*
> *mantrayogamaye pīṭhe tatrasthas tena cocyate ‖ 22 ‖*
>
> Yoga is His (i.e. Sadāśiva's) Śiva-nature. It is eternally *śiva*, free of defect.
> Because [Sadāśiva] resides in it, it is described as the Yoga-throne.
> Sadāśiva is beginninglessly linked with the Yoga that is His Śiva-nature. [Or]
> 'on a throne' [means] 'on [a throne] which consists of a network of mantras'.
> He is situated there, and also for that reason he is called [*yogapīṭhasaṃsthita*].

Just as the description of Sadāśiva as a bound soul is not intended literally, neither is the description of him as residing on a Yoga-throne. The latter, according to these verses of the '*Mantrabhāṣya*', is to be understood as referring either to His Śiva-nature, or to a throne constructed of mantras.

Verse 12 of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Vyomavyāpistava* is a sort of commentary on the above quoted passage of the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha*:

> *yogaḥ sadāśivavapuḥśaktis tatsthaḥ karoti sarvaṃ yat |*
> *tat tena yasya pīṭhaṃ tasmai tatpīṭhasaṃsthitāya namaḥ ‖*

'Yoga is the power (*śakti*) of the body of Sadāśiva. Since it is when He is seated upon that that He creates everything, therefore that is His throne; homage to Him who rests upon that as His throne.'

[299] Despite ending the previous paragraph on a note of irritation with those too intellectually childish to see that the quotation is a case of metaphorical usage, he now puts forward an alternative explanation, according to which it is not a case of metaphorical usage. On this view it does not refer to Sadāśiva proper, so does not imply the superiority of liberated souls to the latter. Cf. *Matańgavṛtti* ad 4.54–55.

[levels of] manifestation that are of the nature of the states of the Vidyeśvaras[300] and such like. Thus that [kind of] Sadāśiva[301] is indeed still a bound soul, because it is still instigated, because its Impurity exists, [remaining] as no more than a particular *saṃskāra*.[302] Thus the use of the word 'bound soul' is not metaphorical. And this will be said by the author of the [*Raurava*]*vṛtti* [Sadyojyotiḥ] in [the passage] beginning, 'For at initiation where do they take birth?'[303] But the Sadāśiva that is doing the purifying, given that he is ultimately non-different from Śiva, is not thus (i.e. is not literally a bound soul), so metaphorical usage was taught [in my first response].[304]

3.4.2 Non-fixedness

[Sadyojyotiḥ] states that there is also a further fault in this position:

10b) And there is non-fixedness [which appears] in two ways.

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[300] See note 263 on the Vidyeśvaras. The Vidyeśvaras are typically located in the lowest of these three tattvas, namely *īśvaratattva*, e.g. in *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 4:12–14. In the *Sarvajñānottara*, however, *īśvaratattva* is replaced by what is called the *vidyeśāvaraṇa* (9:158c–176b), an expression equivalent to *vidyeśatattva*, which Rāmakaṇṭha uses in his *Kiraṇavṛtti*, but perhaps there as a label for an extra interstitial tattva between *vidyātattva* and *īśvaratattva*, for see GOODALL 1998: 188, note 85.

[301] Just as the word Śiva is sometimes used to refer not to the Lord but to souls that have attained Śivahood, so the word Sadāśiva is here being used of a soul that has attained the state of Sadāśiva.

[302] *Saṃskāramātraviśeṣatvena* is slightly awkward because of the combination of *mātra* and *viśeṣatvena* in this particular order. We considered conjecturing *saṃskāramātraśeṣena* or *saṃskāramātraśeṣatvena* or *saṃskāraviśeṣamātratvena* ('as no more than a particular saṃskāra'), but concluded that the awkwardness of the transmitted reading was not serious enough to justify emendation.

[303] We have not traced the quotation, which appears to be in prose. This means that precisely what it meant in its original context and therefore also how exactly it relates to the previous point in this text remain a matter of speculation. Since the previous concerns itself with the journey of the soul at initiation to a location, above *vidyātattva*, in either *īśvara-*, *sadāśiva-*, or *śivatattva*, we expect that a passage related in some way to that followed the quotation in its source text.

See section 6 of the Introduction for information about which texts comprised the [*Raurava*]*vṛtti*.

[304] This completes Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on Sadyojyotiḥ's first response to the opponent: the absence of means of knowledge for the liberated soul's superiority to the Lord (*ādhikye sādhanāsattvam*). Rāmakaṇṭha has come up with and rejected three possible indications of the liberated soul's superiority to the Lord: the latter's possession of *laya*, *bhoga* and *adhikāra*; the liberated soul's attainment of *śakti*, which is superior to the Lord Himself; and the two quotations that seem to attribute bondage to the Lord.

[In other words:] And in this [position of the superiority of the soul to the Lord] there is the unwanted consequence of non-fixedness in two ways.

3.4.2.1 Of the Condition of Being the Lord Of these [two] he states [the non-fixedness] in one way:

10cd) First (*atha*), it would follow that the Lord is instigated for no reason.

First (*atha = tāvat*), it follows that the Supreme Lord is ***instigated*** by a perfected [soul] for absolutely no reason,[305] [i.e.] is not the Supreme Lord—because it is the perfected [soul] that is then the Supreme Lord owing to his superiority to the [previous Lord], since otherwise the assertion of his superiority to the Lord would be quite fruitless for the perfected [soul]—and that perfected Lord would also become a non-Lord when a further perfected [soul] emerged, and that one, and the [next] one too. In this way (*ity evaṃ*) there would be a non-fixedness of the condition of being the Supreme Lord.[306] That is the meaning (*ity arthaḥ*) [of the verse].

3.4.2.2 Of the Perfected Soul He states [the non-fixedness] in the second way:

11ab) And this[307] conception of [oneself as] the Lord,[308] on the part of transmigrating souls (*bhavinām*), would be pointless.

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[305] An example of a 'good reason' for being instigated would be possession of Impurity (*mala*); but the Lord has never had *mala*.

[306] *Asaṃsthā* in the verse, as reflected by *anavasthā* and *anavasthiti* in the commentary, does not quite mean infinite regress, but refers here to the way that there would be no stability attaching to the condition of being the Supreme Lord.

[307] Perhaps the sense of *yeyam...-parikalpanā* is 'As for the conception...'.

[308] It is clear from Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary that he takes *nimitta* to mean the Lord. This could either be because He is the *nimittakāraṇa* of the universe, or because He is that which is aimed at (*nimitta* in the sense of *lakṣya*) in the practice referred to in the commentary that involves saying 'May I become the Lord'. This may refer to the identification of the worshipper with the divinity he is about to venerate, a mental process that is a necessary preliminary to each act of worship and that is formalised by the superimposition of the deity's mantras on to the worshipper's body (*sakalīkaraṇa*), or it may refer to the cultivation, in *yoga*, of the notion that one is Śiva, such as we find in this passage of the *Sarvajñānottara*: 29:4–5 (Tanjore edition 63–64):

yo 'sau sarvagato devaḥ sarvātmā sarvatomukhaḥ |

This conception (*parikalpanā* = *saṅkalpa*) of oneself as ***the Lord*** (*nimitta* = *īśvara*) in the form 'May I be the Lord', ***on the part of transmigrating souls***, who desire liberation, having reached its fruit (*phalaparyantaḥ*),[309] would become ***pointless***, i.e. devoid of purpose, unfixed.[310] Which is as much as to say (*yāvat*) that no one would strive for liberation from transmigration.[311]

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sarvatattvamayo 'cintyaḥ sarvasyopari saṃsthitaḥ ‖
sarvatattvavyatītaś ca vāṅmanonāmavarjitaḥ |
so 'ham evam upāsīta nirvikalpena cetasā ‖

"That all-pervading God, the soul of all, who faces all directions, who is made up of all the *tattvas*, imponderable, located above all else, beyond all *tattvas*, beyond language, thought and name, that am I"—in such a way one should worship with unwavering mind.

Such practices, unproblematic in a non-dualist context, must be understood by dualists as being intended to rehearse the truth that each of us is in essence identical to God.

[309]We take the point of *phalaparyantaḥ* to be that the desire to become the Lord does indeed reach its fruit in the sense that the perfected soul *will* become the Lord for a time, until the next soul becomes perfected and ousts him. Judit TÖRZSÖK pointed out to us the possibility, however, that the whole phrase *saṅkalpaḥ phalaparyantaḥ* is simply intended as a *nirvacana* (etymological gloss) of *parikalpanā*.

[310]The previous way of stating the *anavasthā* was that there would be no fixed Lord; this way is that the fruit of the *siddha*'s desire to become the Lord would not be fixed. The first is from the point of view of the Lord, the second from the point of view of the *siddha*. In both cases 'not fixed' seems close in meaning to 'not permanent'.

[311]The *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* refutes this position of superiority to the Lord as follows (ad 4:48, p. 236–237): *tad asamañjasam, duḥkhahetubandhasyaiva paśutvaprayojakatvena layādīnāṃ taddhetutvābhāvena parameśvarasya paśutvābhāvāt. paśutvapratipādakavacanasyāṇusadāśivaparatvāt. ābhimānikabhedakalpanayā śaktyantaraprakāśanaparatvād vā. kiṃ ca muktasya parameśvarād ādhikye īśvarānīśvaratvayor vaiparītyaṃ prasajyate. kiṃcānyasya muktau tasya pūrvamukteśvarāpekṣayā ādhikye pūrvamuktasyānīśvaratvaṃ uttaramuktasyeśvaratvaṃ ity evaṃ praṇāḍyā īśvaratvasyāvyavasthitatvaṃ prasajyate. mokṣārthināṃ ca svasvāpekṣayādhikāśaṅkayā muktau pravṛttiś ca na syāt.*

'That is not correct, because the Lord is not a bound soul, because *laya* etc. are not causes of that (viz. of being a bound soul), because it is only bonds that cause suffering that bring about the condition of being a bound soul. [And] because statement[s] which teach [Sadāśiva's] bondage intend *the soul* [which on its journey toward liberation is temporarily termed] Sadāśiva[, not Sadāśiva proper]. Or because [they] intend the shining forth of a further power by postulating a difference arrogated [by the Lord to himself]. Moreover, if the liberated soul became superior to the Lord, it would follow that Lordliness and non-Lordliness would be reversed. Moreover, if, at the time of the liberation of a second [soul], he (*tasya*) becomes superior in relation to the previously liberated Lord, then the previously liberated [Lord] ceases to be a Lord, [and] the subsequently liberated [soul]

3.5 Being Devoid of Impurity: verse 11cd

Now he refutes the position [that he named earlier as] 'And being devoid of Impurity alone'.

> 11cd) If [a soul] were merely devoid of Impurity, it would be neither a bound soul nor a Lord. [So][312] what [kind of liberation] would that be?[313]

Because bound souls are parviscient (*kiñcijjñatvāt*), and because the Lord is omniscient, [you must] accept that someone who is devoid of Impurity is different from both, since he lacks Impurity[314] and since his power of cognition is not [fully] experienced.[315] So ***what*** is ***that***, [where 'that' means] a liberation that is not [even] one of the aims of Man, resembling a rock? It is nothing. This is the intention: because the self has as its nature nothing more than (*eva*) [being] a cogniser,[316] as will be stated,[317] if this [state of being

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becomes the Lord. Thus as a consequence (*praṇādyā*), non-fixedness of Lordliness would result. And on the part of those aiming at liberation, striving towards liberation would also (*ca*) not occur, for fear of [others] successively [becoming] superior with respect to themselves.'

[312]'So' reflects the ablative ending on *abhyupagamāt* in the commentary.

[313]That is how we infer from Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary that he understood the verse. But it would be simpler to take *asau* to refer to the soul that would be neither *paśu* nor *pati*: 'what would it be', i.e. it could not be anything. This may have been Sadyojyotiḥ's intention.

[314]This gives a reason for why such a soul would be different from bound souls. Since he lacks Impurity he would not be partially cognizant like them, as there would be nothing to block his power of cognition and make it merely partial.

[315]This gives a reason for why such a soul would be different from the Lord. How can we know that he would not fully experience his power of cognition? Because if he did, he would be omniscient. Yet the proponent of this position, when expounding it in section 2.11, explicitly stated that the liberated soul is not omniscient.

So up to this point in the sentence it has been established that someone experiencing the *mokṣa* described by this proponent, one devoid of *mala* but also of omniscience, would be different from bound souls and different from the Lord, neither parviscient nor omniscient. The only possibility remaining is that he lacks any cognition.

[316]For the translation of *jñātṛtvasvabhāva-*, as though it read *jñāṭṛtvasvabhāva-*, see note 641.

[317]This may refer to the *Mokṣakārikā* or *Bhogakārikā* (e.g. to *Bhogakārikā* 73ab *...ato bhoktā puruṣaś citsvabhāvakaḥ*). If it refers to somewhere within this text, the two best candidates are the end of the commentary to verse 31, where the self's power is described as *jñatvakartṛtvātmakam*, and section 3.10.3.2. In the latter place the perceiver (there termed not *jñātṛ*, but *grāhaka*) is argued to be permanent and is treated as the self.

a cogniser] is not accepted [in *mokṣa*], then the fault of the cessation of the [self follows]. As [Sadyojyotiḥ] will say, 'The greatest heavyweights among the fools are those for whom one's own self is destroyed [in liberation].'

3.6 Agency in the Perfected Soul, Indifference in the Lord: verse 12

[Now Sadyojyotiḥ] refutes the position [the description of] which[318] began with the words, 'It is in the perfected [soul] alone that there is agency'.

12a) Why should the Lord not be an agent?

For the Lord had agency before [another soul became] perfected. So *why*, [i.e.] for what reason (*kim iti = keṇa kāraṇena*), is [its agency] not accepted when the other soul becomes perfected? The opponent states a reason:

12b) Because of the danger of an army of agents.[319]

An army of agents [means here] a multitude [of them], the fact that there would be more than one. [*bhītitaḥ* means] because of the (*tataḥ*) danger of that (*tasmāt*). For to explain, when the perfected [soul], first of all, becomes an agent after attaining at that time an omnipotence that has not [yet] served its purpose (*-acaritārtha-*), the Lord too [still] has an agency that is distinct. Thus because of the possibility of more than one agent, [one may think] 'this [creation of the world] should be new', [and the other] 'it should be old',[320] so that there may be a breakdown[321] in the carrying out of

[318] In verse 4cd.

[319] Both in the verse and the commentary we have the variant *kāraṇā-* for *kārakā-*. The former is an equally possible reading. The word *kāraṇa* was used by the Pāśupatas to refer to God (see for example *Pañcārthabhāṣya* on *Pāśupatasūtras* 1.5, 1.46, 1.47, 2.11 and 4.24; we thank Peter BISSCHOP for most of these references) and continued to be so used in Saiddhāntikas sources (e.g. *Kiraṇatantra* 6:1 and *Parākhya* 3:2 and 6:5); if it is the correct reading, then it probably has that connotation here too.

[320] Perhaps the idea here is that one of the two, either the Lord or the newly perfected soul, may want (certain aspects of) creation to be carried out in a new way, while the other one may want them to be carried out in the old way. Alternatively, as SANDERSON (2006b: 196) interprets the same phrase in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* (ad 118; given in the next footnote), the disagreement may concern the order of creation.

[321] The dictionaries give for *vaiśasa* such meanings as killing, hurting, cutting up, distress; but the word appears in contexts similar to ours seemingly in the meaning of non-arising,

creation and other [tasks of the Lord]. Because of the danger of this [multiplicity of agents] we do not accept [the Lord's agency after another soul has become liberated].

The speaker of the settled doctrine says the following:

12cd) Because of the simultaneous liberation of many [souls], that [danger] certainly remains; it cannot be avoided [by resorting to your view].

When, because the power of agents is inconceivable, many souls become liberated simultaneously,[322] then because they each (*pratyekam*) have omnipotence that has not served its purpose, they are [all] equal, so there can be no possibility of a free choice (*vikalpa*) from among their agencies

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collapse or breakdown. In the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. 1, p. 587,15–16), for example, postulation of a plurality of Lords is said to lead to the unwanted consequence of *vyavahāravaiśasa*, which we understand to mean 'the collapse of action' (more or less equivalent to *vyavahārahāni*). Earlier in the same text (vol. 1, p. 511,5–6), where the context is again the postulating of more than one Lord, we read: *ata evaika īśvara iṣyate, na dvau bahavo vā, bhinnābhiprāyatayā lokānugrahopaghātavaiśasaprasaṅgāt*; 'It is for this very reason that there is held to be only one Lord, not two or many, because that would lead to the undesirable consequence of a breakdown of [the Lords' cosmic operations of] favouring people and harming people, since [the different Lords] would have different intentions'. See also, from Śrīkumāra's commentary on *Tattvaprakāśa* 37 (p. 66,10), *viruddhābhiprāyatve kāryavaiśasaprasaṅgaḥ*, 'since they would have contradictory intentions, it undesirably follows that effects would not arise'. As further evidence for the meaning of non-arising, see this parallel sentence by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* (ad 118): *muktānām apīśvaravat sarvakartṛtve navam idam astu purāṇam astv iti vibhinnamatitvāt sarvakāryānutpādaprasaṅgaḥ*. 'Given that liberated souls also, as well as the Lord, would be omnipotent, then because they would have different ideas, [with some thinking] 'it should be new' [and others] 'it should be old', it undesirably follows that no effects would arise.' In precisely the place where in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* he talks of *vaiśasa*, he talks in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* of *anutpāda*.

[322] Perhaps the reason that Rāmakaṇṭha felt the need to add a justification—the inconceivable power of agents—of the possibility of several souls becoming liberated simultaneously was that the Pravāhanityeśvaravādin does not seem to accept the possibility of this happening, or at least does not take the possibility into account; he recognises only a one-by-one temporal sequence.

Here too the witnesses are divided between *kāraka-* and *kāraṇa-*. If the latter is the correct reading then the sense could either be 'because the way causes function is inconceivable' or, taking the Pāśupata meaning mentioned above of 'God', 'because the workings of God are incomprehensible', the implication being that God plays a rôle in deciding when souls become liberated.

and no possibility of a restricted settling (*vyavasthā*) on any one among them. Therefore [we have to take the only remaining option and assume that] agency is shared,[323] [but] if that is the case, ***the*** [***danger***] (*sā*) ***certainly remains***—the danger (*bhītiḥ*) of a plurality of agents,[324] which [potentially] leads to a breakdown in the bringing about of creation and other such [tasks].[325] Now this disputant, given that differences of opinion among souls are caused by greed, passion and the like, having pondered the matter thoroughly (*tan niścitya*), may remove [logically] the breakdown in the carrying out of creation and other such [tasks] on the grounds that there would

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[323]Literally 'there is agency by sharing (*samuccayena*)'. The trio of *vikalpa*, *vyavasthā* and *samuccaya* are found in many different genres of text, e.g. *darśana*, *alaṅkāraśāstra*, *dharmaśāstra*, *vyākaraṇa*, as three different ways of resolving potential conflicts or deciding between different options. Occasionally only *vikalpa* and *samuccaya* are put forward as mutually exhaustive, denoting either the choosing of one or the accumulation of both / all. When *vyavasthā* is included it is differentiated from the other two in the following way. To take the example of the injunction that an ascetic should carry a single or a triple staff: a *vikalpa* interpretation of the injunction would hold that ascetics are free to choose one of the two kinds of staff to carry; a *samuccaya* interpretation would mean they could carry both; a *vyavasthā* interpretation would maintain that certain kinds of ascetic should carry a single staff and other kinds of ascetic should carry a triple staff (see OLIVELLE 1993: 134–136). *Vyavasthā* is thus similar to a *vikalpa* in that it involves each ascetic carrying only one kind of staff; but it is not really a choice, in that the choice is made for one automatically by what group of ascetic one belongs to. It is similar to a *samuccaya* in that both options are accommodated, but not, however, in the same ascetic.

In the situation at issue in our text, the fact that all of the souls are the same in that they all have an omnipotence that has not fulfilled its purpose rules out the possibility of either *vikalpa* or *vyavasthā*: *vikalpa*, because there can be no objective basis for a free choice of one to the exclusion of the others; *vyavasthā*, because there can be no fixed rule that only a soul with a certain qualification takes on the rôle of God given that all of the souls in question have identical qualifications.

[324]Again the variant *kāraṇā-* for *kārakā-* is possible: 'plurality of causes / Gods'.

[325]In order to make this sentence more parallel with the earlier sentence—*anekakartṛsambhavena ... sarganirmāṇādau vaiśasaṃ syāt*—where the breakdown (*vaiśasa*) is said to occur because of the possibility of a plurality of agents, we considered emending *-dāyikā* to *-dāyaka-*: 'the danger certainly remains (*sthitaiva sā ... bhītiḥ*) because of a plurality of causes, giving rise to a breakdown in ...'. But *-dāyikā* is transmitted in all witnesses and we are able to interpret it by taking *bhītiḥ* closely with *kāraṇānekatvataḥ*.

The reason that the Pravāhanityeśvaravādin adopted the model of a chain of different Lords was to avoid the possibility of a multiplicity of agents. But his model is able to avoid the problem only if just one soul becomes liberated at any one time. When many souls become liberated at once, each with unfulfilled omnipotence, since there can be no means of deciding which ones renounce their omnipotence, the danger that this model is supposed to avert remains.

be no difference of opinion even if one were to involve many perfected [souls coming into being at once], because in liberation there would be no passion and the like [among them]. If [he does so], then he arrives at[326] our very doctrine. That is the unstated part of [Sadyojyotiḥ's] intention.[327]

3.7 Rise of the Lord's Qualities: verse 13a

Now [Sadyojyotiḥ] refutes the fruits of [our] co-religionists:

> 13a) If [the state of being the same as the Lord] arose, it would be non-eternal.

In the view of those who hold that at liberation the quality of being omniscient and [omnipotent], which is the same as [the quality of] the Lord, arises for a soul, liberation would be non-eternal, because things that arise are non-eternal.

3.8 Possession by the Lord's Qualities: verse 13b

> 13b) If [liberated souls] were possessed [by the qualities of the Lord], they would not be autonomous.

And in the position that sameness [to the Lord] at liberation results from possession by the Lord's qualities, the soul, far from being the same as the Lord in liberation, would, like someone possessed by a spirit, be completely devoid of autonomy.[328]

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[326]Literally, 'he will enter'. All witnesses transmit *pratyavekṣyatī-*, but we have conjectured *pravekṣyatī-* because, on the one hand *pratyavekṣyati* is an impossible form—if from *īkṣ* it would have to be *ātmanepada*, if from *viś* the *a* infix is inexplicable—and on the other hand *asmanmatapraveśanam* and other synonymous expressions commonly occur with the verb *praviś*.

[327]Sadyojyotiḥ's treatment of this opponent ended slightly abruptly with him stating that a fear of multiple conflicting agencies cannot be avoided and simply remains. Thus Rāmakaṇṭha feels it necessary to attribute to him this unarticulated consideration that in attempting to think his way out of the problem the opponent may well end up at nothing other than the Saiddhāntika view.

[328]'Devoid of autonomy' in the sense that it would be controlled not by itself or its own qualities, but by the qualities of the Lord. Does this fault not accure equally to Saṅkrāntivāda? Not to the same extent, because in that view the Lord's qualities become the soul's qualities, whereas in this view they remain in the Lord (see note 239), so it is easier to make the case that it is in fact the Lord who is the agent of the liberated soul's knowing and doing.

3.9 Transference of the Lord's Qualities: verses 13c–42

He refutes the position that becoming the same [as the Lord] results from transference.

13cd) No example exists for proving the transference of qualities.

Transference of qualities refers to [the view that] the qualities of the Lord are transferred at liberation. This [transference of qualities, postulated] by you is not, first of all, established by direct perception, because those [qualities] are beyond the [range of] the senses. If [you] say that it [is established] from inference, that is incorrect, because ***no example*** (*udāharaṇa* = *dṛṣṭānta*) ***exists for proving***, [i.e.] for inferring ***the transference of qualities***. And an exampleless inference does not hold weight, since it cannot [be proven to] have concomitance.

3.9.1 The Examples of Verbal Teaching and *Śāstra*

[In response] to this, the proponent of transference states an example:

> 14) Surely [we] observe verbal teaching to be for the sake of the transference of [teachers'] own knowledge. In *śāstra* too the transference of knowledge is enjoined. How would that [enjoined transference of knowledge] be [appropriate, if transference of qualities were not possible]?[329]

[***We***] ***observe teaching*** on the part of teachers towards a pupil (*śiṣyasya viṣaye*) to be for the sake of (*-nimittam*) ***the transference of their own knowledge. In*** this ***śāstra too the transference of knowledge*** is taught in revealed scriptures (*śrūyate*) such as the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* in the [context of] consecration of an Ācārya:

> These duties [to teach etc.][330] that I transfer to you today are to be performed by you until they are transferred to another.[331]

[329] The reading *sā kathaṃ bhavet*, occurring in the *mūlapāṭha* of M^{Y}, is supported by *sā tu ... katham upapadyate* in the commentary. A combination of metathesis and the common Southern confusion (for both graphic and phonetic reasons) between *tha* and *dha* would account for the other corrupt readings having arisen.

[330] That Rāmakaṇṭha understands teaching and the like to be referred to here becomes clear in the refutation of this position below (section 3.9.1.2).

[331] *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 16:21. The verse does not actually speak of transference

But ***how could that*** [enjoined transference of knowledge] be appropriate if transference of qualities is not accepted. So through your [Saiddhāntika] scriptures and direct perception, an example is established in this [inference].[332]

3.9.1.1 Refutation of the Example of Verbal Teaching The Siddhāntin says:

15ābc) But [that is incorrect because] owing to teaching, a cognition that is of the same nature [but] distinct arises. The word 'transference' can be used [metaphorically] when there is similarity, [but there is no actual transference].

Owing to teaching by a teacher, [where the ablative ending indicates that the teaching is] a cause, another ***cognition*** that is quite ***distinct*** arises in the mind of a pupil as though transferred, because it is extremely similar [to the teacher's]; but there is no [actual] transference of the very same [cognition]. He says why [that is so]:

15d) Because that [knowledge] does not cease in the teacher.

Because (*yat* = *yasmāt*) ***that***, [i.e.] knowledge, ***does not cease in the teacher.*** For on the view [that we have a case] of transference, since knowledge is transferred into the *pupil* it should become absent in the teacher.[333]

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of knowledge, so we must attribute to Sadyojyotiḥ (assuming he had this verse in mind) and Rāmakaṇṭha an assumption such as that if *adhikāra* is being transferred, knowledge must either already have been transferred or is being transferred along with it.

Rāmakaṇṭha cites the verse in a version which differs from that of the edition of the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* (given in the apparatus to our text) in several ways, most notably by inclusion of a correlative pronoun, removal of the gender change between relative pronoun and correlative predicate, and inclusion of *tāvad yāvat* in place of *yāvan na*. The first two differences presumably result from the cleaning up of *aiśa* Sanskrit; the third is, if anything, less smooth than in the edition. All three differences are found in the citations of the verse in the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (chapter 5, p. 157–158) and the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* (p. 232), which are there very likely basing themselves on this part of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, although the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* reads *saṅkrāmito* in the final *pāda*, as in the edition but unlike in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*.

[332] The inference aims to prove that the qualities of the Lord are transferred; the examples are of transference of other qualities from a person to another person.

[333] This points to a dilemma that the Saṅkrāntivādin faces. If he puts forward an example in which the thing that is supposedly transferred does not cease to exist in its original

3.9.1.2 Refutation of the Example of *Śāstra* [Sadyojyotiḥ] says [in the following verse] (*ity āha*) that in *śāstra*, for its part, ***the meaning*** of the word ***'transference'*** is simply [that there is] ***autonomy*** in teaching and such like [in the pupil], ***as in the Guru***, as a result of being instructed [to teach and such like] by the Guru.[334] [The meaning of the word] has been explained in that very manner ***by the Guru*** Svayambhū[335] in the section [dealing with] the consecration of an Ācārya.[336] Thus transference is not

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locus, then he can be countered in such a manner as this, i.e. by it being pointed out that the example is not a genuine case of transference. But if he puts forward an example in which the transferred thing does cease to exist in its original locus, then although he has adduced a genuine case of transference, parallelism with the case of the transference of the Lord's qualities requires that those qualities cease in the Lord, which he of course does not accept (for this side of the dilemma, see section 3.9.12). The *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (chapter 5, p. 157) and the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* (p. 232) both begin their refutation of Saṅkrāntivāda by spelling out a similar dilemma. The former reads as follows:

> *saṅkrāntisāmyapakṣo 'py ayuktaḥ. tathā hi: kiṃ svāśrayaparityāgenāśrayāntaraprāptiḥ saṅkrama uta tadaparityāgena? nādyaḥ, īśvarajñānasya mukte saṅkrāntyabhyupagama īśvarasya jñānābhāvaprasaṅgāt. nāpi dvitīyaḥ, jñānasya niraṃśatvenāṃśena saṅkramasyāyogāt.*
>
> The position that sameness [to the Lord] results from transference [of his qualities] is also incorrect. For to explain: is transference the attaining of a different substrate by abandoning one's own substrate or by not abandoning it? Not the first, because [if the substrate is abandoned, then] if transference of the Lord's consciousness into the liberated soul is accepted, it undesirably follows that the Lord would lose his consciousness. Nor the second, because [if the substrate is not abandoned, then one part must stay there and just one part transfer, but] there cannot be transference of [just] one part, because consciousness is without parts.

[334]I.e. when, as enjoined in scripture, a Guru says that he is transferring duties to a pupil, what is meant is simply that from then on the pupil becomes autonomous with regard to the carrying out of those duties.

[335]It is Svayambhū, i.e. Brahmā, who is the speaker in the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha*, passing on the teaching that he heard from Śiva. But Rāmakaṇṭha is not necessarily correct that Sadyojyotiḥ refers to him with the word *guruṇā* in the upcoming verse, for that word may have the same referent as *guroḥ* and *guru-* in the first half of the verse, namely the Guru who has instructed the person currently undergoing *ācāryābhiṣeka*, whose duties are metaphorically said to transfer, and who is reciting the verse during the *ācāryābhiṣeka*.

[336]That the meaning of the word 'has been explained in that very manner' cannot mean that the word *saṅkrānti* has been explicitly defined to be such, for the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* contains no such explicit definition. But in the verses leading up to *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 16:21 the Guru instructs the person undergoing the *abhiṣeka*

proved in [*śāstra*].

16) The meaning of the statement about transference, [this meaning having been] expressed by the Guru in that very place, is [that] as a result of having been instructed by a Guru, there should be autonomy in [the teaching of] scripture, [in the pupil] as in the Guru.[337]

3.9.2 The Example of Transference of merit and sin

Now the Saṅkrāntivādin may perhaps (*kadācit*) rise again, owing to a false conception that the thing to be exemplified (*dārṣṭāntika*)[338] has examples established in *śruti* and *smṛti*. In order to avoid this[339] too by extending the application of the logic [he has applied to the previous] examples,[340] [Sadyojyotiḥ] says:

17) Likewise, as a result of criticising a good person, sin *arises* in [the] souls [of the people doing the criticising], and [some of] their own merit is destroyed. In the [good person, if he] remains calm, the reverse [happens].[341]

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to take on such duties as teaching the meaning of the scriptures (16:18). Thus presumably Rāmakaṇṭha here, and Sadyojyotiḥ in the upcoming verse, mean that through looking at the wider context of the verse, it becomes clear that its mention of the *saṅkrānti* of duties means that the pupil should now start carrying out such activities as teaching; we do not need to suppose that anything has moved by *saṅkrānti* from the Guru to the pupil.

[337]The *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (chapter 5, p. 158) and the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* (p. 233) summarise this refutation in a sentence that is identical in the two texts: *na, ... jñānasaṅkrāntipratipādakavacanasyāpi guruniyogena guruvad vyākhyānādau svātantryapratipādanaparatvāt.* The *Śaivaparibhāṣā* then includes the following sentence, which is not in the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*: *tathā ca tatra na mukhyā saṅkrāntiḥ.*

[338]I.e. the transference of qualities.

[339]Viz. this potential rising up of the opponent (*tat* = *pratyavasthānam*).

[340]Literally, 'by an extended application of the [previous] example-logic'. This logic has entailed treating the examples not as transference of one and the same thing, but as the rise of a completely separate but similar thing. He now explains away an imagined new example in the same way.

[341]I.e. some of his sin is destroyed, and merit arises. The point of this verse is to deny that merit or sin are transferred from one person to the other. As we shall see in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary, the verse is responding to claims in *smṛti* that when a good person is criticised and remains calm, some of his sin transfers to the criticiser, and some of the criticiser's merit transfers to him.

[Objection:] And *smṛti* likewise [attests the transference of qualities]:[342]

> Owing to blaming the twice-born and the good, or owing to serving the bad, sin is transferred into souls, and their own merit disappears.

and:

> But as a result of the person who remains calm not criticising, [and] as a result of staying with meritorious people, the merit of people (i.e. the criticiser and the meritorious people) is transferred [into the calm person and the person staying with meritorious people], [and] the sin [of the latter] goes from them elsewhere.[343]

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[342]The first example put forward relied on direct perception, the second on Śaiva scripture, and now the third on *smṛti*.

Rāmakaṇṭha cites here two *smrti* verses, which seem good candidates for what Sadyojyotiḥ is responding to, given the overlap in wording. *Pāpaṃ puṃsāṃ prajāyate* appears to be Sadyojyotiḥ's rewrite of *pāpaṃ saṅkramate puṃsām*; *kṣīyate ca svakaṃ puṇyaṃ* of *svapuṇyam apayāti ca*; *sādhu-* reflects the same word in the first *smṛti* verse; *samākrośāt* appears to have been influenced by *anākrośāt* in the second *smṛti* verse; and *kṣamāvati* reflects the same word in the second *smṛti* verse. Furthermore Sadyojyotiḥ's next *kārikā* deals with other aspects of these two *smṛti* verses. Thus we can be fairly sure that Sadyojyotiḥ had these two verses in mind, in which case he wrote 17abc in response to the first, and 17d in response to the second.

As is well known (see e.g. INGALLS 1962), one of the Pāśupata observances consisted in provoking criticism (by wandering alone in society like a madman, *Pāśupatasūtra* 4.6, or behaving in such a way that others will think one is insane or an idiot, *Pāśupatasūtra* 4.8) in order to effect a transfer of merit and sin such as is referred to here. This observance was not only part of Sadyojyotiḥ's opponent's religion, but also his own, it being taught in two Saiddhāntika scriptures, the *Niśvāsa* and the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*: see SANDERSON (2006b: 202–209).

It is possible that advocates of the observance pointed to these *smṛti* verses in order to justify the principle behind their practice. A similar verse is cited in the *Pañcārthabhāṣya* ad 4.12. See HARA (1967/68: 395 and 408) for a suggested emendation to the verse, and for three other similar verses from the *Mahābhārata*.

[343]These two verses appear (with numerous corruptions) in the *Sarvamatopanyāsa* (IFP T. 284, p. 18 and GOML R 16820, p. 6), but it seems unlikely that that text is their source. They appear quoted also in the parallel passages in the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* (p. 232) and the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (chapter 5, p. 157).

According to the first *smṛti* verse, two things happen to a person who criticises someone good: some sin transfers into them from the criticised person, and they lose some of their own merit. Sadyojyotiḥ has no problem with the second contention; he asserts it in the

[Siddhāntin:] Such examples are rejected in the same manner as the previous [two examples], because here too it is simply the arising of new [qualities, in this case] merit and sin, that is [metaphorically] described as 'transference'. There is no transference of the very same [merit and sin] (*tayor eva*), because [if there were] it would undesirably follow that [to undertake] enjoined actions (*-vidhīnām*) to earn merit would be pointless as [their] fruit could be stolen merely through association with [people], and because the teaching of *prāyaścitta* would be pointless. Thus [Sadyojyotiḥ] says:

18) And from associating with bad [people] some other (i.e. not that of the bad person) sin arises. Likewise [some other] merit [arises from associating] with good people. The [meaning of 'transference' in *smṛti* passages] has not been taught in any other way.[344]

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third *pāda* of his *kārikā*. But he re-describes the first case as, rather than transference of sin, some new sin arising. According to the second *smṛti* verse, two things happen if the criticised person remains calm and does not criticise back: he receives some of the criticiser's merit, and he loses some of his own sin. Sadyojyotiḥ, again, has no problem with the second, but regarding the first, he asserts that the merit gained is not some of the criticiser's, but is rather newly produced.

[344]The two *smṛti* verses which Rāmakaṇṭha seems to have correctly identified as addressed by Sadyojyotiḥ mention two cases not addressed in the previous *kārikā*: serving a bad person and associating with a meritorious person. This *kārikā* deals with these cases.

Sadyojyotiḥ seems to use the word *saṃsargāt* to reflect both *sevanāt* in the second *pāda* of the first *smṛti* verse, and *saha sthiteḥ* in the second *pāda* of the second verse. To be precise, *pāpīyasāṃ saṃsargāt* in Sadyojyotiḥ's verse reflects *pāpānāṃ sevaṇāt*, and *puṇyavatāṃ* (*saṃsargāt*) reflects *puṇyavadbhiḥ saha sthiteḥ*. So we may be overtranslating by taking *sevana* to mean 'serving'; it could simply be intended as synonymous with *saṃsarga* or *saha sthiti*, as Sadyojyotiḥ seems to take it.

In introducing this *kārikā*, Rāmakaṇṭha mentioned two undesirable consequences that result from a literal interpretation of the two *smṛti* verses. How has the *kārikā* shown that they are avoided? According to the first two *pādas*, association with a bad person leads to some new sin arising. The sin of the bad person is thus left unaffected; so he is not absolved of the necessity of performing *prāyaścitta* to rid himself of his sin. According to the third *pāda*, association with a meritorious person leads to some new merit arising. The merit of the meritorious person is thus left unaffected. If he has acquired his merit from performing enjoined actions (*vidhi*s), it is safeguarded and will not leave him in order to attach itself to the person associating with him. His performance of *vidhi*s is thus not rendered pointless.

3.9.3 The Example of a Flame

[Sadyojyotiḥ now] refutes an objection [raised] by another example of the Saṅkrāntivādin, namely: 'Surely a flame can be observed to transfer on to a burnable [object] such as a different wick.'

> 19) From [one] flame, a separate flame *arises* in another flammable substance. That it is transferred is firmly rejected by the Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas and others.

Here too, because we see, in such cases as the burning of a forest, that a very large fire arises from no more than [a flame or spark] similar [in size] to the flame of a lamp,[345] it is the rise of something new that is established for all disputants, who are intended to be understood in the elliptical mention of the Buddhists etc. (*bauddhādyupalakṣita-*).[346] But there is no transfer possible either of [the whole of] this [flame] retaining exactly its [original] size or of [just] a part of it.[347]

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[345] As to why Rāmakaṇṭha did not write simply *pradīpaśikhāmātrāt* ('from no more than the flame of a lamp'), we speculate that he also wanted to include sparks. His motivation may have been simply that he regarded a forest fire as more commonly arising from sparks produced from the rubbing together of branches of trees (for such a notion in *kāvya*, see *Kuvalayānanda* (section 69, *ullāsālaṅkāra*, p. 142): *te hy anyonyanigharṣajātadahanajvālāvalīsaṅkulā na svāny eva kulāni kevalam aho sarvaṃ daheyur vanam*; 'For those [bamboo branches], when surrounded by some flames of fire produced by their mutual rubbing together, incinerate not only their own species, but nothing less than the whole forest'). Or it may have been that when a spark, being even smaller than the flame of a lamp, leads to a forest fire, the idea that we have a cause leading to the rise of something new, rather than the transference of one and the same thing, is even more forcefully illustrated.

[346] Whether or not Rāmakaṇṭha is correct that Sadyojyotiḥ intended all disputants to be conveyed, there remains the question of why he explicitly mentioned the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas in particular. The denial of the transference of a flame results straightforwardly from its momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), something obviously maintained by the Kṣaṇikavādin Buddhists (see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* pp. 473,20–23 and 474,4–6 for mentions of a flame as the very paradigm of a momentary thing).

The Vaiśeṣikas also envisaged a flame as a sequence of transient entities. See: *tathā hi navānām ātmaviśeṣaguṇānāṃ santāno 'tyantam ucchidyate, santānatvāt; yo yaḥ santānaḥ sa so 'tyantam ucchidyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ, yathā pradīpasantānaḥ* (*Vyomavatī* p. 2,6–7).

[347] Either way the difference in size between it and the forest fire is too massive for transference to be conceivable.

3.9.4 The Example of the Transfer of Smells

In the same way the false conception that there is a transfer of things like the smell of musk into a cloth or such like can be defeated.[348]

3.9.5 The Example of Universals

The Saṅkrāntivādin states another example:

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[348]This example of the transfer of smell is not mentioned by Sadyojyotiḥ, but Rāmakaṇṭha associates it closely with Saṅkrāntivāda, for in his initial one-sentence elaboration of this *pakṣa* (in section 2.18.2) it is the only example that he mentions. We can only speculate as to whether he himself introduces it into this context of Saṅkrāntivāda, or whether he is drawing on Pāśupata texts or representations of Pāśupata views in the texts of their opponents.

He brings it up again here in order to indicate how it can be refuted. But precisely how he thinks it is to be rejected is not clear. The most obvious and convincing refutation would be that when smell appears to spread from one location to another, what moves is not the quality (*guṇa*) of smell having separated from its substrate, but rather minute particles of the substrate, along with their smell. This is the idea that we find in similar contexts elsewhere. In Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (ad 2.3.22–29), for example, an opponent is arguing that the soul is atomic. In response to Śaṅkara's reply that in that case we would not be able to feel things throughout our whole body at one time (*avatārikā* to 2.3.23), the opponent maintains that, although the soul is atomic its quality, consciousness, spreads out from it and fills a larger area, like the smell of a flower spreading out from the flower (2.3.26). Śaṅkara's response is that it is rather the minute particles of the flower, too small to be visible, which change their location. Indeed the *Śaivaparibhāṣā*, when summarizing this section of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, reads *tatrāpi kastūrikāvayavānām eva saṅkrānteḥ* (chapter 5, p.158), 'because in that case [of the supposed transference of the smell of musk], for its part (*api*), it is only the particles of musk that transfer'.

But when Rāmakaṇṭha writes 'in the same way' (*etena*) to what precisely is he referring? There *is* a characteristic way in which all of the examples so far (knowledge, merit and sin, and a flame) have been refuted, namely through redescribing what may seem to be transference as rather the rise of something new. But surely Rāmakaṇṭha does not intend that, in the case of the supposed transference of smell into a cloth, a completely new smell arises in the cloth. We are thus unable to suggest a satisfactory interpretation of *etena*. We could take it to mean 'through rejecting that there is transference of a quality'. This would have to refer back, however, not to the immediately preceding example, that of the flame, since that is not a quality, but to the two before, knowledge and merit / sin. Or we could take it as referring forward (with *parākāryaḥ* having future sense, 'is to be refuted') to the remark at the end of the section on universals that they do not provide an instance of transference of qualities. But this too is separated from the present sentence by a subsection. So if he had intended *etena* to refer to either of these points, he could have placed this remark closer to them.

20ab) Surely [a universal] such as cowness is transferred into another individual.[349]

Because [on the one hand] we immediately perceive in a cow-individual born at that moment, its universal, but (*tu*), because [on the other hand] it is impossible for [this universal] to be related with that [individual] unless we accept that it is transferred from another individual,[350] given that it does not exist there prior to that moment since we do not perceive it—it follows that its transference must be accepted.

3.9.5.1 Universals cannot transfer, because we do not accept universals as separate from individuals The Siddhāntin rejects [this]:

20cd) This does not satisfy someone for whom [a universal] such as cowness is [no more than] similarity.

Transference of universals is not established for us, because—since, like the Sāṅkhyas, we do not accept that universals are separate from individuals, because [it is just] the similarity of several features in [a given] individual[351] [to the features of other individuals] that constitutes a universal—there is no need to suspect transference into a cow-body that has just been born, because [transference] (*tathātva* = *saṅkrāntatva*) is inappropriate in this [case], given that the new body's similarity to [other] individuals is produced.[352] *This* [statement of yours that universals transfer into newly arisen individuals],

[349]Literally, 'the transference of a [universal] such as cowness creeps into another individual'. The Sanskrit is slightly clumsily expressed; it should be the cowness, not its transference, that creeps into (*-visarpiṇī*) the individual, but the problem is not serious enough to justify emending to *-visarpiṇaḥ*.

[350]Presumably from its cause, the mother.

[351]In the case of a cow, the fact that it has a dewlap, four legs etc.

[352]Possibly *vyaktitaḥ* could be interpreted as an ablative: 'the new body's similarity is produced from an individual', i.e. presumably from its cause, its mother, to which it is similar. The question then is in what sense its mother causes its similarity. By virtue of the fact that the mother has similar features to the new-born? By virtue of the fact that the new-born inherits its particular features from its mother?

Whether we take *vyaktitaḥ* as an ablative or in the way we have translated is a relatively minor issue. The main point is that if cowness is not something separate from cow-individuals, but just the fact that they are similar to each other, then rather than having to suppose that it is *transferred* to a new-born cow from its mother, we can see that it simply *arises*.

when addressed (*ucyamānam*) to ***someone*** who has said[353] that there is no transference [of universals] because of the non-existence of universals [as something] other than [similarity], ***does not satisfy*** them.

3.9.5.2 Universals could not transfer even if they were separate from individuals

3.9.5.2.1 Because they manifest in individuals [Sadyojyotiḥ] says [the following, adopting] the intention of the disputant who holds universals to be separate from individuals:

21a') [A universal] pervades its own substrate [alone].[354]

Because there is no possibility of suspecting transference on the view that universals pervade (*-sarvagata-*) everything, [Sadyojyotiḥ] assumes here [the view that] universals pervade only [their own] individuals, and says:[355]

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[353] We are only able to interpret the text satisfactorily here by assuming *ity uktaṃ taṃ prati* to be an elliptical / imprecise way of expressing *ity uktaṃ yena, taṃ prati* or *ity uktavantaṃ prati*. Indeed one might consider emending in such a way.

[354] Cowness, for example, exists only in cow-individuals, not in all individuals. Why does Rāmakaṇṭha claim that Sadyojyotiḥ has here adopted the intention of the opponent? He is interpreting this half-verse in a surprising manner. More natural would be to take it to be giving a reason for the previous half-verse, as suggested by the *hi*, and to take *tat*, with which *svāśrayavyāpakam* here is agreeing, to mean *sādṛśyam* rather than *sāmānyam*. For there are no syntactic indicators in the verse that Sadyojyotiḥ is here changing his *pakṣa*. But Rāmakaṇṭha maintains that Sadyojyotiḥ has moved on from the point about a universal just being the similarity of its individuals, and is here, for the sake of the argument, assuming a universal to be an entity separate from its individuals, in order to show that even so it would be incapable of transference.

[355] Sadyojyotiḥ is, according to Rāmakaṇṭha, adopting the opponent's view that universals exist over and above their individuals. This leaves two choices, referred to elsewhere in discussions of universals (see below): they can pervade everything, or just their own individuals. Rāmakaṇṭha claims that Sadyojyotiḥ assumed the latter view (as indicated by *svāśrayavyāpakam*), because if universals were all-pervading there would be no question at all of their transferring. (On the one hand, they would not be able to move and, on the other, they would anyway already be at the precise spot where the new individual is born.) At least on the latter view there is some potential for transference as the universal exists in some places but not others. But he goes on to show that even on this view, transference is impossible.

We conjecture *sarvasarvagata-* for *sarvagata-*, because the *sarvasarvagatasāmānyapakṣa* is contrasted with the *vyaktisarvagatasāmānyapakṣa* (mentioned in this sentence) in other

21a'–b) It obviously (*hi*)[356] manifests in [its] substrate, even if [that substrate] is differentiated.

It ***manifests in*** [***its***] ***substrate, even*** one that is separate, [i.e.] born right then,[357] because a universal is manifested in its individuals, and because individuals have as their single nature to manifest that [universal]; it is not that a [universal] is transferred from another [individual].[358]

3.9.5.2.2 Because they lack form He states a further reason:

21c–22b) How can there be transference of something [like a universal] of which [even in your view] movement is not accepted. And neither worldly people nor scientists[359] [indicate that] something without form can be transferred.

Because universals are accepted by these [Saṅkrāntivādins] to be incapable of action[360] and devoid of form, how can they be amenable to transference. For this[361] is established neither by worldly people nor by the

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discussions of *sāmānyas* (see for example *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. 2, pp. 8b–8c, pp. 36–37 and p. 64), and because *sarvasarva* could easily become corrupted into *sarva*.

[356]For the interpretation of the particle *hi* see note 460.

[357]It was this newly arisen individual that the Saṅkrāntivādin saw as indicating that its universal must be transferred into it from elsewhere, hence the *api* in this sentence (and in the verse according to Rāmakaṇṭha's interpretation of it).

[358]There would only be a need to postulate transference of a universal into a newly arisen individual if that individual would otherwise lack a universal. But an individual comes into existence together with its universal as that which is manifested by it. To postulate transference of a universal is, furthermore, not only unnecessary but also incoherent. For given that individuals and their universal exist in a relationship of manifestors and manifested, they are inextricably linked; neither can ever occur without the other. Yet if a universal were transferred into a newly arisen individual, the former would exist without an individual during its transference.

Thus even if we were to accept that cowness is separate from its individuals (*vyaktivyatirikta*), and is not all-pervading, it still would not transfer from the mother into a new born. Rather, just as it manifests in the mother, so it manifests in the new born.

[359]The word *lokāḥ* seems to refer to non-experts, those who, unlike *parīkṣakas*, base their knowledge merely on what can be seen, without subjecting it to deeper analysis. Neither those who follow what is *lokaprasiddha*, nor those who are learned in *śāstras*, attest to the transference of something without form.

[360]Of which transference is one kind.

[361]I.e. transference of something incapable of action or devoid of form.

learned.[362]

3.9.5.3 Even if transference of universals and flames were accepted, it would not instantiate the transference of qualities Now [Sadyojyotiḥ] says, accepting [for the sake of the argument] transference of flames and universals:

> 22cd) And neither universals nor flames are qualities, [so] this [description of them as transferred] was pointlessly stated.

This is the meaning: The opponent arguing for the transference of qualities should strive for an example of the transference of qualities in order to prove that. Even if the transference of universals and flames is established, they are not examples of that [transference of qualities], because they are not qualities. Therefore (*iti*) this description of them [as transferred] is utterly pointless.

3.9.6 The Example of Sacred Water

He rejects another example:

> 23a–d') Transference of Kedāra water is possible because it is a substance. For that power [of transference] is taught to exist in substance[s] alone

[362]It is not clear whether Rāmakaṇṭha intends his commentary here to reflect closely the syntactic structure of the verse. If he did, then he understood the break to come not between the two half-verses, but after *amūrtasya ca*, with *amūrtasya* agreeing with *yasya*. Alternatively the *hi* in his commentary may be his interpretation of the *ca* in the verse.

This point about universals lacking form and being incapable of action constitutes a second reason why, even if they were accepted to be separate from individuals, they would not be able to transfer. The first section denied that they are separate from individuals. This completes the second section, which allows for their separateness, but demonstrates that even so it is impossible that they transfer. We now have the final section, which points out that, even if they could transfer, that would do nothing to help establish the view that the qualities of the Lord transfer. We thus have a logical progression in which more and more is conceded to the opponent, without him thereby being able to advance his position.

Transference of water called ***Kedāra***, [derived] from the sacred site,[363] to another person who eats together with the person who is drinking it is indeed accepted ***because it is a substance***.[364]

He states an illustration:

23d') like a *siddha*'s sword.

For a ***siddha's*** sword, though located in a place very far from the *siddha*, transfers, as a result of his intention, straight into his hand. For the powers of substances are unthinkable. [365] That is the meaning. And that is the reason why, because [the verse] establishes transference through an inference of power, proved by means of an extraordinary example,[366] ***Kedāra water***

[363]I.e. Kedarnath. See BISSCHOP's annotation to *Skandapurāṇa* 167:36–8 (2006: 181–2).

[364]The situation envisaged here is not simply that the person drinking the water passes it to another. That is ruled out by the remark below *tatsaṅkrānteḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvenānupayogāt*, which means that we are dealing with a case of *saṅkrānti* that is not *pratyakṣasiddha*. We need something a little more mysterious, parallel to the example given below of the transference of a *siddha*'s sword through the air as a result of his will alone. Hence we assume, as suggested to us by Harunaga ISAACSON, that we are dealing with a situation in which one person from a community visits a pilgrimage site, drinks its sacred water, and magically shares the merit thereof with his fellows, even though they stay at home. We take it that *-sahabhuj* refers to someone of the same household or caste-community as the person who drinks the *kedāravāri*, not to those who happen to be eating in his presence when he drinks it. Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha accept such sharing of merit, and hence they must explain it in such a way as to avoid it being a case of transference of a quality. This they do by claiming that in such cases the sacred water itself transfers.

For a passage in a Saiddhāntika text that mentions the merit of drinking Kedāra water, see Trilocanaśiva's *Prāyaścittasamuccaya* (from edition in progress of R. SATHYANARAYANAN):

> *kedārākhyaḥ pāpaharaḥ ṣaṭsahasre prakāśitaḥ* ‖824‖
> *ahany ahani vā vatsa prabhāte culukatrayam* |
> *piben mantrī prayatnena yāvajjīvaṃ tu sādhakaḥ* ‖825‖
>
> 'That which is called Kedāra is proclaimed in the 6000 [-verse recension of the *Kālottara*] to take away sin. Optionally, my child, each day in the early morning the Mantrin, i.e. the Sādhaka, should for as long as he lives diligently drink three mouthfuls.'

[365]This echoes the tag *acintyo hi maṇimantrauṣadhīnāṃ prabhāvaḥ*, 'the power of jewels, mantras and herbs is indeed unimaginable', which Rāmakaṇṭha quotes in the *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 3:11ab and 6:16 and in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 7:49.

[366]The verse 'establishes' that Kedāra water transfers (see there *kedāravārisaṅkrāntiḥ ... upapadyate*), by inferring that it has a miraculous power. The 'extraordinary example'

should not be explained here as [simply] water from a field,[367] since transference of that would be inappropriate as it is established by direct perception. Thus it has been said:

> For inference does not proceed with regard to an object that is proved by direct perception.

3·9·7 The Example of Transference of Consciousness into Non-Conscious Matter

So, it having been established up to this point (*iyatā*)[368] that the Saṅkrāntivādin lacks an example, the Saṅkrāntivādin now turns something fully accepted by the Siddhāntin into an example[369] and rises again:

> 24ab) Even though consciousness is a quality, [you Saiddhāntikas] accept that it exists in non-conscious things.

Even though consciousness, [i.e.] the power of consciousness, ***is a quality***, you accept ***that it exists in non-conscious things.***

He says why:

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on which the inference depends is the *siddha*'s sword, which indicates that certain substances can have the miraculous power to move without being carried, so why not Kedāra water too. Sadyojyotiḥ's motivation in establishing that it is the Kedāra water, the substance, that transfers is that the transfer of merit does not then have to be explained as transference of a quality without its substrate.

[367]The word *kedāra*, as well as being the name of a sacred site, means field, particularly one under water.

[368]Literally 'with this much'.

[369]'Now turns something fully accepted by the Siddhāntin into an example': The implication of both this remark and the 'you accept' (*abhimataṃ bhavatām*) underneath the half-verse is that whereas the Siddhāntin does not accept that there can be transference of things like knowledge, merit, sin, flames and universals, he does accept the new example. As we shall see, the new example rests on the consideration that clay would not be able to produce a pot were it not 'touched' by the potter's power of consciousness and action (*jñānakriyāśakti*). Perhaps such a claim was asserted by the Saiddhāntikas in another context. Indeed Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's refutation at no point says that this is wrong, but rather that it is metaphorical (*upacārataḥ*). The point may be, then, that the examples given up to now are ones that Saṅkrāntivādins characteristically used to argue for their doctrine, whereas the present one is borrowed from the Siddhāntin.

24cd) Otherwise action on the part of an [insentient] thing to bring about an effect (*kṛtye*) [of that thing] would not be possible.[370]

Otherwise, [i.e.] if the [thing] were not the locus of the [power of consciousness], ***action on the part of an*** insentient ***thing***, aiming at a fruit to be produced, would ***not*** be possible. The following is what is meant. The existence of [the powers of] cognition and action[371] should be accepted [not only] in the agent, [but] also in the object, because non-conscious things that are not connected with consciousness do not have the power to act.[372] And even if the condition of being known [exists] in those [non-conscious things], they would certainly not [through that alone] attain such qualifications as being a producer of effects,[373] because there would be no substrate for mutual

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[370]I.e. if the power of consciousness never entered insentient things, they would never be able to produce their effects, as when clay produces a pot. That at least is how Rāmakaṇṭha interprets the verse, but it is possible that Sadyojyotiḥ envisaged something else, such as *māyā*'s inability to transform itself into the universe were it not penetrated by Śiva's consciousness: cf. *Mālinīvijayottara* 1:25cd *jagad utpādayāmāsa māyām āviśya śaktibhiḥ*.

[371]It is a feature of Saiddhāntika doctrine that consciousness is comprised of both the power of consciousness / cognition and that of action: see after verse 26 *jñānakriyātmanaś cidguṇasya* and, for further references, *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa* II, s.v. *caitanya*, third paragraph.

[372]We can clearly observe that things not connected with consciousness are incapable of action, i.e. cannot produce anything on their own. So when they do produce something, as when clay gives rise to a pot, we have to assume that they are temporarily connected with consciousness; we have to assume that the consciousness of the potter enters, and temporarily exists in, the clay.

The next sentence responds to an imagined objection that consciousness does not actually have to exist in the clay, because it is sufficient to assume that the latter is the *object* of the potter's consciousness. A lump of clay that produces a pot must be distinguished from other lumps of clay in that, unlike them, it enjoys a certain relation with the consciousness of a potter; but why should the relation not be *jñeyatva*, 'being the object of consciousness', rather than *jñānavattva*, 'having consciousness'?

[373]As pointed out to us by Professor MANI DRAVIDA, sense requires in place of the transmitted reading *kāryatvādy-*, rather *kāryakāritvādy-*, *kāryakaratvādy-*, *kāryavattvādy-* or some other synonym. For the qualification spoken of here should refer to the *kāraṇa*: see in the next sentence *kāraṇavastunaḥ prokto viśeṣaḥ*. Insentient matter is never referred to in this section as the effect, but rather as the cause of the effect or as that which has the effect (*vikāravat*, in the commentary to verse 26).

The point is that we describe clay, to take the example that Rāmakaṇṭha will introduce in the next sentence, as the producer of the pot (for example when it is designated as the *ghaṭotpādaka*).

contact,[374] because all things exist only within the confines of their own natures.[375] And [we] do find the qualification just stated even of non-conscious causal-objects such as clay and the like[376] [when they are] touched by the power [of consciousness] of a potter or such like. So the existence of the power of consciousness in them must certainly be accepted.[377]

3.9.7.1 Relation of the Example to the Exemplified He states the significance of this:

> 25ab) Therefore (*iti*) it may be accepted that the Lord's qualities appear in the perfected [soul] too.

Therefore, i.e. by this logic,[378] the existence of ***qualities*** connected with ***the Lord may be accepted in the perfected*** [***soul***] ***too***.[379]

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[374] When the clay is merely the object of the potter's consciousness (when he just looks at it for example), the clay is not a substrate that allows for mutual contact between itself and the consciousness, because the latter remains attached to its own substrate. Only if the potter's consciousness actually transfers into the clay can it come into contact with the clay.

[375] Clay is non-conscious by nature, so unless consciousness enters it from elsewhere it remains unconnected with consciousness. Thus for it to be merely an object of consciousness is not enough for it to take on the designation 'producer of an effect'.

[376] I.e. we do describe clay as a producer of effects, as when we say that clay produces a pot, or that a pot is produced from clay.

[377] The logic of the last three sentences is clear. If the only relationship with consciousness that insentient objects enjoyed were being its objects, then they would never be qualified in a certain way (*viśeṣo na bhavet*). They are qualified in that way (*dṛśyate ca viśeṣaḥ*). Therefore they cannot only be objects of consciousness; they must enjoy the relation that we argued for above (*karmaṇy api jñānakriyayor avasthitir eṣṭavyā*), namely possession of consciousness.

The thought seems to be that since clay is that by which the pot is produced, it should have the *ghaṭotpādanaśakti*, the power that produces the pot. But this implies that it should have agency, and agency involves consciousness.

[378] By the consideration that an example of the transference of qualities is provided by the transference of consciousness into non-conscious matter.

[379] The text now considers and rejects various ways in which omniscience and omnipotence could exist in the perfected soul, yet not occur there as a result of transference: (1) The perfected soul itself had the qualities of omniscience and omnipotence, prior to liberation; (2) The perfected soul's limited powers of cognition and action became unlimited at liberation; (3) The omniscience and omnipotence were not existent in the perfected soul prior to liberation and arose there at liberation.

But such qualities are not found to belong, earlier too, to the perfected [soul] of itself.[380] That is what he now states:

25cd) Because [they] did not exist earlier, [and] because then, by contrast, one sees great might.[381]

Earlier, [i.e.] in the state of the bound soul, his collection of qualities such as cognition and agency were limited. ***Then, by contrast***, [i.e.] in the state of the perfected [soul], they are said in scripture[382] to become unlimited, equal to [those of] the Lord. And it cannot be said that they, being certainly limited, became unlimited, because of the contradiction [involved in one thing being both limited and unlimited], and because it would undesirably follow that [they] would be subject to transformation.[383] And it is not right that they, [though] non-existent [previously], arise at that time, because they have been taught to be unending [and something that arises cannot be unending]. Therefore because the other options are excluded (*pāriśeṣyāt*), it is none other than the qualities of the Lord, of such a nature,[384] that are transferred into the [perfected soul] at that time. So [argue] the Pāśupatas.

3.9.7.2 Refutation of the Example of Transference of Consciousness into Non-Conscious Matter Having anticipated such words of an opponent, he refutes them:

26) But the quality [of consciousness] alone[385] obviously (*hi*)[386] does not exist in a different object. [Rather] its (*tasya*) [existence in a different object] (*asau*) is [ascribed to it] through

[380] 'Of itself': relying on its own powers, without qualities entering from somewhere else, i.e. from the Lord.

[381] *Mahāvibhava* refers to the liberated soul's *aiśvarya*, his omniscience and omnipotence.

[382] *Śrūyate* indicates that he takes *darśanāt* in the verse to mean *śrutidarśanāt*.

[383] Two problems would then result, because whatever is subject to transformation is non-eternal (so the omnipotence and omniscience would be temporary), and, according to the Saiddhāntikas, insentient.

[384] I.e. unlimited.

[385] I.e. without its substrate.

[386] It is not impossible that Sadyojyotiḥ uses *hi* here in its common meaning of 'for' or 'because', to connect the sentence in the second half of the verse with that in the first. But it would be oddly placed for such a function, and Rāmakaṇṭha certainly does not take it in that way, for he introduces his commentary to the second half of the verse with *kintu*. Furthermore Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha frequently use *hi* in contexts where it cannot mean 'for' or 'because' (see note 460).

metaphorical usage, [when it in fact remains] fixed to its own substrate.

It cannot be said that this ***quality*** of consciousness, of the nature of cognition and action, ***alone***, [i.e.] abandoning its own substrate, comes to exist ***in a different object*** that is devoid of sentience, when [this object] becomes an object of perception.[387] For if that were the case, that [object] would also be a knower and an agent, so absolutely everything would be conscious. And all would be Lords of all, because everything is experienced by the Lord.[388] Rather, even though this [quality of agency and action], remaining firm in its own substrate (*svaguṇisthasyaiva*), does not exist in that other substrate (*tatrāśrayāntare*)—the locus of transformation (*vikāravati*)—, its existence [there] is metaphorically, not literally, asserted, as a result of it being a cause of transformation.[389] To be a cause is simply to be potent.[390] And potency with regard to an object is established through positive and negative concomitance to belong to the agent.[391] So it is completely pointless to postulate the existence of the [agent's] power in the [object].[392] And neither can action (*kriyā*), existing [as it does] in the object, belong to the

[387] In fact the Saṅkrāntivādin did not assert that the transference of the powers of cognition and action into the clay can take place merely by the clay becoming an object of perception; one would expect him to assert that it must at least be physically touched by the potter.

[388] And hence the Lord's consciousness would pass into everything.

[389] We describe clay as a producer of effects (*kāryakāri*), and hence, according to the thinking of the opponent, it should be the agent (this is suggested by the suffix at the end of *kāri*). But the Siddhāntin regards this as merely metaphorical. What provokes the metaphorical usage is a conflation of cause and effect. The cause is the potter's power of cognition and action (*vikārahetu*); the clay is the locus of the effect. The power to produce the pot is in the potter, remains there, and brings about its effect from there, even though its effect is in the clay. It is on the basis of this cause-effect relationship that we metaphorically refer to what is actually the locus of the effect as the locus of the causal power.

[390] The argument is here running in a chain. He is defining what it is to be a cause (*kāraṇa*) because the previous sentence referred to the quality of consciousness as a cause (*hetu*) of transformation. Having defined it as being potent, he goes on to talk about potency.

[391] I.e. when a potter is involved a pot arises, when a potter is not involved it does not. If the potency was in the clay, why would a potter always need to be involved when a pot is produced?

[392] There is no need to, for its existence in the agent is sufficient to explain the coming into being of a pot.

agent, because that is contradicted by the earlier stated rule.[393] Rather (*api*

[393]Our interpretation of the last two sentences requires explanation and defence, for a different one, which is also possible, was suggested to us by Professor MANI DRAVIDA. He took *śaktatā ... karmaṇi siddhā* to mean that potency is established in the object. The positive and negative concomitance thus become: Whenever a pot is produced, clay is there; whenever clay is not there, even if the potter is, a pot is not produced. Thus not only the potter but also the clay has potency. The same can be said of all the various causes of the pot, and when all of them come together, the effect arises. The point of the next claim—that it is completely pointless to postulate the existence of the agent's power in the object—is that the object already has its own potency, that appropriate to a material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*), so why would it need the agent's? In the following sentence *kartuḥ* is taken not as the predicate, but with the subject: 'And neither can the agent's action exist in the object, because that is contradicted by the just stated rule.' I.e. it too would be pointless; why would the object need the agent's action when it already has its own active power (*śaktatā*)? Alternatively the 'just stated rule' (*proktanyāya*) could be the point that there can be no transference of something away from its own substrate and into a different one.

But we take it that our interpretation is supported by other passages of Rāmakaṇṭha's to which Professor MANI DRAVIDA did not have access, and it is to one of these passages from earlier in this text that we take *proktanyāya-* here to refer (section 2.8):

> *na, kartṛtvasya spandātmakatvāsiddheḥ. kriyā hi spandaḥ. na ca kriyārūpatvaṃ kartuḥ, kartrantarakalpanāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt. api tu tatra hetutaiva, tatsāmarthyenaiva kāryakaraṇaspandadṛṣṭer iti. jaḍavyāpakakriyātmakaḥ spandaḥ kathaṃ caitanyavyāpakatvāvyabhicāriṇi kartari bhavet? na ca spandātmakataiva kārakatvam, api tu viśiṣṭaśaktiyogo 'yaskāntādīnām iva.*

That passage (which is translated in section 2.8) equates action (*kriyā*) with movement, asserts that it exists in insentient (*jaḍa*) objects, and denies that it exists in agents. It thus seems incompatible with the alternative interpretation of our passage, according to which Rāmakaṇṭha is assigning action to the agent and denying that it exists in the object. That passage also assigns *hetutā* to the agent, which goes against the assigning, in the alternative interpretation of our passage, of potency (*śaktatā*) to the object; we take *hetutā* there to be equivalent to *śaktatā* here. Furthermore the only way sense can be made of the next sentence of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* (*api tu ... upacaryata iti*) on the alternative interpretation is by distinguishing movement from action, with the former, unlike the latter, being assigned to the object. But as we can see from the just cited passage, Rāmakaṇṭha equates action and movement.

We take *proktanyāya-* in our passage to refer to the point in the just cited passage that action cannot be the nature of the agent because, if it were, there would be an infinite regress (*na ca kriyārūpatvaṃ kartuḥ, kartrantarakalpanāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt*).

That passage occurs as part of a defence of a non-Saiddhāntika conception of liberation, but it is Rāmakaṇṭha's own view. For he next writes *ity uktam asmābhir anyatra*, 'I have said as much elsewhere', and quotes a verse that he himself has written:

tu), because [it is] thanks to the [agent] (*tadbalāt*) [that] movement appears even in the [object], it is metaphorically asserted that [action exists in the agent] (*tathātvam*).

3.9.8 The Siddhāntin's own example to illustrate the influence of the Lord on the soul

He states an example:

27ab) Just as fire's quality of heat [can] be undeniably evident in water

Heat, the specific quality of fire, cannot belong to water, because [if it did] it would undesirably follow that there would be no distinction between the

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jaḍaspandakriyāyāṃ yā śaktiḥ sā kartṛtā citaḥ |
vyāpter aspandarūpeṇa siddhāyaskāntavat svataḥ ||

Furthermore he expresses the same view elsewhere when writing as the Siddhāntin. See *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:57d, p. 98,10–99,4):

> *na spandātmakaṃ kartṛtvam, kriyārūpatvāt spandasya, na ca kriyā rūpaṃ* [corr.; *kriyārūpaṃ* ed.] *kartuḥ, api tu tatra śaktatvam ayaskāntamaṇer ivāyaḥspandajanane.*
>
> Agency is not of the nature of movement, because movement is of the nature of action and action is not the nature of the agent. [Agency] is rather potency with respect to [movement / action] (*tatra*), like a magnet's [agency] with respect to the initiating of movement in iron.

Note that here too it is the agent that is said to have *śaktatvam*, weighing in favour of it being in our passage too the agent rather than the object that is said to have *śaktatvam*.

What these passages make clear, then, is that for Rāmakaṇṭha there is a firm distinction between agency and action (*kriyā*); the latter is the same as movement and belongs to insentient objects, the former consists in the power to bring about an action and is designated as *śaktatvam*, *hetutā*, (*kriyā-*)*śakti*. This seems to rule out the possibility that in our passage *kriyā* is said to belong to the agent and denied to exist in the object.

The way that, in our interpretation, *śaktatā ... karmaṇi* does not mean that potency exists in the object is not surprising if we note the sense of similar expressions in the above passages. Rāmakaṇṭha does not intend *tatra śaktatvam* in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* passage to mean 'potency in it', nor does *tatra hetutaiva* in the earlier passage from this text mean 'condition of being a cause in it', nor does *-kriyāyāṃ ... śaktiḥ* in Rāmakaṇṭha's verse mean that the power resides in the action; rather the locatives / *tatras* indicate 'with respect to'. Similarly *śaktatā ... karmaṇi* in our passage means, we suggest, 'potency with respect to the object', i.e. the power to use the object to produce an effect.

elements.[394] For earth[, water and fire] etc. are distinguished from each other by the fact that they are causes [respectively] of bearing, binding together[395] and cooking, etc. Thus the quality of heat does not belong to water, having been adopted from contact with fire,[396] but rather [is evident there]

27c') [while] remaining in fire,

In that [hot] water it is fire, its colour (*rūpa*) remaining unmanifest, that is experienced;[397] it accomplishes its [usual] functions [there] such as heating, by the presence of the temperature (*sparśa*) that is its quality.[398] Just as [this is the case] (*yathā*)—he now states the case for which the example was adduced—

27c'–d) so likewise (*tathā*) the Lord's qualities, remaining in him,
show their influence [in a soul undergoing liberation].[399]

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[394]Each element is distinguished from the others by the quality that is particular to it. If fire's particular quality entered water, there would be no way of telling what was fire and what was water.

[395]Moisture binds together into one lump some bits of dry earth.

[396]When water comes into contact with fire and appears to heat up, it is not that the water loses its quality of cold touch and takes on the fire's quality of hot touch. Rather, as will be explained presently, the heat exists in some fire particles that have entered the water.

[397]It may seem that we are experiencing water with a quality of heat, but we are actually experiencing fire that is invisible because its visible quality is unmanifest. We experience it through its other quality, namely temperature, by our faculty of touch. See *Nyāyavārttika* ad 3.1.38: *caturvidhaṃ ca tejas bhavaty udbhūtarūpasparśaṃ yathādityaraśmiḥ. udbhūtarūpam anudbhūtasparśaṃ yathā pradīparaśmiḥ. ubhayaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ rūpasyodbhūtatvāt. udbhūtasparśam anudbhūtarūpaṃ yathā vāristhitaṃ tejaḥ. anudbhūtarūpasparśaṃ yathā nāyanaṃ tejas. ubhayaṃ cāpratyakṣaṃ rūpasyānudbhūtitaḥ*: 'And *tejas* is of four kinds: (1) That whose colour and temperature are manifest, such as a ray of the sun; (2) That whose colour is manifest and temperature unmanifest, such as a ray of light. And both [of these first two kinds of *tejas*] are visible because [their] colour is manifest. (3) That whose temperature is manifest and colour unmanifest, such as *tejas* when it exists in water; (4) That whose colour and temperature are unmanifest, such as the eye's *tejas* [which enables us to see]. And both [of these last two kinds] are invisible because [their] colour is unmanifest.' The third kind is clearly that with which our passage is concerned.

[398]In Praśastapāda's Vaiśeṣika as expounded in his *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (*dravyapadārtha* section), heat and cold feature as sub-varieties of the quality of touch. Four substances have touch as one of their qualities; earth's is neither hot nor cold but can be changed by fire (*pākaja*), water's is cold, fire's is hot and air's is neither hot nor cold and is not changed by fire. Thus he is silent on the question of whether water's cold touch can be influenced by fire; according to our passage it seems not.

[399]How does it support the Siddhāntin that the Lord's qualities can influence a soul

Likewise a quality, though connected with the Lord, is able to bring about many transformations in another substrate while remaining in its own substrate. Thus there is no reason to postulate its existence in the [other substrate].[400]

3.9.9 The difference of the Siddhānta from Saṅkrāntivāda and two related positions

28ab) But (*tu*) the position [that liberation consists in] possession [by the Lord's qualities] and (*vā*) [the position that it consists in] being controlled by Him / His qualities (*tadadhiṣṭhānam*) are not like that.[401]

But[402] in ***the position*** [***that liberation consists in***] ***possession*** [***by the Lord's qualities***] ***and*** in the position [that the Lord is] the controller [of the perfected soul], which was named in this [text] as 'to be instigated though one is an agent'[403] it is ***not*** like that. Just as the position [that liberation

undergoing liberation? Are not the Lord's qualities irrelevant for the Siddhāntin, given that it is the soul's own qualities that manifest at liberation? The answer becomes clear in verse 32 and the commentary ad loc: the soul's own qualities are what is manifested (*vyaṅgya*), but the Lord is the manifestor (*vyañjaka*).

[400]This sentence closely parallels the following from the previous section: *iti tatra tac-chaktyavasthitikalpanaṃ niṣphalam eva.* The point there was that since the potter has the power to produce a pot, it is pointless to postulate that his power of agency transfers into the clay. In the same way, since the Lord has the ability to bring about the manifestation of a soul's omniscience and omnipotence, there is no reason to think that the soul requires the Lord's omniscience and omnipotence.

[401]*Ex conj.* The idea is that they are not like the Siddhāntin's view that the Lord's qualities bring about effects in other things despite remaining in Him, as illustrated by heat causing water to appear hot despite remaining in its fire substrate. The *āveśapakṣa* and the view that the perfected soul is controlled by the Lord / His qualities, may look similar in they too involve the position that the Lord's qualities produce an effect while remaining in their own substrate (see note 239 and *parameśvaraguṇaiḥ svāśrayasthair eva siddhaḥ samāviśyate* in section 2.18.3), but they are in fact different. The difference, as elaborated in verse 29 and its commentary, is that in these two positions perfected souls would not act autonomously, using their own qualities; rather it would be the Lord acting through them with His qualities.

[402]*Param* in the commentary may appear to be support for *paraṃ* in place of *evaṃ* in the verse, the former being the reading of one of our manuscripts. But *evaṃ* is much better attested, is echoed by Rāmakaṇṭha's *tathā*, and *param* may be glossing the verse's *tu*.

[403]It is not certain that *tadadhiṣṭhānam* in the verse, for which we also have the variants *adhiṣṭhātṛtvam* and *tv adhiṣṭhātṛtvam*, was intended by Sadyojyotiḥ to refer back to the

consists in] transference [of the Lord's qualities] [is not like that].[404] Thus he says:

28cd) Indeed (*hi*) the position of transference of qualities is then (*tadā*) clearly (*hi*)[405] dead before it has even been born.[406]

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position of *kartṛtve 'pi prayojyatvam*, which is not a view of the *samānatāntrikas*, who are the opponents in this section. But it is plausible because no other more likely interpretation suggests itself.

As to the possibility of reading in this verse *adhiṣṭhātṛtvam* or *tv adhiṣṭhātṛtvam* in place of *tadadhiṣṭhānam*, it is true that Rāmakaṇṭha's *adhiṣṭhātṛpakṣaḥ* in the commentary may seem to support them, but we have marginally preferred *tadadhiṣṭhānam* on the grounds that all of Sadyojyotiḥ's other labels of the *pakṣas* in this text refer to the fruit that will accrue to the liberated soul at *mokṣa*, which implies that we would need *adhiṣṭheyatvam* not *adhiṣṭhātṛtvam*.

[404] *Saṅkrāntipakṣa* is also construable as a locative. We suspect corruption or loss of text. *Tayor na tathā* is awkward. One witness reads *tau* for *tayor*, which would be less awkward, reflecting the nominatives in the verse, but *tayor* is much better attested. Even reading *tau na tathā*, it seems unsatisfactory for this to be followed by just *yathā saṅkrāntipakṣa ity āha*. As for correlating the *yathā* and *tathā*, the problem then (whether or not we read *tayor* or *tau*) is that the text would be distinguishing these two positions from Saṅkrāntivāda, whereas we want it to be distinguishing those two from Abhivyaktivāda.

[405] Both Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha use *hi* where it cannot mean 'for' or 'because' (see note 460). But if two such *his* in one clause are considered unlikely to be original, one of them could be emended to *'pi* (as suggested to us by H. N. Bhat). We have however simply assumed that the second *hi* emphatically reinforces the word that it follows, namely *ajāto*.

[406] We suggest that Rāmakaṇṭha understands 27 and 28 differently from how Sadyojyotiḥ intended them. We take verse 27 to have been intended by Sadyojyotiḥ to state a new example of the Saṅkrāntivādin, not of the Siddhāntin. Sadyojyotiḥ's response in verse 28 is then, 'But no (*na tu*), this is just like the *āveśa* position ...'. Or the *kārikā* may originally have read *ca* for *na* (*ca* is well attested, though Rāmakaṇṭha seems to have read a *na*): 'But (*tu*) the *āveśa* position is also (*ca*) like this ...'. 28cd continues: 'Indeed in that case (*tadā*) (i.e. if that is the model of Saṅkrāntivāda that you put forward), then the position of the transference of qualities is clearly dead before it has even been born'. The reason is given in 29: for then Saṅkrāntivāda would be subject to the same fault as Āveśavāda, namely that the perfected soul would not be autonomous.

The point is that in Saṅkrāntivāda as conceived of up to verse 26 the qualities of the Lord transfer into the soul and adopt the soul as their new substrate. But if they remain attached to their old substrate, namely the Lord, as envisaged by Āveśavāda and by the example of fire's heat warming water, then the perfected soul does not have his own powers of cognition and action but is controlled by ones that are still attached to the Lord.

On this interpretation of the verses we are able to give sense to *tadā* in 28d; on Rāmakaṇṭha's we are not. On Rāmakaṇṭha's interpretation 28ab is awkwardly disconnected both from what comes before it and what comes after it. (1) What relevance could it have

Indeed[407] it is ***dead*** without having even arisen. He explains why:

29) For there too [just as in the two positions mentioned in 28ab] it is Śambhu alone who knows and does everything through his own qualities, not the perfected [soul]. For [we] do not observe [people to know or act] by means of [qualities / actions] belonging to someone else [and therefore it makes no sense to say that it is the perfected soul knowing and acting].

Not only in the position of possession, but '***there too***', [i.e.] in the position of transference also,[408] it is the Lord who ***knows and*** does ***everything, through his own qualities*** though he has entered the perfected [soul],[409] ***not the perfected*** [***soul***]. For [we] do not observe one person knowing or acting by means of something ***belonging to someone else***, i.e. by the [mental or physical] actions of another.

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to the preceding discussion if it means that the view outlined in verse 27 is different from the *āveśa* position? Why is this any more pertinent than saying it is different from any other position? (2) His interpretation also entails a weak link between 28ab and 28cd: there is no clear reason why Sadyojyotiḥ would suddenly say that the *saṅkrāntipakṣa* is dead before it has been born, if the preceding were about how Āveśavāda is different from the Siddhāntin's own position. If, moreover, the preceding were about that, would we not expect it to be followed by some explanation of how they are different?

If Sadyojyotiḥ did indeed envisage the example of fire's heat warming water as suggestive of the *āveśa* position, does it provide any answer to the question posed in note 239 as to whether in this position the Lord and His qualities enter the soul or affect it from a distance? No decisive answer, for although the fire atoms 'enter' the water in one sense, they do not actually cross over into the water atoms. The phrase in the commentary to the next verse however, *siddhagato 'pīśvaraḥ*, suggests that the Lord and his qualities do indeed enter the soul.

[407]It may seem forced not to take this *hi* as 'for', but it does not seem possible to take either *hi* in 28cd in that meaning, as 28cd does not give a reason for 28ab, at least not on Rāmakaṇṭha's understanding.

[408]*na kevalam X, yāvat Y api* appears for the most part to be a Kashmirian usage, being found frequently in, for example, the works of Rāmakaṇṭha, Abhinavagupta, Kṣemarāja, Jayaratha and Vallabha, but rarely in non-Kashmirian authors.

[409]We have preferred *siddhagato 'pīśvaraḥ* to *siddhagateneśvaraḥ*, not only because it is better attested, but also for reasons of sense. The latter reading, which would imply that the Lord's qualities but not the Lord have entered the perfected soul, would be true of the *saṅkrāntipakṣa* but not of the *āveśapakṣa*; but it is the intention of this sentence to take what is true of the *āveśapakṣa* and extend it to the *saṅkrāntipakṣa*. The point of the *api* may be: even though the Lord is inside the perfected soul, i.e. even though the perfected soul is controlled by something within, not something without, nevertheless it is still the Lord rather than him who is acting and knowing.

3.9.10 Contact with rather than transference of the Lord's qualities

Another [move by the Saṅkrāntivādin] is anticipated:

> 30ab) And if as a result of contact with the [Lord's qualities] the perfected [soul] too [becomes] omnipotent and omniscient,[410]

If [someone maintains that] ***as a result of contact with the*** qualities of Śambhu, ***the perfected*** [***soul***] ***too*** [becomes] of the same nature, [Sadyojyotiḥ] refutes [such a view as follows]:

> 30cd) then it would follow that even unconscious things could see all objects.

Even unconscious things [means] even Primal Matter and [its evolutes and Impurity (*mala*)]. Contact with the [qualities of the Lord] would be no different for [them than it would be for souls ready for liberation] since [all

[410]If we interpret the verses in the way that we suggest Sadyojyotiḥ to have intended them, the point of raising this view at this juncture is easily understandable. On that interpretation the Saṅkrāntivādin modified his position slightly in verse 27 by comparing the Lord's qualities to fire's heat warming water. This was then argued against (28–29) on the grounds that the perfected soul would lack autonomy; it would be the Lord within the perfected soul acting, as the fire atoms within the water do the heating. The present verse's view resembles the line of thought in the hot water example, but avoids the problem of a lack of autonomy. It can be seen as a modification of the thought behind the hot water example in order to avert the problem pointed out in verses 28–29. It resembles the line of thought in the hot water example in that here the Lord's qualities do not actually enter the liberated soul, they merely touch it, just as the heat from the fire atoms does not enter the water atoms. (In that sense we are in neither case really dealing with 'standard Saṅkrāntivāda'.) But it avoids the problem of a lack of autonomy, because whereas the only heat is that of the fire atoms, the water atoms not having any, the liberated soul on the view of this verse does have its own omniscience and omnipotence, which are stimulated by, but do not come from, the Lord. For these reasons it would be natural for the Saṅkrāntivādin to advance the position of the present verse if it was also he who advanced the hot water example.

But if that example was put forward by the Siddhāntin, and if verse 28 states that the *saṅkrāntipakṣa* in general, rather than in modified form, is dead, the transition to the present point is not so smooth. It is true that there is still the connection that contact (*samparka*) avoids the problem of lack of autonomy mentioned in the last verse. But it is less strange for the Saṅkrāntivādin to change his position here if he has already put forward (in verse 27) a kind of middle stage between standard Saṅkrāntivāda and this view of contact—a middle stage which has just been refuted in verses 28 and 29.

of these] are objects of the Lord's knowledge. So it would undesirably follow that they would be omniscient.

3.9.11 Response to the opponent's rejection of Abhivyaktivāda

31) And the 'earlier non-existence' [of the capacity for omniscience and omnipotence] is not established. [For] the powers of cognition and action are clearly seen to become excellent due to an excellence of the condition of their manifestors.[411]

[This verse beginning] 'earlier non-existence' is a refutation of reasoning put forward by the opponent.[412] ***The non-existence*** of selves' capacity for omniscience and [omnipotence] ***earlier***, [i.e.] in the condition of transmigratory existence, that was mentioned [by the opponent] ***is not established***; for ***the powers of cognition and action are seen*** in those [selves] earlier too in / from / in accordance with the condition (*-sthānataḥ*) of things like a body and senses[413] which are its manifestors.[414] Just as a self is known to be omnipresent on the grounds that we have knowledge of it wherever the body,

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[411]Our taking of the *-tas* suffix as representing a genitive is influenced by *vyañjakasya* in the final sentence of the commentary.

[412]In verse 25cd. The Saṅkrāntivādin there argued that the powers of cognition and action with which the liberated soul is endowed cannot be the same powers of cognition and action that he had prior to liberation. This 'earlier non-existence' (see *prāg asattvāt* in 25cd) of those powers of omniscience and omnipotence in the bound soul was used as an argument for them being transferred from the Lord; it is taken up and rejected here.

It could be argued that the fact that the Siddhāntin does not until here take issue with the Saṅkrāntivādin's earlier statement, *prāg asattvāt*, made six verses ago, is further evidence in favour of our contention that Sadyojyotiḥ intended verses 27 and 28 differently from how Rāmakaṇṭha takes them. For if verse 27 were put not by the Saṅkrāntivādin but by the Siddhāntin, it would be surprising for Sadyojyotiḥ to change the subject there by presenting his own example (hot water) without first addressing the Saṅkrāntivādin's claim of *prāg asattvam*. But if the hot water example is put by the Saṅkrāntivādin, then it is understandable that Sadyojyotiḥ would wait to take up the issue of *prāg asattvam* until after the whole arc of the Saṅkrāntivādin's line of thought running from verses 24–30 was finished.

[413]For 'body and senses' as a translation of *kāryakaraṇa*, see note 147.

[414]There are different possibilities for how to interpret the *-tas* suffix of *-sthānataḥ*. Some witnesses read *iti sthāne* between *-sthānataḥ* and *dṛṣṭam*, and one reads *tadanusāreṇa* in that place. Though we have judged both readings to be interlinear glosses subsequently mistaken to be part of the text, the interpretations they suggest ('in the condition' and 'in accordance with the condition') are both possible. A third possibility is to take the suffix as indicating an ablative ('from', 'because of').

its manifestor [, is found],[415] so likewise the existence and omnipresence[416]

The compound *vyañjakasthānataḥ* in the verse is dependent on *utkarṣāt*, and we take the meaning there to be 'because of excellence of the condition of the manifestor(s)', as reflected by *vyañjakasya ... utkarṣeṇa* in the last sentence of the commentary, which glosses the whole verse. In this sentence of the commentary, by contrast, *utkṛṣyamāṇam utkarṣāt* are not reflected, and thus the meaning of *-sthānataḥ* here is not necessarily the same as its meaning in the verse.

(1) If we take the meaning of this sentence of the commentary to be that the powers of cognition and action are seen 'in accordance with', i.e. to accord with, the condition of their manifestors, then this sentence can be taken to make the same point as the verse, namely that the powers of cognition and action vary with the level of excellence of their manifestors. But the meaning of the *-tas* suffix as 'in accordance with' cannot be the meaning of the suffix in the verse, where it depends on *utkarṣāt*.

(2) If we take the meaning of this sentence to be that the powers of cognition and action are seen 'from / because of' the condition of their manifestors, then the point it makes is different from the verse's point about correspondence with the level of excellence of their manifestors. Rather the point here is just to establish the existence of the powers of cognition and action. This existence is established from the existence of their manifestors, perhaps just because wherever there is a manifestor there must be a manifested. This sentence would then be closely related to the next one: just as the existence of the self is known wherever its manifestor, the body, is present, so the existence of the powers of cognition and action are known wherever their manifestors, the body and senses, are present. Again, the meaning of the *-tas* suffix as 'from / because of' cannot be the meaning of the suffix in the verse, where it depends on *utkarṣāt*.

(3) If we take the meaning of this sentence to be that the capacity for cognition and action is seen 'in' the condition of its manifestors, then the point could be equivalent either to the meaning given above in 1 (seen in = seen to accord with) or to that given in 2 (seen in = inferred from). The meaning of the *-tas* suffix as 'in' could be the meaning of the suffix in the verse, where it depends on *utkarṣāt*: 'because of excellence in the condition of its manifestors'.

Sthāna could mean not 'condition', but 'locus, support'. But (1) Rāmakaṇṭha, when glossing the verse below, reflects *vyañjakasthānataḥ* with *vyañjakasya*; i.e. he seems to see *-sthāna-* as dispensible or as contributing little, which we see as more understandable if he takes it as 'condition' than if he takes it as 'support'. (2) To talk of the 'locus' or 'support' of the *kāryakaraṇādi*, the complex of body, sense faculties etc., would be a bit strange, given that it is its own locus; it has no locus or support other than itself. So we marginally prefer 'condition' for these two reasons.

[415] Wherever my body moves, my self always becomes manifest there. Since my body could potentially move anywhere, the self must be omnipresent.

[416] *Vyāpakatva* when applied here to the powers of cognition and action perhaps denotes not only that they are omnipresent, but also that they include everything within their reach, i.e. they amount to omniscience and omnipotence.

of its qualities (viz. its powers of cognition and action) are established.[417] That is [Sadyojyotiḥ's] intention. One's own ***powers*** (*svabalam*) consisting ***of cognition and action***, just as they are are established [to exist] earlier (*prāk siddham*), so too they are ***seen to be made excellent*** by a commensurate (*yathāyatham*) ***excellence of manifestors*** such as light that bring about the manifestation of an object, of things like magical eye-ointment that enliven the power of the sense faculties, of things like knowledge of a craft which engender skill in the faculties of action, [and] of things like the practice of yoga that conquer the mind.[418]

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[417]There are two possibilities for how to interpret this sentence. The first is that the omnipresence of the powers of cognition and action follows from the omnipresence of the self, because they are its qualities, and what holds of that to which qualities belong must also hold of them, given that they are not separate from it. On the second interpretation the *tathā* clause does not follow from the *yathā* clause. The existence and omnipresence of the powers of cognition and action are derived without recourse to the omnipresence of the self, but the manner of coming to know the former resembles the manner of coming to know the latter.

Either way the translation could also read 'The way that the self is known to be omnipresent ... is exactly the way that its qualities are known to exist and to be omnipresent'. On the first interpretation 'exactly the way' means 'one and the same way'; on the second interpretation it means 'exactly the same *kind* of way'. Whereas on the first interpretation the parallelism suggested by the *yathaiva ... tathaiva* structure is just that both are established (by the same argument); on the second it concerns the way in which they are established.

What then are the parallels between the ways that the self and its powers are known to be omnipresent?

(1) The fact that my self is not currently manifest apart from where my body is located does not mean that it does not exist elsewhere. Similarly the fact that my powers of cognition and action can currently be seen only to have limited range does not mean that they are inherently limited. Both in the case of the self and its powers, observation of them is restricted by their manifestors.

(2) Even though we are only capable of observing the self's existence at the places where my body goes, the fact that it becomes manifest *wherever* my body goes enables us to infer that it exists everywhere; so similarly even though prior to liberation we can only ever observe the powers to be limited, the fact that any increase in effectiveness of their manifestors leads to an increase in their range enables us to infer that the subsequent omniscience and omnipotence are simply those same earlier powers unimpeded.

(3) Therefore, just as when my body moves to a different location it is not a different self that is manifest in the new place, but rather the same one, so too when a change in the manifestors of the power of cognition and action occurs at liberation, it is not a different power that becomes manifest, but rather the same one at a fuller level of manifestation.

[418]The sentence gives examples of the powers of cognition and action increasing in their effectiveness as a result of an increase in the excellence of one of their manifestors. In each

[Sadyojyotiḥ] states what we are to conclude from that:[419]

32) At liberation it is Śambhu's power of course (*hi*), which has everything as its object, that is seen to be the manifestor.[420] So what is to prevent sameness with Him coming into being for the [perfected soul]?[421]

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case there is a triple structure: increased light leads to an increase in the manifestation of objects, which leads to an increase in the power of cognition; the application of magical eye-ointment leads to a sharpening of the faculty of sight, which leads to an increase in the power of cognition; increased knowledge of a craft leads to the faculties of action becoming more skillful, which leads to an increase in the power of action; and the practice of yoga leads to increased control of the mind, which leads to an increase in, presumably, both the powers of cognition and action. In each case 'increase in the power' means that the power becomes more manifest; the power itself is not actually affected.

The *yathaiva ... tathaiva* structure can be interpreted in two ways. Either it can simply mean: not only are the powers of cognition and action established to exist earlier (as argued in the last two sentences), but they are also seen to vary in accordance with the level of excellence of their manifestors. In other words we just have an accumulation of two points. Or it could mean: the way the powers are established to exist earlier is as varying in accordance with the level of excellence of their manifestors.

What exactly is Rāmakaṇṭha's argument as presented in these three sentences of the commentary? With this third sentence we finally get his understanding of the structure of the whole verse, supplemented with some examples of manifestors that affect the powers of cognition and action. Would this one sentence not have been enough? Why does he give the previous two? He seems to want to make three different points: (1) The powers of cognition and action exist prior to liberation; (2) The powers of cognition and action are omnipresent; (3) The powers of cognition and action vary with the excellence of their manifestors. Each point lends credence to the idea that the powers of omniscience and omnipotence do not enter the soul at the time of liberation, but are the same powers as existed prior to liberation in limited form. Rāmakaṇṭha gives the impression that the first and third point can be derived separately from the verse by in the first sentence focusing on *dṛṣṭaṃ jñānakriyābalam ... vyañjakasthānataḥ sphuṭam*, i.e. ignoring *utkarṣāt* and *utkṛṣyamāṇam*; and in the third sentence taking all the words of the verse.

[419]The relevance of the previous is a pertinent thing to bring up here, for thus far what has been claimed to exist earlier are powers of cognition and action, which are omnipresent and which vary in accordance with the condition of their manifestors. But it has not yet been shown how these powers are the same as the omniscience and omnipotence that reveal themselves at liberation.

[420]The body and sense faculties are the manifestors prior to liberation; at that time Śiva's power takes over.

[421]The Saṅkrāntivādin thinks that to become the same as the Lord, omniscient and omnipotent, is impossible unless His qualities are transferred. Sadyojyotiḥ's response takes the form of first, in the last verse, pointing out that the powers of cognition and action

At liberation, because of being linked to the most excellent manifestor, namely Śiva, that which is manifested too[422] is established to be of that [most excellent] nature. That being the case, ***sameness with*** the Lord, resulting from the manifestation of qualities that are the same as [those of] the Lord, ***coming into being*** at that time ***for the*** [***perfected soul***] ***can*** not ***be prevented.*** And the non-manifestation and manifestation of that [sameness with the Lord][423] are caused by [respectively] the presence or absence of obscuring [Impurity], not by any alteration in the nature [of the power]—in which case they would lead one to conclude that it was liable to change [and therefore impermanent and insentient]—because they (viz. the manifestation and non-manifestation) are located in another thing.[424]

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vary with the excellence of their manifestor, and then here pointing out that at liberation it is Śiva's power that is the manifestor. Taking these two considerations together leads to the conclusion that at liberation the excellence of Śiva's power becomes reflected in the liberated soul's powers of cognition and action.

[422]I.e. the powers of cognition and action.

[423]Alternatively *tasya* could mean 'for the soul' or (obscuring [Impurity]) 'of the soul'.

[424]Differences in the level of the manifestation and non-manifestation do not imply any change in the nature of the power, because these differences belong to the extent of the covering of Impurity that surrounds the power, not to the power itself. It may appear strange to say that the manifestation does not belong to the power, since it is, after all, the power that is usually spoken of as manifest or unmanifest; but the point is that such talk, just like the 'purification of the power', is imprecise to the extent that it implies a change in the power rather than a change in the level of Impurity. See the following parallel sentence from his commentary to verse 41b: *satāṃ teṣām ajñānalakṣaṇāvaraṇasya tamasa iva nivṛttyābhivyaktau sakalāsakalanivṛttikṛte śuddhyaśuddhī paragatatvān nābhedabādhike.* 'When those [qualities], which are already existent (*satām*), become manifest as a result of the removal, as of darkness, of their covering that consists of ignorance, their purification and non-purification, caused by the total or incomplete removal [of the covering], do not refute the non-difference [of the qualities before and after liberation] because they (i.e. the purification and non-purification) are in something else (i.e. they are in the covering, not in the qualities).'

See also the following related sentence from the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:60, p.100, 12–16): *cakṣuṣas tamolakṣaṇasyevāvaraṇasya sadbhāvāsadbhāvakṛto viśeṣo 'syā viṣayālpatvamahattvātmako 'pīdānīṃ kalāder muktāv īśvarātmanaś ca vyañjakasyālpatvamahattvakṛtaḥ, na tu svarūpabhedakṛtaḥ, iti muktau jñānakriyayoḥ sarvaviṣayatvasyābhivyakter īśvarasamatvam, na tūtpatter iti.* 'Just as (*iva*) variation (*viśeṣa*) [in the power] of the faculty of sight is caused by the existence or non-existence of that which covers it, namely darkness, so [variation] of the [power of cognition] (*asyāḥ*) too (*api*), in the form of having a small or large range, is caused by the smallness or greatness of its manifestor, namely *kalā* etc. now, and the Lord at liberation. It is not caused by a difference in the nature [of the power]. Thus becoming the same as the Lord at liberation is a result of

3.9.12 The problem that transference involves leaving the previous substrate

Having thus removed a problem from his own position,[425] he states another fault[426] [in that] of the opponent.

> 33) Transference to another locus without abandoning the previous locus is certainly not commonly accepted. But if abandoned [by its qualities], then the first [locus] should become devoid of qualities.

For ***transference*** of things like the sun[427] ***to another locus*** is seen [to occur] by abandoning ***the previous locus***. Thus here too,[428] when one accepts the abandoning of the previous locus, that first [locus], namely Supreme Śiva, would become devoid of all qualities, because it is the perfected [soul] into which His qualities would have been transferred.

[Saṅkrāntivādin:] Surely the [Lord's properties] (*tasya*), just like the light of a flame, can be [both] present in their own locus and transfer into that (*tatra*) further locus. [Sadyojyotiḥ] replies:

> 34) But the [movement][429] of something that moves without leaving [its starting point] is obviously (*hi*) called 'spreading'.[430] And therefore [if one assumed such a model], because of [the thing that spreads] being subject to transformation, an army of problems would be entailed.

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the manifestation of the all-encompassing nature of cognition and action, not a result of its arising.' At that point in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* Rāmakaṇṭha is arguing against the Utpattivādin, here against the Saṅkrāntivādin; the similarity is that in both cases the opponent assumes that there is a change in the nature (*svarūpa*) of the powers of cognition and action at liberation. It is that that Rāmakaṇṭha denies in both places by appealing instead to the concept of manifestation resulting from the removal of covering.

[425]The supposed problem of the non-existence of omniscience and omnipotence prior to liberation.

[426]Another fault in addition to the fact that the opponent lacks an example.

[427]Which transfers from one place to another throughout the day. Or perhaps from one *nakṣatra* to another.

[428]I.e. at liberation.

[429]We understand *tat* as referring to the movement (*gamanam*) implied in the first word of the verse, *gacchataḥ*.

[430]Conjecturing *gacchatas tv aparityajya* for *gacchatas taṃ parityajya* or *gacchatastham parityajya*.

For when a flame arises,[431] the light of the flame, moving to various places by removing the darkness that opposes it, is held to spread. [Its spreading] is possible, just like that of a flow of water, since it is subject to transformation.[432] And for the qualities of the Lord the whole group of faults that will be treated below[433] of non-sentience and the like would follow undesirably [from their being subject to transformation], since (*iti*) whatever has a form that is subject to transformation, that—clay or whatever—is seen to be insentient.[434]

3.9.13 The problem that qualities cannot be transferred

35) If [you insist that] somehow or other there is transference, then [we point out to you that] that [transference], being produced of qualities, is logically impossible, [since][435] the restriction that [transference] belongs only to substances is well established by all means of knowledge.

Now if the Saṅkrāntivādin, although [all] his arguments have been struck down, is not set free from his fit of screaming 'transference';[436] in other words (*iti*) if he should require transference out of an obsessional fixation

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[431] I.e. when a lamp is lit.

[432] Something can both move and remain in its initial location if and only if its 'shape' becomes transformed.

The point of the example of the flow of water is not entirely clear. It must be envisaged as something that by becoming transformed can move despite remaining in its initial location. Perhaps its initial location is the source of the river or one point further along it; water 'remains' there in the sense that it continues to flow from there. The water is transformed in the sense that it spreads along the river from there. It does not seem a perfect example, for someone may justifiably object that the water does not remain in its initial location, rather new water appears there.

[433] We see no place in this text to which this could refer, and so we take it to refer to a future part of the *Rauravavṛtti* or *Rauravavṛttiviveka*. Perhaps it refers forward to *Bhogakārikā* 79c–80b.

[434] Rāmakaṇṭha's argument here can be divided into three stages. (1) Movement without leaving the initial location is possible, but only if the thing moving is transformed thereby. (2) If the qualities of the Lord transferred without leaving their initial location, they would thus have to be transformed. (3) Since whatever is transformed is insentient, it undesirably follows that the qualities of the Lord would have to be insentient, which is absurd.

[435] 'Since' is perhaps indicated by *yataḥ* in the commentary.

[436] Or, seeing in *apasmāra* a reference to the demon: 'is not let go by the fit-inducing demon causing him to scream "transference"'

(*āgrahāt*), even so ***that*** transference would be ***logically impossible***, [given that it] would be ***produced of qualities***, [i.e.] it would be produced of the sovereignty that is [the Lord's] qualities. [Only] transference of substances is admissible in this [theory of yours], since it is obviously (*hi*)[437] transference of substances, not qualities, that is commonly accepted. And therefore the purport is that it undesirably follows that the Lord's properties are substances.[438]

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[437]On Rāmakaṇṭha's frequent use of *hi* in combination with an ablative or a *yataḥ*, see note 460.

[438]Sadyojyotiḥ's refutation of Saṅkrāntivāda in the *Mokṣakārikā* consists of just two verses (as opposed to twenty-eight and a half in this text). The first makes a point similar to what we saw in verse 33, and the second makes the point we have just seen in this verse:

pāśupatās tu muktāv īśvaraguṇānāṃ saṅkrāntitaḥ siddhānāṃ śivasamatām ācakṣīran. tad ayuktam:

> *vimokṣe guṇasaṅkrāntāv īśo 'nīśvaratāṃ vrajet* ‖ 129 ‖
> *guṇakhaṇḍasya saṅkrāntau guṇaḥ sāvayavo bhavet* |

siddha eveśvaraguṇānāṃ saṅkrāntāv iṣyamāṇāyām īśvaraḥ sarvajñatvādiguṇarahitaḥ syāt, guṇānām anaṃśatvād ekadeśena guṇasaṅkrāntyasambhavāt. kiñca:

> *tyaktvā svaguṇinaṃ yānti na ca guṇyantaraṃ guṇāḥ* ‖ 130 ‖
> *gacchatāṃ ca vyavastheyaṃ padārthānāṃ virudhyate* |

yadi ca svasvaguṇityāgena [*svasvaguṇi-* M^{Y}; *svaguṇi-* E_{V}] *guṇyantare guṇānāṃ vṛttir iṣyeta, tadā sarvaḥ sarvaguṇī syād iti dṛṣṭaniyamānupapatter mukto 'py amuktaḥ* [*amuktaḥ* M^{Y}; *om.* E_{V}], *amuktaś ca muktaḥ prasajyata iti guṇasaṅkrāntyanupapatter na tayā śivasamatvam abhyupagantavyam iti.*

'But the Pāśupatas would say that perfected [souls] become equal to Śiva as a result of transference of the Lord's qualities at liberation. That is incorrect:

> 129c–130b) If liberation occurs when there is transference of [the Lord's] qualities, the Lord would cease to be the Lord. If transference takes place of [only] a portion of [His] qualities, then those qualities would have to have parts.

If it is held that the qualities of the Lord are transferred into the perfected [soul], the Lord should become devoid of the qualities of omniscience and [omnipotence], because it is impossible that one part of [His] qualities be transferred [such that the remaining part allows him to remain omniscient and omnipotent], since the qualities lack parts. Moreover:

> 130c–131b) And qualities do not abandon their own substrate and go to a different one. And if they did go,* this restriction [in the nature] of things would be contradicted.
>
> * We understand *gacchatām* as *gacchatāṃ satām*. We find this slightly preferable to trying to construe it with *padārthānām*.

36a) If [you say] this fault does not [accrue] if [the qualities of omniscience etc. mean not the quality-individuals but the quality-]universals...

[Saṅkrāntivādin:] 'Then let these properties of omniscience and [omnipotence] be quality-universals, since they are found in many individual instances of these qualities—in perfected souls and in the Lord.[439] That being so, transference can take place of the [quality-universal] into yet another soul (*pumantare 'pi*)[440] who has realised the state of perfection (*prāptasiddhabhāve*), just like [transference of] the whiteness of a new jasmine blossom.[441] In this way there need be no problem in establishing transference.' Having thus anticipated the position of the opponent, he refutes it [with]:

36b) No, because this [quality-universal is nothing other than] the qualities of cognition and such like (*jñānādiguṇāḥ*) [themselves].[442]

It is not established that these [qualities of cognition and such] are transferred, and so this [argument based on quality-universals] is worthless, for

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And if one should hold that qualities can move to another substrate by abandoning their various own substrates, then anyone could have anyone's qualities; so because of the impossibility of [maintaining] the restriction that we see, it undesirably follows that even a liberated soul could become unliberated (its qualities could leave it), and a non-liberated soul could become liberated. So because of the impossibility of transference of qualities, becoming the same as the Lord by means of that [transference] should not be accepted.'

[439]The point of the 'since' clause is probably that for a universal to exist it must occur in at least two individual instances.

[440]In addition to the just mentioned perfected souls in whom the quality-universal already exists.

[441]Which is also a quality-universal. That it is transferred (presumably from an already existing jasmine blossom) is controversial and will indeed be rejected by Rāmakaṇṭha in favour of the view that it *arises* when the new blossom comes into existence. But what makes this version of Saṅkrāntivāda more plausible than the idea that it is the quality-individuals that transfer is that universals, by definition, exist in many places at once. Thus it is easier to imagine the universal of the Lord's qualities existing simultaneously in the Lord and in many perfected souls.

The Saṅkrāntivādin has already advanced the idea of transference of universals above (verses 20–22). The difference is that there he was advancing it as an example, parallel to the transference of the Lord's qualities; here he is claiming that the transference of the Lord's qualities is itself a case of transference of universals. Furthermore the universal discussed there, cowness, is a substance-universal not a quality-universal.

[442]This recalls Sadyojyotiḥ's point (in 20cd) that universals are nothing other than the similarity between individuals.

even the qualities of jasmine blossoms and the like *arise* at the moment [that they appear; they are not transferred from anywhere else].[443]

If this disputant were to hold that there is transference of a part of the substance of the Lord which is the locus of His qualities of omniscience etc.,[444] even then [the view is] illogical, as [Sadyojyotiḥ] says:

> 36cd) If [the opponent holds what is transferred] to be a substance, the postulation [of all the substance parts] as substrates of cognition and [action] would be [subject to the fault of] heaviness.

If [the opponent] thus accepts that it is a ***substance*** [that is transferred], the postulation [of all the substance-parts] as ***substrates of cognition and [action]*** would have to be admitted to have an excessive ***heaviness*** (*garīyastvam* = *gauravam*) that is without basis (*apramāṇam*). For to explain, the Lord [according to this view] would have to have the form of a mass of various substances; those substances would be transferred from Him when they are obtained by various perfected souls; and the [substances] are postulated to be the locus of omniscience and so forth—[thus] that which is postulated would be without proof and unending.

3.9.14 Liberation for the opponent is connected only with Śiva (*śāmbhava*), not with the soul (*pauruṣa*)

The Saṅkrāntivādin points out a fault in the [conception of] liberation held by the proponent of the Siddhānta:

> 37ab) Surely in that case [following your view], liberation is something that is brought about [exclusively] by the soul, for if [omniscience and omnipotence exist unmanifest in the soul prior to liberation and simply] become manifest [at that time], [liberation] (*sa*) is not brought about by Śiva [at all].

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[443]The commentary here does not expound the verse, but assumes it and continues the argument. Rāmakaṇṭha's point in the commentary that transference of the qualities of cognition and action is not established is relevant because the quality-universal has been said to be nothing other than the qualities of cognition and action. Thus the adducing of quality-universals is worthless.

[444]The opponent responded to the problem that qualities cannot be transferred by proposing that it is quality-universals that transfer. He now abandons that position and tries to get around the problem by arguing that what are transferred are substance-parts.

Surely in that case, [i.e.] if the soul's own qualities alone are manifested in liberation, then, just as [for the Vedāntins] for example [who hold that liberation is attained by following the scriptural precept] 'the self should be known', for you too it undesirably follows that ***liberation is*** brought about only by the soul; it cannot be brought about by the Lord, because He (*tasya*) is not an agent of that [liberation][445] (*tatra*), since there is no contact between His *śakti* [and the soul]. For if there were contact, then that would be nothing other than transference [after all].[446]

In reply to him the proponent of the Siddhānta says:

> 37cd) Surely in that case [following *your* view], liberation would be connected [exclusively] with Śiva, for if [omniscience and omnipotence] were transferred [from Śiva], [liberation] would hardly be connected with the soul.[447]

In your view too [there is a problem, namely] no one would be liberated. Because of there being transference into the [soul] of qualities of the Supreme Lord that *exist prior* [to the transference, in the Lord], liberation would be unconnected with the soul.[448] In my view, both are connected.[449] This he says:

> 38) [Liberation] is connected with the soul [because] it has its locus in the soul; it is connected with Śiva [because] it is produced by Śiva. Both are respected in [the view of] manifestation; in [the doctrine of] transference clearly (*hi*) only one is.[450]

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[445] Or alternatively, 'of that [manifestation]'.

[446] This last point of the Saṅkrāntivādin's is weak. It seems quite possible that there may be some kind of contact between Śiva as manifestor and the soul's powers as manifested, without there being any transference.

[447] Although in the last verse the relevant meanings of *pauruṣa* and *śāmbhava* were 'caused by' or 'brought about by' the soul and Śiva, as evidenced by *puruṣakartṛka* and *īśvarakartṛka* in the commentary, here we want the more general meanings of 'connected with' the soul and Śiva, as will become clear in the course of the commentary on this and the next verse.

[448] Perhaps the idea is that liberation would be unconnected with the soul because the support (*āśraya*) of the omniscience and omnipotence, since they are the Lord's qualities, should still be the Lord even after liberation.

[449] I.e. both the soul and Śiva are needed for liberation to take place.

[450] The Saṅkrāntivādin argued (37ab) that for the Abhivyaktivādins liberation is *pauruṣa*

It inheres in the soul as object and it has the Supreme Lord as its agent; thus, because of its being connected with two causal factors, characterised by being the agent and being the object, liberation is referred to in [two] different ways—just as one may say (*iti*) 'the cooking of rice' or 'the cooking of Devadatta'.[451] And it is not correct that there can be no agency [on the part of the Lord] without transference.[452]

[Now] the proponent of the Siddhānta himself states that his own view is easily established.

> 39) Let it be manifestation that is accepted, for that is well-established[453] [to take place] when in the company of [various other] manifesting factors.[454] In this [view of manifestation] nothing unprecedented or difficult [to conceive] has to be posited.

It has been taught [above][455] that ***manifestation*** of the qualities of the self[456] is clearly (*hi*)[457] ***well-established*** [***to take place***] ***when in the company of*** [***various other***] ***manifesting factors***. Let that same [manifestation] ***be accepted*** [as what happens] in liberation too. It is my

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because it is brought about exclusively by the soul. The Abhivyaktivādin here asserts that in his view it is actually brought about exclusively by Śiva; its *pauruṣa* element derives from the soul being its locus, not from it being partially brought about by the soul. As can be inferred from the commentary, the background model here is a sentence such as *īśvaraḥ puruṣaṃ mocayati*, 'the Lord brings about the liberation of the soul', where liberation is seen to have the soul as its object and the Lord as its agent. The Saṅkrāntivādin would no doubt claim that the same is true of his doctrine; but from the Abhivyaktivādin's point of view the soul is not the object of liberation if the latter is brought about by transference of *the Lord's* qualities.

[451]One may say *puruṣasya mokṣaḥ*, 'the soul's liberation', and *īśvarasya mokṣaḥ*, 'liberation of, i.e. by, the Lord'.

[452]As the Saṅkrāntivādin argued in the commentary to 37ab. It is not correct, for His agency can consist in being the manifestor of the soul's liberation.

[453]We have conjectured *susiddhā* for *prasiddhā* because of *susādhanatām* in the introduction to the verse and *susiddhā* in the commentary after it.

[454]As support for our taking *vyañjakaiḥ saha* in this sense of *vyañjakasamavadhāne/vyañjakaiḥ sāhitye sati*, see *Mokṣakārikā* 62cd: *vyaṅgyavyaktir bhavet tāvad yāvad vyañjakasannidhiḥ*.

[455]Verse 31 and commentary ad loc.

[456]The phrase refers here to the powers of cognition and action.

[457]On Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of *hi* to express the obviousness of the contention, see note 460.

postulation that accords with examples;[458] and in it (*atra*) there is no unwanted consequence of having to search out [examples] and [justify them and] so forth, as there is in your position.[459]

3.9.15 The opponent does not accept purification of qualities even in liberation

The Saṅkrāntivādin asserts:

> 40ab) [We] do not accept [manifestation], since the qualities of souls are obviously (*hi*)[460] experienced as impure before [the soul becomes liberated].

For manifestation [takes place] of something [already] existing, by the recognition of its form, just as a pot or the like [may be made manifest] by, for example, a lamp.[461] But in this case, ***before*** [the attainment of] the

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[458]In the commentary to verse 31 the Siddhāntin gave examples such as (1) light leading to increased manifestation of objects, leading to increased manifestation of the power of cognition, and (2) cognition of a craft leading to increased skill in the faculties of action, leading to increased manifestation of the power of action. Elsewhere (ad 41b) he has spoken of the manifestation of the powers of the soul taking place when the Impurity that covers and obstructs them is removed, just like the removal of darkness by light.

[459]In the first half of this refutation of Saṅkrāntivāda we saw the Saṅkrāntivādin searching for one example after another; some of these were controversial in themselves, for example the transference of a universal into a newly arisen particular; others had to be twisted to make them parallel the case of transference of the Lord's qualities, for example the transference of a flame or a smell. Rāmakaṇṭha points out that there are, by contrast, well-established examples of qualities becoming manifest in the presence of manifesting factors, which thus illustrate that omniscience and omnipotence can become manifest due to the presence of the Lord as the manifesting factor.

[460]Both Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha use *hi*, as here, in clauses which already contain a reason-indicating ablative, *yataḥ* or *yena* (see WATSON 2006: 143, 239 and 345). For other examples in this text, see notes 437, 463, 536, 594, 709 and 774. Rather than assuming the *hi* to contribute nothing, we take it to express the obviousness of the contention. For more examples of Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's non-reason-giving uses of *hi*, see notes 96, 212, 255, 386, 405, 457, 648, verses 21, 32, 34 and 38, the commentary to this verse, and GOODALL et al. 2008: notes 47 and 53.

[461]Since the applicability of the concept of manifestation requires prior existence, recognition of something as having existed before is necessary for it to be regarded as manifest. When a lamp enables us to see a pot, if we recognise it as the same pot that we saw in that place before it was shrouded in darkness, then we can be sure that it is a previously existing pot that has just become manifest; without this recognition it could have just

condition of perfected [souls] (*siddhāvasthātaḥ pūrvam*), ***the qualities of souls*** are established to be ***impure***, [that is to say] having a limited scope (*kiñcidviṣayaḥ*). At liberation [by contrast] they are obviously (*hi*) known from scripture to be different from that, [i.e.] utterly pure, the same as [the qualities of] the Supreme Lord. Therefore (*iti*), since there is a difference between the [soul's qualities before and after liberation], there can be no recognition of [qualities that were there] prior [to liberation]; so we ***do not accept*** this manifestation [of previously existing qualities] at liberation.

The proponent of the Siddhānta says:

40cd) As for the soul, do [you] hold that it is experienced to be of that nature (viz. impure) prior [to liberation]?

Even in your view the soul (*pumān*) is impure [prior to liberation],[462] because obviously (*hi*)[463] now [viz. at liberation] it becomes a fitting recipient of the transference of the Lord's qualities.[464]

On this point [he imagines] the opinion of the opponent:

41a) If [you hold] (*cet*) that the [soul] (*sa*) is [impure prior to liberation, but is then] purified by a purificatory process,[465]

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arisen in that spot, or just been transferred there from elsewhere. Yet, as he will go on to argue, the qualities present at liberation are not recognised as those that existed earlier.

[462]Rāmakaṇṭha takes the question in the verse to be rhetorical, implying an affirmative answer.

One might have expected the Siddhāntin to reply to the previous half-verse (40ab) by arguing that the qualities of the soul are not impure prior to liberation. But the text goes in a different direction. The difference between the two disputants in the following discussion is that the Siddhāntin accepts that the qualities can be impure prior to liberation and then purified at liberation. The Saṅkrāntivādin rejects this possibility, and so holds that the soul must receive completely new qualities. (Of course the Siddhāntin, despite accepting 'purification of the qualities', will explain this as the removing of the covering that surrounds the qualities.) The point of Sadyojyotiḥ's switching of topic in this half-verse from the qualities of the soul to the soul itself is that he will point out the following inconsistency in the Saṅkrāntivādin's position: the Saṅkrāntivādin accepts that *the soul* can be impure prior to liberation and purified at liberation, so why does he not hold that the soul's *qualities* can be impure prior to liberation and then purified at liberation. It is just the non-acceptance of the latter that forces him to hold transference of the Lord's qualities; yet this non-acceptance is not consistent with his stance towards the soul itself.

[463]Another example of *hi* in combination with *yena* or *yataḥ*; see note 460.

[464]If the soul were already pure it would not need transference of any new qualities.

[465]The implication of the question in the previous half-verse (40cd) was: If you hold the

You may maintain that the [soul], though impure, is then (*tadānīm*) purified by the purificatory activity of the Lord [consisting in] initiation and so forth.

In that case, how is it that its qualities do not become pure in the same way, having everything within their scope?[466] This he says:

> 41b) why do [you] hold that the qualities are not likewise [purified]?

And it has been taught that [the liberated soul]'s qualities are not non-existent earlier.[467] When there is manifestation of the [soul's qualities] (*teṣām*), which exist [earlier], by the removal, as of darkness, of their covering that consists of ignorance, their [relative] purity or impurity, caused by the total or incomplete removal [of that covering], cannot disprove their non-difference [before and after liberation], since the [relative degrees of purity and impurity] exist in something other [than those qualities, i.e. in the covering].[468] Thus [your attempted] refutation of liberation through manifestation is not justified.

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soul to be impure prior to liberation, then it should never be able to become pure. For you hold that the qualities, since they are impure prior to liberation, can never become pure. The Saṅkrāntivādin gets himself out of this problem by appealing to the purification of the soul. But as we shall see, that propels him straight into the trap that the Siddhāntin has set, for the Siddhāntin can now reply: If you accept purification of the soul, why do you not accept purification of the qualities?

[466] Just as 'impure' in verse 40ab was glossed as 'having a limited scope' (*kiñcidviṣaya*), so 'pure' here is explained as 'having everything within their scope' (*sarvaviṣaya*).

In what sense does the Saṅkrāntivādin not hold that the soul's qualities become pure at liberation? In the sense that it is the Lord's qualities that the soul comes to adopt then, not his own ones in a purified form.

[467] Verse 31 and commentary ad loc.

[468] For a similar sentence to this, see the last sentence of the commentary to verse 32.

The argument against the Saṅkrāntivādin that he should accept the soul's qualities to be purified at liberation, because he is prepared to accept the soul to be purified then, came to an end with the last *pāda* (41b). The commentary since then has clarified that what the Siddhāntin means when he speaks of the purification of the qualities is the removal of the covering that surrounds and obstructs them. This addresses itself to the Saṅkrāntivādin's point in the commentary to 40ab, unanswered till now, that it cannot be the soul's qualities that become manifest at liberation, since they cannot be recognised as the same qualities as previously, given that previously they were impure and are now pure. The impossibility of recognition has now been removed, given that it has been shown that the difference in the purity of the qualities is not to do with any difference in the qualities themselves, but merely in the extent of the removal of their covering.

And in the doctrine of transference, purification of the soul could never occur.[469] This he says:

41cd) [In your view] the [liberated] soul has the same qualities [as it had when bound] now too. [So] how can it be completely pure?

Whatever qualities the ***soul*** (*ātmā* = *aṇuḥ*) had earlier, in the state of a bound soul, it should have exactly ***the same*** impure own ***qualities***[470] ***now too***. You do not hold that there is an improvement (*atiśayaḥ*) in the [soul]'s qualities (*tadguṇānām*) in liberation. So ***how could it be completely*** (*sarvathā*) ***purified***? The meaning is that it is not purified at all.[471]

[Saṅkrāntivādin:] Even though [we] do not accept that the [perfected soul]'s (*tasya*) own qualities[472] are purified then (i.e. at liberation), what we hold is that (*iṣyata eva*) purification [takes place] only of the substance (viz. the self), that being the locus of the transference of the qualities of the Lord.[473]

In response to this [tactic of the opponent], [Sadyojyotiḥ] mockingly says:

42ab) You are discovered to be fond indeed of substances (/ of material [wealth]) (*dravyapriyāḥ*), and are not at all in favour of qualities (/ virtues) (*guṇapriyāḥ*).[474]

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[469] This introduces a new argument. In the previous section the Saṅkrāntivādin was represented as holding that although the qualities are not purified, the soul is. Now the Siddhāntin maintains that the Saṅkrāntivādin cannot even justifiably hold that the soul is purified.

[470] The reason for the inclusion of the word 'own' (*sva*) is that it now has not only its own qualities but those of the Lord that have been transferred into it. The latter may be pure, but there is no reason for the former to be any different from how they were prior to liberation.

[471] It may have the pure qualities of the Lord, but if it retains its own impure qualities too, in what sense is it pure at all?

[472] It may seem awkwardly repetitive having both *tasya* and *ātma-* (and that may be the reason for one witness reading *tatra* for *tasya*), but the inclusion of both is justified given that the perfected soul now has both his own qualities (*ātmaguṇa*) and those of the Lord. *ātmaguṇa* here parallels *svaguṇa-* above. See also *yat tat saṃsārāvasthāyāṃ tasyātmīyaṃ jñatvakartṛtvam abhūt* in the passage from the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*'s refutation of Saṅkrāntivāda cited in note 477.

[473] So even if the self retains its own impure qualities, it itself *can* be purified, since it is the locus of the transference of the Lord's qualities.

[474] *Guṇapriya* and *dravyapriya* are puns. On the one hand they are a comment on the

The meaning here is as follows. Even if the qualities of the Supreme Lord are transferred, do the impure qualities of the substance that is the self exist then, or not? [You can]not [say], firstly, that they do not exist, since the view that [the powers of] cognition and action are destroyed is about to be refuted.[475] If they exist, are they limited in their scope, as before [liberation], or do they have everything within their scope? If they are limited in their scope, then we have already taught that[476] at that time too (i.e. after liberation) the [self] would be no more than an impure bound soul. You may say that (*atha*) they have all things within their scope as a result of the transference of the qualities of the Lord. If that is the case, there is indeed purification of the qualities [after the fashion] of our doctrine, and so how can your fondness for the purification of the self-substance alone and your reluctance to accept purification of the qualities be appropriate?[477] And [Sadyojyotiḥ's] mockery consists in [it being well-known that] partiality towards [good] qualities is appropriate among great people.[478]

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opponent's insistence on attaching purification to the self-substance but denying it of its qualities; on the other, they imply that he is attached to wealth and material things, not virtues.

[475]In verse 47 and the commentary thereon, during the rejection of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika position.

[476]In 41cd and the commentary thereon.

[477]Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:63, p.102,8–13: *yat tat saṃsārāvasthāyāṃ tasyātmīyaṃ jñatvakartṛtvam abhūt, tan muktyavasthāyām api yady asty amukta eva tadeti kim īśvaraguṇasaṅkrāntyādinā kalpitena. atha vinaṣṭam ity ucyate, na tarhi nityaḥ puruṣaḥ, jñatvakartṛtvayor vināśāt tadvyatirekeṇānyasya puṃso 'saṃvedanāc ceti svāgamavirodhaḥ.* 'As for the [soul]'s own cognition and agency that it had in the state of *saṃsāra*, if they exist in the state of liberation also, it would not actually be liberated then, so what is the point of postulating the transference of the Lord's qualities etc. If [you] say that they cease, then the soul would not be eternal, because of the cessation of its cognition and agency and because we do not experience the soul to be anything other than that [cognition and agency], so there would be a contradiction by your own scriptures'.

[478]See the following verse (2:5) from Bhāravi's *Kirātārjunīya*: *iyam iṣṭaguṇāya rocatāṃ rucirārthā bhavate 'pi bhāratī | nanu vaktṛviśeṣaniḥspṛhā guṇagṛhyā vacane vipaścitaḥ ||* '[Draupadī:] May this speech [of mine], replete with beautiful meanings, be pleasing to you too, who are concerned with qualities. For are not the wise attracted by the good qualities in a speech, [and] indifferent to whoever might be the speaker (i.e. whether a woman, a scholar, a child, etc.)?' Here *guṇagṛhya* conveys a similar meaning to *guṇapakṣapātin* in our text.

3.9.16 Saṅkrāntivāda entails non-duality with Śiva

He states another fault [in the argumentation] of the proponents of transference.

> 42cd) Or [alternatively we may point out that] [you], wise one, have lost, in as much as you did not postulate [earlier in the debate] the soul to be derived from Śambhu.[479]

And you have forgotten this, [namely] that [you] do not resort to non-duality with the Lord, ***in as much as***[480] [elsewhere you] do not postulate the soul to be related to Śambhu, [which means here] a transformation of Him.[481] [But] in liberation clearly (*tāvat*)[482] since [the soul] has the qualities of the [Lord], non-duality with Him is well-nigh accepted. That is the meaning.

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[479] I.e. You have lost the debate (literally, 'by [you] who are wise a losing has been done (*kṣatam*)'), because you have ended up contradicting the position you adopt elsewhere, that the soul is not derived from Śambhu. Or, if we want to read into the verse a closer echo of the commentary's point that the opponent has forgotten that he does not resort to non-duality, 'in your wisdom you have lost [your earlier position], in as much as ...'. Rāmakaṇṭha could then be interpreting *kṣatam* as 'lost [from your memory]'.

Kṣataṃ vā is a conjecture. Other conjectures we considered were *kṣīṇaṃ vā* or *kṣaṇaṃ vā vismṛtaṃ*. It is also possible that *kṣaṇaṃ vā vaiduṣī* could be retained: 'Or was your wisdom [only] momentarily existent, since you did not [earlier] postulate the soul to be derived from Śambhu.'

The following half-verse from the *Mokṣakārikā* (134ab), where Sadyojyotiḥ uses a similar expression (in arguing against the Vedāntins), is perhaps evidence for retaining *viduṣā* in our verse, the reading of the manuscripts, not *vaiduṣī*, the reading of the editions: *kḷptaḥ kim iti vidvadbhir abhedo niṣpramāṇakaḥ* | 'Why do [you] who are wise postulate non-difference, which lacks valid means of knowledge?'

[480] The *yena* is explaining not why the Saṅkrāntivādin has forgotten, but rather the sense in which he does not resort to non-duality. Another possibility is that it means 'by which [principle] (viz. *advaitānāśrayaṇena*) [you] do not postulate the soul to be ...'. If this is the preferred interpretation of the commentary, then the verse could be brought into line with it by understanding a *tat* to go with *kṣatam*: 'In your wisdom you have lost [that principle] by virtue of which [you] do not postulate the soul to be derived from Śambhu'.

[481] In the way that a pot is a transformation of clay and is thus non-different from clay. Why does Saṅkrāntivāda involve the view that the soul is a transformation of the Lord? Because if the Lord's qualities actually pass into the soul and become the soul's qualities, then the soul is, at least partly, constituted out of the 'stuff' of the Lord.

[482] For this meaning of *tāvat*, see *Tantrālokaviveka* ad 23:73cd-74ab: *avipratipattidyotakas tāvacchabdaḥ*, 'The word *tāvat* indicates non-disagreement.' We thank Harunaga Isaacson for the suggested meaning and the reference.

3.10 Cessation of Everything, as advocated by the Buddhists: verse 43

So having accomplished, in the section that has just ended (*iyatā*),[483] the refutation of the view of transference, he now refutes (*tiraskaroti*) the view that all is destroyed.

3.10.1 The Saiddhāntika Argument from Memory

43) An old man can certainly[484] remember things that he saw in childhood [and] in youth. Therefore the soul must be stable between birth and death.[485]

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[483] On *tad iyatā*, literally 'so ... with this much', see note 79.

[484] Alternatively, *dṛḍham* could mean 'firmly' in the sense of 'easily, clearly.' But Rāmakaṇṭha's rephrasing of *saṃsmared dṛḍham* as *saṃsmartuṃ śakto dṛṣṭaḥ* makes it more likely that he took it in the way we have translated.

[485] Several witnesses suggest the reading *-prayāṇa-* for *-prāyaṇa-*, but our best manuscript reads *-prāyaṇa-* and the expression *janmaprāyaṇa* is not uncommon; see for example *Yogabhāṣya* ad 2:13.

This argument from memory occurs frequently in the texts of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta in the context of refuting the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) or that of non-self (*anātmavāda*). It is clearly an important argument for Sadyojyotiḥ, this being the only verse he writes to refute the Buddhist doctrine of liberation (although he devotes many more verses to refuting the Buddhists in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* and he does not use this argument there). But in the subsequent history of the Śaiva Siddhānta, Sadyojyotiḥ's followers granted this argument less importance. See Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's remark, *dṛśyate ca śaiśavādyanubhūtaṃ yauvanasthāvirādyavasthāsu smaryamāṇam. sā ceyam atītānubhavasmṛtiḥ kṣaṇikatāṃ vijñānasya nirasyati, na tu sthirasvabhāvam ātmānam anumāpayati tasya svasaṃvedanasiddhasya svānubhūtyekapramāṇatvāt* (*Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:25ab, p. 91). 'And we observe that [pleasure, pain, etc.] experienced in childhood, say, is remembered in [later] stages of life such as adolescence or old age. And this memory of past experience refutes the momentariness of cognition; but it does not allow us to infer a self of stable nature, because the latter, which is established through self-awareness, has self-awareness as its only means of being known.'

By this stage of the history of Indian philosophy (c. 920–970 AD), Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's idea that cognition is aware of itself had become well-known, and Śaiva authors such as Utpaladeva and Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, in the same way as the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, applied the claim of self-awareness to the self (see WATSON 2006: 98–103 and WATSON 2010a). Self-awareness became, for Saiddhāntikas from Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha onwards, the only means of knowing the self; though through inference one can know that cognition is not momentary.

Since ***an old man*** is seen to be capable of remembering ***things*** experienced[486] in the states of childhood etc., we know ***therefore***, [i.e.] from the fact that this memory occurs, that the self [that has it] is permanent. For if the perceiver were at every moment different [from the perceiver at the previous moment], then no memory of an object experienced by a previous perceiver (*anyena*) would arise in a subsequent perceiver (*anyasya*), just as [there is none] in Caitra [of an object experienced by] Maitra. But we *do* observe here[487] memory at a later time of things experienced at an earlier time, and so there [must] be permanence.

3.10.2 Buddhist Response to the Saiddhāntika Argument from Memory

3.10.2.1 Memory is not capable of proving non-difference [Buddhist:] First of all, surely even you, who teach that there is direct experience of an enduring self, hold that there is a difference between experiencing and remembering.[488] For experience is not the same as memory for you either,

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[486]-*anubhūtān* glosses *dṛṣṭān*.

[487]I.e. in this example of the old man remembering.

[488]Two questions arise in connection with this sentence. (1) The Buddhist assertion here of difference (*bheda*) is intended to oppose the Saiddhāntika claim of permanence, which ended his argument (*ity ataḥ sthairyam*). But surely it was clear that the Saiddhāntika intended permanence of the *subject* of experience and memory. So why does the Buddhist respond by asserting the difference between experience and memory? Two answers could be given to this question: (A) The Buddhist does not actually think that the Saiddhāntika argument in any way implies, or commits the Saiddhāntika to, the non-difference of memory and experience; it is just the Buddhist strategy to first (in this section 3.10.2) establish difference on the level of mental events *cittavṛttis*, so that when he then argues in the next section (3.10.2.2) that there is no self beyond *cittavṛttis*, the self is well and truly disproved. (B) The Buddhist does think that the Saiddhāntika does not fully respect the difference between memory and experience: for if *smṛti* and *anubhava* are different, then it follows on Buddhist presuppositions that the *smartṛ* and the *anubhavitṛ* are different, yet the Saiddhāntika conflated these by referring to both as the *draṣṭṛ*, and by his conclusion of permanence. For the Buddhist it is impossible for there to be sameness on the level of the subject of cognition, without there being sameness on the level of the cognitions themselves.

(2) The sentence implies (with its use of *api*, 'even') that there is a contrast between teaching that there is direct experience of an enduring self and holding that experience and memory are different. But why does teaching the former imply that one might not hold the latter? No definite answer is forthcoming, but the following is a possibility. In order to experience a stable self, one must in the present moment experience that self's existence

otherwise it would undesirably follow that all mental events were the same.[489] And there being some difference between the two, you too certainly require that the old man's memory now (viz. in old age), which has as its content (*-viṣayā*) his [earlier] experience or the object experienced [earlier] by him, is brought about by a trace left in the mind, produced by the operation of the past experience,[490] since the self cannot be admitted to have traces left in it, since that would entail that it would be subject to modification [and therefore insentient].[491] But because the mind-streams of Caitra and Maitra cannot be causes for the production of traces in each other, you [too] accept that memory arises from the laying down of a trace only by an experience that falls within the same mind-stream [as the memory, not by one that falls in a different mind-stream];[492] so how is non-difference [between the earlier

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not only now but also in the past (for if one only experienced its existence now, how would one know that one was experiencing something stable not momentary?). But an experience of its existence in the past should not properly be called experience (*anubhāva*) at all, but rather memory.

[489]The standard list of *cittavṛttis*, or *buddhivṛttis*, in the Śaiva Siddhānta is: *kḷptiḥ, matiḥ, smṛtiḥ*. See *Bhogakārikā* 46d–47a: *bodho vṛttir mater matā* ‖ *kḷptir matiḥ smṛtiś ceti* (where *mateḥ* = *buddheḥ*). But since the *Yogasūtra*'s list of *cittavṛttis* begins with *pramāṇa* (1.6: *pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā, smṛti*), and since it is therefore likely to be that list that Rāmakaṇṭha has in mind below when he writes, *nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayavyayasaṃvedane* (section 3.10.3.2), it is probable that it is that list that is to be borne in mind here too.

[490]It is possible that *vṛtti* is here used as short for *cittavṛtti* (an expression used in the previous sentence) and that *-anubhavavṛtti-* is a *karmadhāraya*: 'the [cognitive] event that is the experience'.

[491]The point is that memory, being linked with past experience in either of the two ways mentioned, must be brought about through traces of that past experience. These traces, furthermore, since their maturation modifies their substrate, cannot be located in the self, so must therefore be located in the mind. This second stage of the argument is indeed one that Rāmakaṇṭha himself uses, when writing as the Siddhāntin. See for example *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 17:2: *sa* (= *saṃskāraḥ*) *ca nātmani sambhavati, avikāritvāt ...

experiencer and the later rememberer] established in this [argument based on memory]?[493]

3.10.2.2 There is no self separate from mental events

3.10.2.2.1 The self is not perceived If [you, the Saiddhāntika, argue that] the non-difference that is established in this [argument from memory] is [not of the mind, but] of a self beyond [transitory] mental events, that is not justifiable, since we do not experience this [self] separate from mental events. For what is perceived is this one single consciousness that has many forms, such as joy, sorrow etc.[494]

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experienced by Maitra. But this sentence indicates that the reason why no memory arises in this case of Caitra and Maitra is not because of absence of sameness (*sthairya* / *abheda*), but rather because Caitra's memories only arise from traces of his own experiences, since Maitra's (or anyone else's) stream cannot produce a trace in Caitra's stream. Thus absence of sameness does not preclude memory.

[493]How has the Buddhist argument progressed in this paragraph? It is opposing the idea of a permanent, unchanging self that has access to all memories and experiences. By pointing out that memories are not the same as experiences, the Buddhist shows that the former, unlike the latter, must involve traces. A permanent self is not enough to explain memory, for traces are required to play a rôle as that which preserves the original experience so as to make it available to be remembered, and as that which triggers a subsequent memory. Once the necessary involvement of traces is accepted, it will also be accepted that memory only results from traces of experience that fall within the same stream as the memory. But that means that we now have a perfectly good explanation, which has nothing to do with absence of stability, for why memory does not arise in Caitra for something experienced by Maitra: namely that Caitra's mind-stream cannot contain traces of Maitra's experiences. This means that absence of stability does not necessarily preclude memory, which means that we cannot conclude stability from the fact of memory.

So the paragraph starts off by asserting that even if you Saiddhāntikas accept a permanent self, you must still accept that memory is different from experience and hence requires traces. But it then, by showing how traces can explain both the arising of memory within one person and the non-arising of memory across two people, undermines the argument for a permanent self. It can at that point conclude 'so how is non-difference established?', for we have then arrived at a model involving not a permanent, non-different subject, but a highly differentiated mind-stream, one which contains experiences, traces produced by those experiences, and memories produced by the operation of those traces. Given that this model can account for memory (and that the Saiddhāntika should accept as much), memory cannot lead us to conclude the non-difference of experiencer and rememberer.

[494]The Buddhist calls a stream of consciousness one thing here, but it has a plural form of course. The force of the word 'one' is that there is consciousness alone, not some further self in which consciousness inheres in addition to that.

3.10.2.2.2 It cannot be shown to be concomitant with anything else Or if [you, the Saiddhāntika, say that] the non-difference that is established in this [argument] is of an inferred soul which is not [directly] experienced (*asaṃvedanasya*), that is even more absurd [because such a soul could not be inferred], since nothing at all[495] can be established to have concomitance with that [kind of self, it being] imperceptible.

3.10.2.2.3 It cannot be inferred through *anyathānupapatti* And the self cannot be inferred on the grounds that it would be impossible otherwise to account for some effect,[496] since its [supposed] effects, such as memory, can be [otherwise] accounted for in the way that has just been stated.[497]

3.10.2.2.4 Who is the inferrer? And [you] will also have to explain who the inferrer of this [self] is. It cannot be the mind, since [you] hold that to be insentient.[498] And if [you] say that the [mind], although not a sentient

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Rāmakaṇṭha is here paraphrasing Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (ad 1:24cd, p. 25,6): *ekaṃ evedaṃ saṃvidrūpaṃ harṣaviṣādādyanekākāravivartaṃ paśyāmaḥ*. He quotes it exactly in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 6:19c–21b and 6:22cd; and in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:6ab (p. 17). His father quotes it exactly in the *Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:24 (see STERN 1991: 159).

[495] Whether memory or anything else.

[496] The previous argument about the impossibility of establishing concomitance for something which is never perceived does not rule out all inferences. Both disputants accept the validity of the inference of the existence of the sense faculties, although these are not perceptible. Hence the Buddhist now explains why even this kind of inference is not possible in the case of the self.

[497] In section 3.10.2.1. The explanation of memory given there is one that would be accepted by the Saiddhāntika: an experience leaves a trace, which on coming to fruition produces a memory with either the past experience, or the experienced object, as its content.

Proktavat is a way of expressing 'in the way that (/ as) has been stated' that appears to be unusual outside the works of Rāmakaṇṭha and Aghoraśiva: we find another instance below (see section 3.10.6), and three occurrences of the equally unusual *uktavat* (see notes 727, 872 and 900).

[498] *Citta*, or *buddhi*, evolves out of insentient matter for the Śaivas, as for the Sāṅkhyas. We see here that the Buddhist (for whom *citta* is certainly not insentient) is arguing from a Śaiva point of view. There will be several other clear examples of this below, and we have seen some already, for example, the Buddhist's assertion that traces cannot exist in the self on the grounds that that would mean the self would be subject to modification. Indeed Rāmakaṇṭha would probably also agree to the contentions in all three of the paragraphs

entity, has consciousness through contact with a [sentient entity],[499] that is wrong, for consciousness cannot arise in what is not a sentient entity through contact with a sentient entity, and so [the mind] would not be of the nature of consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were [held to be] of the nature of consciousness, then it alone would be the self, since it would illuminate (*prakāśakatvāt*), so what would be the point of a further entity?[500]

3.10.2.2.5 Anything that can be inferred is 'other', and thus cannot be the self And as for[501] that which is inferred, that cannot be appropriately regarded as the self, since the illuminator and things illuminated by that are [respectively] self and other. For what shines forth of itself is the self, what is illuminated by that is other than it;[502] there is no con-

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preceding this one, namely that we do not experience any self separate from cognition (see section 3.10.3.1 below and WATSON 2010b: 84–89 and 2006: 215–216), that the self cannot be inferred (see note 502) and that it cannot be known through *arthāpatti*.

[499]The Buddhist imagines here that the Śaiva may use the Sāṅkhya idea that because of the *buddhi*'s contact with the sentient soul, it becomes as if sentient. See *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 20ab: *tasmāt tatsaṃyogād acetanaṃ cetanāvad iva liṅgaṃ* (on which place the *Yuktidīpikā* quotes the following, *cetanādhiṣṭhitā buddhiś cetaneva vibhāvyate* |); and, for a reference to this idea in the literature of the Saiddhāntikas, *Bhogakārikā* 74ab: *acic ca* [M^Y; *acitaś* E_V] *citisambandhād bhogyam ābhāti cetanam*.

[500]If the mind were held to be conscious, then it could perform all of the tasks that a self is supposed to perform, so it would certainly have no grounds for inferring some further self beyond itself. That the Buddhist would be prepared to call it a self is not to concede ground to the Saiddhāntika, for the designated entity would be plural, not unchanging: Buddhist ontology would be accepted, with a mere label borrowed from his opponent.

The Buddhist shows in this paragraph that the mind could not be the inferrer of the self. But could not the self infer itself; why does he not consider that possibility? The self of which we are currently speaking is one which is admitted to be unexperienceable, merely inferrable (see *asaṃvedanasyātmano 'numeyasya* in section 3.10.2.2.2). Hence for the Saiddhāntika to assert here that it infers itself would be like alleging that angels can never be experienced while asserting that they can be inferred by themselves. On the one hand it would assume the existence of that whose existence stands in need of being proved. On the other hand, if a self that is *not experienced by us* is able to know the self through inference, it is not clear that *we* would thereby know the self—just as the angels' knowledge of themselves through inference would not pass on to us.

[501]The *api* marks a change of focus from the inferrer to the inferred.

[502]Again (see note 498) we see that the Buddhist is clearly arguing not from his own point of view but from that of his Śaiva opponent. That the self 'shines forth of itself' is Rāmakaṇṭha's view, meaning that it reveals itself without requiring a *manas* or sense faculties, let alone inferential marks (see WATSON 2006: 103–104 and 2010a: 304). This talk of the self may sound odd in the mouth of the Buddhist, unless we recognise that

what the Buddhist is doing throughout this whole section (3.10.2) is pointing to what the Saiddhāntikas should accept based on their own doctrines and arguments.

How about the idea that the self cannot be inferred because it is always that which shines forth, never that which is illuminated? Is this a Saiddhāntika view? This is not easy to answer. Certainly Rāmakaṇṭha was doubtful about the possibility of inferring the self. See *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:2, p. 4,8–9: *svata evānumeyatvānupapatteḥ* [*evānumeya-* conj. ISAACSON; *eva svānumeya-* E_P; *eva vānumeya-* E_K, B]; 'because [the self] cannot be inferred by *itself*'. But he has to comment on verses from within his tradition that do assert that the self is inferred, and although he sometimes downgrades or re-interprets these assertions (for example in section 3.10.6 below), he does not always do so. See for example *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 6:16–18b, where he interprets the verse's *anumīyate ... ātmā* as meaning what it seems to mean.

Furthermore even if we take the view expressed in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, that the self cannot be inferred by itself, as representative, Rāmakaṇṭha does not necessarily have the precise point in mind there that it can never be *anumeya / prakāśya* because it can only ever be the *anumātā / prakāśaka*. We do find precisely this point in the *Mṛgendravṛtti* by Rāmakaṇṭha's father (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:4ab, p. 153, 1–12). In fact it seems likely that Rāmakaṇṭha, in this paragraph of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, is basing himself on that passage:

siddhāv api vā anumīyamānasyātmano devadattādivat paratvaṃ prasajyate. yat kila svayaṃ prakāśate sa evātmā, tatprakāśyas tu para iti viviktatayātmaparabhāvasya prakāśamānasyaiva saṃkaro 'navasthānaṃ ca syāt. tad uktam:

> *ātmā yadi bhaven meyas tasya mātā bhavet paraḥ |*
> *para ātmā tadānīṃ syāt sa paro yas tu mīyate ||*

'Or even if an inferred self were established, it would undesirably follow that it was other, like Devadatta or such like. The relation of self and other—[whose relata] certainly appear distinctly in such a way that (*iti*) whatever on the one hand (*kila*) shines forth of itself, that alone is the self, whatever is illuminated by that, by contrast, is other—would be confused and would be subject to infinite regress. Thus it has been said:

> If the self were inferred, its inferrer would be other. Then that other would
> be the self, [and] that which is inferred would be other.'

This is not evidence, however, that this is a Saiddhāntika view, for it is stated there by a Cārvāka opponent. The passage, including the cited verse, has been copied from the *Mṛgendravṛtti* into two later Saiddhāntika texts, the *Pauṣkaravṛtti* by Jñānaprakāśa (p. 334), and the *Śataratnollekhinī* ad *Śataratnasaṅgraha* 18 (see the edition by GOODALL 2004: 516). But in both cases it is again attributed to a Cārvāka opponent.

So it may be that this line of argumentation was one that the Saiddhāntikas put into the mouths of their opponents but did not themselves assert. Nevertheless we know that Rāmakaṇṭha (and Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha: see note 485) was sceptical about the inferability of the self, and we also know that he maintains the complete separation of *grāhaka* and *grāhya*, so it is not unlikely that he maintains the complete separation of *prakāśaka* and *prakāśya*. We know that he adhered to the former because, for example, we see him arguing in the *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 1:15 that cognition, pleasure, pain and the like cannot be qualities of the perceiver

fusion [between the two].[503] In that way (*evam*),[504] the natures of self and other would be confused, since everything, both what is other and not other, would become the self.[505]

'because they are, like pots and the like, experienced as having the property opposite to that of the [perceiver], i.e. as being objects of perception' (*buddhisukhaduḥkhādīnāṃ ... ghaṭāder iva grāhyatvena tadviruddhadharmatayānubhavāt*). See also his argument in this text (section 3.13.5.3) that the Lord cannot share a continuous nature with other selves because He appears to Himself as completely separate from them in that He is their perceiver (*so 'pi hi svasaṃvedanena parātmabhyo bhedenaitadgrahītṛtayā bhāsate yataḥ*). We know furthermore that he maintains the complete separation of inferrer and inferred. Frequently when opposing the Vedāntins he argues that the self, since it is the inferrer of other selves, can be known to be distinct from those other selves, because it is the *anumātṛ* and they are *anumeya* (see note 788). Since he relies in those arguments on the complete separation of *anumātṛ* and *anumeya* (see *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:52: *na cānumeyo 'numātā, anumātā vānumeya eva yugapad eva sambhavati, atyantabhedād ity uktam. atas tayor bheda eva yuktaḥ*), it would not be surprising if he held that separation to be the cause of the impossibility of inferring the self. And it would not be surprising if he held that separation to be simply a special case of the separation of *prakāśaka* and *prakāśya*. All of the elements of the argument we are looking at, even if they do not occur together except in the mouth of his opponents, occur separately when he is writing as the Siddhāntin.

Furthermore the argument is presented as Śaiva in the Śaiva chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* (p.181). As GOODALL (2004: 516) has noted, that text draws on the *Mṛgendravṛtti* passage quoted above, including the cited verse, yet presents the argument not as Cārvāka, but rather as a Śaiva means of refuting the Naiyāyikas, whom it characterises as holding that the self is *prakāśya*.

The source of the cited verse (*ātmā yadi bhaven meyaḥ ...*) is *Saṃvitprakāśa* 2:6 (we thank Harunaga ISAACSON for this information). The fact that the verse comes from that text by Vāmanadatta (which SANDERSON (2007: 280) argues should actually bear the title *Viṣṇustuti*), indicates that it may have been the Pāñcarātrikas who were the originators of this particular argument.

[503]There is a firm dividing line between the two; one thing cannot be both. This complete separation of perceiver and perceived is also (in addition to the many examples so far pointed out in the annotation to this speech of the Buddhist) at odds, if not with all forms of Buddhism, at least with the strand most often attacked by Rāmakaṇṭha, that of Dharmakīrti and his followers, who maintained the non-difference of perceiver and perceived (*grāhyagrāhakābheda*), and also with the views of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas, who seem to be the source of Rāmakaṇṭha's exposition of this Buddhist speaker's own view (section 2.15).

[504]I.e. if it were the case that the self were inferred.

[505]Whatever is *prakāśya* is necessarily other than the self, but whatever is inferred is *prakāśya*, so if the self were inferred, it would have to be not only self, but also other, which infringes the principle of the complete separation of these two.

3.10.2.2.6 The shining forth of cognition must be accepted And it is not the case that what is illuminated (viz. the object) can be established without an illuminator being established,[506] as a result of which it might have been possible [for you] not to accept the shining forth of cognition even without the self being perceptible.[507] The whole universe would

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[506]The Buddhist here puts forward a principle of Dharmakīrti's, which Rāmakaṇṭha also accepts. At the corresponding place in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, that is to say at the end of the Buddhist refutation of the knowability of the self through inference, just before Rāmakaṇṭha responds with his own view, the Buddhist articulates this principle (which underlines the common structure of the argumentation in both texts) and quotes this famous line of Dharmakīrti's: *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati* (*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:54cd); 'For someone whose cognition is not perceived, the seeing [even] of objects is not established.'

[507]The meaning is: if it were not for the fact that establishment of (which, as we can see from the Dharmakīrti verse in the previous note, means essentially awareness of) an object requires establishment of (/ awareness of) the cognition of that object, it might be open to you to deny that cognition shines forth, i.e. is perceived; you might concede our point that the self is not perceived, yet claim that neither is cognition. But since the mere fact that we perceive objects shows that we perceive that which illuminates those objects, we must be aware of cognition.

Why is it so important to the Buddhist that cognition is perceived? The reason is that the failure of the inference of the self depends on the existence of cognition as that which explains the things that the self is held to explain. The reason that memory cannot establish the self is that cognition and traces can, and these are already accepted even by the Saiddhāntika, whereas the self is unperceived and unestablished. But if cognition were not established the self would be just as good a candidate.

We have conjectured *'bhyupagamyeteti* for *'bhyupagamyata iti*. It is true that there is another instance of this kind of construction in this text transmitted with an indicative: *na ca ... yatpraptāv īśvarād ādhikyaṃ muktau varṇyate* (section 3.4.1). But we have conjectured an optative there too (*varṇyeta*); hence some defence of these two decisions is in order. (1) The optative is much more natural in this kind of construction. For three examples from Rāmakaṇṭha's writings, see *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 2:6: *na ca ... yena ... vyabhicāraḥ sambhāvyeta*; *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 5:10ab *na tv ... yena ... kṣayaḥ sambhāvyeta*; and in this text, section 3.10.5: *na ca ... yena bhrāntatā bhavet*. (2) *eta* is frequently corrupted by scribes into *ate*. Confusion is particularly easy in Śāradā, where the *e-mātrā* floats unattached above the letters and so slippage to one side or the other is easy both in reading and in writing. Though this can account for the corruption of *varṇyeta* to *varṇyate*, it might be objected that the corruption of *gamyeteti* to *gamyata iti* cannot wholly be explained in this manner. But we regard the repeated sounds and letters in *gamyeteti* as potentially confusing, both phonetically and graphically, and hence as possibly even more liable to corruption. Furthermore in birch-bark manuscripts, which were the principal medium used in earlier centuries in Kashmir, there are horizontal dark marks in the bark which can occlude the vowel markings.

thus (viz. because of your accepting awareness of neither the self nor cognition) become blind.[508] If, while the self is not established to be that which shines forth, the shining forth of cognition (*cittaprakāśaḥ*)[509] is accepted, then the flow of cognitions, which has the capacity to illuminate [and so can perform the function that the self is supposed to, but] which certainly arises and perishes, should be accepted to be the self: what is the use of [trying] to establish in this [argument concerning the old man's memory] the eternality of a self beyond that, which is [itself] completely unproven?

3.10.3 Rāmakaṇṭha's own view

3.10.3.1 Rāmakaṇṭha's overlap with Buddhism [Siddhāntin:] True, experience is not the same as memory. And true, memory arises from a cognitive trace which is not situated in some other stream, [but] falls in the same stream [as the rememberer] [and] has been put there by the power of the operation of an experience or such like.[510] And what you have said, viz. that a self-witnessing self beyond cognition does not exist, is certainly true.[511] For it

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[508]Since the non-awareness of an illuminator would mean the non-awareness of any illuminated objects.

[509]We switch between 'mind' and 'cognition' in translating *citta*. As pointed out in note 511, the word *citta* is used in several different senses in this passage, for example to refer to the faculty that produces cognition as well as to different types of, or conceptions of, cognition itself; we have not found it desirable to stick to one English word for all of its uses.

[510]Thus Rāmakaṇṭha agrees with all of the Buddhist argumentation in section 3.10.2.1 above. A small but insignificant difference between what was asserted there and what is agreed to here is that there it was the experience that was said to fall in the same stream as the memory, whereas here it is the trace that is agreed to fall in the same stream as the memory.

Just as the compound *-anubhavavṛtti-* in that section could be a *karmadhāraya*, with *vṛtti* used as short for *cittavṛtti* (see note 490), so here too *anubhavādivṛtti-* could mean 'a [cognitive] event such as experience'.

[511]Thus Rāmakaṇṭha agrees with the Buddhist argument in section 3.10.2.2.1. In fact the Buddhist there spoke of a self beyond *cittavṛttis*, not beyond *citta* per se. And he did not explicitly deny its existence; he merely asserted that we do not experience such a thing. As to why both Rāmakaṇṭha and the Buddhist assent to this extra step of denying its existence: they both hold, as we shall see in the rest of this paragraph, that experience should be that which establishes what is the case; and they both hold that the self is the kind of thing that, if existent, we would expect to experience (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*), as Rāmakaṇṭha writes when dealing with the non-perceptibility of a self beyond cognition in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (introduction to 1:5, p. 8).

is not correct for those who try to establish [truth] to establish it disregarding experience.[512] It is exactly that (viz. experience) which establishes [truth], and if you cast that aside, what is then not cast aside?[513] So that [experience], whose nature is such that we cannot deny it,[514] should be investigated.[515]

Citta has been used in this passage in several different senses. When the Buddhist stated that *citta* is held (by the Saiddhāntikas) to be insentient (section 3.10.2.2.4) it denoted the Saiddhāntika conception of the *buddhi* or the cognition produced by the *buddhi*. Occasionally it has been used to denote the Buddhist conception of a stream of consciousness (see *caitramaitracittapravāha-* in section 3.10.2.1). But here it cannot be used in either of those senses, for Rāmakaṇṭha certainly would not agree that there is no self beyond the *buddhi* or its cognition or beyond a Buddhist *cittapravāha*. As demonstrated by WATSON (2006: 349–382), Rāmakaṇṭha uses the word *jñāna* to refer to two different things; the cognition of the *buddhi* and the cognition of the self. It seems that he uses *citta* in this double sense too, for in this sentence it must refer to the self's cognition (which for Rāmakaṇṭha is not different from the self).

[512]Since in the next sentence experience (*anubhava*) is described as *vyavasthāpaka*, we wondered if *vyavasthāpaka* in this sentence refers to *pramāṇa*s rather than people: 'For it is not correct to establish [means of knowledge] that establish [truth] disregarding experience.' But in a sentence in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:5) Rāmakaṇṭha clearly uses the word to refer to people: *na hi pratidarśanaṃ vyavasthāpakānāṃ sarvapramāṭṛṇām anubhavabhedaḥ sambhavati, tasya svabhāvasiddhatvāt*, 'For the direct experience of all knowers who set out / establish [views] in the different philosophical traditions cannot differ, because it (i.e. direct experience) is established [entirely] by [its] own nature [not at all by the mental conditioning of knowers]'. Although the meaning of that sentence is not the same as this one, it is not unrelated (both giving reasons for why *anubhava* should be investigated) and it occurs in the exactly corresponding part of that text (that in which Rāmakaṇṭha has begun to respond to the Buddhist and is about to give the rhetorical passage beginning in three sentences time with *kiṃ pratikṣaṇam* that occurs almost identically in both texts); it is highly likely that he is using *vyavasthāpaka* to refer to the same thing here (but then goes on in the next sentence to say that the real *vyavasthāpaka* is experience).

Ananubhava, found in the editions and M_2, was perhaps an interlinear gloss of *anubhavam apahnutya*, subsequently mistaken for part of the text.

[513]On the evidence of the editions alone, the meaning of this sentence would have remained opaque.

[514]Rāmakaṇṭha uses *anubhava* in the sense that the Dharmakīrtians use it, to refer to non-conceptual experience. 'We cannot deny it' in the sense that it gives irrefutable knowledge; for it occurs prior to, and so is unmediated by, concepts that the knower subsequently superimposes upon it.

[515]The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* reads (ad 1:5, p.13): *tat sa evāyaṃ sakalalokaprasiddhaḥ svānubhavo nirūpyatām.*

Rāmakaṇṭha thus agrees with the Buddhist (1) that the way things appear to us in (non-conceptual) experience should be the determinant of what is true, and (2) that no self beyond cognition is given to us in that experience. His position is that the self is not

3.10.3.2 Does the perceiver appear as permanent or momentary (*sthiragrāhakaprakāśa* or *bhinnagrāhakaprakāśa*)? Does the perceiver[516] shine forth as different from the previous and subsequent moments [of itself], continually new in each moment, its form appearing only for a moment, or [does it shine forth as] always the same?[517]

With regard to that question (*tatra*),[518] this stable shining forth, which is ever-present (*sarvadaiva*), is established for every person (*pratipuruṣam*) through self-awareness, not sensing a division of its own nature even though its delimiters, namely perceived objects, do differ (*grāhyopādhibhede 'pi*); having no sense of any non-existence—before it [comes into being] or [after] it is destroyed—associated with it[519] even in all three times;[520] even though experiencing the rise and fall of many mental events, which are of various kinds beginning with means of knowledge,[521] its experience of the stability of the perceiver of those unshaken; its radiance uninterrupted even between thoughts; its self-consciousness unbroken even in deep sleep and other [states of apparent non-consciousness such as fainting, coma]; being conveyed by the word 'self' because it is constantly perceived as the shining forth of oneself / itself. So what is the need of any other means of proving it?[522]

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different from cognition. Hence the crucial question that must now be addressed is whether cognition is experienced as momentary (in which case there is no self) or continuous (in which case it can be termed the self).

[516]Which for both Rāmakaṇṭha and the Buddhists (unlike for the Naiyāyikas) is simply cognition (*jñāna*, *vijñāna*) / experience (*anubhava*).

[517]The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *kiṃ pratyarthaṃ pratikṣaṇaṃ cāpūrvo 'pūrvaḥ pūrvottarābhyām anubhavābhyāṃ bhinnaḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpāvabhāso grāhakaḥ prakāśata uta sarvadaivābhinna iti.*

[518]Or: 'Of these two possibilities'.

[519]We have chosen the reading *tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāva-*, and not *tiraskṛtasvaprāgabhāva-*, despite the *-svagata-* being slightly awkward, on the grounds that it is the reading of our best witness M^{Y}, of the parallel passage in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, and of the parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. We take *-svagata-* in the loose sense of *svasambandhi*.

[520]I.e. we never have been nor will we ever be aware of a moment in which our consciousness is yet to exist or has ceased to exist. Yet if, as the Buddhist claims, consciousness not only is, but also appears to us as, momentary, we would expect some awareness of these two kinds of non-existence. We would feel constantly new, as though what we were in the last moment had just ceased to exist.

[521]See note 489 for the full list of *cittavṛttis* that Rāmakaṇṭha probably has in mind here.

[522]The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *tatrāyaṃ sthirarūpaḥ prakāśaḥ sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ, kālatraye 'pi*

And everyone undertakes actions that have results at a subsequent time relying on this very undivided and unceasing self-awareness. But if it were momentary then all action would cease, since who would act, in what circumstances (*kutra*), or for what purpose, because no cognition could exist in another moment, as it would perish after the merely momentary awareness [of itself]?[523] For action is not appropriate for someone who experiences themself as momentary, thinking [with respect to another moment][524] 'that is not me [and] it doesn't belong to me.' Therefore creatures would become desireless / inactive, mere light established in [nothing but] its own inner nature,[525] without any notion [that things are] to be abandoned or appropriated, devoid of many kinds of cognition such as false knowledge, deliberation and refuting cognition, because all such [cognitions] depend on the shining forth of a stable perceiver.[526] Therefore this [stable] shining forth, which is the basis

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tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayavyayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantarāleṣv apy aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam eva svaprakāśatvena gamyatvād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ, iti kim atrānyena sādhanena.

A parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:34c–35a): *na grāhyabhede 'pi grāhakātmā yugapad iva krameṇāpi bhinno 'vabhāsate. api tu sarvadaiva grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedaḥ, kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayasaṃvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhakasthairyavedanaḥ, vṛttyantarāle 'py aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam evārthāvagamakatvena bhāsanād ātmapadapratipādyaḥ pratipuruṣaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ sthira eva [sthira eva* U, Ṛ, Ṝ; *sthirabhāva* ed.], *iti kim atrānyena sādhanena.*

See also *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 2:25, lines 2–3: *ātmā svasaṃvedanena svaparātmaprakāśakatayā* [conj.; *-prakāśatayā* ed.] *pratipuruṣaṃ siddhyati, kim anyena sādhanena.* On the conjecture of *-prakāśakatayā* for *-prakāśatayā*, see WATSON (2006: 221–222, note 30).

[523] Alternatively, 'after [being] a sensation for just an instant.'

[524] The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* includes here *kṣaṇāntare.*

[525] The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* reads, instead of *svarūpaniṣṭhaprakāśamātraṃ*, *svarūpamātraprakāśaniṣṭhaṃ*, 'established in the shining forth of nothing but their own inner nature'.

[526] The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *tām eva cābhinnām anapāyinīṃ cātmasaṃvidam āśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve tu tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ, sarvānubhavānāṃ kṣaṇamātravedanoṭtarakālaṃ dhvaṃsatāṃ kṣaṇāntare sambhavābhāvāt kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ. na hi kṣaṇātmavedinaḥ kṣaṇāntare 'nāhaṃ na mama' iti paśyataḥ pravṛttir ghaṭate. iti nirīhaṃ svarūpamātraprakāśaniṣṭhaṃ heyopādeyabuddhivikalam amithyājñānaṃ vicārabodhādyanekajñānaśūnyaṃ jagad etad bhavet, iti sarvānubhavavirodhaḥ, sthiragrāhakaprakāśapūrvakatvād evamāder iti.*

A parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:23ab) runs: *tām eva hi sthirataṃ ātmasaṃvidam āśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve tu*

for worldly interaction (*vyavahāra*), and which is the cause of action whose fruits occur at a subsequent time, must be (*syāt*) undeniable for absolutely everybody (*sarvair eva*).[527]

3.10.4 The Buddhist Response: stability is superimposed.

[Buddhist:] True, even this perceiver [of yours] that appears as a unitary stable perceiver, and which is capable of bringing about all worldly interaction,

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tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayāt sarvajñānānāṃ kṣaṇamātravedanottaradhvaṃsataḥ kṣaṇāntare sambhavābhāvataḥ kaḥ pravarteta [*pravarteta* Ū, Ṛ; *pravartate* ed.] *kutra* [*kutra* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *tatra* ed.] *kimarthaṃ vā. iti nirīhaṃ heyopādeyabuddhivikalaṃ mithyājñānavicārabādhādyanekajñānaśūnyaṃ jagad bhavet. iti sarvavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* [*sarvavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* corr.; *sarvavyavahārā bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ* ed.] *sthirabodhapūrvakatvād evamādeḥ sarvasya, ity ātmasiddhiḥ, sthirasyaiva saṃvedanasyātmatvād ity uktam.* In the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, and the *Mataṅgavṛtti* passage given below, *kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ* gives a reason for *sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ*, whereas in the just quoted passage *sarvavyavahārapratyastamayāt* gives a reason for *kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā*. Both seem possible.

A second parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, fifteen pages after the one above (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:34c–35a) reads: *tām eva cā*[*eva cā-* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *evā-* ed.]*tmasaṃvidam abhinnām anapāyinīṃ cāśritya sarvaiḥ kālāntaraphalāni karmāṇy ārabhyante. kṣaṇikatve hi* [*kṣaṇikatve hi* conj. SANDERSON; *kṣaṇikatvavad anityatve 'pi* ed.; *anityatve 'pi* A; *kṣaṇikatvavedinityatve 'pi* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *tasyāḥ sarvavyavahārapratyastamayaḥ, sarvajñānānāṃ jñānāntarotpattikāla eva dhvastatvāt kaḥ pravarteta kutra kimarthaṃ vā yataḥ.*

[527]The parallel sentence in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:34c–35a) runs: *tad ayam anapahnavanīya eva grāhakātmano jñānasya sarvadā sthirarūpaḥ prakāśo vyavahārahetubhūtaḥ kālāntarabhāviphalapravṛttikāraṇaṃ sarvair eva.* That sentence is the reason we have chosen the reading *sarvair eva* as opposed to *sarvadaiva*. (There is no parallel sentence in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*.)

We have decided to punctuate after *sarvair eva syāt* and begin the new paragraph with *satyam, grāhako 'py ayam ekarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśaḥ* .... But the fact that the parallel to this sentence in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (just quoted) ends with *sarvair eva*, and the fact that the parallel to the next sentence in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* begins with *syāt* (*syād etat—asty ayam ekarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśaḥ, anapahnavanīya eva*) suggest the possibility of punctuating after *eva* and beginning the next sentence with *syāt*. Doing so would have to involve emendation however. We could simply follow the text of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* and read: *syād etat—asty ayam ekarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśaḥ*..., but that involves assuming that *satyam grāhako 'py* (most witnesses) / *nanu grāhako 'py* (M_1) is a corruption of *etat asty*. Alternatively we could read *syād etat—satyam, grāhako 'py ayam ekarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśaḥ*, which involves only the addition of an *etat* to the reading of most *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* witnesses: 'The following might be the case—it is true that ...'. We have in fact decided not to resort to emendation, since the text can just be made sense of taking the reading of most witnesses, but we are aware of two problems: the evidence of the two parallel passages mentioned above suggest that *syāt* should begin the next sentence, not end this one; the inclusion of the words *grāhako 'pi* arguably make the next sentence unsmooth.

need not be denied. But it is not experienced by itself (*svasaṃvedyaḥ*);[528] rather, what is actually experienced being just a stream of momentary perceivers, it becomes an object of awareness (*prakāśyate*), having been superimposed [on to them] by conceptual cognitions that are mistaken as a result of seeing the resemblance of those [momentary perceivers], in the same way as the unity of of a stream of water [is superimposed onto discrete pieces of water by those fooled by their similarity].[529]

3.10.5 Rāmakaṇṭha's Response: Superimposition of a permanent perceiver is impossible.

[Siddhāntin:] But that is error,[530] since we experience its (viz. the perceiver's) unity as distinct from [external] objects, [and] without [that unity] becoming

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[528] If this appearance of a stable perceiver were experienced by itself, it would be infallible, as there would be no gap between experiencer and experienced for distorting factors to enter. But it is not, because, as explained in the rest of the sentence, on the one hand, it is not so much experienced (*saṃvedyate, anubhūyate*) as superimposed; and, on the other, that which 'experiences' it is not itself (i.e. a stable and uniform perceiver) but a series of distinct perceivers.

[529] The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *syād etat. asty ayam ekarūpasthiragrāhakaprakāśaḥ, anapahnavanīya eva. sa punar na svasaṃvedyaḥ, api tu grāhakakṣaṇapravāha evānubhūyamāne tatsādṛśyadarśanabhrāntair vikalpair adhyāropito 'mbhaḥpravāhasyevaikyam iti bhrānta eva.*

The parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:32ab) reads: *satyam, asty eveyam ātmasaṃvittir ā saṃsārād nairātmyapratipakṣabhūtā. sā tu na saṃvedanātmikā, api tu* [*api tu* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *catuḥ* ed.] *kṣaṇātmavijñānapravāha eva saṃvedyamāne sadṛśāparāparotpattivipralambhād vikalpena sa evāyam ity aikyam adhyāropya prakāśyate* [*prakāśyate* 7 mss, including Ū and Ṛ; *prakāśate* ed.].

Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, can be seen to be the source of these passages. He writes (commenting on verse 24 of chapter 2 of the *vidyāpāda* of his *Mṛgendravṛtti*, the so-called *paramokṣanirāsaprakaraṇa*): *saṃvedana eva kṣaṇike jaladhārāpravāhavat sadṛśaparāparotpattibhramād vikalpena sthairyam adhyāropyata ity avidyājanitā seyam ātmadṛṣṭiḥ.*

[530] Note that the parallel passage in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, slightly suspiciously, ends the previous sentence with *bhrānta eva*, indicating that *bhrama eva* may have been written in this text too as part of the previous sentence. It would there indicate that the appearance of a stable perceiver is an erroneous cognition (*bhrama*), as it is superimposed by conceptual cognitions. But in order to accommodate it there we would have to delete the *na punar* before it, and we would have to add in a *na* or *tad ayuktam* or some equivalent expression after it in order to indicate a speaker-change.

an object [of perception].[531] For[532] if it were superimposed, it would appear like an [external] object, as separate from its superimposer that is the [real] perceiver, as in [the thought] 'Devadatta's awareness is stable';[533] and this experience [of a stable perceiver] is not like that. Rather, as the illuminator of [external] objects, its nature is that of the inner perceiver;[534] because that

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[531]We might expect Rāmakaṇṭha to have said that we experience the perceiver, rather than its oneness, in this way. Indeed the parallel sentence in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* reads *asya = sthiragrāhakasya / sthiragrāhakaprakāśasya* instead of *tadaikyasya*. But since oneness is a property of the perceiver, it should be experienced in the same way as the perceiver.

It is a feature of *svasaṃvedana*, not only for Rāmakaṇṭha, but also for others who accept it, such as Buddhists and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, that the self-cognised perceiver does not thereby become an object of perception: it shines forth as the perceiver and not as the perceived. Rāmakaṇṭha relies here partly on that doctrine. But his claim here is primarily intended as a description of our awareness of ourselves, based not on adherence to any philosophical position but simply on introspection; everyone will recognise, he assumes, that this continuous (i.e. single) self-awareness is something internal and non-objectified. Why this means that our self-awareness cannot be superimposed is made clear in the next sentence.

[532]What follows this 'for' gives a reason, not for why we experience the oneness of the perceiver internally, but for why the fact that we experience it internally means that it is not superimposed.

[533]In this case, where we superimpose stability on to Devadatta's consciousness, his stable consciousness is, and appears as, external to us. In what kind of circumstance would one say, 'Devadatta's awareness is stable'? Perhaps when one can see that something he has been taught has been firmly remembered and understood.

[534]We have resorted to inserting a passage of text adopted from the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, since the text here can make no sense without it. See below for the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*'s parallel passage. Note that the passages are very closely related, and furthermore that in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*'s text the repetition of the syllables *āropakā* at the beginning and at the end of the passage that is not in the sources that transmit the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* could easily have triggered eyeskip for a scribe copying the passage. We are assuming, therefore, that the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* originally did contain either the text we have inserted, or a passage very like it.

One way to avoid having to insert text here from the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* would be to emend *yadi* to *na*: 'for this cannot be superimposed, because...'. But the problems with this are: (1) What follows does not really give a reason for why oneness cannot be superimposed, but rather for why the thing doing the superimposing must be experienced as stable. (2) The Buddhist claimed that the oneness of the perceiver is superimposed. Rāmakaṇṭha responded that it is not, because it is experienced internally. We would thus then not expect a sentence beginning 'for this cannot be superimposed, because', but rather one that explains why something experienced internally cannot be superimposed. (3) It would be very surprising if in two different texts Rāmakaṇṭha wrote two passages almost identically worded but replaced *yadi hi*, which made perfect sense in

which [you] hold to carry out a superimposition of this [oneness] could not itself[535] appear as being destroyed after a mere moment, for[536] if it did, superimposition would be impossible, since superimposition must be carried out by an enduring cognition in that it consists of synthetic awareness of earlier and later [cognitions].[537]

And [you can]not [say] that [the perceiver / *anubhava*], though momentary, [can] superimpose through having a long object[538] that is simultane-

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one, by *na hi* in the other, with this then becoming corrupted to *yadi hi* in all witnesses.

It may well be, in fact, that we have to add in more text than we have done. For in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* there is first the missing text we have supplied, which explains why something experienced internally cannot be superimposed; and then comes an assertion that that which carries out superimposition must be experienced as stable (*sthira eva saṃvedyate*), for which the string of three ablatives that are also transmitted in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* give a reason. They clearly support that assertion. But with the amount of text that we have so far added into the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, these ablatives seem to have to give an argument for why the stable perceiver that appears to us is internal (*api tu ... antargrāhakasvabhāvaḥ*); and it is not easy to see how they support such a claim. Thus we could assume the loss of additional text from the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* corresponding to the following in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*: *tatsamāropakābhimatagrahītṛrūpatve ca tadāpi sthira eva saṃvedyate* ('And if it has the character of being the perceiver that [you] hold to carry out a superimposition of this [oneness], then too it is certainly (*eva*) sensed as stable'). Since the word that follows this in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, *tasya*, refers to *tadāropakābhimatasya*, it may be that when Rāmakaṇṭha was writing the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* he wrote there not *tasya* but *tadāropakābhimatasya*, which would mean that eyeskip up to that point would account for all of the missing text.

[535]The *svataḥ* emphasises that we are talking of the thing itself, not the distorted picture we get of it after *adhyāropa*.

[536]For Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of *hi* in combination with an ablative, see note 460.

[537]For *pūrvāparaparāmarśa* see *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:174 (=*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1:8): *saṅketa-tasmaraṇopāyaṃ dṛṣṭasaṅkalanātmakam | pūrvāparaparāmarśaśūnye tac cākṣuṣe katham ||*; *Nyāyamañjarī*(M) vol. 1 p. 243; and *Nyāyamañjarī*(M) vol. 2 p. 5–6.

The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *tad ayuktam, viṣaya-vailakṣaṇyenākarmatayādhyātmam* [conj. WATSON; *-vailakṣaṇyena karmatayā-* $E_K E_P$BP] *asya saṃvedanāt. yadi hy ayam āropitaḥ syāt, tadāropakād grāhakarūpād bhedena viṣa-yavad bhāseta devadattabodhaḥ sthira itivat. na caivam ayam anubhavaḥ, api tu viṣa-yaprakāśakatvenāntargrāhakasvabhāvaḥ. tatsamāropakābhimatagrahītṛrūpatve ca* [*-rūpatve ca* conj. WATSON; *-rūpatvena* $E_K E_P$B; *-rūpatvenā* P], *tadāpi sthira eva saṃvedyate, ta-syāpi hi svataḥ kṣaṇamātrarūpatvenāpratibhāsanāt, tatpratibhāsitve hy āropānupapatteḥ, āropasya pūrvāparaparāmarśarūpatvena sthirabodhanirvartyatvāt.*

[538]The Buddhist opponent would not accept the existence of a long (non-momentary) object. (We do not think Rāmakaṇṭha is here thinking of how a Sarvāstivādin would explain superimposition: his opponent is a Dharmakīrtian.) The very problem to be

ously linked with earlier and later [time],[539] as [such a momentary perceiver] would be incapable of conceptualisation, since it would not be of the nature of a linking [cognition],[540] in the way that [cognitions of], for example, the image of a circle [caused by a swinging] firebrand [have as their nature to join together the momentary instants of the firebrand's trajectory].[541] That is precisely why[542] it has been taught [by you][543] that yogic perception is devoid, as it were,[544] of conceptualisation, even though it simultaneously has word and referent as its content.[545]

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explained is how ***momentary*** objects (=phases of an object) can be joined into a unity by a momentary perceiver who is fooled by their similarity. Thus we have to interpret 'long object' as the stream of several momentary phases of an object.

[539]The parallel passages in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* and the *Mataṅgavṛtti* both read *pūrvāparakāla-* in place of *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*'s *pūrvāpara-*. One *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* manuscript (M_1) reads *pūrvāparatā*, which is not impossible, but it seems less logical to talk of being simultaneously linked with sequentiality, than to talk of being simultaneously linked with earlier and later time.

[540]Dignāga indeed defines conceptual cognition as linking: *yojanā kalpanā* (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:3). For Dignāga this joining refers to the process through which an individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) becomes associated with a name, genus etc.

[541]The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *na ca kṣaṇātmano 'pi yugapatpūrvāparakālayuktadīrghaviṣayatvataḥ samāropakatvam ayojanātmakatvenāvikalpakatvāt, alātacakrādipratibhāsavat.*

A parallel passage in *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:24ab) reads: *na ca kṣaṇātmano 'pi sa evāyam iti pūrvāparakālayuktadīrghārthaprakāśakatvena vikalpakatvam iti vācyam ayojanātmakatvāt, alātacakrādipratibhāsavat, yojanā hi kalpanā* [*kalpanā* Ṛ, Ṝ; *vikalpanā* ed.] *yataḥ* (160, 10–11). The reason I prefer the reading of those two Kashmirian manuscripts is that, as stated in note 540, Dignāga wrote *yojanā kalpanā* in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and Rāmakaṇṭha quotes this (for example in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:22cd).

[542]'That is precisely why' means 'because something momentary would be incapable of linking even if it could simultaneously perceive the things to be linked'.

[543]It has been said by the Buddhists, for in place of *ity uktam* the parallel passage in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* reads *ity uktaṃ bhavadbhiḥ*, and the parallel passage in *Mataṅgavṛtti*, *bhavadbhir iṣyate*. But in none of these three texts have we found places where Rāmakaṇṭha puts words to this effect into the mouth of his Buddhist opponent. Hence he presumably refers with the words *ity uktam* here not to somewhere where a Buddhist has said this in a previous part of his *Rauravavṛttiviveka*, but to somewhere in a Buddhist text where it has been said.

[544]It is possible that *avikalpakakalpam* arose through dittography from what was originally simply *avikalpakam*, the reading of the parallel passages in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* and *Mataṅgavṛtti*.

[545]The editions and the manuscripts read *sarvārthaviṣayatve*, which is also the reading of several manuscripts of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, and which could also be interpreted. We have conjectured *śabdārthaviṣayatve*, however, as it is the reading of the parallel passage in the

[Buddhist:] That [yogic perception] has as its content [things, i.e. word and object] which are [already] joined.[546]

[Siddhāntin:] If that [is your response] it is not worth considering, because, since [for you] everything is momentary, nothing could do the linking.[547] That is precisely why even several momentary conceptual cognitions in sequence could not superimpose.[548] Thus because superimposition is impossible [on the Buddhist presupposition of momentariness], conceptual cognitions are doomed.[549]

Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa, of the Kashmirian mss of the *Matangavṛtti*, and arguably has a more pertinent meaning in the context: the content of the yogic perception is then things that are ordinarily linked together.

[546]It is difficult to reconstruct how precisely this contention fits into the flow of the argument, i.e. why the Buddhist says it and what aspect of the previous claim it responds to. It seems to be responding to the *ata eva* in the previous. The meaning of that was that it is because something momentary would be incapable of linking, even if it could simultaneously perceive the things to be linked, that yogic perception is non-conceptual according to Buddhism. The upshot of this response is that it is not due to that, but due to word and object being already linked.

This exchange could have one of two flavours. Rāmakaṇṭha's previous remark may have been intended to imply that it is a strange doctrine that the Buddhist has been forced into that yogic perception is non-conceptual. For how can perception be non-conceptual if it involves comprehension of language? This response of the Buddhist would then explain how language can be comprehended despite the cognition of it being non-conceptual.

Alternatively Rāmakaṇṭha's previous remark may have been intended to imply that, in the Buddhist's admission that yogic perception is non-conceptual, they have intuited the truth that something momentary cannot link. Thus they should admit that conceptual cognition is impossible for the non-Yogin's momentary cognitions too. This response of the Buddhist would then justify his distinction between yogic and non-yogic cognition: the latter is free to be conceptual, because the reason the former is non-conceptual is nothing to do with any inability on the part of momentary cognitions to link.

[547]The Buddhist took the responsibility for the joining away from the yogic perception itself, by claiming that it had already been done. But done by what? There is nothing in the Buddhist's world that, being non-momentary, would be capable of such action.

[548]The Buddhist would explain this problem of superimposition on the part of something momentary through a sequence of cognitions, each passing on information to the next, such that although it is one cognition that perceives phase 1 of an object and another that perceives phase 2, the second cognition has access to memory of the cognition of phase 1 of the object, can thus spot the similarity between the two phases, and can thus superimpose unity on to the object. But if, argues Rāmakaṇṭha here, individual moments can be shown to be incapable of joining, how can a sequence help? If every single member of the sequence is incapable of joining then the sequence too should be incapable of superimposition.

[549]The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *ata eva yugapaccha-bdārthaviṣayatve 'pi yogijñānam avikalpakam ity uktaṃ bhavadbhiḥ. yojitaviṣayaṃ tad iti*

And it cannot be said that the perceiver, for its part,[55°] could be grasped [by itself] in this way (i.e. as stable by conceptual cognition), for conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself.[55¹] It is for precisely that

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cet, sarveṣāṃ kṣaṇikatvena yojanānupapatter na kiṃcid etat. ata evānekasyāpi kramabhāvino vikalpakṣaṇasyānāropakatvam, ity āropāsambhavād astaṃgatā vikalpāḥ.

The parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* continues: *ata eva yogijñānam yugapaccha-bdārthaviṣayatve* [*-chabdārthaviṣayatve* U, Ṛ, Ṝ; *-sarvārthaviṣayatve* ed.] *'py avikalpakam bhavadbhir iṣyate. nāpi ca bahūnāṃ kramabhāvināṃ jñānānāṃ vikalpakatvaṃ yuktam.*

[55°]If the *api* is original it seems just to mark a change of subject back to the perceiver after the focus had changed to *vikalpakṣaṇas*.

[55¹]We have here a slight change of topic from how something momentary would be incapable of superimposition to how a momentary perceiver would have to perceive itself as momentary. The Buddhist is trying (see section 3.10.4) to explain its experience of itself as stable as a case of conceptual cognition mistaking itself for something stable. But conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself (see below), hence it always cognizes *itself* accurately, even if it is mistaken concerning its object. Since it cognizes itself accurately, it cannot cognize itself as stable if it is momentary.

It is tempting to conclude that we have here another instance of text dropping out due to eyeskip, this time from one *svātmani* to another. For the parallel passage in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* reads: *na ca grāhakātmā grāhyīkartuṃ śakyate yena svātmany adhyāropeṇa sthairyam āropitam ity ucyeta, svātmany avikalpako vikalpo yataḥ.* 'And the perceiver cannot be made into the perceived in such a way that one might be able to say that stability is superimposed through superimposition [by the perceiver] on to itself, for conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself.' That sentence is more readily understandable than the one in our text. And the parallel in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:24ab) could also be argued to support the insertion of text here, because there too the phrase *svātmany avikalpako vikalpaḥ* comes after explicit mention has been made of superimposition of stability on to the self by conceptual cognition: *nanu svātmany api* [*api* U, Ṛ, Ṝ; *om.* ed.] *vikalpaḥ* [*vikalpaḥ* U, Ṛ, Ṝ; *vikalpa* ed.] *sthairyam āropayann utpadyate, tena naiṣa* [*naiṣa* Ṛ Ṝ; *naitat* ed.] *prasaṅgaḥ. tan na, tathāvṛtter ātmani virodha* [*virodha* U + 5 non-Kashmirian mss; *virodhāt* ed.] *ity uktam, svātmany avikalpako vikalpa* [*avikalpako vikalpa* Ṛ, Ṝ; *avikalpiko vikalpa* U; *na vikalpa* ed.] *iti ca.*

But the sentence transmitted in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* is coherent if we take *evam* in the way that we do. Furthermore even if we were to insert into it the words from the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*'s first *svātmani* to the next, *adhyāropeṇa sthairyam āropitam ity ucyeta, svātmani*, we would still have to resort to further emendation. We would need to add in a *yataḥ* after *vikalpaḥ* (or express that sense in some equivalent way), and we would perhaps also need to bring the expression *grākakātmāpy evaṃ gṛhyeteti vaktuṃ śakyate* more in line with the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*'s *grāhakātmā grāhyīkartuṃ śakyate*. For these reasons we have tentatively retained readings of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*.

For a discussion of the view that 'conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself', see WATSON (2010a: 318–319). It is a view shared by the Buddhists, which is why Rāmakaṇṭha is on firm ground using it against them here. For them, as for Rāmakaṇṭha, there are two aspects of every cognitive act: that directed towards the cognition itself,

reason that the [perceiver] cannot even be the object of the I-cognition:[552] rather it is the very shining forth of I-cognition, because it appears as stable indeed then too[553] in that form.[554] For I have said[555] that the ceasing of the perceiver is not sensed in any of the three times. For something which had prior non-existence is said to have arisen; something which undergoes cessation is [said to] be destroyed; but there is no consciousness of the absence of I-cognition at some previous or subsequent extremity. It cannot

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the perceiver, and that directed towards its object. In non-conceptual cognition both of these are non-conceptual, but in conceptual cognition, although the object-cognition is conceptual, the self-awareness is, even there, non-conceptual, and therefore a valid case of perception. See Dignāga's remark, *kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt*; '[We] hold even conceptual cognition [to be non-conceptual perception] in its self-awareness, [but] not with regard to its object, because it conceptualises that.', *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1:7ab (see HATTORI 1968, note 51, p. 95).

[552]In the parallel sentence in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* 'it is for precisely that reason' means 'because the perceiver cannot be made into an object', picking up *na ca grāhakātmā grāhyīkartuṃ śakyate*. Those words are not in our text; here it is best to take it as 'because conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with regard to itself', picking up *svātmany avikalpako vikalpakaḥ*. The reasoning in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* is very clear: if the perceiver cannot be made into an object then it cannot be the object of I-cognition. But the reasoning here also works. I-cognition has as its object the *concept* 'I'. If its relation to itself is necessarily *non*-conceptual, then its relation to its object cannot be its relation to itself: the perceiver of the I-cognition cannot also be the object of the I-cognition.

[553]'Too' = even in I-cognition, which is conceptual cognition, as well as in self-awareness, which he described in detail in section 3.10.3.2.

[554]I.e. in the form of the shining forth of I-cognition.

What is the relevance of Rāmakaṇṭha's claim here that the perceiver is not the object, but the shining forth, of I-cognition? If the seemingly stable perceiver appeared to us as the object of I-cognition, then the Buddhist explanation (in section 3.10.4) of that appearance of stability as resulting from conceptualisation would be possible. But the shining forth of the I-cognition itself appears to us as stable, and there is no room for the involvement of conceptualisation in the production of that appearance.

We have conjectured *bhāsanāt* for *ahambhāsanāt* the former being also the reading of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* parallel passage. The sentence flows more smoothly if the object of *bhāsanāt* is that which is referred to by *asya* at the beginning of the sentence, i.e. *grāhakātmā*, the perceiver. If it were not that but *ahaṃ*, then the contention that the perceiver is the shining forth of I-cognition would not follow; what would follow is that the 'I' is the shining forth of 'I'-cognition. The 'I' and the perceiver are not identical for Rāmakaṇṭha as the former is the object of I-cognition but the latter is not.

The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *ata evāsyāhaṃpratyaya-viṣayatāpi na sambhavati, api tv ahaṃpratyayaprakāśarūpataiva tadāpi tena rūpeṇa sthiratayaiva bhāsanāt.*

[555]See section 3.10.3.2: *kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ.*

be said to arise and cease in every moment.[556] And we shall teach[557] that something that is not self-cognised cannot be a property of consciousness.[558] Therefore it is correct to say that (*iti yuktam*), just as the momentariness of lightning, for example, being established by a means of knowledge excludes non-momentariness, because the momentary and the stable, like the gross and the subtle, have natures that are mutually contradictory, so likewise

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[556] All witnesses apart from M^{Y}, our best manuscript, point to a different sentence-break: *ahaṃpratyayasya punaḥ pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyor nāsty abhāvaḥ. saṃvit pratikṣaṇam utpannā niruddhā bhaved iti na śakyate vaktum.* This makes sense, its only awkwardness being that *saṃvit* then has to mean the same as *ahaṃpratyaya*; but the evidence of the parallel in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* makes it unlikely to be original. The relevant sentence there reads: *yasya punaḥ pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyor nāsty abhāvasaṃvit, sa pratikṣaṇam utpanno niruddho veti na śakyate vaktum*; 'But when there is no consciousness of absence of something at some previous or subsequent extremity, that cannot be said to arise and cease in every moment.' It would be surprising if Rāmakaṇṭha there wrote *abhāvasaṃvit*, where it has to be taken as a compound, and here wrote a very similar concatenation of words, but with a sentence break between *abhāvaḥ* and *saṃvit*. Since it is also our best manuscript that reads *abhāvasaṃvit*, we have adopted that.

Although the readings of that manuscript take us closer to the readings of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, we still have to break the sentence into two, while in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* we have one sentence containing a relative-correlative structure. Thus some may want to adjust our text further to bring it in line with the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*. To do so would involve emending *ahaṃpratyayasya/pratyayasya* to *yasya* and inserting a *sa* before *pratikṣaṇam*; we decided on balance not to do so, given that the text can be interpreted as it is.

If Rāmakaṇṭha did indeed write *ahaṃpratyayasya* here then it would seem to indicate a change in his thinking between this text and the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*. For then *ahampratyaya* would be being used here as equivalent to *svasaṃvedana*, but in that text it is firmly distinguished from it. See chapter 3 of WATSON 2006, where it can be seen that for Rāmakaṇṭha the *aham* is not quite the same as the self. If it is possible that at the time of writing the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* Rāmakaṇṭha was not distinguishing these two, our conjecture above of *bhāsanāt* for *ahambhāsanāt* is perhaps not required.

[557] In section 3.15.2.4: *asvasaṃvedyasya tatsvabhāvatvāyogāt tatsvabhāvatve vā svasaṃvedyam eva.* 'Because something that is not self-experienced could not have that (viz. consciousness) as its nature; and (vā) if something has that (viz. consciousness) as its nature, it must be self-experienced'.

[558] The implication is that if arising and destruction were properties of consciousness, then consciousness would be aware of them.

The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *na hi kālatraye 'pi grāhakātmano dhvaṃsaḥ saṃvedyata ity uktam. yasya hi prāgabhāvaḥ sa utpanna ucyate, yasya tu pradhvaṃsaḥ sa naṣṭaḥ. yasya punaḥ pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyor nāsty abhāvasaṃvit sa pratikṣaṇam utpanno niruddho veti na śakyate vaktum. na cāsvasaṃvedyaḥ saṃviddharmo bhavatīti vakṣyāmaḥ.*

in this [case] the stability [of the perceiver] shining forth undoubtedly excludes momentariness, because of the impossibility of superimposition on to oneself.[559]

And as we shall show,[560] no contradiction of self-awareness is possible, as a result of which it might be erroneous.[561] And if something is proved by a valid means of knowledge, acceptance of it as otherwise without some contradictory factor does not appeal to the mind of wise people. If [you say] 'the impossibility of a stable entity producing things (*sthirasyārthakriyānupapattiḥ*) is just (*eva*) [such] a factor, contradicting [the permanence of the soul],' [we reply] no, because the impossibility of this is not a contradictory factor, as [this supposed impossibility] in a [stable perceiver] is about to be rejected.[562]

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[559] We have conjectured *svātmany āropāsambhavena* for *svātmāropāsambhavena* because of not only the three parallel passages, but also the fact that Rāmakaṇṭha uses the phrase *svātmany āropaḥ* many times throughout his works, but never *svātmāropaḥ*.

The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthirakṣaṇikayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād yathā vidyudādau kṣaṇikatvaṃ pramāṇasiddhaṃ sad akṣaṇikatvaṃ vyāvartayati, evaṃ grāhakātmany apy āropāsambhavāt sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ vyāvartayatīti yuktam.*

The parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* continues: *tasmāt svātmany āropāsambhavād grāhakātmanaḥ sthairyam avabhāsamānam svasaṃvedanasiddham* [*svasaṃvedanasiddham* ed.; *saṃvedanam* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *evābhyupagantavyam.*

A second parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:34c–35a) reads: *tat sthūlasūkṣmayor iva sthiratvāsthiratvayoḥ parasparaviruddharūpatvād vidyudādāv asthairyaṃ* [*asthairyaṃ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *asthairyatvaṃ* ed.] *siddhaṃ sat sthairyaṃ vyāvartayati yathā, tadvad atra svātmany āropāsambhavena sthairyam avabhāsamānam asaṃśayaṃ asthairyaṃ vyavacchinatti, tṛtīyaprakārāsambhavād iti.*

[560] This refers to the passage beginning *na ca tatra bhrāntiḥ sambhavati*, 'And no error is possible with regard to [self-awareness]', which occurs in the rejection of Vedānta in section 3.15.2.4.

[561] The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *na ca svasaṃvedanasya tathātve bādhaḥ sambhavati, bādhakābhimatasyāpi tenaiva sthirātmanā saṃvedanāt, anyathā bādhakatvāyogād. bhrāntyabhāvāc ca. bhrāntam api hi vijñānaṃ sarvam ālambane bhrāntaṃ na svātmanīti darśayiṣyāmaḥ.*

A parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:34c–35a) reads: *nāpi bādhaḥ* [*nāpi bādhaḥ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *om.* ed.] *sarvam ālambane* [*ālambane* 4 (non-Kashmirian) mss; *ālambanaṃ* ed.] *bhrāntaṃ* [*bhrāntaṃ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *bhrāntir* ed.] *na svātmani yataḥ* [*yataḥ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *kadāçana iti* ed.].

[562] In sections 3.11.5.3ff. The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* continues: *na ca pramāṇasiddhasya bādhakam antareṇānyathābhyupagamo matim āvarjayati vipaścitām. sthirasyārthakriyānupapattir eva bādhakam iti cet, na, tatraiva tasyāḥ samutpatter iti vakṣyāmaḥ.*

3.10.6 The condition of being a rememberer is our logical reason, not memory.

Thus in this [argument / verse] it is the condition of being a rememberer—in the self, which is self-luminous, a witness to the arising and falling away of the activities of its mind,[563] indeed (*hi*) stable,[564] and a perceiver—which, having as its fruit the raising up again of awareness of the self as described above (*proktavat*),[565] because it (i.e. this condition) is self-cognised, is made the logical reason (*hetūkṛtam*), since it sidesteps the group of arguments advanced by others that [attempt to] prove its non-existence; it is not memory [that is the logical reason].[566] For that [memory] is something different from

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[563]We take *citta* here in the sense of *cittavṛtti*, since it is the latter that has been said earlier to have *udaya* and *vyaya*; see in lines 37–38 of his commentary to this verse *cittavṛttir udayavyayavaty eva*, and in lines 51–52, *nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛtty-udayavyayasaṃvedane*.

[564]The *hi* transmitted in all witnesses is awkward. Even though Rāmakaṇṭha uses the particle in contexts where it cannot be translated by 'for' (see note 460), where it seems to mean 'certainly', we always find that he uses it enclitically and as a qualifier of a phrase rather than of just a word. And yet that is how he appears to use it here. For the sense of a 'weak "indeed" ', see SPEIJER 1886: 334, §429.

[565]In sections 3.10.3.2 and 3.10.5.

[566]Rāmakaṇṭha is clearly aware of difficulties with the argument from memory: he put a barrage of forceful arguments against it into the mouth of the Buddhist opponent in section 3.10.2, and he nowhere opposes those arguments. Rather he claims here that they can be sidestepped if we switch the focus from inference to self-awareness. And this can be done by switching the focus from memory to the fact of being a rememberer, for the latter necessarily involves self-awareness. As he explains below, someone involved in remembering is necessarily aware of themself as being same entity as the previous experiencer of the remembered object. Thus, as he says here, the condition of being a rememberer has as its fruit the raising up of awareness of self if this has become submerged: if one reflects on oneself as the subject of a certain memory, inevitably one becomes aware of oneself as identical with the entity that had the remembered experience.

Sadyojyotiḥ's verse did not mention self-awareness, and hence both in this sentence, and in the way he has commented on the verse up to now, by focussing on self-awareness, Rāmakaṇṭha distances himself from Sadyojyotiḥ. Yet at the same time he attempts to save the verse and its inference by saying at least that the condition of being a remember, if not memory, is to be considered *the logical reason of the inference*. What, then, does the inference look like now? Perhaps: 'since an old man can be aware of himself as the rememberer of his childhood experiences, he must be the same self as experienced those experiences'.

It is as though Rāmakaṇṭha is saving the reputation of his author by claiming that what he actually meant when he wrote *smṛti* was *smartṛtvam*. But what we are left with, in spite of Rāmakaṇṭha saying that this is a logical reason, is not really inference at

past experience, whereas the rememberer is not different [from the past experiencer],[567] since that same [rememberer] is aware of itself at the time of [the memory] as being the previous experiencer.[568] Thus, because there is no difference between them (viz. the rememberer and the experiencer), [there is only] secondary usage that speaks of a difference with respect to them:[569] in reality there is no difference. So enough of this extremely subtle examination of experience which torments the minds of poor simple-minded persons.[570]

3.11 Cessation of Everything, as advocated by the Cārvākas: verses 44–46

Having thus established the permanence of the soul between birth and death, now, in order to establish its[571] existence prior to birth, [Sadyojyotiḥ] replies to those who maintain that consciousness arises from the [four] elements [of earth, water, fire and air]:

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all, but simply direct perception. One reflects on oneself as the rememberer and thereby *experiences* oneself as stable. It is precisely because it is a case of direct perception that it can sidestep the Buddhist inferences of plurality without having to address them directly. If we can experience a stable self, why do we need to refute the inferences of its being momentary? The Buddhist explanations of memory may work theoretically. Memory could possibly work even in absence of a stable self, but that is contrary to our observation; we have direct experience of a stable rememberer.

[567]The implication seems to be that since memory is different from the past experience, it will struggle to prove permanence. Perhaps the problem for Rāmakaṇṭha is that it is difficult to prove something permanent from something temporally atomic. To prove that I existed in the past from the fact that I am having a memory now, would be like proving fire in the past from seeing it now.

[568]At the time of the memory a rememberer necessarily has the awareness, 'I who am now remembering this object am the same as I who previously experienced it'.

[569]As when we refer to the experiencer as the child and the rememberer as the old man.

[570]It is possible that Rāmakaṇṭha means to allude to the Buddhist with the expression *tapasvin*.

[571]I.e. the soul's. Alternatively *tat-* could refer to *jñānasya*. In favour of the latter is the fact that it comes closer in the sentence. But the part of the sentence in which it comes can easily be seen as parenthetical, and in favour of *puṃsaḥ* is the fact that *janmanaḥ pūrvam* (which qualifies *tatsattām*) contrasts with *janmamaraṇayor madhye* at the beginning of the sentence, where it was the soul that was being talked about.

3.11.1 Proof of the existence of consciousness prior to birth from the behaviour of newborn babies

44) Memory for an object experienced in a previous birth is discerned even in one [just] born. And this [memory] must exist, because of the movement with respect to the breast milk in order to eat.[572]

For if sentience arises with the body, then there would be no activity ***aimed at feeding*** (*aśanāya = bhojanārtham*), ***with respect to the milk*** (*stanyaṃ prati*), [i.e.] in order to obtain the milk, namely the action of swallowing, on the part of a new-born child that wishes to eat. And this is an indication [of an uncompleted list] (*upalakṣaṇam*) of other [actions of newborn babies that would not take place if consciousness rose from the elements] such as the striking [of the breath] against the places and instruments [of articulation, which takes place when the newborn cries].[573]

As [Bhartṛhari] has said:[574]

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[572] Word order would suggest: 'And this [memory] must be for the sake of eating, because of the movement with respect to the milk.' But this seems a less satisfactory meaning, and it is not how Rāmakaṇṭha interprets the verse.

Sadyojyotiḥ may have intended the child's movement towards the milk, but Rāmakaṇṭha takes him to talk of the swallowing of the milk.

Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 3.1.21, *pretyāhārābhyāsakṛtāt stanyābhilāṣāt*: '[There exists a soul also] after death, because of [the new-born child's] desire for breast milk, which [can only] arise from the repetition of eating [in an earlier life].'

[573] Sound is produced, according to the conception of the Indian phoneticians, by the breath being impelled upwards, once the instrument and place of articulation appropriate for the particular sound in question are placed in relation to each other. This relation is one of actual touching for some sounds, but for others is simply the moving towards the place of articulation by the instrument of articulation. In general the places are defined as 'that which is approached' (*yad upakramyate*) and the instruments as 'that which approaches' (*yenopakramyate*): see ALLEN (1953: 17), citing the commentary on the *Atharvaprātiśākhya*.

The instruments of articulation (*karaṇa*) are for the majority of sounds either the tip of the tongue (*jihvāgra*), the middle of the tongue (*jihvāmadhya*) or the root of the tongue (*jihvāmūla*) (ALLEN 1953: 18). Normally eight places of articulation (*sthāna*) are given: the throat (*kaṇṭha*), the palate above the front teeth (*tālu*), the teeth (*danta*), the top of the vault of the palate (*śiras, mūrdhan*), the lips (*oṣṭha*), the nose (*nāsikā*), the root of the tongue (*jihvāmūla*) and the chest (*uras*); see for example *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā* v. 9, p. 2. But for a different classification see ALLEN (1953: 18).

[574] *Vākyapadīya* (1:130): RAU's critical text reads *śabdabhāvanām* where we have *pūrvavedanām* (a reading which he does not report). Rāmakaṇṭha quotes the verse in the

> The first positioning of the instruments [of articulation], the impelling upwards of the breath and the striking [of the breath] against the places [of articulation] are not possible without previous experience [in former births].[575]

And we do see activity [in the new-born child]. This then causes one to infer memory, which [in turn] must depend on experience in a previous birth.[576]

Kiraṇavṛtti ad 1:15 with *pūrvavedanām*, in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:19 (p. 45) with *pūrvacetanām*, and in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 6:7c–9b (p. 138) with *pūrvavedanām* accepted by the editor, and *pūrvacetanām* given as the reading of the Kashmirian manuscripts. Aghoraśiva also quotes the verse in the *Mṛgendravṛttidīpikā* ad 6:6cd (p. 190) with *pūrvavedanām*.

[575] These three physiological actions are required for the production of sound, including that involved in a baby's crying. No one has taught the newborn how to perform these actions in this life, therefore it must have some memory of having performed them in a previous life.

Sadyojyotiḥ's verse does not refer at all to speech-production or the three actions required for it, but Rāmakaṇṭha reads them into the verse through *upalakṣaṇa*. He seems to want to update Sadyojyotiḥ's account, which uses the *Nyāyasūtra* argument, by adding to it this *Vākyapadīya* argument of which Rāmakaṇṭha was fond: the three other places he uses it, mentioned in the previous footnote, also all occur in commentaries to verses that make no mention of it. He introduces it in his commentary to *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 1:19 by saying that the *ādi* in the verse's expression *harṣādi* refers to *sthānakaraṇābhighātādi*. But this is unnatural, given that the *ādi* very likely refers to *bhaya* and *śoka*, these two being mentioned along with *harṣa* in the *Nyāyasūtra* (3.1.17) argument on which the verse is clearly based.

The *Vākyapadīya* verse, which is often quoted, has received a wide variation of interpretations, in particular with regard to the expression *ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ*. Vācaspatimiśra, for example, in his *Nyāyakaṇikā*, a commentary on Maṇḍanamiśra's *Vidhiviveka*, takes *karaṇa* to refer not to the instruments of articulation, but to the tongue when used for eating. To be specific, he takes the expression *ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ* to refer to the baby's licking of honey and ghee that are placed on its tongue by its father immediately after it has been born as part of the *jātakarma* ritual: *jātamātraḥ khalv ayaṃ bālakaḥ pitrā mukhahute madhusarpiṣī jihvayā leḍhi, so 'yam ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ* (p. 177). The *Ambākartrī*, a twentieth century commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, takes the expression in one of its interpretations as referring to the positioning of the *antaḥkaraṇa* (p. 182). The *Bhāvapradīpa*, another twentieth century commentary on the same text, explains *karaṇavinyāsaḥ* as *karaṇānāṃ prayatnānāṃ vinyāsaḥ* (p. 132). Helārāja's commentary on this *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* has not come down to us. See BIARDEAU (1964: 157) and RAU (2002: 29) for their translations of the verse.

[576] To fill in all the stages of the argument, some of which are not mentioned here but later: activity such as swallowing can be seen to result from a particular effort preceded

[Opponent:] Surely, just as yawning and other [involuntary actions such as sneezing][577] arise in children just because of the nature of things,[578] since they are a property of their class, so too these [actions such as swallowing] may arise.

[Response:] These [actions such as swallowing] are not the same (*asamam etat*), because they depend on understanding. For those [other actions such as yawning] all arise without understanding; it is appropriate that they—yawning and the like—should be properties of the class, just as [growing][579] hair and nails is. But such [actions] as the swallowing of milk are not a property of the class, because we see them to be accomplished by a particular effort that arises because of desire.[580]

For even a newborn babe, because of having a desire (*arthitayā*) [for food], draws milk from the breast by a particular effort that is preceded by that desire. Having drawn [it in], and having filled his mouth with it,[581] he does not vomit it out, but rather, even while swallowing it up to the moment of [attaining] the result of being satisfied, he is observed to be swallowing it in such a way that no obstruction arises for him of the wind known as 'life-breath'. [Thus] we observe an effect, namely a particular effort,[582] which is motivated by a desire for attaining or avoiding such like beneficial and non-beneficial [consequences as the satisfaction of hunger and the obstruction of

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by desire for the milk; this allows us to infer knowledge that the milk is beneficial (*hita*); this implies memory that the milk was beneficial on a previous occasion; this allows us to infer experience of the milk in a previous life, since there has been no such experience in this life.

[577] Cf. in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* parallel passage given below *kṣutajṛmbhādeḥ*.

[578] Literally, the 'power of things'. The expression is often used of a fact that cannot be further justified or explained, it being simply the way things are. The point in the present context is that yawning does not require some further explanation in the form of desire to yawn; it just happens spontaneously because it is the nature of humans to yawn.

[579] The *Mataṅgavṛtti* parallel passage, given below, reads here *keśanakhavṛddhyādīnām iva*.

[580] The expression 'particular effort', both in this sentence and the next, may mean 'that kind of effort that is preceded by desire'; or it may express that every action has a different effort that precedes it.

[581] *Ex conj.*

[582] A *tatpuruṣa* interpretation of the compound is equally possible: 'the effect of a particular effort', which would refer to the swallowing. The advantage of a *karmadhāraya* interpretation is that we can take the phrase *prayatnaviśeṣakāryasya darśanād bālānāṃ hitāhitabuddhiṃ jñātvā* to express that because of seeing an effect, we come to know its cause, namely *hitāhitabuddhi*. That is obviously not possible if *prayatnaviśeṣakāryasya* denotes not the effect of *hitāhitabuddhi*, but the effect of *prayatnaviśeṣa*.

the breath]. Therefore we know that there is in children an awareness of what is beneficial and what is not beneficial, and [so] we can establish memory [in them] of previously experienced beneficial and non-beneficial things, which are inferred.[583]

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[583]This reading *jñātvānumitapūrvānubhūtahitāhitasmṛtisiddhiḥ* is the best among those that survive, and it is not impossible, but we wonder if it is original, the element *anumita-* seeming awkward. We mention as worthy of serious consideration Professor SANDERSON's conjecture of *-numityā* for *-numita-*: 'and [so] by inference we can establish ...'. The fact that two witnesses read *-numitā* could be seen as support for *-numityā*. Two possible shortcomings of it are: (1) since *anumiti* typically denotes the result of inference, rather than inference as the means, would we not expect *anumānena* rather than *anumityā*? (2) Why would he mention that this last stage of the argument occurs by inference, when the previous stage (that of coming to know *hitāhitabuddhi*) was also inferential and he did not mention it there?

See the following parallel passage in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* (ad *vidyāpāda* 6:7c–9b, pp.139–40): *prāṇināṃ sthānakaraṇādeś ca ākuñcanaprasāraṇādyaṃ karma hitāhitasmaraṇāvināmbhāvi vyavahārakāle siddham iti. bālānām api tad dṛśyamānaṃ svakāraṇam anubhavasmaraṇaṃ gamayatīti śukra*[Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *śukla* ed.]*śoṇitasaṃyogāt prāg apy anubhavituḥ sattvasiddhiḥ. anyathā kāraṇābhāvāt naivākuñcanādikaṃ bhavet teṣāṃ bālānām iti.*

na caitasya kṣutajṛmbhāder iva vastuśaktyaiva bhavataḥ, tatkāraṇatvam [Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *tatkāraṇam* ed.] *anāśaṅkanīyam, prayatnaviśeṣapūrvakatvenopalabdheḥ. yad āhuḥ:*

preraṇākarṣaṇe vāyoḥ prayatnena vinā kutaḥ | iti.

na cānavagamapūrvaḥ prayatnaḥ sambhavati. bālānām api hi [Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *apīha* ed.] *tīvratamarodanānumitakṣudhādyupaśamanārthitayā*[Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *-śamanasamarthatayā* ed.] *stanāt kṣīraṃ tadaharjātānām api prayatnaviśeṣeṇa prāṇāpānoparodharakṣāpūrvam ākarṣatāṃ, vamanādiparihāreṇa tṛptilakṣaṇaphalaprāptiṃ yāvac ca nigiratāṃ* [*yāvac ca nigiratāṃ* ed.; *yāvan nigiratāṃ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *darśanāt, hitāhitasmaraṇāvagamapūrvakatvaṃ prayatnāder avagamyata* [*prayatnāder avagamyata* ed.; *prayatnād eva gamyata* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *iti kuto 'sya vastuśaktyaiva bhāvaḥ. kṣutajṛmbhādīnāṃ tu, keśanakhavṛddhyādīnām iva avagamapūrvakatvena pravṛttyadṛṣṭer yukta eva vastusāmarthyenodbhavaḥ. na tv ākuñcanāder iti tadanyathānupapattyaiva janmanaḥ pūrvaṃ draṣṭuḥ siddhiḥ* [*draṣṭuḥ siddhiḥ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *draṣṭṛsiddhiḥ* ed.].*

'The actions of living beings such as the contracting and extending of the places and instruments [of articulation] and the like are established at the time of the activity to be invariably concomitant with memory of what is and is not beneficial. Those [actions], being seen in children too, imply memory of [previous] experience as their own cause. Therefore the existence of an agent of experience is proved even prior to the coming together of the semen and menstrual blood. Otherwise these children would not perform [actions] such as contracting at all, because they would have no reason to do so.

And it is not the case that these [actions], taking place—like sneezing, yawning and such like—merely through the nature of things, need not be suspected to have that (viz. memory of earlier experience) as their cause; for they [unlike sneezing and yawning] are observed to depend on a certain effort. As [Dharmakīrti] says (*Pramāṇavārttika* 2:52ab):

3.11.2 Memory of past lives

He states a [consideration] that supports[584] this very [conclusion].

> 45ab) And people who remember their [past] lives [and who thus] give confidence [in the view that consciousness exists prior to birth] are found.

Those who remember previously existing lives (*bhūtapūrvajanmasmartāraḥ = jātismarāḥ*)[585] are actually perceived.

If memory for past lives is indeed observed[586] or inferred,[587] what [follows] from that? [With that question in mind] (*iti*), he says:

How could the impelling out and the drawing in of breath take place without effort?**

And effort is not possible unless preceded by cognition. For we observe children, even ones born that very day, drawing milk from the breast by a particular effort preceded by protection against blocking the in- and out- breath, as a result of desiring to quell their hunger and the like, which can be inferred by their very strong crying. And [we observe them] swallowing by avoiding vomiting etc., until attaining the [desired] result, namely satisfaction. Therefore effort and such like can be known to be preceded by a cognition in the form of memory of what is and is not beneficial. So how can these [actions such as contraction] come about merely through the nature of things? It *is* correct that sneezing, yawning and such like, on the other hand, like the growing of hair and nails, arise through the power of things, because we do not observe their process to be preceded by cognition. But that is not so of contraction and the like. So [the existence of] a perceiving agent prior to the present life is established precisely because of the impossibility otherwise of those [movements].'

* We report only those variants which we have adopted against the edition, or which we regard as worthy of consideration despite not adopting them.

** The fact that this verse is cited in support of contraction and expansion being preceded by effort indicates that Rāmakaṇṭha is regarding contraction and expansion as being the result of the impelling out and drawing in of one of the breaths.

[584]We take it that *abhyuccaya* here denotes a supporting reason, a kind of *hetu* that in itself cannot prove anything, but supports a conclusion for which other *hetus* have already been given. For another example of this usage, see Śaṅkara's *prakṛtitvasyāyam abhyuccayaḥ* (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on 1.4.25), on which the *Ratnaprabhā* comments *abhyuccayo hetvantaram* (p. 340). See also *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on 2.1.23. This meaning seems not to have been noted in the dictionaries.

[585]The word-order here is unusual: usually the word from the verse is given first, followed by its gloss. Perhaps the *pratīka* was added by a transmitter between the lines or in the margin and then incorporated into the text in this unusual place by a subsequent copyist.

[586]In the case of those rare people mentioned in the verse.

[587]In the case of newly born children swallowing breast milk and producing sound.

45cd) And there can be no memory on the part of one [person] for an object experienced by another.[588]

It has already been established above[589] that experience and memory share the same locus.[590] Therefore an experiencer [who is the same as the present rememberer] is proved to exist prior to the birth [of the body] too.[591]

3.11.3 Proof of a beginningless sequence of lives

So this too, having been proved, [proves] what? [With that question in mind] (*iti*), he says:

46ab) And thus a beginningless sequence of births of souls is to be inferred.

Because in each birth we can observe behaviour that is dependent on memory-traces from births that ceased earlier, it is proved that souls have a beginningless sequence of births. Thus it is proved that they (i.e. souls) are beginningless, not that [they] are produced from the elements alone.[592]

3.11.4 Something beginningless cannot cease

And thus the position that everything is destroyed [in liberation] is refuted because of the beginninglessness [of souls], which is established [by the previous argument]. This he says:

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[588]This verse closely resembles *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 1.18cd , which Sadyojyotiḥ wrote in a similar context: *yato 'nyenānubhūte 'rthe tad* (=*smaraṇam*) *anyasya na jāyate.*

[589]In the refutation of Buddhism in section 3.10. See in particular *yadi hi pratikṣaṇam anyo 'nyaś ca draṣṭā bhavet, tadānyenānubhūte 'rthe smṛtir anyasya na bhavet, caitra-maitrayor iva* (section 3.10.1) and *smartā tu na bhidyate, tasyaiva pūrvānubhavitṛtvena tadā svasaṃvedanāt* (section 3.10.6).

[590]I.e. they must occur in one and the same subject.

[591]Memory of experience in a past life, when combined with the principle that the memory and the original experience must occur in the same subject, proves the existence of a subject of experience in a past life, who is identical with the present rememberer of that experience.

[592]We conjecture *evotpādyateti* (*sandhi* of *eva+utpādyatā+iti*) for *evotpādita iti.* The latter reading is certainly unsatisfactory, because it requires a subject such as *pumān* to be understood, which involves a change both of number and of construction from the previous (*anāditvaṃ teṣāṃ siddhyati*). If the conjecture is correct, possible explanations for the transmitted reading of *evotpādita iti* are an initial corruption of either *evotpādyata iti* or *evotpāditeti*, the latter then being taken to be wrong *sandhi* for *evotpādita iti.*

46cd) There can be no means of proving the perishability of a beginningless thing.

There can be no means of knowledge that causes [us to know] ***the perishability*** (*vināśitvanimittam = vināśitve*) ***of a beginningless thing***. By the [mention of] absence of proof here (viz. in the verse), the impossibility of perishing is indirectly stated (*lakṣyate*); the meaning [of the verse] is that because of the [absence of proof], the perishability of a beginningless entity cannot be supposed.[593] For (*yataḥ*) it is clearly (*hi*)[594] things that arise that are established to be impermanent—since their concomitance [with impermanence] is proved—not things that never arose. And it has been stated that the self does not have the property of arising.[595]

3.11.5 Cārvāka: Causal efficacy proves that the self is subject to destruction

[Opponent:] [But] the following may be possible. There *is* proof of the destructibility of a beginningless self, [namely its] being the agent of the production of effects.[596]

3.11.5.1 Something eternal would be incapable of producing effects either sequentially or simultaneously For to explain, an eternal entity must have causal efficacy as its nature, because if it did not have this as its nature, it would undesirably follow that it was not real.[597] And the own nature that belongs to it must be (*eva*) single, for if [it] had various own

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[593]The verse literally says that there can be no means of knowing a beginningless thing to be perishable; Rāmakaṇṭha takes it to express indirectly that a beginningless thing cannot be perishable.

[594]On Rāmakaṇṭha's use of *hi* in combination with *yataḥ*, see note 460.

[595]Most likely he is referring back to 46ab and his commentary on that. It is not impossible that he also had the following remark in mind (from the refutation of Buddhism in section 3.10.5): *na hi kālatraye 'pi grāhakātmano dhvaṃsaḥ saṃvedyate ity uktam. yasya hi prāgabhāvaḥ sa utpannaḥ, yasya tu dhvaṃsaḥ sa naṣṭaḥ. ahaṃpratyayasya punaḥ pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyor nāsty abhāvasaṃvit. pratikṣaṇaṃ utpanno niruddho bhaved iti na śakyate vaktum.*

[596]On the word *arthakriyā* and its two meanings, see NAGATOMI (1967/68), MIKOGAMI (1979), KELLNER (2001: 511, note 30) and KYUMA (2010: 121, note 1).

[597]On this view that to be real entails having causal efficacy, the criterion for distinguishing a pot in a hallucination or a dream from a real pot is that the latter, unlike the former, is capable of actually accomplishing effects such as the carrying of water.

natures, then it would itself be plural (*tasyāpi nānātvam*), since a plurality of entities has as its defining characteristic a plurality of own natures.[598] And given that [its] own nature is single, then because its own nature is *at all times* agency in the production of all the things that it is to accomplish, it follows undesirably that it would produce all its own effects in one single moment.[599] So there would be simultaneity of effects, because that nature [to produce all of its effects] would exist even then [in that very first moment]. And so effects would not arise in sequence.

And there could be no way to restrict this action [that produces many effects simultaneously] to a particular time. In the second moment too, since [the eternal thing] would have this own nature, it would act in exactly the same manner. The effects produced in the second moment, it should have produced in the earlier [moment also]; and those produced in the earlier moment, [it would produce] again in the second moment.[600] Because of

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The view originated with, or at least was formalised by, Dharmakīrti. See *Pramāṇavārttika* 1:166ab, 3:3ab (*arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat*), *Hetubindu* p. 3*,14 (*arthakriyāyogyalakṣaṇaṃ hi vastu*), and *Nyāyabindu* 1.14–15.

Indeed for the rest of this Cārvāka section, the Cārvāka uses Dharmakīrtian arguments. For the latter's argument for momentariness from existence (*sattvānumāna*) on which much of the following passage is based, though perhaps via intermediaries, see *Vādanyāya* pp. 2,1–3,13, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2:53–55, *Hetubindu* p. 4*,6–7, p. 19,10–13, STEINKELLNER (1968/69) and YOSHIMIZU (1999). Dharmottara's further development of the argument (a part of which is cited by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:22cd, p. 53,2–7) is found in his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* ad 2:53–55 (see SAKAI 2010a, 2010b, 2011) and his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (ed. FRAUWALLNER 1935). We are extremely grateful to Masamichi SAKAI for increasing our understanding of the argument.

[598]The very way in which we determine that two things are different is by determining that they have different natures.

The editions both wrongly punctuate before *bhāvabhedasya*.

[599]Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, gives this argument for momentarines from *arthakriyā* in a passage (*Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:24, p. 85,18–88,7) which has some parallels with this one. For the general point made by this sentence, see: *sa ca kālāntaranirvartyām arthakriyāṃ tadānīm eva kiṃ na karoti* (p. 86,6–7). 'And why would that [eternal thing] not produce at that very time [all] of the effects that it is to accomplish at other times?' Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's sentence is also paralleled at *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:22, p. 54,17–18: *sarvāḥ kālāntarakāryā api yugapat kuryāt*.

[600]We have three contentions:

1) Whatever it does in the first moment, it should do in the second moment also (*dvitīyasminn api kṣaṇe tatsvabhāvatve tathaiva kuryāt*).

2) Whatever it does in the second moment it should have already done in the earlier moment (*dvitīyakṣaṇakṛtāś cārthakriyāḥ pūrvam eva kuryāt*).

3) Whatever it does in the earlier moment, it should do again in the second moment

the infinite regress that begins in that way (*ityādyanavasthiteḥ*), something with a single own nature could not produce effects simultaneously either.[601]

(*pūrvakṣaṇakṛtāś ca punar dvitīyasmin kṣaṇe*).

How does 3 say anything different from 1? Is Rāmakaṇṭha not simply repeating exactly what is asserted there? Probably not, for compare the following from Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (p. 22,15–23,2, commenting on *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2:54, p. 80,4–5), where we have three exactly parallel assertions:

yena hi svabhāvena prathame kṣaṇe kāryaṃ kṛtavān asau bhāvaḥ, sa svabhāvaḥ dvitīye 'pi kṣaṇe sannihita iti prathamakṣaṇavad avikalaṃ sarvaṃ kuryāt. dvayoś ca kṣaṇayor yat kṛtam, tatkaraṇasamarthasya svabhāvasya prathame kṣaṇe sannihitatvāt prathame 'pi kṣaṇe tat kuryāt. yāvac ca prathame kṣaṇe nirvartitam, tāvad dvitīye kṣaṇe tasya svabhāvasya sannihitatvāt kuryāt.

1) Everything that it produces in the first moment, it should produce in its entirety in the second also (*prathamakṣaṇavad avikalaṃ sarvaṃ kuryāt*).

2) And whatever is produced in those two moments (*dvayoś ca kṣaṇayor yat kṛtaṃ*), should have been produced in the first moment (*prathame 'pi kṣaṇe tat kuryāt*).

3) And however much is produced in the first moment (*yāvac ca prathame kṣaṇe nirvartitam*), should be produced in the second moment (*tāvad dvitīye kṣaṇe ... kuryāt*).

Here 3 does not merely repeat what is stated by 1, since each stage builds on the previous. There is an accumulation:

1) Whatever is done in the first moment must be done in the second.

2) But whatever is done in both of these should have been done in the first. What is done in the second moment is qualitatively identical but numerically distinct from what is done in the first. An accumulation of these two numerically distinct sets of actions should have been done in the first moment.

3) Whatever is done in the first, which now includes both what is done in the first and in the second, must be done in the second moment.

So 3 differs from 1 in that 'whatever is done in the first moment' differs slightly in the two cases. In 3 it includes what is done in both moments. More stages could be added *ad infinitum*, each one adding something more to what must be done. This explains why Rāmakaṇṭha will in the next sentence describe this as an infinite regress (*anavasthiti*).

It is true that Rāmakaṇṭha's stage 2 differs from Dharmottara's stage 2, in that it says only that 'whatever is done in the second moment' should have been done earlier, rather than 'whatever is done in both moments'. But it can be regarded as making the same point, because for Rāmakaṇṭha too 'what is done in the second moment' includes what is done in the first moment, given his first stage.

[601]It seems clear from the preceding footnote that this explanation of why something eternal could not produce effects simultaneously is extremely close to, and derived from, Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*. Whether Rāmakaṇṭha was drawing directly on Dharmottara, or on a third source that was, in turn, based on Dharmottara, cannot be said for sure; but the former is plausible, for two reasons. (1) Rāmakaṇṭha elsewhere cites a long passage from another part of Dharmottara's inference of momentariness (where the issue is how the inference can avoid the fault of *āśrayāsiddhatvam*): *dharmottarās tv āhuḥ ...* (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:22cd, p. 53,2–7). (2) Other versions of this inference of

momentariness, including those given by authors on whom Rāmakaṇṭha draws elsewhere, such as Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, do not contain quite the same explanation in that they do not lay out the same infinite regress.

Support will now be given for this second contention by observing some of these other explanations of why something non-momentary would be incapable of simultaneous production of effects. Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha writes:

tad evaṃ na nityasya krameṇārthakriyā. nāpi yugapat karaṇam upapadyate, yasmād yaugapadyena nirvartitārthakriyo 'pi tasmāt svabhāvān na viramet, sthiraikasvabhāvatvāt [KSTS; *sthirataika-* DK]. *tatsvabhāvaviratau* [DK omits *tat-*] *svabhāvahānir iti kṣaṇikatvam eva.*

atha nāsya svabhāvāntarayogaḥ, kintu na karoty evāyam. kāryasya tv ayaṃ hi [KSTS omits *hi*] *vipākaḥ, kṛtasya yat kartum aśakyatvam eva.*

tad apy ayuktam. tasya tāvad arthakriyām akurvato hi [*hi* DK; *asyaiva* KSTS] *sattāyā eva durlabhatvāt, 'arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat' ity uktatvāt. arthakriyākaraṇalakṣaṇāt svabhāvāt tadakaraṇātmasvabhāvo 'nya eveti katham asya na svabhāvāntarayogaḥ.*

yadi ca yaugapadyenāpi kurvann anavaratam karoti tadā svabhāvāviśeṣāt sarvadā sarvārthakriyākaraṇaprasaṅgaḥ.

'Thus something eternal could not produce effects sequentially. Neither could it do so in one moment, because even [if] it has brought about effects simultaneously, it would not stop having that nature, because its single nature is enduring. Or if that nature did cease, momentariness would certainly result, because of the loss of [its] nature [and hence its existence].

If [you say:] This [eternal thing] does not take on a different nature, but it does not produce [effects in the second moment]; for the way that effects ripen (i.e. come into being) (*kāryasya ... vipākāḥ*) is that once produced (*kṛtasya*), they certainly cannot be produced [again].

[Then we reply:] that too is incorrect. For the very existence of that thing would be impossible to establish for the period that it was not producing effects; for as we said [above] (citing Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:3ab), 'Only those things that are capable of producing effects are here [considered to be] ultimately real.' [Its] nature which consists in not producing those (viz. effects), is clearly different from [its] nature that is characterised by producing effects. So how can it not take on a different nature [when it ceases producing effects]?

And if, though producing effects simultaneously, it produces without ceasing, then because its nature never differs, it follows undesirably that it would produce all of its effects in every moment.'

Thus here there is no suggestion of any infinite regress, let alone that given by Dharmottara and Rāmakaṇṭha.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's explanation is as follows: *yugapat kṛtakāryasyāpi* sthirasya punar akaraṇe hetvabhāvaḥ* (*Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 2, p. 303,8–9). 'Something enduring, despite having produced effects simultaneously, would lack a cause for not producing them again'.

* *yugapat kṛtakāryasyāpi* was echoed by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's *yaugapadyena nirvartitārthakriyo 'pi* and *yaugapadyenāpi kurvan.*

Thus this [causal efficacy] being impossible in that [eternal thing], comes to rest—because there is no other way, it being a property of real things—in entities that are the opposite of it, [i.e.] which are destroyed after a mere instant.[602] Therefore things are momentary.

This does not really say anything more than Dharmakīrti's sentence in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ad 2:54, p. 80,4–5, (*nāpi yugapat kriyā, tatsvabhāvasya paścād apy akriyāyogāt*; 'nor simultaneous action, because it would be impossible for that nature to be non-active subsequently too'), which Dharmottara went on to elaborate in his own particular way as we saw above. In Jayanta Bhaṭṭa too, we have no infinite regress, let alone the particular one that Dharmottara and Rāmakaṇṭha outline. The same goes for the version of the argument that is found in various texts of Vācaspatimiśra's:

(1) *Nyāyakaṇikā* (cited here from STERN's unpublished edition, as reported by ACHARYA (2006) in the annotation to his edition of the *Tattvasamīkṣā*, p. 33; the passage occurs, in a more corrupt form, on p. 102–3 of the published edition): *na krameṇārthakriyākāritā sambhavati bhāvasya. nāpi yaugapadyena yujyate, yasmād yāvat kāryaṃ kimapi prathame kṣaṇe tenākṣaṇikena svenātmanā sampāditam, tāvat sarvaṃ dvitīyādikṣaṇeṣu sampādayet, tāvatkāryasampādanayogyasyātmano dvitīyādikṣaṇeṣu sannidhānāt.*

(2) *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (p. 513–514): *tasmān na krameṇārthakriyā bhāvānām. nāpi yaugapadyena, yasmād* [conj.; *tasmād* ed.] *yāvat kāryaṃ tenākṣaṇikena prathame kṣaṇe sampāditam, tāvat sarvaṃ dvitīyādiṣv api kṣaṇeṣu sampādayet, tāvatkāryasampādanasvarūpasya dvitīyādiṣv api kṣaṇeṣu bhāvāt.*

(3) *Tattvasamīkṣā* (p. 33–34): *na krameṇārthakriyā yujyate bhāvānām. nāpi yaugapadyena, yato yāvat kāryajātam akṣaṇikena prathame kṣaṇe nirvartanīyam, tāvatkāryajātanirvartanasvarūpasyātmano dvitīyādiṣv api kṣaṇeṣu bhāvāt, tāvad eva teṣv api nirvartayet.*

To summarise: something eternal could not produce effects simultaneously, because whatever effects it brings about in its first moment, it would have to produce again in the second and subsequent moments. Vācaspatimiśra is basing himself in these passages not on Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, but on his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (p. 236,24–28; we thank Masamichi SAKAI for this information).

Whereas the passages looked at above of Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Dharmakīrti, and Vācaspatimiśra all state the problem as that the non-momentary thing would have to go on producing in the next (and subsequent) moment(s), the *Hetubinduṭīkā* (p. 148) of Dharmottara's teacher, Arcaṭa, states the problem by looking back to previous moments rather than subsequent ones: *nityaś ca yadā yugapat karoti, tataḥ prāg api bhāvāt, tadaiva tatkriyāprasaṅgaḥ punas tato 'pi pūrvataram ity evaṃ na kadācid yugapat kriyā syāt.* 'And when something eternal acts simultaneously, then because it exists prior to that too, it undesirably follows that it would have acted at that [earlier] moment too, and again yet earlier than that. Thus simultaneous action is possible at no time at all.'

But this is no closer to the argument of Dharmottara and Rāmakaṇṭha that involves switching back and forth between the first and second moments in such a way that nevertheless involves an accumulation at each step.

[602] Since it is a property it cannot exist of itself, free-floating; it must exist in some entity. It cannot exist in eternal things; and since there is no third class of things other than the eternal and the momentary, it must exist in the momentary.

But if [things] are momentary, then the sequence of previous (*pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ*) agents of purposeful action are destroyed, and a sequence of new (*apūrvo 'pūrvaḥ*) separate (*anyaḥ*) agents of purposeful action arise, so there is at no time any difficulty in accounting for the production of things that

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As support for taking *prakārāntarābhāvāt* to refer to the impossibility of a third option other than existing in eternal things or momentary things, see the following three passages from the *Nyāyamañjarī*:

> *nityeṣu ca padārtheṣu vyāpakānupalambhanāt |*
> *tadvyāptam api sattvaṃ hi balāt tebhyo nivartate ||*
> *na ca rāśis tṛtīyo 'sti tena gatyantarakṣayāt |*
> *kṣaṇikān eva tān bhāvān sattvaṃ samavalambate ||* (vol. 2, p. 300,3–6)

'And because we do not perceive the pervader (sequence and simultaneity) in eternal things, [we know that] that which is pervaded by it too, namely existence, obviously (*hi*) turns away necessarily from those (eternal things). And there is no third group (other than eternal and momentary). Therefore, because of the closing off of any other way, existence embraces only those things which are momentary.'

> *evaṃ kramayaugapadye nityebhyaḥ padārthebhyaḥ nivartete. te ca nivartamāne sattvasya vyāpake iti sattvaṃ tebhya ādāv eva nivartate. tebhyaḥ pracyutaṃ sattvaṃ gatyantaravirahāt kṣaṇikeṣv eva niviśate* (vol. 2, p. 303,11–13).

'Thus sequence and simultaneity turn away from eternal things. And those two which turn away are the pervaders of existence. Therefore existence turns away from those [eternal things] at the very outset. Having fled from them, existence, as there is no other path, enters into momentary things.'

na hy evaṃ sambhavati—nityebhyaś ca vyāvṛttaṃ sattvaṃ kṣaṇikeṣu ca na niviṣṭam iti, tṛtīyarāśyabhāvāt nirāśrayatvānupapatteś ca (vol. 2, p. 304,2–3).

'For the following is not possible: "existence is excluded from eternal things, and at the same time it does not enter into momentary things", because there is no third group and because of the impossibility of [the property of existence] being unlocated.'

We understand *tṛtīyarāśyabhāvāt* and *nirāśrayatvānupapatteḥ* in that last passage as corresponding, respectively, to *prakārāntarābhāvāt* and *vastudharmatvena* in the sentence of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* under comment. Cf. also *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:22cd, p. 50,12–13 *nityānityayor ekenānvitatvād vastudharmatvenobhayabahirbhāvāyogāc ca*, 'because [existence] is concomitant with one out of either eternal or non-eternal things, and because it is impossible that it exists outside of both [eternal and non-eternal things] in that it is a property of objects.'

Rāmakaṇṭha uses the word *viśrāmyati* both in the sentence under comment and in his presentation of the argument in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:22cd, p. 55,7–9): *sattvaṃ hi vicāryamāṇaṃ tejorūpaṃ dāhakatva iva svabhāvapratibandhād evākṣaṇikatvān nivartamānaṃ kṣaṇikatve viśrāmyati*. The words *akṣaṇikatvān nivartamānam* there parallel the phrase *tebhyo nivartate* in the first two passages above from the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

we experience as sequential, and so there is no problem [in maintaining that momentary entities produce things]. And thus the fact that the self is characterised by [being] the agent of purposeful action is proof of its perishability, so it is proved that the self is perishable.

3.11.5.2 Rāmakaṇṭha: Both direct perception and inference refute the momentariness that you postulate [Siddhāntin:] This is completely incorrect, since [we] experience our own self, the perceiver, only as stable.[603] And if it were momentary (*tasmiṃś ca kṣaṇike*), deliberation on this [topic] (*atra*),[604] focussed on such [matters] as the cessation of an own nature,[605] would also (*ca*)[606] not be possible (*na ... sambhavaḥ*).[607] For this reason too (*ity api*) [the view that the self is perishable] is certainly incorrect. And [you] cannot say that [deliberation] will be possible because of a permanence that is brought about by error,[608] since there can be no error in self-awareness.[609] And therefore the appearance of the permanence

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[603]Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha also begins his response to the inference of momentariness by adducing *svasaṃvedana: tad etat kṣaṇikatvaṃ saṃvedanasya nairātmyavādābhyupagamanaṃ* [*nairātmyavādā-* DK; *nairātmyabhāvanā-* KSTS] *ca na yuktam, svasaṃvedanasiddhasya sthirarūpasyāparokṣasyātmanaḥ prakāśanāt* (*Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:25ab).

[604]Or alternatively 'in this [momentary perceiver]'.

[605]Literally 'characterised by' such [matters] as .... We have conjectured *svabhāvanivṛttyādilakṣaṇavicārasya* for *svabhāvanivṛttyādeḥ kṣaṇavicārasya*. We were unable to come up with a satisfactory sense of *svabhāvanivṛttyādeḥ*, whether it is understood as a genitive or ablative. The conjecture is not completely satisfactory though, since the word *-lakṣaṇa-* contributes little.

[606]In addition to our experience of the perceiver as stable.

[607]Deliberation in general has already been listed by Rāmakaṇṭha, at the end of section 3.10.3.2, as one of several kinds of cognition that would be impossible if the perceiver were momentary. Here he makes the more specific point that this very deliberation that you Kṣaṇikavādin are currently engaged in would be impossible if your doctrine were correct. In neither place does he elaborate on why a momentary perceiver would be incapable of deliberation. One possibility is that the latter must take more than one moment because to deliberate on something involves considering it from different perspectives, synthesizing various cognitions of it. Another is that deliberation follows on from doubt (*saṃśaya*), and the agent of the doubt must also be the agent of the deliberation.

[608]The Buddhist position, as outlined in the commentary to verse 43, was that stability is superimposed by mistaken (*bhrānta*) conceptual cognitions. Rāmakaṇṭha here imagines that the opponent may try to adduce this stability as an enabler of deliberation, while holding to the view that it is superimposed. Cf. *Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:25, p. 89: *na cāropitaṃ sthairyaṃ tattadvyāpāranirvartanakṣamam.*

[609]As to why self-awareness, according to both Rāmakaṇṭha and his Buddhist opponents, is necessarily non-erroneous, see WATSON (2010a: 299, 302 and 308). The claim was made

of the perceiver [through *pratyakṣa*], along with corroboration furthermore (*ca*) by an inference of there being one [perceiver], that consists in it being impossible otherwise to account for our observation of reflection (*vicāradarśanānyathānupapattilakṣaṇena*), constitutes a means of disproving the momentariness which is postulated [by you] on [the premise of] the production of things being [otherwise] impossible.[610]

3.11.5.3 The nature of things is to produce effects only when certain auxiliaries are present [Opponent:] But we have said that producing things is not possible on the part of a permanent entity.[611]

[Siddhāntin:] That is also incorrect, for that [permanent entity], even though its own nature is single,[612] has as [that] single nature the producing of effects [only] when particular auxiliary factors are present. So it will produce only in the presence of those [auxiliary factors], [and] not before, because of the absence of those [factors then]. So there is no difficulty accounting for effects [arising] in sequence.

3.11.5.4 Cārvāka: There are three options; each of them is problematic [You Cārvāka] might [argue as follows] (*atha*): if a granary-stored seed,[613] whose nature is to produce a sprout in the presence of auxiliary factors such as earth, is [itself] capable [of producing the sprout], then [it] should produce it whether or not auxiliary factors are present.[614] Or if [it itself] is not capable, then even in the presence of the auxiliary factors it

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in this text in section 3.10.5 (*na ca svasaṃvedanasya bādhaḥ sambhavati, yena bhrāntatā bhavet*), and will be justified in section 3.15.2.4.

[610] You have an inference on your side; but we have direct perception corroborated by inference. Therefore our position has stronger support than yours.

[611] The opponent repeats this claim here as Rāmakaṇṭha has still not really dealt with it. He introduced two different considerations that indicate the stability of the perceiver: its self-perception and its ability to deliberate. But he has not addressed the difficulty of how an eternal thing can bring about effects.

[612] And thus even though you might expect it to produce all its effects simultaneously.

[613] Only one witness reads *kusūlasthasya*. We have adopted it, for *kusūla* is the word used by, for example, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Vācaspatimiśra when they give this argument in, respectively, the *Nyāyamañjarī* (five times between pp. 454,9 and 458,16 of vol. 2) and the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, *Nyāyakaṇikā* and *Tattvasamīkṣā* (four times between pp. 35,18 and 40,11; the passages from the first two texts are given in ACHARYA's apparatus).

[614] *Ex conj.* An early dittography seems to have corrupted the texts of all of the witnesses.

would be incapable, because it can have only one own nature.[615] Or if [in order to avoid both these problems you claim that] it derives capacity from the auxiliary factors, then it[616] was not capable before and becomes capable afterwards; so because of having a plurality of natures it would certainly be differentiated, in other words it would not be one.[617]

3.11.5.5 Rāmakaṇṭha's Response [Siddhāntin:] In reply to this we say: although it is capable, it produces its effect only when the [auxiliary factors] are present, because that is its nature, and not at any other time.

[Opponent:] But if it is capable, why does it require the presence [of anything else]?[618]

[Siddhāntin:] We have [already] said:[619] because that is its nature. Whether because of its own causes or its own nature, it is a thing whose nature is such that though capable, it produces its effect [only] in the pres-

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[615] An almost identical argument is given in the *Nyāyamañjarī*: *sahakāryapekṣayā karotīti cet, na, asamarthasya sahakāriṇā 'pi sāmarthyādhānānupapatteḥ, samarthasya svata eva sāmarthye sati sahakārivaiyarthyāt* (vol. 2, p. 301,7–9).

'If [you say that the eternal thing] produces [an effect] depending on auxiliaries, that is not admissible, because it is not possible that something impotent could take on power even through an auxiliary; and because an auxiliary would be pointless for something potent, given that the latter has potency by itself.'

The first point here corresponds to the second option in our text; the second point here corresponds to the first option in our text.

[616] The masculine gender of *asamarthaḥ* may seem surprising given that he has been talking about the *kusūlasthaṃ bījam*. We take it that the gender anticipates the change in the next paragraph from specific talk of the seed to general talk of a thing (*asau, sa … bhāvaḥ*) capable of carrying out effects.

[617] The *Nyāyamañjarī* passage continues as follows: *sahakārisannidhāne 'pi cāsya svarūpeṇa vā kartṛtvaṃ syāt pararūpeṇa vā. svarūpasya ca prāg api bhāvāt, tasya ca kārakatvāt, kiṃ sahakāriṇā. pararūpeṇa kartṛtve pūrvarūpaparityāgāt tadrūpāntarāpatteś ca kṣaṇikatvam āpadyate* (p. 301,10–13).

'And even though the auxiliaries are there, its (i.e. the eternal thing's) agency would either be due to its own form or a different form. [If due to its own form] why would the own form, since it exists before and since it is the agent, need an auxiliary? If agency is due to a different form, then because [the supposedly eternal thing] abandons its prior form and because it takes on a form other than that, momentariness results.'

The second point here corresponds to the option given in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā-vṛtti* sentence under comment.

[618] This is effectively a restatement of the first of the three options above: *sāmarthye, saty asati vā sahakāriṇi tajjananam.*

[619] Both in our previous sentence, and in section 3.11.5.3.

ence of auxiliaries of a certain kind,[620] not at any other time.[621] The proof of this (*ity atra*) is simply positive and negative concomitance with respect to the enduring thing.[622] And the natures of things cannot be called into question. For one cannot call into question why it is that fire burns [and] water does not.

Now you might say (*atha ... ucyate*): When the auxiliaries are absent, because the [thing] is not producing, its own nature is different from [that

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[620]To get this sense we considered conjecturing *yat* for *yaḥ*, even though *yaḥ* is the reading also of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* parallel passage. But we were dissuaded from doing so by reading SPEIJER (1886: 354), §358, in which he observes: '...the relative pronoun is sometimes used, where one expect a relative adverb or conjunction, *yaḥ* being almost = *yat sa* (that he) or = *yathā sa* (in order that he) or = *yādṛśaḥ* (such as to —).'

[621]If a thing's nature can be defined only as either capable or not capable of producing a particular effect, then the Kṣaṇikavādin's arguments are hard to overcome. But if we include within the definition of a thing's nature the fact that it is capable of producing an effect *only when certain additional factors are there*, then the three difficulties that the Kṣaṇikavādin has pointed to can be avoided: (1) the thing's ability to produce the effect later does not entail that it should be able to produce it even without auxiliaries; (2) the thing's non-ability to produce the effect earlier does not entail that it should be unable to produce it even with the auxiliaries; (3) the thing's non-production of the effect earlier, followed by its production of the effect subsequently, does not entail a break in its nature, so momentariness is avoided.

A parallel passage in the *Matangavṛtti*, which is given and translated in note 635 on p. 394, contains the following sentence: *akṣaṇikā api bhāvāḥ svahetubhyaḥ svabhāvād vā tathāsvabhāvā eva, yenānyonyopakārānapekṣayā sahakaraṇamātreṇaiva sahakāriṇo bhavanti* (ad 6:27cd, p. 165,8–9). Although the context is slightly different there, insofar as Rāmakaṇṭha is discussing the nature of *sahakārins* in particular, it has a syntactical structure similar to that of our sentence, and it is what prompted us to conjecture *svahetubhyaḥ* for *svahetubhiḥ*—it would be awkward to have one instrumental and one ablative linked by a *ca*.

The *svahetus* that Rāmakaṇṭha intends are perhaps the material causes (*upādānakāraṇas*) that bring the seed, pot or such like into existence.

[622]I.e. the proof that things have that kind of nature is that they are observed to produce effects when in the presence of certain other factors, and not to when not. The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (given below) reads here *-ity atra tathādarśanam eva pramāṇam*.

of] the producer [of the effect].[623] [In that case we reply:] No,[624] because even then [when the auxiliaries are not there], its one nature is to produce an effect when in the presence of auxiliaries. And when they are present it is the same, and so there is no plurality [in it].[625] Never in all three phases of time does a thing depart from this same own nature. It is rather due to the absence of auxiliary factors, [not to any difference in its own nature,] that its effect does not arise then.[626] Thus it is just the presence and absence of those [auxiliaries] that differ; there is however no difference in the thing.[627]

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[623]This is effectively a restatement of the third of the three difficulties raised by the Kṣaṇikavādin above: *pūrvam asamarthaḥ paścāt samartha iti svabhāvabhedād bheda eva tasya.*

We conjecture *sahakāryasannidhau* for *sahakārisannidhau*, since the former is the reading of the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (see below). The latter reading is not impossible to defend, for it could yield the meaning: 'the nature of this [seed in the granary / thing when not producing], by virtue of its not producing, is different from [the nature of] that which produces [a sprout / an effect] in the presence of auxiliaries'. But it is unlikely that Rāmakaṇṭha would have intended the reader to understand *tasya* to refer specifically to the seed in its latent state in the granary, or to the thing when not producing. (1) In the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, which is almost word for word identical to our passage, such an interpretation is not possible as no such seed has been mentioned. (2) *tasya* here clearly refers to *bhāvaḥ* three sentences above, i.e. to the thing in general, not to it in its non-productive state.

[624]*Ex conj.*

[625]Whether it is producing or not its nature is the same: to produce effects when the auxiliaries are there.

[626]Cf. Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's *sa padārtho 'rthakriyāṃ karoty eva yadi sahakāriṇo 'sya sannihitāḥ syuḥ. tadasannidhānād akurvāṇasya nāsyopālambhayogyatvam* (*Mṛgendravṛtti* ad 2:24, p. 86,11–13). 'The thing actually produces an effect should its auxiliaries be present. It need not be blamed for not producing when they are not present.'

[627]There is a parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:46, pp. 81,7–83,3): *na, tathāsvabhāvatvād ity uktam. svahetor hi sa tathābhūtasvabhāvo bhāvo bhavati yaḥ *sarvadānupakārakamudgarādisannidhau vikāram upayāti nānyathety* atra tathādarśanam eva pramāṇam. na ca svabhāvā bhāvānāṃ paryanuyogam arhanti. etena tathābhūtasahakārisannidhāv arthakriyākaraṇasvabhāvatvāt sthirasya krameṇārthakriyāvirodhaḥ parihāryaḥ. nanu sahakāryasannidhau janakād bhinnas tasya svabhāvo jananābhāvād eva. na, tadāpi sahakārisannidhau kāryakaraṇasvabhāvatvāt* [*kāryakaraṇa-* $E_K^{pc}C$; *kāryakāraṇa-* E_K^{ac}], *tatsannidhau tu sa eveti na bhedaḥ. na hy asmāt svabhāvāt kālatraye 'pi tasyānyathābhāvaḥ, sahakāryasannidhānāt tu na prāk kāryodbhava iti tatsannidhyasannidhī paraṃ bhidyete na vastubhedaḥ.*

* Comparison with our passage could prompt two conjectures in this sentence: *samartho 'pi* for *sarvadān-* and *nānyadety* for *nānyathety.*

3.11.5.6 The single nature of the auxiliaries defended [Opponent:] But presence and absence [which you have just admitted to be different and to be] in the auxiliaries will in that case make the auxiliaries plural, because [presence and absence] have contradictory own natures.[628]

[Siddhāntin:] There is no contradiction [between different natures] in those [auxiliaries] either. For the [auxiliaries] too have as their nature to be present when their own auxiliaries, [those factors] which cause them to be present, are there.[629] And [their own auxiliaries] (*tasya*) [have as their

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[628]The Kṣaṇikavādin, having been given an explanation for how stable entities can produce effects, now gives up arguing against that point, but attempts to show that the Siddhāntin's explanation entails that the *auxiliaries* must each be plural, having a different nature when present from when absent. For the rest of this section the Siddhāntin defends the position that the auxiliaries, just like the main cause, are single (= enduring) not plural (= diachronically divided into a sequence of entities of limited duration).

(1) Why does it follow from an auxiliary's sometimes being absent and sometimes present that it should be plural? (2) Why would it be a problem for the Siddhāntin if the auxiliaries were plural? Neither question is easy to answer. The argument seems simply to be that presence and absence are contradictory qualities, hence that to which they belong must be of a different nature when it has one from when it has the other. But sometimes the presence of an auxiliary results not from any movement on its part, but from movement on the part of the main cause. The earth, to take the one example of an auxiliary that has already been given and that will be given again below, becomes present by the placing of the seed next to it; why should this change in the location of the *seed* entail any difference in the *earth*? Perhaps because at that point it becomes an auxiliary, a factor in the production of the sprout, whereas previously it was not; hence its nature before was different to what it is now. Or perhaps the Kṣaṇikavādin would simply assert that at the time of the planting of the seed the earth changes from being absent to being present, and this change is sufficient to postulate a difference in the earth itself.

As to what the problem is for Rāmakaṇṭha if an auxiliary is plural, perhaps the point is that if plurality accrues to the auxiliaries as a result of them sometimes being in one state and sometimes not, then it should accrue also to the main cause as a result of sometimes being in one state (such as the state of producing an effect) and sometimes not.

To return to our sentence: some of our sources read *nanu yadi* for *nanu*, but the *yadi* is not in our best manuscript, and we judge it to result from secondary insertion of a particle to correlate with *tarhi*. The *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* parallel passage reads here *nanu sannidhyasannidhī tarhi sahakāriṇo bhedaṃ vidadhāte*.

[629]The auxiliary's nature is here defined in such a way that it is the same whether the auxiliary is absent or present.

What kinds of factors cause the auxiliaries to be present? The earth is caused to be present by the (hands of the) farmer who has placed the seed in it. The auxiliary cause of my perception of a pot, namely the pot, is made present by the (hands of the) person who put it there.

Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. 2, p. 302,10–11): *taditarapadārthasannidhānaṃ tu svahetuvaśād*

nature to be present] when other auxiliaries are present. Thus there is no indeterminacy, because the diversity of things is determined by [their] own natures.[630]

And since it is only in the presence of a seed or other [main cause] that earth and other auxiliaries produce an effect of that [main cause], they must have this nature, similar to [that of] the [main cause],[631] by which they produce the effect only when the [main cause] is present, not at any other time.[632] Thus all things [both main causes and auxiliaries] have a nature to produce the [effect] that is dependent on the presence of each other.[633] Thus all producers can be denoted by the word auxiliary, not [just] certain particular ones.[634]

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upanītam iti nopālambham arhati. 'But the presence of things (i.e. the auxiliaries) other than the [main cause] is brought about by their own causes; so it (i.e. their presence) does not deserve reproach'.

[630]From the Kṣaṇikavādin's point of view there is a problem of indeterminacy if something stable sometimes produces effects and sometimes does not, without any change in its nature. For then the time of its production of an effect seems arbitrary, lacking correlation with a corresponding change in its nature. But the Siddhāntin has avoided this problem by defining the nature of a main cause in such a way that although its nature does not change, its production of an effect at a particular time is brought about by that nature. It is constrained by its nature to produce the effect at precisely that moment, for its nature dictates that it produce an effect when and only when particular auxiliary causes are present; hence arbitrariness is avoided.

The presence or absence of the auxiliaries presents the possibility of arbitrariness reappearing at this level. But arbitrariness is avoided here by defining the nature of these auxiliaries as to be present when their own auxiliaries, which cause them to be present, are there. And so on.

[631]*Ex conj.* The transmitted reading, *tatkāryakaraṇas tv asau*, although it is also the reading of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* parallel (see note 638), is extremely awkward, the masculine gender of *-karaṇaḥ* being difficult to justify. We deem it more plausible that the same corruption has occurred in two texts, than that the transmitted reading is original. For several other examples of what seem to be shared corruptions in parallel passages in two of Rāmakaṇṭha's texts, see note 895.

[632]Thus far this section has been about whether the presence and absence of the auxiliaries entails their plurality. The answer is no, because their nature is to be present when their own *sannidhāpakas* are there. This sentence takes up and rejects another way in which their plurality may be entailed, namely because they produce effects only at certain times. Plurality is avoided by defining their nature in a similar way to how that of main causes was defined: their unchanging nature is to produce effects when the main cause is there.

[633]The *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* passage (note 638) reads *tatkārakatvaṃ svabhāvaḥ* for *tatkārakatvasvabhāvaḥ*.

[634]There is no hierarchy between main causes and auxiliaries (*sahakārins*). Both ultimately fall into the same category of being mutually co-operating producers because just

And they do not have plural natures.[635] And although all of them have

as the seed can be said to produce the sprout, but only with the co-operation of the earth, not alone, so the earth can be said to produce the sprout, but only with the co-operation of the seed, not alone.

This perhaps explains why Rāmakaṇṭha has included this section disproving that the auxiliaries are plural (over time). Since they fall into the same category as main causes, their plurality could be taken to imply the plurality of the main cause.

[635]Since their unchanging nature is to produce effects when the main cause is there.

The *Mataṅgavṛtti* contains a passage (ad 6:27cd, p.163,10–165,10) which includes this defense of the non-plurality of the auxiliaries, and also parallels other points that this opponent has made above. There it is a Buddhist rather than a Cārvāka speaking. He begins by asserting that there is a contradiction or incompatibility (*virodha*) between a non-momentary thing and the capacity for sequential or simultaneous efficacy. Rāmakaṇṭha disputes this, stating that there can be no contradiction between a thing and a property (such as the capacity for efficacy); something can only be contradicted by a thing (*padartha*), not by a property (*dharma*). To support his point he cites Dharmakīrti's definition of the two kinds of *virodha* in the *Nyāyabindu* (3.73–75). (That it is a quotation was not noticed by the editor.)

The passage continues (p.164,1): *dharmaś cāyam akṣaṇikasyaiva* [P, Ṛ, Ṝ; *akṣaṇikasya* ed.] *ghaṭādeḥ krameṇa kṣīradadhidhāraṇādikaḥ pradīpādeś ca yugapad vartidāhatailakṣapaṇādiko 'rthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇaḥ pratyakṣeṇa* [*pratyakṣeṇa* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *om.* ed.] *siddhaḥ, iti* [*iti* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *om.* ed.] *na tena sahāsya* [ed.; *na tenāsya* P] *virodhaḥ.* (The Pune manuscript [P] was not used by the editor; its readings are supplied by us but the readings of the other manuscripts are taken from the apparatus to the edition.)

'And this property, namely being the agent of the production of effects, is established by direct perception to exist in things which *are* non-momentary such as pots, which [bring about] such [effects] as the carrying of milk and yoghurt sequentially, and such as candles, which [bring about] such [effects] as the burning of the wick and the consuming of the oil simultaneously.* Thus there is no contradiction between this [property of producing effects] and these [non-momentary things].'

* Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:22cd, p. 54,14–15: *tad apy ayuktaṃ virodhāsiddheḥ. akṣaṇikasyaiva ghaṭādeḥ kṣīraghṛtadhāraṇādyarthakriyā krameṇa, pradīpādeś ca vartidāhatailakṣapaṇādikā yugapad dṛśyate, iti kutas tadvirodhasiddhiḥ.* Some support is provided by *akṣaṇikasyaiva* there for reading *akṣaṇikasyaiva* in the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, where it is the reading of two Kashmirian manuscripts.

nanu yadyadarthakaraṇasvabhāvaṃ tat tat karoty eva, yathāntyāvasthāprāptaṃ bījādy aṅkurādikam [ed.; *-prāpte bījāṅkurādikaṃ* P, Ṛ]. *yat tu na karoti na tat* [*tat* ed.; *om.* P] *tatsvabhāvam, yathā ghaṭādi nāṅkurajanaka*[ed.; *-janana-* P]*svabhāvam iti. pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām eva dharmayor api* [*api* ed.; *om.* P] *janakasvabhāvājanakasvabhāvayoś* [ed.; *janakatvajanakasvabhāvayoś* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *ca virodhāvirodhau siddhyata eveti. akṣaṇikasyāpy ekasvabhāvatvena sarvadā sarvārthakāritvād yaugapadyena kāryotpādaprasaṅgaḥ. atha na tatsvabhāvaḥ* [ed.; *atha tāvatsvabhāvaḥ* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ], *krameṇāpi na kuryāt. karoty cāyaṃ grāhakātmā krameṇa. tatas* [P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *atas* ed.] *tadā tatkartṛtvasvabhāvaḥ, nānyadā,*

tadakaraṇād [ed.; *tatkāraṇād* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *iti svabhāvabhedād bhinna eveti kṣaṇikaḥ.*

'[Buddhist:] Surely when X has as its nature the producing of an effect Y, then X does produce Y, just like a seed or such like, having reached its final state, [does produce] a sprout or such like. But if X does not produce [Y], then X does not have [the producing of] Y as its nature, as a pot or such like is not of the nature of producing a sprout. Whether having a productive nature and having an unproductive nature, even though they are properties,* are contradictory or non-contradictory *is* established by just perception and non-perception.**'

* You, Rāmakaṇṭha, have argued above that properties cannot contradict anything else, but we Buddhists maintain that even though these two natures are properties, they can be contradictory.

** We can see through perception (of sprouts being produced by seeds) and non-perception (of sprouts being produced by pots) that the kind of things that produce sprouts are opposed to the kind of things that do not. Thus we can see that the having as one's nature to produce a sprout and the not having as one's nature to produce a sprout are contradictory and cannot occur together in the same thing. Thus you, Rāmakaṇṭha, are wrong to accept that one seed can remain the same thing from when it is in the granary not producing, to when it is in the field producing—and wrong to accept that one perceiver can remain the same thing from when it does not produce a certain action to when it produces that kind of action.

A difficulty we have with this sentence is why it says *virodhāvirodhau siddhyataḥ* rather than simply *virodhaḥ siddhyati.*

'And because an eternal thing, since it is always of the same nature, is [by nature] a producer of all [its] effects, it undesirably follows that [all] its effects would arise simultaneously.* If it were not of that nature [to produce all of its effects] it would not be able to produce them even sequentially. And this perceiver does produce effects sequentially. Therefore it is only at the time [that it is producing a certain effect] that it has as its nature to produce that effect, not at other times, because it does not produce them [then]. Thus because its nature is differentiated, it [itself] is certainly differentiated; thus it is momentary.'

* This sentence is elliptical. Cf. the following sentence from section 3.11.5.1 of our text, which begins and ends in a similar way but has more steps in the middle: *ekasvabhāvatve ca sarvadaiva svanirvartyasarvārthakriyākartṛtvasvabhāvatvād ekasminn api kṣaṇe sarvasvakāryakaraṇaprasaṅgāt kāryayaugapadyaṃ bhavet.*

tad ayuktam. tata eva viśiṣṭasvabhāvatvena siddheḥ. yo hi yadarthakaraṇasvabhāvo yathā siddhaḥ, sa tathaiva tadarthakaraṇasvabhāvo niścīyate, nānyathā, [*niścīyate, nānyathā, ... evāṅkurajanakasvabhāvo nānyathā* ed.; *nānyathā* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *bījādir* [conj. ISAACSON; *bījāder* ed.] *iva kṣityādisannidhāna evāṅkurajanakasvabhāvo nānyathā. sthirasvabhāvaḥ* [*sthirasvabhāvaḥ* ed.; *sthiraś ca svabhāvaḥ* P, Ṛ, Ṝ] (P, f.168v) *sarvadā tattatsahakārisannidhau tattadanekakāryajanakasvabhāvaḥ siddhaḥ, iti sarvadā* [*sarvadā* P, 4 mss; *sarvathā* ed.] *tathābhūtaikasvabhāvaḥ siddho nānyathābhūtasvabhāvaḥ, iti svabhāvabhedābhāvād*

abhinna evety akṣaṇikaḥ. sahakāriṇāṃ tu [*tu* ed.; *om.* P] *prāg asannidhānād ajanakasvabhāvabhrāntir* [ed.; *asannidhānājanaka-* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *atra bhavatām. na tv ajanakatvam eva sarvadānāropitarūpasya grāhakātmano 'kṣaṇikasyaivāvabhāsanād* [ed.; *-syaiva bhāsanād* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *ity uktam. sahakāriṇām api svasahakārisannidhau tatsahakāryekasvabhāvatvāt* [P, Ṛ; *tattatsahakāryaikasvabhāvatvāt* ed.] *na svabhāvabheda ity akṣaṇikatvam eva.*

'[Siddhāntin:] That is incorrect; for [the perceiver] is established as having a specific own nature* from exactly that.** For that which is established to have as its nature the producing of a certain effect in a certain way*** is determined to have as its nature the producing of that effect in precisely that way, not in any other, just like a seed or such like, whose nature is such that it produces a sprout only in the presence of earth and the like, not otherwise. It is of stable nature, being established to always have as its nature the producing of various particular effects in the presence of particular auxiliaries. Thus (*iti*) it is established to always have that kind of single nature, not to have a nature that changes. Thus because it does not have a plurality of natures, it [itself] is certainly non-plural; i.e. it is non-momentary. But it is because its auxiliaries are not present earlier that you commit this mistake of thinking that [at that time] it has a nature not to produce. In fact it is not a non-producer [even then], because as we have said (e.g. ad 6:7c–9b, 23ab, 24ab), a perceiver that is non-momentary and not superimposed appears [to us] all the time. As for the auxiliaries they have as their single nature to become an auxiliary of the [main cause, the perceiver] when their own auxiliaries are present; therefore their natures are not divided, therefore they are certainly non-momentary.'

* As becomes clear in the sentences after this one, 'specific own nature' means a nature to produce particular kinds of effect in the presence of particular kinds of auxiliary.

** 'From exactly that' could mean three things:

(1) From the principle you laid out at the beginning of your speech, that there is a firm correlation between whatever things do and the kind of nature they have.

(2) From perception and non-perception.

(3) From the fact that the perceiver acts sequentially. The Buddhist mentioned this fact and then concluded that therefore (*tataḥ*) the perceiver is momentary. Rāmakaṇṭha replies that from precisely this fact (*tata eva*) we can establish the perceiver to have a kind of nature that determines that it will produce effects sequentially.

*** For example, only in the presence of particular auxiliaries.

nanv anupakāriṇy apekṣāyogād akṣaṇikasya kiṃ sahakāriṇā? tadupakāryatve vā tasyopakṛtānupakṛtayoḥ svabhāvayor bhedān nākṣaṇikatvam. na, kṣaṇikatvād eva parasparopakārarahitair [ed.; *-kārahitair* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ] *apy ekārthakāritvena sahakāritayā bhavadbhir abhyupagatair ekasāmagryantarbhūtaiś cakṣūrūpālokādibhir apekṣyakāribhir* [conj.; *-lokādibhir ākṣepakāribhir* P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *-lokādibhir* ed.] *anaikāntikatvāt.*

'[Buddhist:] But because there can be no dependence on something that does not help, the non-momentary [perceiver would lack dependence, so] why would it need an auxiliary?

Or if it were helped [by the auxiliary], its helped nature would be different from its nature before it was helped, so it would not be non-momentary.

[Siddhāntin:] No [the perceiver can depend on an auxiliary without being helped by it], because [to infer that something is helped from the fact that it has dependence] is inconclusive, as is proved by the eyes, colour, light and the like, which, belonging to one causal complex, and being accepted by you to be auxiliaries since they all act towards the same aim (i.e. visual cognition), act depending [on each other] despite lacking, precisely because they are momentary, mutual help.

nanu teṣāṃ parasparopakārāsambhave 'pi ['*pi* ed.; *om.* P] *svahetukṛta evāsau svabhāva ity uktam—te "nirabhiprāyavyāpārāḥ svahetuparipiṇāmopanidhidharmāṇaḥ* [P, Ṛ, Ṝ; *-pariṇāmo-pādhividhuradharmāṇaḥ* ed.], *tatprakṛtes tathābhavanto* [ed.; *-bhavantaṃ* P] *nopālambham arhanti" iti.*

'[Buddhist:] But even though it is not possible for these [eyes and other members of the causal complex] to help each other, this nature [to act in dependence on each other] is brought into existence by their own causes, as we have said [in the *Hetubindu* p. 9*,8–10]: They "act without intention, having, as a result of the transformation of their own cause, the property of being present [at the location of the effect]; being that way because of that nature, they should not be blamed".*'

* We are following the interpretation of Arcaṭa in the *Hetubinduṭīkā*. He takes 'own cause' to be the whole causal complex consisting of earth, seed, water etc., and the 'transformation' of that to be the creation of a new moment. He glosses *upanidhiḥ* with *kāryadeśe sannidhānam*, and *tatprakṛteḥ* with *tatprakṛtitvāt*.

How has this speech of the Buddhist answered Rāmakaṇṭha's point that the Buddhists themselves accept that one thing can depend on another without being helped by it? It has shown how a momentary thing (whose nature is brought into existence by a preceding momentary causal complex) can depend on other momentary things without being helped by them. The implication is that for something non-momentary, the problem remains that if it depends on other things, it must be helped by them (and must therefore be non-eternal).

yady evam, akṣaṇikā api bhāvāḥ svahetubhyaḥ svabhāvād vā tathāsvabhāvā eva, yenānyo-nyopakārānapekṣayā sahakaraṇamātreṇaiva [ed.; *-kāraṇamātreṇaiva* P] *sahakāriṇo bhava-ntīty anupālabhyāḥ* [mss; *anupalabhyaḥ* ed.]. *vistareṇa cāyaṃ pakṣo nareśvaraparīkṣāpra-kāśe 'smābhiḥ pratikṣipta iti tata evāvadhāryaḥ. etena jñatvavirodho 'py ātmanaḥ pratyu-ktaḥ* [P, Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ, AI; *pratikṣiptaḥ* ed.], *tattadviṣayasannidhau tattadgrāhakaikasvabhāvatvād iti. nāto 'pi tasyānityatvasiddhir* [ed.; *nāto 'py āsyānitya-* P] *iti nairātyamābhāvaḥ.*

'[Siddhāntin:] In that case, non-momentary things too, whether because of their own causes or their own nature, are certainly of a kind of nature by virtue of which they are auxiliaries merely by acting together, without depending on mutual helping; they should not be blamed for that. And this position [of yours] has been refuted at length by me in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*; so it should be understood from there.* In this way the [supposed] contradiction of the self's being a knower is also refuted,** because its single

the capacity [to produce the effect],[636] the [unwanted] corollary that there would be a plurality of effects does not follow,[637] since their nature is to produce this single effect in the presence of each other.[638]

3.11.5.7 The production of several different effects And the same is the case[639] even in the producing of several effects:[640] there is no [need to

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nature is [to be] a perceiver of particular [objects] in the presence of those particular objects. And it is not proved from this that it is non-eternal; thus there is no absence of self.'

* *vistareṇa cāyaṃ pakṣo nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśe 'smābhiḥ pratikṣipta iti tata evāvadhāryaḥ*: BHATT takes this to be a reference to *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:22cd, p. 49. The passage beginning on that page is relevant, but an even closer parallel is that which occurs in the commentary to 1:46, pp. 81,11–83,3, and which we have given in footnotes (both above and below).

** The contradiction that has been being discussed in this passage is that of a non-momentary thing being able to produce effects. By the removal of this general contradiction, the more specific contradiction of a non-momentary perceiver being able to perceive objects is removed.

[636]They must have the capacity, for the opponent has shown above how both of the other two possibilities—that they do not have the capacity, or derive it only when the other factors are present—involve logical problems.

[637]The unwanted corollary is that since the main cause as well as the auxiliary causes are all capable of producing, they should all produce their own separate effects.

[638]The *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* passage continues: *nanu sannidhyasannidhī tarhi sahakāriṇo bhedaṃ vidadhāte, vidadhator* viruddhasvabhāvatvāt. na tatrāpi virodhaḥ, tasyāpi sannidhāpakasvasahakārisannidhau tatsannidhisvabhāvatvāt, tasyāpi svasahakārisannidhau, tasya tasyāpi,* iti nāniyamaḥ, svabhāvaniyāmitatvād bhāvānāṃ vaiśvarūpyasyeti.* sahakāriṇām api kṣityādīnāṃ bījādikāraṇasannidhau tatkāryakaraṇas* [*-karaṇas* E_K^{pc}B,C; *-kāraṇas* E_K^{ac}] *tv asau tatsadṛśa eva svabhāvo yena tatsannidhāna eva tadaṅkurādikāryaṃ kurvanti nānyadā iti sarveṣāṃ tatkārakatvaṃ svabhāvaḥ parasparasannidhānāpekṣa* [E_K; *-pekṣas tv* B,C] *iti sarve kārakāḥ sahakāripadavācyā naikakāḥ.* na ca teṣāṃ svabhāvabhedaḥ, sarveṣāṃ ca sāmarthye 'pi na kāryānekatvaprasaṅgaḥ, parasparasannidhau tadekakāryanirvartakasvabhāvatvāt.*

* Noteworthy differences—not already mentioned in footnotes above—from the passage in our text are: the inclusion of *vidadhatoḥ* (= '[presence and absence] which are laying down [difference]'), the inclusion of *tasya tasyāpi*, *vaiśvarūpyasyeti* for *vaicitryasyeti*, and *naikakāḥ* for *naikaikaḥ*.

[639]I.e. here too the producer of the effects has one unchanging nature throughout.

[640]The previous sections have been about a seed or such like producing a single effect (despite having existed previously without producing it). Now we turn to things that can produce several effects in sequence.

conclude that there is a] plurality of own natures, since even when it produces several effects sequentially, [the agent's] single nature is [to be] the agent[641] of many varied effects when many varied auxiliaries are present. For example (*yathā*) one person [called] Caitra, who is nevertheless (*ca*) the agent of many effects such as cutting, cooking and eating,[642] does not have a plurality of natures even though the cutting and the rest occur sequentially, since it is his nature [to be] the agent of those effects such as cutting when he is in the presence of particular auxiliaries such as sickles and the like. For that kind of nature (i.e. a single nature to produce various effects) exists in him *non*-sequentially (*tatrākrameṇaiva*).[643] For you accept that a lamp, which

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[641]The compound in this sentence ending *-kartṛekasvabhāvatvāt*, and that in the next sentence ending *-kartṛsvabhāvatvāt* would perhaps be smoother if they read, respectively, *-kartṛtvaikasvabhāvatvāt* and *-kartṛtvasvabhāvatvāt*. The readings with the abstract suffix are found in some of our witnesses, but we are reluctant to adopt them since in both cases the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* parallel lacks the *tva*, and since Rāmakaṇṭha commonly elsewhere omits an abstract suffix in such compounds: for example this text ad 11cd (*jñātṛsvabhāvatvāt*), *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 2:12cd (*prakāśanakartṛsvabhāvā* and *āvaraṇakartṛsvabhāvā*), *Matańgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 6:9ab (*draṣṭṛsvabhāvam*, three times), ad 6:10–11b (*kartṛsvarūpam*), ad 6:12–13b (*draṣṭṛsvabhāvam*, three times), *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:46, p. 82,19 (*-kāryakartṛsvabhāva-*), ad 2:29–30b and ad 3:7 (*kartṛsvabhāvaḥ*; three times), *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* ad 3, p. 321,15 (*kāryakatṛsvabhāvam*).

We either have to understand such compounds as using *kartṛ*/*jñātṛ* etc. in the sense of *kartṛtva*/*jñātṛtva*, or interpret them to mean that the *svabhāva* itself is an agent/knower.

[642]The cutting presumably refers to the cutting of the food that he then goes on to cook and then eat.

[643]I.e. at one moment of time. The manuscripts here read *tatra krameṇaiva*, but we have conjectured *tatrākrameṇaiva*, which is the reading of *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, and which is clearly required by the context: the claim of this sentence is about to be illustrated by the example of a flame which produces burning of the wick, lessening of the oil etc.—Rāmakaṇṭha's standard example for non-sequential production of effects (see, apart from the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* given below: *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:6ab, p. 27,15–17, ad 1:22cd, p. 54,15, ad 1:38ab and *Matańgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 6:27cd, p. 164,1–2).

A reason has already been given for the contention of the last sentence that a person performing several actions in sequence has an undivided own nature, namely, that his nature is to produce certain kinds of effects when in the presence of certain kinds of auxiliaries. This sentence adds a further supporting reason that answers the doubt of someone who may still think that if an effect such as cutting is different from eating, the producer of that cutting (or his own nature) must be different from the producer of the eating (or his own nature). It does so by pointing out that a person is able to carry out more than one action at once, and even a Buddhist would not hold that such a person's own nature is divided at one point of time.

is certainly single, has as its one nature [to be] the accomplisher of several effects, such as burning the wick, consuming the oil and causing itself to be perceived; [you do] not [hold in this case that] a plurality of own natures is necessitated by a plurality of its effects,[644] for there is no contradiction in something utterly single, with a particular own nature, bringing about many effects.

The same [as can be seen clearly in this non-sequential case, namely that one thing can bring about many effects,] should be accepted in this [sequential case also]: a thing which is permanently stable too[645]—since it is never separated from its own nature,[646] which is to produce various particular effects when particular auxiliaries are present,—is not plural (*na bhedaḥ*), in spite of the fact that it produces several effects sequentially as a result of the sequentiality of the presence of the auxiliaries, as above,[647] because it does not have a plurality of own natures.[648]

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[644]We take it that *na tu kāryabhedena svabhāvabhedaḥ* has most force if *abhyupagato bhavadbhiḥ* is carried over to go with it as well as with the previous. Rāmakaṇṭha can be known to regard the Buddhist as accepting *na kāryabhedena svabhāvabhedaḥ* not only because he regards the latter as accepting that a flame has a single nature at a single moment of time, but also because he attributes to the Buddhist the following untraced quotation (in precisely this context in a parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:6ab, p. 27): *śaktir hi bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ bhidyamānā vastv api bhinatti, na punaḥ kāryabhedena*, 'For power, when divided by its occurrence and non-occurrence, divides the thing [that has the power too]. But [it does] not [do so when divided merely] through [having] a plurality of effects.'

[645]The sense of the *api* is not certain. One possibility is: a stable thing *too*, which produces effects in sequence, in addition to the just mentioned lamp, which in one moment produces simultaneous effects. Another is: a thing which *despite* being stable, and which you would therefore hold to be incapable of producing a plurality of effects.

[646]M^{Y}'s reading with its inclusion of an *-eka-* after *-karaṇa-* is equally possible.

[647]I.e. as taught above. This could simply refer to the many places where a thing has been said to have as its nature the bringing about of various effects *in the presence of various auxiliaries*. Or it could refer more specifically either to the sentence earlier in this section about the sequential performance of cutting, cooking and eating when a sickle and other corresponding auxiliaries are present, or to the beginning of the previous section, where the presence or absence of the auxiliaries was explained as resulting from the presence or absence of their own auxiliaries.

[648]The *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* parallel passage continues: *evaṃ nānābhūtārthakriyākaraṇe. nānābhūtatattatsahakārisannidhau nānābhūtānekakāryakartrekasvabhāvatvāt, krameṇa nānābhūtārthakriyākaraṇe 'pi na svabhāvabhedaḥ. yathaikasyaiva caitrasya lavanapacanabhojanādyanekakāryakartus tattaddātrādisahakārisannidhau tattallavanapacanādikāryakartṛsvabhāvatvāt krameṇa lavanapacanādibhāve 'pi na svabhāvabhedaḥ, tathābhūtasvabhāvasya tatrākrameṇaiva bhāvāt pradīpa iva. pradīpasya hi vartidāhatailakṣapaṇa-*

Thus for a stable thing to produce effects in sequence is possible. So the impossibility of producing effects is not capable of refuting [the stability of agents], because [in fact] only stable things are capable of the [production of effects].[649] And as for how it is the case that something momentary would not be capable of producing effects, that I have expounded in the *Āgamaviveka*[650] and so it should be understood from that very place.

3.11.6 Conclusion

Because of the absence of anything that contradicts it,[651] the permanence of things, which is established by direct perception,[652] [must be accepted

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prakāśasvajñānādyanekakāryanirvartakaḥ svabhāvo 'bhyupagato bhavadbhiḥ. na tu kāryabhedena svabhāvabheda iti darśitaṃ prāg eva. tadvad atrāpi. sahakārisannidhau tatkāryakartṛsvabhāvāviyogāt sarvadaiva sthirasya bhāvasya, sahakārisannidhānasya tu kramikatvāt krameṇānekakāryanirvartane 'pi, na bhedaḥ, tatsvabhāvābhedāt. svarūpasya tu bhedasiddhau hi nañarthānupraveśaparamāstrā bauddhāḥ. na ca tat [*tat* B; *om.* C, ed.] *sarvadaikasvabhāvavarmācchāditānāṃ* [*-varmā- em.* SANDERSON, *-dharmā-* B, C, ed.] *sambhavati* [B, C; *sa bhavati* ed.]. *iti na sthirasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyānupapattir iti.*

It thus concludes with the following condemnation of the Buddhists: 'But it is well known that (for this meaning of *hi* see note 460), the greatest weapon of the Buddhists when they try to establish that [the perceiver's] own nature is plural is introducing negation. And this [weapon] does not work* against those who are protected by the armour of a nature that is permanently single. Therefore it is not impossible for a stable thing to produce effects sequentially or simultaneously.'

> *A weakness of the reading *sambhavati*, is that it does not usually have quite this meaning. Furthermore to translate the genitive with 'against' is not entirely natural. It is thus possible that we should adopt two readings of the edition, i.e. the omission of the *tat* and *sa bhavati* for *sambhavati*, which would yield the meaning: 'And that [plurality] (*sa*) does not occur for those who are protected ...'.

[649] As support for the *eva* here, see *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:5, p. 16,18–19: *sthirasyārthakriyānupapattir eva bādhakam iti cet, na, tatraiva tasyāḥ samutpatter iti vakṣyāmaḥ.* 'If [you say], 'the reason for the refutation is just that a stable [entity] could not have causal efficacy,' [we reply that that is] not [correct], for, as we shall teach, that (i.e. causal efficacy) can arise only in a [stable thing].'

[650] This is the sole reference known to us to a work of this name. GOODALL (1998: xix) suggested that it may be another name for the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, about which, see note 911.

[651] *Tatra* = *sthairye.*

[652] Through direct perception we do not observe things to flash in and out of existence constantly, but rather to be continuous.

as] uncontradicted. Among these [i.e. among all possible entities that exist], those for which a logical reason [for supposing them to be destructible] is established by a valid means of knowledge are destructible. But ones other than that are certainly not destructible, so the indestructibility of the soul is established in spite of its being the agent of the production of effects, since there is no logical reason [for its being destructible].

By this [preceding argumentation][653] the [supposed] contradiction of the self's being a perceiver (*jñatvavirodhaḥ*) is also[654] countered—for it does not have a plurality of natures, since, as [argued] above,[655] its single nature is to perceive particular [objects] when in the presence of those objects. But the delusion that the [self's being a perceiver] is contradicted by a plurality of [perceiver-]natures may occur in those whose minds are mistaken [in thinking that there is] an absence of a nature [to perceive a pot] (*tatsvabhāva-*) prior to the perceiving of that pot. So it has been refuted thus.[656]

And therefore, because of the indestructibility of the perceiver and because of the real existence of the perceived, neither of these are destroyed at the point of liberation.[657] Rather it is nothing short of omniscience that it is correct to posit [as the state of the soul in liberation], because the perceiver endures unenveloped, as a result of ignorance and the rest—which are known [in our system] as Impurity, past action and primal matter, [and] which have as their nature to conceal—ceasing [to operate on the soul] at the time [of

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[653]I.e. that given in sections 3.11.5.2 to 3.11.5.7.

[654]We take the 'also' to mean: in addition to the supposed contradiction of its being an agent of effects (*arthakriyākāritva*). It is true that to be a perceiver *is* to be an agent of effects, but we take Rāmakaṇṭha to be signaling a shift from the more general category of *arthakriyā* to the more specific category of perception—or from action to cognition.

[655]In sections 3.11.5.5 to 3.11.5.7.

[656]Rāmakaṇṭha's claim that the reason he has refuted this delusion is because it may occur in these people could be intended as a justification of his importation, into this rejection of the Cārvāka view, of the whole preceding discussion of the Buddhist inference of momentariness.

[657]Rāmakaṇṭha is here rounding up his refutation not only of this Cārvāka interpretation of 'cessation of everything' (*sarvanāśa*), but also of the Buddhist interpretation. For it was the Buddhist who asserted (section 2.15) that both the perceiver and perceived cease at liberation, because the perceived is unreal (*avasturūpa*) and because the perceiver is dependent on the perceived; and that point is responded to only in this sentence, not anywhere in the preceding refutation of Buddhism.

liberation].[658] As they say:[659]

> This cognition is by nature pure; [its] impurities are adventitious.
> When they are not present, the light of that [cognition], which is
> indestructible, has everything as its object.

3.12 Cessation of Cognition and Agency: verse 47

Thus, having shown the view that [liberation consists of] cessation of everything to be false, [Sadyojyotiḥ] now states [the following verse] in order to obliterate the view that cognition and agency are destroyed.

> 47ab) And there is no cessation of [the powers of] cognition and
> action, since that would contradict all scriptures.

'For there is no cessation of the seer's seeing [nor] of the thinker's thinking'[660]—through this Vedic passage this view that rejects [the powers of]

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[658]We assume that *avidyā* is here being used as a synonym of *mala*, so that the *ādi* refers to karma and *māyā*. Strictly speaking Rāmakaṇṭha's view is that *mala* is the cause of ignorance, the former being of the nature of a physical impurity (see *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 47c–53b). The view that *mala* is simply ignorance is that of the non-Saiddhāntika non-dualist Śaivas (see for example *Mālinīvijayottara* 1:23c: *malam ajñānam icchanti*) who advance it specifically to oppose the Saiddhāntika view.

But in contexts where Rāmakaṇṭha is debating with non-Śaivas and thus not wanting to assume categories that they do not accept, he sometimes refers to *mala* simply as ignorance (*avidyā*) (see *avidyādyāvaraṇa* at *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:59, p. 100, 13–14, and WATSON 2006: 86, note 125). Such a practice is not in fact a radical departure from earlier tradition: see for example the list of synonyms of *mala* given in the *Kiraṇatantra* (2:19–20).

The reading *-māyākhyānām avidyādīnām* gives a nice meaning, but it is found only in the editions. It is thus possible that M^{Y}'s *-māyāvidyādīnām* is original and that Rāmakaṇṭha's intended meaning was just: 'as a result of Impurity, past action, primal matter, ignorance and the rest, which have as their nature to conceal, ceasing [to operate on the soul] at the time [of liberation]'.

[659]The first line occurs at *Pramāṇavārttika* 2:208cd. The following line in that text reads *tatprāg apy asamārthānāṃ paścāc chaktiḥ kva tanmaye*. The verse is cited with an almost identical second line to ours twice by Jayaratha in the *Tantrālokaviveka*, where he gives it as the view of the Vijñānavādins. In both instances (ad 1:33 and 4:30) there is the one difference of *apāye* for *abhāve*. The first line is also cited by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:9), where a Vijñānavādin opponent adduces it to support their case.

[660]The citation is an amalgamation of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.3.23, *na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo vidyate*, and *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 4.3.28, *na hi mantur mater viparilopo vi-*

knowledge and action in liberation is contradicted by scripture.[661] And it is not appropriate to accept something that is contradicted by all scriptures as true.[662] As [Kumārila] has said,[663]

> But the intuition of a single person is no different from an artificial construct.

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dyate. Rāmakaṇṭha uses the same form of the citation in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:64, p.102,19.

[661]This translation assumes the separation *iti śrutyā āgamanirastaḥ*, as we have found no parallel in any text for the *karmadhāraya* compound *śrutyāgama*. The fact that when Rāmakaṇṭha gives the same citation in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, he follows it with *ity āgamanirasto 'yaṃ pakṣaḥ* is perhaps also support for the separation. But it is nevertheless possible that *śrutyāgamanirastaḥ* is a single compound in which *āgama* is brought down from the verse and *śruti* qualifies it.

It is clear both from this sentence and from elsewhere that Rāmakaṇṭha spoke of the Veda as one kind of *āgama*: see *ātmani hi vyavasthāpite sarva eva vedādir apy āgamaḥ samarthito bhavati, tasya hi ... sarvasyātmārthatvāt* (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:74, p.111,9–12); 'For when the self is established, then all scripture including the Veda and the like becomes congruent, since all of it has the self as its target'.

[662]What are we to make of Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's contention that this Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika view is contradicted by *all* scripture? In verse 1:74 of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, Sadyojyotiḥ makes the point that denial of the existence of a self goes against 'all scripture' (*sarvāgama*), those who deny it being dry logicians (*śuṣkatārkika*). Rāmakaṇṭha gives as examples of such dry logicians Buddhists and Lokāyatas. So it is clear, as we would expect, that the scriptures of the Buddhists and the texts of the Lokāyatas did not count as *āgama* for these Saiddhāntika thinkers.

In our text, however, it is not the loss of the self that is said to be contradicted by all scripture, but rather the loss of cognition and agency in liberation. The absence of agency in liberation was held by so many non-Buddhist and non-Lokāyata traditions (not only Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, but also Vedānta and Sāṅkhya) that in order to enable Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's claim here to be cogent, perhaps we have to assume that it is in particular the denial of cognition in liberation that is contradicted by all scripture. That would leave just the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas as potential counter-examples to Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha's claim. The denial of cognition in liberation is maintained in the *Nyāyasūtra*, and this denial was cited by Rāmakaṇṭha above in his exposition of this Naiyāyika position (section 2.14). But it is safe to assume that Rāmakaṇṭha and Sadyojyotiḥ did not regard the *Nyāyasūtras* as *āgama*. Their point then is presumably that, although this position is followed by an 'orthodox' tradition, Nyāya, and although it may be found in the source text of that tradition, it is not backed up by anything that counts as a genuine scripture.

[663]*Ślokavārttika codanāsūtra* 150cd.

Now [someone may say]: although the thing (*artham*) exists,[664] [the Naiyāyika] does not see it because of [his] impurity,[665] so he accepts something as real on the strength of logic, even though it is opposite to that [really existent thing] (*tat*).[666] In response to this, [Sadyojyotiḥ] says:

> 47cd) And [this position] is refuted by inference[667] [as well as being contradicted by all scripture], because we see that these two [powers] are eternal in the existent Lord.[668]

[The word *sadīśe* is to be analysed as a *karmadhāraya* with the following meaning:] He is both ***existent***, since He has been established by valid means of proof, and He is ***the Lord***. By the ***inference*** (*yukti* = *anumāna*), '***because we see that*** [the powers of] cognition and action are ***eternal*** in Him', this position ***is refuted***. The meaning is as follows. First of all, someone [such as a Naiyāyika or Vaiśeṣika] who claims to include [all that there is in the world] in categories, can teach the inclusion of the Lord only in the category of substance, and within that only in the category of selves, not elsewhere, because the [inclusion of Him elsewhere] is impossible (*tadayogāt*)[669] given that He is utterly different in nature [from any other categories such as qualities, and any other substances such as water]. For if one does not include Him [with selves], then He would have to form some further category

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[664]The relevant thing being the continued existence of cognition and agency in liberation.

[665]One could suppose here that Rāmakaṇṭha is almost punning with the word *mala*—its technical sense is inevitably recalled, but the recently quoted verse (*prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ* ...) provides a generic meaning also.

Malān na is the reading of our best manuscript, M^{Y}, but other witnesses read *nirmalā na* and *amalā na*. These readings would require the plural *paśyantīti*, the singular being, again, only found in M^{Y}. They are interpretable, perhaps, if we take the sentence to mean: '[These Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas], not having *mala* [as part of their ontology] do not see ...', the idea being that non-acceptance of *mala* restricts how much they can know about liberation. But since we have frequently found M^{Y} to be the sole witness to preserve the correct reading, and since its readings here are unproblematic and arguably smoother, we have followed it. We find its singular understandable given the frequent expressions in the text such as *ayaṃ vādī*; opponents are more commonly referred to in this text in the singular than in the plural.

[666]Or possibly, 'even though it is contradicted by scripture'.

[667]The translation follows the explanation of *yuktibādhā* in the commentary as *yuktyānumānena bādhāsya pakṣasya*.

[668]As to why the Lord is referred to as *sat*, the point seems to be that he is something concrete and proven that we can point to as a basis for inference.

[669]We take *tat* at the beginning of the compound to mean *anyatrasaṅgrahasya*.

or further substance, so there would be a contradiction with [your] tenet that the number of categories is six [and] the number of substances is nine.[670]

[Naiyāyika / Vaiśeṣika:] Let us assume that He is included there [as a self]. What then?

[Siddhāntin:] Well[671] [it follows] from that [that] liberated souls, which are the locus of the dispute,[672] are omniscient and omnipotent, since, like the Lord, they are devoid of the retributive force of good and bad karma while being souls.[673] Thus by logic too [as well as by scripture] the view that [the powers of] knowledge and action are destroyed is rejected. For lack of the retributive force of good and bad karma, being established in the Lord as invariably concomitant with omniscience and omnipotence, [and] occurring in souls [in liberation], proves that they have that [omniscience and omnipotence] as their nature[674] at that time. Thus all liberated souls are equal to the Lord,[675] and so the cessation of [the powers of] knowledge and action in liberation is indefensible (*na ... yuktaḥ*).

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[670]How can we understand the 'For' at the beginning of this sentence, given that the previous sentence itself contained a reason. Both sentences give reasons for why the Lord must be classified as a self; but the previous does so by excluding the possibility that He can be placed in any of the existing Vaiśeṣika categories other than that of selves, and this does so by excluding the possibility that He forms some completely new category on His own.

Although the existence of God is maintained in the surviving texts of classical Vaiśeṣika, where he indeed features as a particular kind of self, he seems not to have been part of earlier Vaiśeṣika: see BRONKHORST (1996) and the references there to earlier scholars such as FRAUWALLNER and CHEMPARATHY.

[671]The *ca* is awkward.

[672]The dispute being whether or not they possess the powers of cognition and action. For the reading we have preferred, *vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannāḥ*, which is found in the editions but not the manuscripts, cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:50 (p. 87,9), where the same expression occurs (in the corrected reading to be found in the *śuddhipatra*, and in B and C).

[673]The first stage of this argument was to show that the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas themselves should include the Lord as a self. The second stage can then utilise the principle that all selves that lack *dharma* and *adharma* are omniscient and omnipotent (since the Lord can now serve to illustrate this principle) to arrive at the omniscience and omnipotence of liberated souls.

[674]Or possibly, 'that they are of the nature of the [Lord]'.

[675]One could consider seeking to avoid this awkward word-order and having to take *bhavanti* as a copula by conjecturing *muktau* for *muktā* and translating, 'Thus all [souls] become equal to the Lord in liberation'. Even retaining the unanimously transmitted *muktā* one could perhaps avoid taking *bhavanti* as a copula by translating, 'Thus all, when liberated, become equal to the Lord'.

3.13 Dissolution into the Supreme Material Cause: verse 48

Now [Sadyojyotiḥ] refutes the positions indicated above in [the half-verse] beginning with the word *avyākṛtādiṣu* ('into *avyākṛta* and the like').[676]

3.13.1 Souls Dissolved into a material cause would Return Again

48ab') Those [souls] dissolved into material causes return again

Let liberation be, like [the dissolution] of things such as pots into clay, the dissolution, at the relevant time (*tadā*),[677] of individual souls, in as much as they are effects, into that thing [you] term Mahāvibhūti, the highest [reality], her nature being uncaused;[678] but [those individual souls] would, after a period of absorption, at the beginning of the [next] period of creation, ***return again*** (*punaḥ ... āvartanam = parāvṛttiḥ*) from that place; in other words they would come [again] into *saṃsāra*. [Sadyojyotiḥ] states the reason why:

48b'cd) because, O Mistaken Ones (*viparyastāḥ*),[679] they dissolve when the [material] cause [into which they dissolve] has the power (*adhikāraḥ*) [to transform itself].

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[676] 2cd.

[677] It occurs, according to the exposition in section 2.4, when a soul's karma and *avidyā* are destroyed.

[678] This sentence concedes, for the sake of the argument, the point that individual souls, being effects of a material cause, should dissolve back into it at liberation. The point was made in the exposition of this position above (section 2.4: *tata evopādānakāraṇād vikṛtidharmakād avidyākarmānubandhena jīvātmanāṃ sambhavāt, tatkṣayataḥ samupaśāntakāryabhedarūpe tasmin paramakāraṇātmani teṣāṃ vilayaḥ paraṃ śreyaḥ.*). Partly this is just an application of the general principle that if something emerges from a material cause, it must at some point return to it, as a pot must at some point revert to clay. Perhaps also in the background is the idea that when a soul splits off from its material cause, it necessarily suffers as a result of the loss of its connection with its basic source and ultimate nature, Vāsudeva; hence liberation is the reinstating of that connection, the restoration of completeness.

[679] We are following the suggestion of Professor MANI DRAVIDA to take this as a vocative, on the grounds that it can be inferred from Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary that he took it so; see note 692. Rāmakaṇṭha refers to Sadyojyotiḥ's use of the word *viparyastāḥ*, and comments: *viparyāso mithyājñānam atra vaḥ*; 'you have a mistaken idea, [i.e.] false knowledge, about this'. The mistaken idea spoken of there is that souls can dissolve permanently into a material cause; but the point that is relevant here is that he attributes the mistaken idea (*viparyāsa*) to 'you', i.e. the Pāñcarātrikas. Thus he seems not to have taken *viparyastāḥ* in the verse in the syntactically simplest manner, namely as agreeing

[What the verse terms] ***the*** [***material***] ***cause***'s ***power*** is its tendency to return again as effects, because it goes on being possessed of the power (*adhikriyamāṇatvāt*) [to reappear] in the form [of effects], since its very nature is transformation. ***Because*** (*yataḥ*) [liberated souls] are dissolved[680] in that [cause] of such a nature, they therefore return again, just like non-liberated souls, when there is a return [of the material cause in the form of effects];[681] so the effort made for liberation in this [system] by those who teach dissolution into that [Mahāvibhūti] (*tallayavādinām*) is futile.

3.13.1.1 Only the bound return [Pāñcarātrika:] The following may be the case. Even if absolutely all individual souls, both the bound and the unbound, are dissolved into that [cause] at the time of cosmic resorption, nevertheless Mahāvibhūti (*asau*), at each creation, returns again only in the form of bound individual souls [still] linked with traces of ignorance and

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with the *te* immediately before it; for if he had taken it in that way—as a nominative plural: 'those mistaken [souls]'—then he would have attributed the mistaken idea to the souls.

Perhaps it is possible to cling to the assumption that he took it as a nominative plural, seeing that as consistent with his commentary, if we take him to have understood the *te* in the verse to mean, 'those [Pāñcarātrika] souls'. The whole verse would mean, '[Souls] dissolved into material causes return again, because, given the power of a [material] cause, those [Pāñcarātrika] souls dissolve having a mistaken idea (*viparyastāḥ*)'.

But Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary certainly does not indicate clearly that he understood the verse in this way. And although it is possible that Sadyojyotiḥ intended it in this way, it does not seem an entirely satisfactory sense: we expect the mistake to be on the part of those who think that souls dissolve permanently, not the souls themselves.

[680] *Līnāḥ* glosses *layaṃ gatāḥ*.

[681] One might have thought that dissolution would involve annihilation and hence the impossibility of further return. But it is the very nature of material causes to undergo constant transformation. Hence dissolution into a material cause will necessarily be followed at some point in the future by further return. This fault does not accrue to those such as Saiddhāntikas who do not postulate dissolution of liberated souls into a material cause.

The parts of a particular pot will at some time dissolve back into clay, but they will not stay in that precise lump of clay forever, for it will be modified into different shapes and parts of it will break off from it. Similarly liberated souls may dissolve into Mahāvibhūti, but at the beginning of the next cosmic cycle she will transform herself again in the form of both sentient and insentient effects, otherwise there would be no more cosmic cycles. As bound souls, despite having been dissolved, will emerge, so necessarily will those supposedly liberated in the previous cycle. There is no such thing as a material cause which can remain permanently in the same static state.

[karma], not in [the form of] the unbound, because the cause of return, namely ignorance and [karma],[682] is lacking in their case.

[Siddhāntin:] That is incorrect because there is no division in that state.[683] It is [Mahāvibhūti's] very condition of being without division that [according to you] makes Her into the [ultimate] cause. If there is a division even in that [state], between bound and unbound [souls], then, since division is necessarily preceded by non-division, it is plain that we must infer a [further] material cause for that. Thus this [supposedly supreme] material cause [which has division] is not supreme, since there exists a further material cause of it. And with respect to [this] further material cause the very same attack and defence that have just been stated [apply],[684] and so there is an infinite regress, and no state of being undivided [on the part of a Supreme Cause].[685]

3.13.2 Destruction of selves

Even if the Supreme Cause had a form without division, it would undesirably follow that selves are nothing short of (*eva*) destroyed at liberation,[686] both because[687] it can undergo no increase even when individual souls are dissolved into it, because it exists in the very same form (*tathābhūtasyaiva*)

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[682]The Pāñcarātrika named ignorance and karma as the causes of the emergence of souls from Mahāvibhūti in section 2.4.

[683]I.e. in Mahāvibhūti.

[684]The attack is the point that the material cause has a natural disposition to return again in the form of effects; the defence is that only bound souls, not liberated ones, return. This entails a division in the material cause, which means that a further material cause must be postulated. Thus we have an infinite regress. That a further material cause must be postulated follows from the Pāñcarātrika's own logic as expounded in section 2.4: the different parts of the material cause would have continuity with one existence / existent thing (*ekasadanvaya*), and hence they must have that one thing as their common material cause (*ekasadúpādānakāraṇatva*).

[685]Cf. the following similar construction below (section 3.15.2.3): *pramāṇāntare cākṣepapratisamādhāne pūrvokte evety anavasthiter na satyādvaitasiddhiḥ.*

The opponent is caught on the horns of a dilemma. If he holds the Supreme Cause to lack division, then the fault of recidivism (*punar āvartanam*) results; if he tries to avoid this by postulating a distinction between dissolved bound souls and dissolved unbound souls, then we have an infinite regress and we never reach any Supreme Cause, since for the Pāñcarātrika that must be something without division.

[686]Rāmakaṇṭha leaves for the time being the problem of recidivism, and shows that even if the opponent could avoid the infinite regress by claiming that we somehow reach a Supreme Cause that lacks division, a different problem results.

[687]The first *ca* is awkward; we interpret it as part of a 'both ... and' construction.

as before, since it is unlimited in its nature, and also because we do not perceive individual souls in it—if after all the individual soul is previously perceived as an effect-producing agent, then, when it is not perceived in its nature [thereafter], it must have been destroyed. This [destruction of selves] is a further problem with this [position of yours].[688] As [Sadyojyotiḥ] will say:

> The greatest heavyweights among the fools are those for whom one's own self is destroyed [in liberation].[689]

But by [our pointing to] this [undesirable consequence of destruction of selves, you should] not [think that] the earlier stated fault is now annulled.[690]

3.13.3 Two contradictory effects cannot arise from the same material cause

[Pāñcarātrika:] This may be [the case]. What can we do?

> 'Who can avoid an undesirable consequence that obtains because of being supported by valid means of knowledge?'[691]

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[688] Literally, 'There is (*asti*) this other problem with this [position of yours].'

[689] *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 57ab.

[690] The charge of destruction of selves might be taken to imply that they do merge into the material cause permanently, and hence that there is no recurrent return. But Rāmakaṇṭha stresses here that the original fault of returning again is in no way lessened by this second fault. Even though selves would be destroyed, as a result of the reasoning just given, we also have to accept that they would return again, for otherwise there would be no more cosmic cycles. Since the Pāñcarātrikas accept that bound souls come back, they must also accept that liberated souls come back.

Rāmakaṇṭha may mean just that both of these faults result for the Pāñcarātrika, without thinking that they could co-exist. If he envisaged them as able to co-exist, perhaps he would explain his position by the following analogy. Even though an individual pot is destroyed forever when it merges into a larger lump of clay, that larger lump will be re-used to form other objects, will 'return again' in the form of other effects. Hence the cycle will continue indefinitely even though individual objects will never exist again in precisely the same form with precisely the same clay-atoms.

[691] This seems to be a quotation of *Ślokavārttika*, *śūnyavāda* 195cd, although the editions of that text read *pravāhaḥ* in place of Rāmakaṇṭha's *prasaṅgaḥ*. *Pravāhaḥ* makes good sense there, referring to a stream of cognitions. It is not impossible that our witnesses are all corrupt and that Rāmakaṇṭha wrote *pravāhaḥ*. The word could then refer to a stream of individual souls; the Pāñcarātrika would be accepting that one soul is destroyed

[Siddhāntin:] It was in anticipation of such a response that [Sadyojyotiḥ] wrote ***O Mistaken Ones.*** This [notion of yours that selves dissolve permanently into a material cause] is not supported by valid means of knowledge, rather you[692] have a mistaken idea here, [i.e.] false knowledge.[693]

For to explain, two contradictory effects, namely sentient and insentient things, cannot arise from a single sentient material cause, because two contradictory things, like being and non-being, cannot have a single material cause. Moreover, since its transformations have continuity with both sentience and non-sentience (*pratyayāpratyayānvayitvāt*),[694] the Supreme Cause too must be both sentient and insentient, and even Brahmā[695] could not achieve this, just as [he could not make possible] the barrenness of a mother. And if [you say that] a certain part of this [Supreme Cause] is sentient and a certain [part] not, we reply: if that is the case, then, since it would have parts, and since it would therefore be established to be an effect like a pot, the above

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at liberation and another one emerges out of the same stuff subsequently.

But that seems less likely than that Rāmakaṇṭha wrote *prasaṅgaḥ*: (1) It is not clear that the destruction of selves and the subsequent emergence of souls would best be characterised as a 'stream' at all; (2) *prasaṅgaḥ* makes good sense, referring to *ātmanāśa*, which is the topic at hand and which Rāmakaṇṭha elsewhere describes as a *prasaṅga* to which the Pāñcarātrikas are subject (*Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:67cd); (3) For Rāmakaṇṭha to cite the *Ślokavārttika* verse in this different form would arguably not distort its sense, for in the *Ślokavārttika* discussion a stream of cognitions *is* an unwanted consequence.

Thus we take it that the Pāñcarātrika's position here is that destruction of selves is quite acceptable to him, if not to the Saiddhāntika.

[692]Rāmakaṇṭha attributes the mistaken idea (*viparyāsa*) to 'you', i.e. the Pāñcarātrikas. That is why we take *viparyastāḥ* in the verse as a vocative.

[693]The charge that individual souls would be destroyed, and the charge of recurrent return for that matter, were unwanted consequences that would follow if the Pāñcarātrika position was correct. But individual souls are not destroyed (and liberated souls do not return) because the very idea of souls being dissolved into a material cause is mistaken. It is confused to think that they could be, for, as Rāmakaṇṭha will argue in the following pages, (1) they are sentient and so could not share the same cause as insentient things, and (2) they are not effects at all. Thus the rest of his refutation of Pāñcarātra refers to what is actually the case, whereas up to this point he has been pointing to unwanted consequences that would obtain if immaterial souls could be dissolved into a material substrate.

That they cannot is what Sadyojyotiḥ, according to Rāmakaṇṭha, intended to point out by writing 'O Mistaken Ones'. And since they cannot, it is not open to the Pāñcarātrika to say, as he did in his last speech, that he will settle for the unwanted consequence of destruction of selves, that being acceptable to him.

[694]I.e. since some have continuity with sentience and others have continuity with non-sentience.

[695]Despite his miraculous power to create the whole universe.

stated fault (viz. the necessity of inferring a further material cause) would remain unchanged.

3.13.4 Selves are not Effects

Moreover, [only] if individual souls are established to be effects, can one say that (*iti*) the Highest Prakṛti is established to be their [material] cause; and [yet] these, since they are sentient (*cetanatvāt*), are not effects.

3.13.5 Selves do not have a Common Continuous Nature

And as for the assertion that '[they] are effects because they have a common continuous nature' (*samanvayāt*),[696] that too is unjustified (*ayuktam*), as selves are not established to have a shared continuous nature.[697]

3.13.5.1 Selves are never objects of perception For the sharing of a continuous nature can be grasped [only] of some perceptible thing that has become an object [of perception]. And the self is not an object of perception

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[696]This refers back to section 2.4, where the Pāñcarātrika put forward an argument that must be borne in mind for the understanding of the whole of the rest of this refutation of the Pāñcarātrikas. The argument was based on the observation that since pots are continuous with clay (*mṛdanvaya*), i.e. are thoroughly pervaded by clay throughout all of their parts, they are all effects of one common cause, namely clay. The Pāñcarātrika thus holds the general principle that if ever a group of things are continuous with X, they arise from X. He used this principle to argue that since selves and insentient matter are continuous with the one Existent / the same existence (*ekasat*), they must both arise from a single cause, Mahāvibhūti.

It becomes clear in the course of the passage below that Rāmakaṇṭha agrees with this principle. Thus it is incumbent on him to refute that selves all have a common continuous nature in order to avoid the conclusion that they are all temporary effects of a greater, single cause.

On the words *anvaya* ('continuity', 'continuous nature') and *samanvaya* ('shared / common continuous nature'), which are used repeatedly throughout this section, see note 148 and Introduction, section 3. They refer to the nature common to effects that derive from the same cause (e.g. clay pots and dishes), and common to effects and their cause (e.g. pots and clay). The 'continuous' of the translation refers to the way that the nature of the material cause 'continues' in its effects. Where no mention of the material cause is made and a group of things are said to have *samanvaya*, as selves are here said to have *samanvaya*, this means that they have the kind of common nature that effects of one material cause have.

[697]To characterise this in logical terminology: the *hetu* is *asiddha* in the *pakṣa*.

to itself, because its acting upon itself (*tatra*) is logically impossible.[698] For it shines forth at all times[699] as the subject of perception,[700] internally,[701] as has been stated earlier.[702]

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[698]This is a well-known principle, referred to elsewhere by Rāmakaṇṭha (and many other authors) as *svātmani kriyāvirodhaḥ*, often used to argue against the possibility of reflexive awareness. Just as a gymnast cannot stand on his own shoulders, an axe cannot cut itself, fire cannot burn itself, and the tip of a finger cannot touch itself, so the self or consciousness cannot become an object of its own awareness. See *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 1:15; *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 23ab and ad 66c–67b; *Sārdhatriśatikālottaravṛtti* ad 10:7–8; *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:44ab (p. 76) and ad 1:55 (pp. 93–94); and WATSON (2010a: 306–307).

[699]Even in deep sleep according to Rāmakaṇṭha; see for example section 3.10.3.2 on p. 358 above.

[700]Although Rāmakaṇṭha denies the possibility of reflexive action, he does accept that kind of reflexive awareness (known as *svasaṃvedana*) in which the self appears not as the object of perception but as its subject (*grāhakatvena*). Indeed it is precisely because it appears always in that form that it can never become an object of perception.

[701]The term *pratyagrūpatayā* is difficult to translate. Rāmakaṇṭha uses it frequently in other texts of his to describe the way that the self is experienced, in contrast to the way objects of perception are experienced, namely *pararūpatayā* (e.g. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1.32ab, ad 1.50). It seems partly intended to convey that, in contrast to the situation with external objects, everyone experiences only their own self, and that they do so by directing their attention not outwards towards objects, but inwards.

[702]In the refutation of Buddhism in sections 3.10.3.2 and 3.10.5.

See the following parallel passage in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 20c–23b, which refers at the end to this section of our text:

nanu cetanānāṃ nityatvena prāg bhogaprakaraṇe pratipāditatvāt, kāryatvam asiddham. na, ekānvitatvena kāryatvasambhavāt [*ekānvitatvena kāryatvasambhavāt* E_D; *anekānvitatvena kāryatvasambhavāt* E_V, *vl.* in E_D; *ekānvitatvena nityatvāsambhavāt* M^Y]. *acetanānām iva cetanānām api cidanvayād upādānakāraṇaṃ cetanaṃ siddhyaty eva. tad apy anupapannam, yataḥ:*

> *cidacidviśvasambhūtir ātmano yadi so 'pi hi* || 20 ||
> *cidacij jāyate yasmāt kāryaṃ kāraṇadharmagam* |

paramātmanaḥ sakāśād yadi cetanācetanaṃ viśvam utpadyeta [M^Y; *utpadyate* M_1E_V], *tataḥ so 'pi paramātmā cetanācetanasvabhāvo bhavet, upādānakāraṇasvarūpānugatā eva kāryāṇāṃ mūrtiviśeṣā hemamṛdādijanyaghaṭādīnāṃ siddhā yataḥ. tataś ca:*

> *viruddhāv ekakālasthau dharmāv ekāśrayaṃ gatau* || 21 ||
> *itaretaranāśāt tau kuruto lopam ātmanaḥ* |

viruddhayoḥ parasparopamardanaivātmalābhād ghaṭatadabhāvayor iva cetanācetanayor ekatraikasmin kāle na sambhavaḥ. atha kenacid bhāgena cetano 'sau kena cin nety, ucyate: yady evaṃ sabhāgatve sati ghaṭādivat kāryatvāt paramakāraṇatvāyogaḥ. api ca:

> *upādānatvato mṛdvat paramātmā na cetanaḥ* || 22 ||

upādānakāraṇam acetanaṃ mṛdādi niścitam iti paramātmano 'py acetanatvam, upādānakāraṇatvāt. cetanatve vā nopādānakāraṇatvam iti. kiñ ca:

tadutthāś cāpi bhoktāra utpādyatvād ghaṭādivat |

upādānakāraṇād utpadyamānaṃ ghaṭādy acetanam eva siddham iti paramātmalakṣaṇād upādānakāraṇād utpadyamānā bhoktāra ātmāno 'py acetanāḥ prasajyante bhavatām. cetanāś caite yathāsvaṃ grāhakatvena [yathāsvaṃ grāhakatvena $M^{Y}M_{1}$*; yathā svaparagrāhakatvena* E_{V}*] svasaṃvedanasiddhā iti na tata utpannāḥ [tata utpannāḥ* $M^{Y}M_{1}$*; tatrotpannāḥ* E_{V}*], tat paramātmavan nityā iti. nanv anvayād eṣām acetanānām iva kāryatvam uktam. tan na yuktam, ananvayād iti. na cātmana evātmā grāhyo bhavati, tatra tasya vyāpāravirodhāt. api tu grāhakatvenaiva pratyagrūpatayā sarvadā bhāsata ity uktam asmābhiḥ paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛttau vistareṇa, tata evāvadhāryam [tata evāva-* $M_{1}M^{Y}$*; tatraivāva-* E_{V}*].*

[Siddhāntin:] Surely, since it has been demonstrated above in the section on *bhoga* (i.e. the *Bhogakārikā*) that conscious entities are eternal, it is not established that they are effects.

[Opponent:] That is not [correct], because [they] *can* be effects, since [they all] have continuity with one [thing]. Because conscious entities [all] have continuity with consciousness, just as unconscious entities [all have continuity with unconscious Primal Matter], they are indeed established to have a conscious material cause.

[Siddhantin:] That too is inadmissible, because:

> 20c–21b) If the universe, which is both conscious and unconscious, arose from the [Supreme] Self, that [Supreme] Self too would obviously (*hi*) exist as both conscious and unconscious, because an effect conforms to the properties of [its] cause.

If the universe, which is both conscious and unconscious, arose from the Supreme Self, then that Supreme Self too would be by nature both conscious and unconscious; for the particular forms of effects, such as pots, produced from things like gold or clay, are established to conform to the nature of [their] material causes. And therefore [he says]:

> 21c–22b) Contradictory properties existing at the same time in the same substrate, because of mutual destruction, annihilate themselves.

Consciousness and non-consciousness are not possible in the same thing at the same time, because, being contradictory, like a pot and its absence, they achieve themselves precisely by suppressing the other one. If [you say] it is conscious in some portion, and not in another, we reply: if that is the case, then given that it has parts, it would be an effect like a pot, and so it could not be the Supreme Cause. Moreover:

> 22cd) Because of being a material cause, the Supreme Self, [being] like clay, would not be conscious.

material causes are determined to be unconscious, like clay and such like. So the Supreme Self too would be unconscious as a result of being a material cause. Or if it were conscious, it would not be a material cause. Moreover:

[Pāñcarātrika:] Let things be as follows (*syād etat*) [in that case]: The sharing of a continuous nature between *objects* may be grasped only of things that have actually become objects of perception; but as for the perceiver's sharing of a continuous nature, that shines forth in the self when it appears in the very form of the subject of perception (*grāhakarūpeṇaiva*)[703] [at every moment in self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*)].[704]

23ab) And experiencers arising from that, since they are brought into existence, would be just like pots (i.e. unconscious).

Things like pots arising from a material cause are established to be quite without consciousness. So experiencers too, [i.e.] selves, arising from a material cause, namely the Supreme Self, must also be considered by you as unconscious. Yet (*ca*) these are conscious, in as much as they are each for themselves (*yathāsvam*) established by self-awareness to be perceivers. So they do not arise from that [Supreme Self]. Therefore, like the Supreme Self, they are eternal.

[Opponent:] Surely, as we have said, they have a continuous nature, just like unconscious things do, and so they are effects.

[Siddhāntin:] That is not correct, because they do not have a continuous nature.* And a self cannot become an object of perception of itself, because of the contradiction of it (*tasya*) acting on itself (*tatra*). Rather it shines forth at all times as the perceiver alone, internally. This has been expounded by me in detail in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*; it should be determined from *that* [work].

* It appears that a sentence has dropped out of the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* at this point, corresponding in meaning to the sentence that we have at that point in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*: *samanvayo hi grāhyasya karmatām āpannasya grahītuṃ yujyate.* The parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, given in note 708, includes such a sentence.

[703] *Grāhakarūpeṇaiva ... bhāsamāne* corresponds to *grāhakatvena ... pratibhāsate* in the last sentence of the Siddhāntin's speech to which this responds.

[704] The steps of this argument so far are as follows. The Pāñcarātrika claim made above (section 2.4) that selves can be known to be effects because they share a continuous nature was re-introduced. The Saiddhāntika objected that it is only objects of perception that can be known to share the same nature as each other, and the self never becomes an object of perception, as it appears to us at all times as the subject of perception. In other words the Saiddhāntika, in order to show why the self cannot become an object of perception, admits that it does appear to us. The Pāñcarātrika uses this admission, by suggesting that, in the case of the self, when it appears to us in this way (as the perceiver) one can spot that it has a nature continuous with other things, even if in the case of objects, for their continuous nature with other things to be observed, they must become objects of perception. If the self can be perceived without becoming an object of perception, why can its continuous nature not be observed without it becoming an object of perception?

3.13.5.2 Only my own self appears to me; I have no direct experience of other people's selves [Siddhāntin:] That is even more incorrect.[705] For [to grasp] that perceivers have a continuous nature would depend on the appearance to consciousness of many perceivers (*anekagṛāhakaprakāśapūrvakaḥ*).[706] And there is no awareness of another perceiver in self-awareness, which grasps the particular nature of each self, because that [other perceiver] is 'other' (*tasya ... paratvāt*), since, like a pot or other [external object], it is different from the [self that is having the *svasaṃvedana*] (*tato 'nyatvena*). For souls, who are nothing but self-awareness, are not mutually conflated,[707] since that would entail that all people would be omniscient. So when in each individual there is awareness of one's own self [alone], who [can be known] to have a continuous nature with whom?[708]

3.13.5.3 To the omniscient are not all other selves objects of perception? [Pāñcarātrika:] [Even] if that is so (*yady evam*), absolutely no self can escape being perceived by the omniscient one, so (*tat*) it is He who can grasp the continuous nature among those [selves], which are [all] objects of perception [for Him].

[Siddhāntin:] That is incorrect, because there is an instance of deviation

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[705]It is more incorrect than assuming that the continuous nature of perceivers could be established by regarding them all as objects of perception; for then one would have access to many perceivers, but in this case one would only have access to one.

[706]For the perception of perceivers Rāmakaṇṭha uses the term *prakāśa*, because a word such as *grahaṇa* would be more likely to imply that the perceiver becomes an object of perception; only through *prakāśa* or *svasaṃvedana* can individuals be aware of their selves.

[707]The parallel passage in *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (given in the next footnote) reads *ātmanāṃ*, which is also possible: 'For it is not the case that the mere self-awarenesses of souls are mutually conflated.' Weighing against the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* reading is the fact that the *-mātrāḥ* has little force there.

[708]See the following parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:55, pp. 93–94): *yo 'pi kaiś cij jīvātmanām avyāpakatve layasvabhāvatve ca sattādinānvitatvāt [sattādi- E$^{pc}_{K}$; sati ādinā- E$^{ac}_{K}$] ghaṭādivad iti hetur uktaḥ, so 'py asiddha evātmanām anvayāsiddheḥ. anvayo hi grāhyasya karmatām āpannasya grahītuṃ śakyaḥ. na cātmā svātmana eva grāhyībhavati, svātmani kriyāvirodhāt. sa hi grāhakatvenaiva pratyagrūpatayā sarvadā bhāsate ity uktam. nanu tenaiva rūpeṇāsyānvayo 'pi bhaviṣyatīti. na, tasyānekagrāhakaprakāśaviṣayatvāt. na caikaikātmasaṃvedane grāhakāntarasaṃvedanaṃ sambhavati, tasya tato 'nyatvena ghaṭādivat paratvāt. na hy ātmanāṃ parasparaṃ svasaṃvedanamātrāḥ saṅkīryante, sarvasya sarvajñatvaprasaṅgāt ity uktam. pratyekaṃ ca svātmavedane kasya kutrānvayaḥ.*

provided by the soul of the omniscient one. For[709] He, for his part (*api*), appears by self-awareness as different from other souls, in as much as He is the perceiver of them. And as we have said above,[710] no continuity of nature can be [grasped] of something that has not been perceived (*agṛhītasya*).[711]

And it cannot be conceived that He has mistaken perception, since He is omniscient. Therefore, just as through self-awareness, which is incapable of error, His own self is grasped by Him as completely lacking a continuous nature with other selves,[712] so in exactly the same way other selves are directly

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[709]On Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of *hi* combined with *yataḥ* or an ablative, see see note 460.

[710]In the first sentence of section 3.13.5.1: *samanvayo hi grāhyasya karmatām āpannasya grahītuṃ yujyate.*

[711]Here being 'perceived' clearly means being perceived as an object of perception and does not include appearing in self-awareness.

The progression of the argument since the summary in footnote 704 has been as follows. The Siddhāntin rejected that self-awareness can allow one to observe the continuous nature of selves, for only one self appears to us in self-awareness—our own. The Pāñcarātrika pointed out that all selves are objects of perception to the omniscient one, so He can observe their continuous nature. The Siddhāntin's response is that even the omniscient one cannot turn His own self into an object of perception (*grāhya, jñeya*), so He cannot observe that His own self shares the same nature as other selves; on the contrary His self appears to Him as of a different nature from them, He being the perceiver and they the perceived. (Note that the fact that two things are different (*bhinna*) does not preclude that they have a continuous nature; two pots are different and yet both continuous with clay. Hence Rāmakaṇṭha could be challenged here as to why the fact that the omniscient one appears as different (*bhedena*) from other souls precludes His sharing of a continuous nature with them. Two possible responses suggest themselves. (1) The sense of the word 'different' that is appropriate to characterise the different way in which perceiver and perceived appear is not the same as the sense in which two pots are different. The former is sufficient to preclude *samanvaya*; the latter is not. (2) The fact that the perceiver (in this case the omniscient one) appears as different from the perceived (in this case other souls) does not mean that *samanvaya* between them is impossible; it just means that it cannot be established.)

This discussion concerning whether selves are effects as a result of having a continuous nature has as its wider context the Pāñcarātrika claim that selves are all effects of Vāsudeva. Thus the omniscient one referred to in this paragraph may be Vāsudeva. On that interpretation the implication of this paragraph is that since the continuity of their nature with Vāsudeva's cannot be grasped, there is no evidence that they arise out of Him. According to the Pāñcarātrika's exposition of their position above, the first stage of evolution out of Vāsudeva is into *īśvara*, selves and insentient matter. It is thus possible that the omniscient one here refers not to Vāsudeva but to his effect, *īśvara*. In that case the point would be that since the continuity of selves' nature with *īśvara*'s cannot be grasped, selves and *īśvara* cannot be known to share a common cause, namely Vāsudeva.

[712]The ablative *ātmāntarebhyaḥ* is surprising; we would expect rather an instrumental.

perceived by Him as mutually different and as falling beyond the scope of having a continuous nature [with each other]. Thus there is no fault.[713]

We wondered if a word such as *bhinnaḥ* had dropped out after *ātmāntarebhyaḥ*; this would explain the ablative and would make this *yathā* clause more parallel with the *tathā* clause. But the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* parallel given at the end of the next footnote supports the readings that we have.

[713]The paragraph begins with the claim that the omniscient one cannot have mistaken perception, and then concludes from this that just as He perceives His own self as lacking continuity with other selves, so He perceives these other selves as lacking continuity with each other. But what reasons are there for assuming that it is correct perception (1) to see His own self as discontinuous with other selves, and (2) to see other selves as discontinuous with each other? Without independent reasons, this paragraph would be entirely circular: it would assert that the omniscient one perceives things in a certain way because he can only perceive things correctly; but why perceiving them in that particular way is the correct way would remain unanswered. The reason for 1 being correct is that it is the nature of self-awareness that the perceiver appears in it *as the perceiver*, i.e. as different from, and discontinuous with, perceived objects, in this case other selves.

We suggest that the reason for 2 being correct is as follows. A particular self will, through self-awareness, be aware of itself as discontinuous with other selves, since they do not feature, along with it, as the perceiver. (If it is objected that this self will not be aware of itself as discontinuous with other selves since it would not be able to perceive them, it could be replied that if it were able to perceive them, they would certainly feature not as the perceiver, but as perceived objects, and hence as discontinuous.) This demonstrates the discontinuity between it and them, but how about between them. The discontinuity between them is demonstrated by the fact that every one of them is also aware of their discontinuity with other selves through their own self-awareness. When we put all of these individual pieces of evidence together, we arrive at the discontinuity of every self from every other self. So since we have an independent reason for regarding selves as discontinuous, we can assume that the omniscient one would perceive them as discontinuous. Thus even though the omniscient one, unlike other selves, can actually perceive other selves, he would perceive them as discontinuous.

This strengthens the argument in the previous paragraph. There it was stated that the omniscient one cannot know that He has continuity with selves, because although they are all objects of perception for Him, He is not an object of perception along with them. Thus one might have objected that at least the omniscient one could perceive their continuous nature with each other. We can now see that this is not the case, since he perceives them all as discontinuous with each other.

See the continuation of the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:55, p. 94): *yady evam, sarvajñaḥ sarvātmanāṃ grāhyatvād anvayaṃ grahīṣyatīti. tad apy ayuktaṃ, sarvajñātmanaiva vyabhicārāt. so 'pi svasaṃvedanena parātmabhyo bhedenaiva tadgrahītṛtayā bhāsate yataḥ. na ca grahītary anvayaḥ sambhavatīty uktam. na ca tasya sarvajñatvād eva viparītagrahaṇaṃ sambhavati. tad yathā tenātmāntarebhyaḥ svātmātyantānanvitarūpo 'sambhavadbhrameṇa pratyakṣeṇa gṛhītaḥ, tathaiva parātmānaḥ parasparabhinnāḥ samanvayaviṣayabhāvam atikramya vartamānās tena sākṣātkriyante ity adoṣaḥ.*

3·13·5·4 Inference of continuous nature is impossible It is for that very reason that [this continuous nature among selves][714] cannot be inferred, because—since [when I'm inferring other selves] the inferrer shines forth as completely different [from what is inferred] as it is the inferrer—other selves too can be inferred to be completely different, just like my own self.[715]

3·13·5·5 Selves do not have continuity with existence; but they do exist [Pāñcarātrika:] If that were the case, selves would not exist, just like horns on a horse, because they would not have continuity with existence.[716]

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[714]It is clear that this is the subject in the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, given in the next note.

[715]I can know that my own self is completely different from other selves because it appears as completely different from them when I am inferring their existence (for many other instances of this argument, see note 788). I can then use my own self as an example in an inference to the conclusion that other selves are all completely different from each other. What would the *hetu* be in this inference? Perhaps simply 'because they are selves' (*ātmatvāt*).

Alternatively it is possible that the text means: 'because—since [in my inferences] the inferrer shines forth as completely different [from what is inferred] as it is the inferrer—other selves can be inferred [to shine forth] as completely different [when they are performing inferences], just like my own self [appears as completely different when I am performing inferences].' Whichever selves are supposedly being inferred to have a continuous nature will always appear as discontinuous with whichever self happens to be doing the inferring. Therefore the very structure of inference, with its separately appearing inferrers and inferred entities, undermines from the outset any attempt to infer a continuous nature of selves. On either interpretation, inference is of no use in establishing the continuous nature of selves.

The last four sections have been dealing with the question of whether selves have a continuous nature. The first concerned whether this continuous nature could be known through perceiving selves as objects of perception; the second concerned whether it could be known through perceiving them in self-awareness; the third concerned whether the omniscient one could perceive it in them; and this one concerned whether it could be known by inference. In each case the answer has been no. In the next two sections the Pāñcarātrika claims that two undesirable consequences would result if selves lacked a continuous nature: (1) they would not exist; (2) one word could not be used to refer to them.

See the continuation of the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:55, p. 94): *ata evānumeyo 'py ātmanām anvayo na sambhavati, tadānīm anumeyāt anumātur anumātṛrūpatayā vaisādṛśyenaiva bhāsanāt, svātmavat parātmanām atyantavisadṛśatayaivānumānāt.*

[716]If souls have absolutely no continuous nature between themselves, then they do not even have continuity with existence. Having no *anvaya* (as has been expressed by such phrases as *atyantānanvitarūpaḥ* and *samanvayaviṣayabhāvam atikramya vartamānāḥ*) en-

[Siddhāntin:] The existence of selves in this world,[717] just like [the existence of] existence [itself] or [of your] Supreme Cause, does not result from [their having] continuity with existence, but rather from [their having] existence by nature.[718] For you cannot wish to hold that its existence either[719] is derived from the fact that it has connection with existence, since that would entail its being an effect.[720] Rather [it has] just existence by nature, so it is not like the horns of a horse [and the same goes for selves].[721]

3.13.5.6 Without continuity, how can we account for word usage? If [you Pāñcarātrika] say the following (*iti cet*)—How can [we] use the one word, 'existent', for all selves and non-selves if they do not all have continuity with this [existence]? And how can [we] even use the word 'self' (*ātmapadapravṛttiḥ*) of selves [if they do not share a continuous nature]? This [word usage] also needs to be examined[722]—then [we reply] (*tarhi*): what is this obstinacy on the part of this skilled debater in presenting [his concept of]

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tails having no *sattānvaya*, which seems to imply that they do not exist at all.

[717]Or possibly, 'in this system'.

[718]This is a Vaiśeṣika-like strategy: just as for the Vaiśeṣikas *sattā* does not have existence inhering in it (otherwise there would be an infinite regress), but has rather *svarūpasattā*, Rāmakaṇṭha here claims that selves do not have continuity with existence (*sattānvaya*) but *svarūpasattā*.

[719]Viz. that of the Supreme Cause.

[720]It was the very fact of both selves and insentient matter having continuity with existence that the Pāñcarātrika put forward as proving that they are both effects of a greater material cause (section 2.4). Thus if the Supreme Cause had continuity with existence, the Pāñcarātrika would have to infer a further cause of which the 'Supreme' Cause, and all other existent things, were effects.

Sattāyoga is here used as synonymous with *sattānvaya*. Is that surprising? Perhaps it is explainable on the grounds that if a thing has continuity with existence it has, or at least had, a *connection* with the existence of the material cause from which it originated—as a pot's having continuity with clay means that it has a connection with the clay of its material cause.

[721]Thus to lack continuity with existence (*sattayānanvitatva*), which was put forward by the Pāñcarātrika as a logical reason for not existing, like horses' horns, is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*); things which have the property of *sattayānanvitatva* can be either existent or non-existent.

See the continuation of the parallel parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:55, p. 94): *tarhi asann ātmā sattayānanvitatvād aśvaviṣāṇavat. nāsya sattvānvayāt sattvam, api tu svarūpasattvāt sattāvat paramakāraṇavad vā, tasyāpi hi sattvānvayāt kāryatvena paramakāraṇatvābhāvaḥ.*

[722]Alternatively, the second of these three sentences (*ātmapadapravṛttiḥ ... katham*) could be Rāmakaṇṭha's reply, in the form of a rhetorical question, to the first. The *iti cet* would

continuity with existence (*sattānvayapradarśane*)? Moreover (*ca*) the use of a single word is not always simply the result of continuity with one [nature] (*ekānvayanibandhanaiva*), since one observes the usage of such words as *akṣa* ('dice', 'axle', 'seed', 'sense faculty') to denote a group of referents, even though [that group] is heterogeneous, [and] because words such as 'cooker' are used (*pravṛtteḥ*) on account of [etymological] connection [with a specific action] (*yogabalena*)[723] [to apply to all agents that cook, without there being any continuous nature between them]. So, because in this case too [of the application of the word *ātman* to souls, and of 'existent' to both selves and non-selves] there is the possibility [of the use of one word] in such ways (*evam*),[724] there is no problem [with the Siddhānta]. Or[725] even though in this case (*atra*)[726] there is no possibility of continuity as taught [above],[727] the usage of one word with regard to selves is based on their similarity, just like [the usage] of the word 'pot' [is based on the similarity] of pots. For something characterised by having a particular configuration of a certain kind is denoted by the word pot because that [particular configuration] occurs without difference in another pot also.[728]

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then govern only the third sentence, *sāpi vicāryatām*, which would be the Pāñcarātrika response to Rāmakaṇṭha's rhetorical question.

[723] *Yoga* is here used in the sense of etymological derivation, which is often contrasted with conventional usage (*rūḍhi*). A meaning (such as those of *akṣa*) that is based on *rūḍhi* cannot be explained etymologically. A meaning, such as that of *pācaka*, that is based on *yoga* can be explained as resulting from *avayavaśakti*, 'the force of the [two] parts [of a word]', i.e. the verbal root and the suffix.

[724] I.e. it is possible that the usage of one word in these two instances is not due to all the referents of the word having a continuous nature, but either is analogous to the usage of *akṣa* to denote things as unrelated as dice and axles, or results from the etymologies of the words *ātman* and *sat*.

[725] This third option introduced by *yad vā* seems to be Rāmakaṇṭha's actual view.

[726] I.e. in the case of the referents of the word *ātman* as opposed to the referents of the word *akṣa* or *pācaka*.

[727] Rāmakaṇṭha argued for a lack of *anvaya* from the beginning of section 3.13.5 to the end of section 3.13.5.4.

Regarding the expression *uktavat*, see note 497.

[728] Harunaga ISAACSON suggested that the text may be corrupt in all of the manuscripts, because he found the compound *tathāsanniveśaviśeṣātmanaḥ* suspect and because *ghaṭānām iva ghaṭaśabdasya* requires us to supply *pravṛttiḥ* to go with *ghaṭaśabdasya*, when what we have in the previous is not *pravṛttiḥ*, but *ekapadapravṛttiḥ*. He therefore suggested that the correct reading might be either ... *ghaṭānām iva. sanniveśaviśeṣātmano* or *ghaṭasya yathā. sanniveśaviśeṣātmano*. Corruption could have arisen through either *ghaṭānām iva* or *ghaṭasya yathā* entering the manuscripts as an interlinear gloss and being

3.13.5.6.1 Do not pots have potness as their continuous nature? [Pāñcarātrika:] Surely all pots really do have continuity with [one thing, namely] potness.[729]

[Siddhāntin:] If so, then it would undesirably follow that pots arose from 'potness', because of their continuity with it.[730] And pots do not arise from 'potness', but rather from clay.

3.13.5.6.2 Similarity and continuous nature are two different things Therefore 'similarity' and 'continuous nature' are two different things. For it is similarity that is taught in this system to be [that which other systems refer to as] a universal (*sāmānyam*).[731] It is that that is the cause of the fact that [several things] can be denoted by a single word, such that [we say] 'this too is a pot', 'and this too', 'and this too'.[732] And that [similarity] is not in the parts of that [pot], for we do not have a perception 'pot' with respect to [its] neck or its bottom. Nor is it (viz. similarity) seen in the effects of the [pot], such as pot-sherds, for pot-sherds feature in perception as completely dissimilar [to pots].[733]

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subsequently mistaken for part of the text. The *ghaṭasya yathā* could then have become further corrupted in a few of the manuscripts into the readings we have. This is a plausible hypothesis, but it is debatable whether the transmitted reading is quite problematic enough to justify such an emendation.

[729]How does this point serve the Pāñcarātrika's wider argument? His claim is that if selves had no continuous nature we would not be able to use one word to refer to them. The Siddhāntin countered this in the previous section by showing how the use of a single word, e.g. 'pot', does not depend on continuity of nature, but rather on similarity. The Pāñcarātrika's present intervention seeks to undermine that. For if, as he asserts here, pots do have continuity with one thing, the use of the word 'pot' could depend on that continuity and not on similarity. Thus there would be no evidence that a single word could be used in the absence of continuity. Hence the use of the single word 'self' would indeed imply that all selves have a continuous nature.

[730]It would entail this because, as the Pāñcarātrikas and Rāmakaṇṭha agree, if various things share X as their continuous nature, as all pots share clay as their continuous nature, they must arise from X.

[731]In[e] the commentary to verse 20cd above, while discussing universals (*sāmānyas*), Rāmakaṇṭha stated that for him, as for the Sāṅkhyas, universals are not anything separate from individuals (*vyaktis*), but rather just the similarity of the individuals.

[732]The list of expressions serves to illustrate that each time we call an object that is new to us by the name 'pot', it is because of its similarity to previous pots that we have encountered.

[733]Why is he pointing out that the parts of the pot and the effects of the pot are not similar to (i.e. do not share the same configuration as) the pot? (1) Because he is

But the (*yā tu*)[734] continuity (*anuvṛttiḥ*) of a thing (e.g. clay) in an effect (e.g. a pot) and in each of its parts (e.g. the neck and bottom of a pot), [and] elsewhere even in quite dissimilar objects (e.g. clay dishes), in every case in that very form (i.e. in the form of clay)—that is called 'continuous nature' (*anvayaḥ*). And it is that which enables postulation of a single cause [of all the entities that contain that continuity], since that is the way we observe [the world] (*tathādṛṣṭatvāt*). For, since we perceive continuity with clay in all of the following—pots, dishes, and such like, although they are very different, and their parts, such as their necks, and their effects, such as pot-sherds,—we can establish that [continuity with clay] is logically concomitant with being an effect of clay.[735] Thus there is a difference between similarity and having a continuous nature (*sādṛśyasamanvayayoḥ*).[736] Therefore here [too, in the case of selves], even though there is no continuous nature, the usage of a single expression [for them all, viz. *ātman*] is appropriate [because] it is just caused by similarity, and so there is no fault [in our position].

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distinguishing between similarity and continuity, and, as he will go on to say, there *is* continuity between the pot, its parts, and its effects. (2) Because he wants to show that it is not continuity but similarity that accounts for word usage, and the fact that things which have continuity but appear in perception as dissimilar—the neck of a pot, its bottom, its sherds and the pot itself—are not referred to by the same word provides evidence for that. If continuity was what accounted for the use of one word, we would use one word to refer to the neck, the bottom etc.

Vaisādṛśyena here contrasts with the mentions of *sādṛśyam* in the sentences that precede this one.

We have followed the conjecture of ISAACSON: *buddhiviṣayatvāt* for what is transmitted as *ghaṭaviṣayatvāt* (or *ghaṭāviṣayatvāt* in some sources). The corruption, he suggested, may have occurred through the middle stage of *ghaṭabuddhiviṣayatvāt*, which could in turn have arisen because we have just had the compound *ghaṭabuddhiḥ* above. ANJANEYA SARMA had first conjectured *ghaṭabuddhyaviṣayatvāt*: 'because pot-sherds are not the objects of cognitions of pots, because they are quite different' but he agreed with ISAACSON's observation that *vaisādṛśyena* is almost always used adverbially.

[734]Reading *yā* for *yasya*; this conjecture of SANDERSON's was also proposed independently by ISAACSON.

[735]We know that all these things (pots, dishes, necks, sherds etc.) are effects of clay, and we can observe that all have continuity with clay. Thus the concomitance between being continuous with clay and being an effect of clay is established. Hence in other cases we can use the fact that a group of things have continuity with X to conclude that they all have X as their material cause.

[736]The two salient differences are that having a continuous nature entails arising from one cause, but similarity does not; and similarity, not continuity, is what enables the usage of one word.

That is why in that regard (*tatra*) the author of the *vṛtti*[737] says:[738] 'And Śiva is of the same type as the self'. [And] in this [quotation] it is nothing other than the similarity of sentient beings that is meant by their 'type'.[739]

3.13.5.7 How can the similarity of selves be known? [Pāñcarātrika:] Surely the similarity of selves (*asya*)[740] cannot be grasped at all either, [those selves being] by nature ungraspable.[741]

[Siddhānta:] True; [the similarity of selves], just like [other features of the self] such as its ability to be denoted by the word 'self' (*ātmapadābhidheyatvādivat*), is not literally (*na vastutaḥ*) but metaphorically spoken of here (*atropacaryate*) somehow, by a close approximation (*adūraviprakarṣeṇa*), for the sake of being able to talk [about them] (*vyavahārārtham*), merely by excluding [their] dissimilarity.[742] As they say, 'The way to understand the

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[737] I.e. Sadyojyotiḥ. The reason for his being referred to in that way is given in section 6 of the Introduction.

[738] *Svāyambhuvavṛtti* ad 1:2, p. 5,4.

[739] Śiva and selves do not have a continuous nature (*anvaya*)—if they did it would follow either that selves arise from Śiva, or that Śiva and selves arise from a common higher cause. Instead they belong to the same type, which for Saiddhāntikas does not mean that they have the same universal inhering in them, but just that they are similar to each other.

This concludes a section, which began at the beginning of 3.13.5.6, concerned with how word usage can apply if there is no *anvaya*. We have reached the conclusion that selves, including the Supreme Self, Śiva, have not continuity but similarity, and that this is enough to account for the word 'self' or 'existent' to apply to all of them.

[740] The singular is here used to refer to the class.

[741] The opponent points out that the same difficulties in grasping the continuity of selves that were argued for from the beginning of section 3.13.5 to the end of section 3.13.5.4 apply also to the similarity of selves.

[742] When we assert that selves are similar, i.e. of the same kind, or whenever we use the word 'self', we achieve no more than a close approximation, because selves can never become objects of perception and hence transcend the literal possibilities of language.

See the very similar remark made by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1.15ab, p. 38,17–18) in response to the charge that the self cannot be the object of I-cognition: *satyam, ātmādipratyayavat tu kathaṃcid adūraviprakarṣeṇa so* [= *ahampratyayaḥ*] *'pi vyavahārārthaṃ tadviṣayo* [= *ātmaviṣayaḥ*] *'bhyupagamyate*. This sentence provides two possibilities for what could be referred to by the *ādi* in our *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* sentence: the self's ability to be an object of I-cognition, and the self's ability to be an object of self-cognitions (*ātmapratyaya*).

The expression *adūraviprakarṣeṇa* occurs in similar contexts in other texts, sometimes also accompanied by *kathaṃcit*. It seems to be a cliché to describe the manner in which language-transcending things can be denoted by words. See for example the *Bhāmatī* ad 1.1.4, p. 125: *na hīkṣukṣīraguḍādīnāṃ madhurarasabhedaḥ śakya ākhyātum. evam anyatrāpi*

Self is not this, nor that'.[743]

Thus all [the above-stated argumentation of ours][744] is beyond objection.

3.13.6 Even if Selves were effects of a Supreme Cause, recurrent return would make your position untenable

Even if there were the possibility of a Supreme Cause that is the material cause of sentient beings in the way that [you have argued] (*ittham*), with respect to a [conception of] liberation that consists in attaining that [Supreme Cause][745] the stated fault of recurrent return [would apply].

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sarvatra draṣṭavyam. tena pramāṇāntarasiddhe laukika evārthe yadā gatir īdṛśī śabdasya, tadā kaiva kathā pratyagātmany alaukike. adūraviprakarṣeṇa tu kathaṃcit pratipādanam ihāpi samānam.

'For the various different types of sweet flavour to be found in sugar cane, milk, molasses, etc. cannot be expressed. The same [sort of inadequacy of language] may be experienced everywhere else too. Therefore when the way in which language relates even to a worldly object whose existence is known to us through other means of knowledge is like this, then what to say about [the way language relates to] the internal self, which is not commonly knowable (*alaukike*). Yet, here too its being referred to [with words] somehow, by way of approximation (*adūraviprakarṣena*), is similar[ly possible].'

[743]Rāmakaṇṭha mentions here the Aupaniṣada view that since the Self cannot become an object of direct perception, knowledge of it can only be arrived at by rejecting that it is such and such (red, long or whatever); by regarding it as not having any features, we come closest to understanding it. This relates to his point that the similarity of selves cannot be known directly, but only by rejecting that they are dissimilar (*vaisādṛśyaparihāramātreṇa*). Since there is no evidence that selves are dissimilar, we metaphorically assert that they are similar.

See the continuation of the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1:55, pp. 94–5): *kathaṃ tarhy anvayābhāve sarvātmasv ātmapadasya pravṛttiḥ? sādṛśyāt, brahmaṇīva paramātmaśabdasya* [*paramātma-* conj.; *parātma-* E_K]. *nanu tad apy agrāhyasvabhāve svātmani naiva grahītuṃ śakyam. satyam, vaisādṛśyaparihāreṇa tu kathañcid adūraviprakarṣeṇa vyavahārārthaṃ tat tatrocyate, na paramārthataḥ. yat śrūyate 'neti nety ātmagatiḥ' iti darśitam asmābhir vistareṇa rauravavṛttiviveke* [*-viveke* E^{pc}_K; *-viveka-* E^{ac}_K] *paramokṣanirāsakārikāsu, iti tata evāvadhāryam.* The cross-reference in the final sentence is to our passage.

[744]That selves do not have a continuous nature, and are therefore not effects, but that one word can nevertheless be applied to them, because they are similar.

[745]One might expect *tallayarūpāṃ* in place of *tatprāptirūpāṃ*, but the latter expression is not sufficiently disturbing to require emendation.

3.14 Dissolution into Primal Matter (*prakṛti*), Egoity (*ahaṅkāra*) and the like: verse 48

By this same [fault] others too—those presented earlier who preach dissolution [of the self] into Primal Matter,[746] into egoity, and so forth—are refuted 'because those dissolved in material causes return again'.[747]

3.15 Dissolution into the Supreme Self: verses 49–52

Now he rejects the view that '[Liberation is] dissolution into the Supreme Self'.

3.15.1 Souls dissolved into a material cause necessarily return again

> 49) In the Upaniṣads (*vedānte*) it is well established (*-saṃsiddhiḥ*) that the Supreme Self is the material cause. [But there is a problem with this view, namely that an individual soul] dissolved in [that] material cause would certainly return, just as before.

The meaning [of the verse] is (*ity arthaḥ*): In the scriptures of Vedānta it is quite clear that ***the Supreme Self*** is ***the material cause*** of the entire universe. [But there is a problem with this view, namely that individual souls] ***dissolved in***, i.e. entered into,[748] that ***material cause***, would even so (*api*) necessarily, because that is [their] nature,[749] ***return***, i.e. be reborn

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[746] After expounding the Pāñcarātrika position earlier, Rāmakaṇṭha briefly mentioned two other groups as coming under the same general heading: Prakṛtilayavādins and Ahaṅkārādilayavādins. Since we would therefore expect it to be those two groups that are mentioned here, and since the term *pradhānalaya* is associated with *prakṛtilaya* in the commentaries on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 45 (*vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ*) and 50, we conjecture *pradhānā-* here for *prāṇā-*.

[747] Verse 48ab.

[748] We have conjectured *praviṣṭānām*; our sources read *apraviṣṭānām*, *aviṣṭānām* or *upaviṣṭānām*. *Upaviṣṭānām* is perhaps not impossible and could be translated 'rested in'.

[749] It is the nature of things dissolved into material causes that they emerge again as effects. We assume that Rāmakaṇṭha is being slightly loose and could have expressed himself more correctly with *tatsvabhāvatvāt* instead of *tatsvabhāvāt*.

The same point was made in the last verse-segment (48b'cd) and the opening sentence of its commentary, against the Pāñcarātrikas, where it was maintained that their material

again ***just as before***.[750]

3.15.1.1 Brahman is not a material cause, so your objection does not apply [Objection:] Surely according to the Vedānta that was presented above,[751] this whole world characterised by difference cannot be an effect, since it is unreal, being playfully produced by ignorance,[752] so why is the [supposed] fact of *brahman* being the material cause of the [world] taken as the basis for a fault here [by Sadyojyotiḥ]?[753]

3.15.2 Why is this world unreal?

[Siddhāntin: We] reply: why is this world unreal? And (*vā*) what do [you] claim the defining characteristics of something real to be?

3.15.2.1 Because it is not of the nature of consciousness In response to this the [Vedāntins] say: The mark of something real is simply that it is of the form of consciousness. Things like pots are unreal because they lack that [property], since they are the objects of consciousness, not consciousness by nature. As they say,[754]

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cause has a tendency (*adhikāra, yogyatā*) to return, i.e. to evolve again into effects, because its very nature is transformation.

[750]I.e. before they were 'dissolved'. Since this charge was made in the previous verse against the Pāñcarātrika (see previous note), it is possible that *prāgvat*, both in the verse and the commentary, was intended to mean rather, 'just as in the previous *pakṣa*.'

[751]Commentary ad 2b, section 2.3. See in particular *tadanyeṣāṃ ca bhedarūpāṇām avidyādinirmāṇaikasāratvenāsatyatayāvagatiḥ*. Alternatively the reference may be to the Upaniṣadic statement that was cited there, *neha nānāsti kiñcana*, this being frequently quoted as support for the unreality of the world.

[752]The expression *avidyāvilasita* occurs in the *Brahmasiddhi* (p. 48: *na bhedo bhāvato 'sti, anādyavidyāvilasitam etad iti*), which may well have influenced Rāmakaṇṭha's formulation, as he quotes the text twice in the exposition of Vedānta above (section 2.3) and once more below (section 3.15.2.5).

[753]As we saw above (section 2.3), Rāmakaṇṭha distinguishes between two kinds of Vedānta, which he terms *pariṇativedānta* (transformationism) and *māyāvāda* (illusionism). It is transformationism that holds *brahman* to be the material cause of this universe of difference / plurality; for illusionism the plural world is not an effect of *brahman*, which would involve it being real, but simply an illusion projected as a result of ignorance. Since the Vedāntin expounded illusionism above, he asks here why Vedānta is being attacked in a way that assumes it to hold *brahman* to be the material cause of the universe.

[754]Source unknown.

That which is experienced by something other than itself simply does not exist.

3.15.2.1.1 Something can be cognised by something other than it, and yet real [Siddhāntin:] Surely (*nanu ca*) [something] may be both a real object and experienced only by things other than itself;[755] what is the contradiction? For to explain, entities have various natures—some (e.g. selves) are not revealed by things other than themselves [but they are revealed by themselves],[756] others (e.g. pots) are knowable to others [but not to themselves]:[757] it is not appropriate for the wise (*na ... satāṃ samucitā*) to distinguish between the real and the unreal by means of that alone, i.e. on the basis of mere variety, because the opposite is also possible (*vaiparītyasyāpi sambhavāt*).[758] Rather, a cause for [things] being non-existent which disproves [their] existence should be put forward, for it is not appropriate for sensible people to reject the existence of all things without something that disproves it (*bādhakam antareṇa*) [since this existence is] established by experience.

3.15.2.2 Because of not standing up to analysis [Vedāntin:] [But] it might be like this (*syād etat*): things that are known by others do not in any way stand up to analysis, neither as being of the nature of atoms nor as being [wholes composed of atoms, whether] gross or [subtle].[759] Therefore, being

[755]Literally 'and be something the experience of which is restricted to others.'

[756]A self can be cognised by itself, but not by a pot, or by another self.

[757]The editions are lacunose here, containing none of the Saiddhāntika's speech up to this point.

[758]If it were possible to establish what is real and what is not just on the basis of variety, one might assert that heavy things exist and light things do not. Such arguments are inconclusive because the opposite is equally possible; one could just as well argue that only light things, or things cognised by something other than themselves, exist.

[759]Our interpretation of *sthūlādi* is influenced by the following example of the phrase in a discussion involving atoms from Prabhācandra's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhaparīkṣā* (p. 2; we thank Isabelle RATIÉ for this reference): *nanu cāṇūnām ayaḥśalākākalpatvenānyonyaṃ sambandhābhāvataḥ sthūlādipratīter bhrāntatvāt kathaṃ tadvaśāt tatsvabhāvo bhāvaḥ syāt?* 'But since the cognition of gross and other [wholes made of atoms] (*sthūlādi-*) is an illusion, because there is no mutual relation between the atoms (*aṇūnām*), for they are similar to particles of iron, how could there be any entity that would have the nature of those [wholes made of atoms] owing to this [relation]?' Here it is clear from the context that *sthūla* and the referent(s) of the *ādi* both refer to wholes, *avayavin*s, that are composed of atoms. For only if they are composed of atoms does their

unreal, they are of the nature of ignorance,[760] just like [things perceived in] a dream. For the nature of ignorance is to be incapable of bearing an explanation of itself.[761]

But something of the nature of consciousness is not like that (i.e. incapable of being explained / established) because, inasmuch as it has that [consciousness] as its single nature, it is the determiner of that [consciousness], so it is established by itself. This is a reason for non-existence, which refutes existence.

3.15.2.2.1 That is the fault of the analyser not the world [Siddhāntin:] In response to this (*tatra*), [we reply]: analysis (*vicāraḥ*) is a type of means of knowledge of the nature of personal intuition.[762] And if a person's means of knowledge are unable to determine the nature of things, because of a deficiency in intuition on account of [that person] being afflicted by the demon of ignorance,[763] why does this amount to *the things* having

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unreality follow from a lack of relation between atoms. The *ādi* may stand primarily for *sūkṣma*, referring to small wholes, some of them too small to be perceptible, consisting of only a few atoms, *dvyaṇukas* and *tryaṇukas* for example. The context of this argument is slightly different from that of ours: this argument does not contest the reality of atoms at all, but challenges merely the existence of a relation between them. Nevertheless we regard it as likely that the opposition here, between atoms on the one hand and gross and other kinds of atomic whole on the other, is what is intended in our argument.

Rāmakaṇṭha's Buddhist opponent made a similar assertion earlier (section 2.15): *grāhyasya cāṇusthūlādivikalpaiḥ sarvathā sambhavābhāvenāvasturūpatvāt.* Neither here nor there does Rāmakaṇṭha relate precisely why things cannot be analysed as either atoms or wholes consisting of atoms, seeming to regard the reasoning as well-known enough not to have to. Most likely he had in mind some version of the argument put by Vasubandhu and many Buddhist authors after him that an atom cannot have parts, for in that case it would not be an atom; but if partless, then atoms in contact would occupy the same space, so all objects, even those consisting of many atoms, would be the size of a single atom (see note 226 above).

[760]Note that *avidyā* is used by the Vedāntin to refer not only to the cause of objects such as pots, but also to the form they take.

[761]I.e. to be *anirvacanīya*.

[762]I.e. it differs among different people depending on their aptitude. As support for the reading *puruṣapratibhātmakaḥ* see the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1.22cd, p. 55: *arthāpattyātmako 'yaṃ vicāraḥ proktapratibhātmako vā.*

[763]The Siddhāntin uses this technical term of Vedānta (*avidyā*) partly in order to show that the unreality of things does not follow even from their own standpoint, but also in order to mock the Vedāntins by implying that, although they may be infected by *avidyā*, not everybody is.

done something wrong, such that that they should be said to be unreal by that [person]? 'For it is not the fault of the post that the blind man fails to see it;'[764] rather it is the fault of the person.

3.15.2.2.2 Doubt is appropriate, not certainty as to non-existence And because things cannot be analysed, doubt regarding them is appropriate—since it follows logically from the absence of means of knowledge that prove or disprove [the reality of] those [things]—not certainty as to their non-existence. Thus [you who are] engaged in analysing the nature of things have analysed them well, since [you] have thus made what is no more than a doubt that is present in everybody—including even cowherds, women, children and old men—into a settled conclusion.[765]

3.15.2.2.3 Things *do* stand up to analysis And it is not true that things absolutely (*eva*) do not stand up to analysis, for they have been analysed at length above [in the commentary] on the section dealing with knowledge (*jñānakāṇḍe*) [of the *Raurava*].[766] So nor does it follow from this

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[764]Yāska's *Nirukta* 1.16 reads *naiṣa sthāṇor aparādho yad enam andho na paśyati | puruṣāparādhaḥ sa bhavati.* Rāmakaṇṭha inserts an *iti* after *paśyati*, indicating that at that point he ceases quoting and paraphrases.

[765]The doubt (*saṃśaya*) is: maybe this world is unreal. This should properly be followed by analysis (*vicāra*), which only on completion yields the settled conclusion (*niścaya, siddhānta*). The Vedāntin collapses these three stages into the first alone, according to Rāmakaṇṭha.

Rāmakaṇṭha's formulation here has perhaps been influenced by his familiarity with *Sārdhatriśatikālottara* 1:6cd: *āgopālāṅganā bālā mlecchāḥ prākṛtabhāṣiṇaḥ ||*.

[766]We take this to be a reference to an earlier part of either Sadyojyotiḥ's *Rauravavṛtti* or of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Rauravavṛttiviveka*. This use of *jñānakāṇḍa* to refer to the doctrinal portion of a particular *Siddhāntatantra* is found e.g. ad *Mṛgendra kriyāpāda* 1:1, and ad *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* 58cd below, where it seems, like here, to refer to the doctrinal portion of the *Raurava*. It is also sometimes used to refer collectively to the doctrinal portions of *Siddhāntatantras*, for example in the prose introduction to the anonymous commentary on the *Śataratnasaṅgraha*.

Alternatively the expression could refer to the *jñānakāṇḍa* of the Vedic corpus, viz. the *Upaniṣads*. For Rāmakaṇṭha uses the term in that way in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 3:82, p. 208. The argument would then have more force against the Vedāntin opponent, meaning 'And it is not true [even according to your tradition] that things absolutely do not stand up to analysis ...'. But the inclusion of the word *pūrvam* weighs in favour of the reference being to an earlier part of the present corpus.

If that is the case, then we can infer that the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* comments on a part of the *Raurava* that does *not* fall within its doctrinal portion; on this point see

that they are unreal.[767]

3.15.2.3 Because scripture tells us so [Vedāntin:] Have [we] not stated earlier[768] that one can determine what is real and unreal from scripture, which tells us that (*iti*) *brahman* alone is real, differentiated things on the other hand unreal, since scripture is valid as something that teaches us about established objects as well as [religious actions to be performed]?[769]

[Siddhāntin:] If that is the case, then given that [*brahman*][770] has valid means of proof [in the form of scripture], the statements of scripture with regard to it (*atra*) are also real,[771] so there would be a contradiction with the [claim of] non-duality expressed in the words (*iti*) '*brahman* alone is real'; for [you] base [your supposed] non-duality on the existence of means of knowledge, objects of knowledge and the rest.[772]

[You] may say that these statements of scripture are also unreal / untrue

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footnotes 912 and 917.

[767]I.e. neither from the earlier reason that things are not of the nature of consciousness (*abodharūpatvāt*), nor from this supposed fact that they cannot be analysed (*vicārayitum aśakyatvāt*), does it follow that they are unreal.

An alternative possibility is: 'for this reason too they are not unreal', i.e. for the reason that things *can* be analysed, in addition to the reason that only doubt would be appropriate if they could not. But this meaning would follow more naturally from a different word order: *ato 'pi na teṣām asatyatvam.*

[768]Section 2.3.

[769]The Mīmāṃsakas regarded Vedic scripture as authoritative only with regard to dharmic injunctions, things to be performed (*sādhyārthapratipādaka*); the Vedāntins held it to be authoritative both with regard to these and established objects (*siddhārtha*). See note 118. Thus the reason that the Vedāntin includes *siddhārthapratipādakatvenāpi śruteḥ pramāṇatvāt* is to avert the Mīmāṃsaka objection that scripture cannot inform us about what is real and what not, since it can inform us not about facts, but only about things to be done.

[770]Other suppletions are possible: 'non-duality', 'this position of yours' or 'this determination of what is real and what is not real'.

[771]The force of this argument rests partly on the fact that *satya* can mean both 'real' and 'true'. The sentences of the Veda, if they are a genuine means of knowledge, must be *satya* in the sense of true. But if they are *satya* in the sense of ontologically real, then the tradition's professed non-duality is compromised.

The reading *pramāṇatvāt* for *pramāṇavattvāt* would simplify this sentence: 'If that is the case, then because the statements of scripture would be the means of knowledge with regard to [*brahman*] (*atra*), they too would be real ...'. But *pramāṇavattvāt* is better attested.

[772]We take this to be a reference to the group of four, namely *pramātṛ, pramāṇa, prameya* and *pramiti*: see e.g. *Nyāyabhāṣya* p. 1,13–15, and *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. 1, p. 38,8–9.

indeed. [But] if that is the case, then, because these would thus not be means of knowledge, some other means of establishing the reality of *brahman* and the unreality of plurality must be stated. For[773] something unreal, like a cognition had by a barren woman's son, obviously (*hi*)[774] cannot be a means of knowledge.[775] And with regard to this other means of knowledge, the very same attack and defence that were stated above [apply].[776] And so, because there would thus be an infinite regress, the non-duality of the real[777] remains unestablished.

[Vedāntin:] Then ultimately [the statements of scripture] really are (*asty*

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[773]This is the fourth sentence in this passage that ends in *yataḥ*: see also lines 12, 19 and 23. On Rāmakaṇṭha's usage of sentence-final *yataḥ* see GOODALL (1998: xxviii). The same practice can be found in the works of Maṇḍanamiśra, whom Rāmakaṇṭha frequently quotes: see *arthāpattis tu viparyaye, na bhedam antareṇa kaścid vyavahāra upapadyate yataḥ* (*Brahmasiddhi* p. 22).

[774]On Rāmakaṇṭha's frequent use of *hi* in combination with an ablative or a *yataḥ*, see note 460.

[775]The word order is awkward. Any of the following would appear more natural: *na hy asatyaṃ vandhyāsutajñānam iva pramāṇam bhavati yataḥ*, *na hi vandhyāsutajñānam ivāsatyaṃ pramāṇam bhavati yataḥ*, or *na hy asatyaṃ pramāṇam bhavati vandhyāsutajñānam iva yataḥ*.

This stage of the argument receives slightly different treatment in a parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (ad 1.4cd, p. 8). The Vedāntin there is faced with the same problem that if he holds Vedic scripture to be real, his non-duality is compromised, but the response is not simply that scripture is unreal; it is that scripture is a means of knowing *brahman* indirectly, by revealing that plurality is false and that knowledge of the Self is not this, not this (*neti nety ātmagatiḥ*). It is in response to this that Rāmakaṇṭha brings up the example of the son of a barren woman: *avastuviṣayatvād asya eṣa vandhyāsuto yāti ityādivākyajātasyeva prāmāṇyābhāvāt punar apy advaitāsiddhir eva*; 'Because this [scripture] has [even by your own admission] unreal contents, just like such statements as "here goes the son of a barren woman", it is not a means of knowledge, so yet again there is absolutely no proving of non-duality'.

Thus whereas in our text the example involving the son of barren woman is given as analogous to an unreal scripture, in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* it is given as analogous to a scripture whose words refer to something that is not real. Furthermore in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* it is a *statement* that is given as an example of a faulty means of knowledge, whereas in this text it is a cognition.

[776]The attack is: the means of knowledge must be real, so it contradicts non-duality. The defence is: the means of knowledge is unreal. This, for Rāmakaṇṭha, entails that it cannot be a means of knowing anything, hence some further means of knowledge must be proposed. Thus we have an infinite regress.

[777]This translation assumes *satyādvaita* to be a genitive *tatpuruṣa* equivalent in meaning to *brahmādvaita*; it could also be a *karmadhāraya*, 'real non-duality', 'non-duality as real'.

eva) non-different [from *brahman*].[778]

[Siddhāntin:] How could that be the case? They would have non-duality as their nature, so for whom and with regard to what would they be means of knowledge,[779] since being established as means and object of knowledge depends on duality?[780]

If [you Vedāntin] say, 'That is true;[781] ultimately this worldly interaction involving the tetrad of means of knowledge [, objects of knowledge and the

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[778]The Vedāntin switches back from the position that the statements of scripture are unreal to the position that they are real, but avoids the problem of duality by maintaining that they are non-different from *brahman*.

[779]The text from *tat paramārthataḥ* to *katham ittham* is not completely smooth. (1) The omission of a genitive to go with *abhedaḥ*, such as *śrutivākyānām* or *teṣām*, is surprising. (2) We would expect the *eva* to qualify *abhedaḥ*, and not to be positioned so as to qualify *asti*. (3) Although *katham evam* could naturally mean 'How could that be the case?', *ittham* is not usually used as a predicate. But the way we have constituted and interpreted the text is the least awkward of the possibilities that occurred to us.

We could understand *paramārthato bhedo* instead of *paramārthato 'bhedo*, and end the sentence at a different place: 'Then how [can you Saiddhāntikas claim], as you do (*ittham*), that ultimately there is certainly plurality?' The Vedāntin would then not be arguing for his own position of non-duality, but turning against the Siddhāntin's position, questioning how he could establish ultimate plurality. The problems with this are: (1) *ittham* is still awkward on this interpretation; (2) There is nothing in the preceding lines that suggests it would be problematic for the Siddhāntin to establish *bheda*. If the *pramāṇa*s are held to be unreal, then there are grounds for questioning how they can establish something, but for the Saiddhāntikas the *pramāṇa*s are real. (3) If this were the meaning, we would have to assume that after this question some text has been lost that first gave the Siddhāntin's response to this question of how *bheda* can be established, before returning to the issue of whether the statements of *śruti* are real or unreal for the Vedāntin.

Or we could remove the *tat*, which is found in only one of our sources, and translate '[Siddhāntin:] How could [any means of knowledge give the conclusion], "ultimately there is in fact non-duality"? They would have such non-duality (*itthamadvaita-*) as their nature, so for whom ...'. But since the Siddhāntin has just completed a firm argument against non-duality at the end of the previous sentence (*na satyādvaitasiddhiḥ*), it is unlikely that he would follow that by asking how non-duality could be established. Furthermore *ittham* is still unsmooth on this interpretation.

[780]Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:4c'd: *āgamasyāpi satyatvāt, asato 'tadviṣayatvenāpramāṇatvāt, na satyādvaitasiddhiḥ, dvaitanibandhanatvāt pramāṇaprameyabhāvasyeti.* 'Because the scripture too is real—since something unreal could not be a means of knowing [the reality of *brahman*], as it could not have it as its object—there is no proving of the non-duality of the real, since the relation of means of knowledge and object of knowledge is based on duality.'

[781]I.e. for means of knowledge and objects of knowledge to be established as such is based on duality.

rest] is indeed of the form of ignorance', [then we reply] surely it is this very thing which is being examined.[782] [And] since the means of knowledge are unreal [according to this view that you have just stated], how can you have certainty also with regard to the flaws [of things other than *brahman*]?[783] And that which is understood from something that is not a means of knowledge is certainly unreal, like the two moons and such like [that appear in the mistaken cognition of a person with an eye-defect]; so by [establishing] that *brahman* too is unreal, how exceedingly well [you] wise persons have explained the point of the Vedas: the non-existence of everything.

[Vedāntin:] But [could it not at least be said that] the statements of scripture, though of the nature of ignorance, are certainly means to wisdom.

[Siddhāntin:] This is [just] something you say to trick naïve students of the Veda [and we shall not be deceived by it]. If the means of knowledge are unreal, then this whole [attempt of yours to establish non-duality] is like an empire in the mind.[784] Or, if they are real, then it is the dualist position that is correct,[785] and so determining what is real and what unreal in this way (i.e. in such a way as to conclude that *brahman* alone is real) is not appropriate from scripture either.[786]

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[782]In other words, you cannot simply state this to be the case in the middle of the discussion, for the truth of it is precisely what we are trying to decide.

[783]There are two sides to the Vedāntin's view: *brahman* is real; everything other than *brahman* is unreal. The Siddhāntin turns here from the impossibility of establishing the former to the impossibility of establishing the latter. It is also possible that *doṣe* means 'with regard to the fault [that all worldly interaction is of the nature of ignorance]', i.e. that it refers specifically to the claim in the Vedāntin's last speech that *pramāṇādivyavahāraḥ* is *avidyārūpaḥ*.

[784]I.e. it is wishful thinking.

[785]The Editions are missing a portion of the text beginning here, owing to eyeskip from one *eva* to another.

[786]The dilemma that confronts the Vedāntin, and that has been a continuous theme throughout this section, is that if Vedic statements are *satya* then they contradict non-duality, but if they are *asatya* then they cannot be means of knowledge and hence cannot reveal *brahman*. What stance did Vedāntin authors take towards the dilemma?

THRASHER (1993: 99) has pointed out that there is probably a difference between Śaṅkara's and Maṇḍanamiśra's view. For Śaṅkara's view, he points to *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, introduction to 1.1.1: *na ca pramātṛtvam antareṇa pramāṇapravṛttir asti. tasmād avidyāvadviṣayāṇy eva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca.* 'And there is no operation of the means of knowledge without the condition of being an agent of knowledge. Therefore the means of knowledge such as direct perception, and scripture too, have as their locus [people] who have ignorance.' Later (ad 2.1.14) an opponent asks, *kathaṃ tv asatyena vedāntavākyena satyasya brahmātmatvasya pratipattir upapadyeta?* 'But how can unreal

3.15.2.4 Rāmakaṇṭha's own position: Plurality can be established through self-awareness And something established by reflexive awareness is not unreal (*avastu*), because, just like *brahman* [for you], it is not cognised by something other [than itself].[787] And each individual's own self

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Upaniṣadic statements enable knowledge of the real unity of Self and *brahman*?' Śaṅkara does not deny, in his response, that the Vedas are unreal, but answers the opponent by giving examples.

For Maṇḍanamiśra's view he points to *Brahmasiddhi* p. 157,19–21: *āmnāyaikanibandhanatvaṃ tu tasyocyate, pratyakṣādīnām avidyāsambhinnatvāt, pratyastamitanikhilabhedena rūpeṇāviṣayīkaraṇād bhedapratyastamayasyāmnāyāvagamyatvād iti.* 'But that [non-existence of diversity] is said to be based only on scripture, because perception and the other [means of knowledge] are mixed up with ignorance, since they do not make [*brahman*] into an object in its form in which all plurality has disappeared, because the ceasing to exist of plurality can be known [only] through scripture.'

Thus for Maṇḍanamiśra scripture is clearly distinguished from perception and the other means of knowledge, only the latter being connected with ignorance, whereas for Śaṅkara scripture falls together with perception and the others as being associated with ignorance.

On the question of how, then, Śaṅkara deemed scripture capable of revealing *brahman*, see the following remark in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* ad 1.1.4 (p. 124): *na hi śāstram idaṃtayā viṣayabhūtaṃ brahma pratipipādayiṣati, kiṃ tarhi pratyagātmatvenāviṣayatayā pratipādayad avidyākalpitaṃ vedyaveditṛvedanādibhedam apanayati.* 'For scripture does not wish to present to us *brahman* as "this", an object; rather, establishing [it] as the internal self, as a non-object, it removes [from it] the differentiation of known, knower, knowing and [means of knowledge], which is postulated by ignorance.' (See CARDONA 1998 for the view that *kiṃ tarhi* is better explained in the *Mahābhāṣya* as an adversative particle, not as a question—a meaning not attested in our dictionaries.)

For Prakāśātman, scripture belongs to the realm of *vyavahāra* / *avidyā*, and thus is as unreal as the other means of knowledge. It excels the other means of knowledge, however, in that its object, existing beyond the senses (*atīndriya*), transcends the realm of *vyavahāra* (*vyavahārātīta*). See MESQUITA (1984: 185, note 28) and MESQUITA (1990: 160ff.). This view was strongly criticised in Viśiṣṭādvaita, for example by Rāmānuja (*Śrībhāṣya* I, 182,5–6): *mithyābhūtaśāstrajanyajñānasya mithyātvena tadviṣayasyāpi brahmaṇo mithyātvam, yathā dhūmabuddhyā gṛhītabāṣpajanyāgnijñānasya mithyātvena tadviṣayasyāgner api mithyātvam.* 'From the falseness of a cognition produced from scripture regarded as false, there follows the falseness of the object of that cognition too, namely *brahman*; just as from the falseness of a cognition of fire produced from steam grasped with the notion that it is smoke, there follows the falseness of its object too, namely fire.' Cf. MESQUITA (1990: 168).

[787] Rāmakaṇṭha begins this section by stating a syllogism that will be acceptable to the Vedāntin opponent also; the Vedāntin proposed being cognised by something other than itself as the hallmark of the unreal in section 3.15.2.1.

Having established in this sentence that what is known by self-awareness is necessarily real, Rāmakaṇṭha will now go on to argue that plurality—in particular of selves—can be established by self-awareness.

(*pratyekaṃ svātmā*) shines forth through self-awareness as utterly different from other selves [in as much as it appears] as the inferrer of other selves.[788]

Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:53c'd, p. 91: *na hi svasaṃvitsiddham avastu aparavedyatvāt brahmavat.*

[788]The argument that the self knows itself as the inferrer of other selves and therefore as different from them, is one Rāmakaṇṭha frequently uses elsewhere. See for example *anumātur anumātṛtayā vaisādṛśyena bhāsanāt* (section 3.13-5.4 of this text, with a parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:55, p. 94); *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda*, 2:1, p. 22,8–9: *sa ca sarvārthaprakāśakatayā parātmānumātṛtvena ca pratyātmānaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddho bhinna eva nityo vyāpakaś ca*; *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:53c'd, p. 91: *svasaṃvedanena parātmānumātṛtayā svātmā bhedena prakāśamānaḥ satya eva.* In the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:52 the argument is slightly more complicated because he attaches it to a verse that argues for the separateness of selves on the grounds that when one self is experiencing pleasure, another can be experiencing pain: *svasaṃvedanena hi pratiśarīraṃ svātmā sukhādyanubhavitṛtvena paraśarīraceṣṭādibhiś ca duḥkhādiyuktātmāntarānumātṛtvena* [*-ānumātṛtvena* B, C; *-ānumātṛkatvena* E_K] *yugapad eva saṃvedyate. na cānumeyo 'numātā, anumātā vānumeya eva yugapad eva* [*eva* E_K; *evaṃ* C; *om.* B] *sambhavaty atyantabhedād ity uktam. atas tayor bheda eva yuktaḥ. na ca parātmānumātṛtvaṃ tadānīm asiddham asatyaṃ vā yujyate vaktuṃ, svasaṃvedanasiddhatvāt sukhādiprakāśakatvavat* [*prakāśakatvavat* E_K, C; *prakāśatvavat* B]. ... *ity ātmabhedaḥ satya eva.*

'For in each body one's own self is experienced through self-experience as simultaneously the experiencer of pleasure and the like, and the inferrer of other selves who are linked with suffering and the like through [an inference based on] the movement and [speech] of other bodies. And as we have said, that which is inferred cannot simultaneously be the inferrer; and the inferrer cannot simultaneously be the inferred, because the two are completely different. Therefore the difference of these two is certainly correct. And it is not correct to say that being an inferrer of other [selves] is at that time unproved or unreal, because it is established by self-experience, just as being the illuminator of pleasure and the like is. ... Therefore the plurality of selves is real.' (As support for taking the *ādi* in *paraśarīraceṣṭādi* to refer to speech, see *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:50, p. 87, *kāyavāgvyavahārātmanānumānena*, and *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:29.)

It is questionable whether the argument in these passages and in our text is valid. The fact that one experiences oneself as the inferrer of a plurality of other selves certainly does not entail that there must be a plurality of other selves. The correctness of that conclusion depends entirely on the correctness of the inference; it cannot be secured by self-awareness. Otherwise the conclusions of all my false inferences would be secured by my awareness of myself as their inferrer. That is probably not quite what Rāmakaṇṭha is doing with with the argument, but then what is he doing?

It is significant that in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* passage ad 1:52 he adds the assertion that the inferrer cannot be the inferred. He could argue that, although self-awareness does not secure the conclusion of inferences of which I am aware of myself as the inferrer, it can secure the fact that my self is different from the selves I am inferring, since the inferrer cannot be the inferred. But then the difference of my self from other selves follows from

For if they[789] were non-different as expressed by 'this whole universe is *brahman*', then who would do what for whom in that case? Thus the whole world [of everyday interaction] would not work.[790] And no error is possible with regard to [self-awareness],[791] for even erroneous cognitions, such as [those in] dreams and the like, are all erroneous with respect to their object, not with regard to themselves.[792] And it is an object that exists

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the inferrer not being the inferred, and self-awareness seems to have nothing to do with it, so Rāmakaṇṭha would not be happy with this interpretation of the argument.

If the validity of self-awareness is to be used to secure the conclusion of a plurality of selves, would it not have to be aware of more than one self? Yet selves other than my own cannot fall within the domain of self-awareness. He is appealing to the fact that when I am aware of myself as the inferrer of other selves, I am aware of myself as different from those other selves. But surely only if the inference of those other selves is valid can existence be granted to them. So probably to defend the argument Rāmakaṇṭha would have to admit that it depends both on inference in which other selves are validly inferred, and on self-awareness in which I am aware of myself as the inferrer of those other selves and hence separate from them.

[789]I.e. one's own self and other selves, or inferrer and inferred.

[790]Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:29, p. 92: *kaḥ kasya kiṃ kuryād iti sarvavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ.*

[791]The following all constitute evidence that *tatra* here means *svasaṃvedane* or a synonym thereof: (1) The passage is summed up below with the phrase *iti svasaṃvedane bhrāntyasambhavāt.* (2) In section 3.10.5 Rāmakaṇṭha wrote *na ca svasaṃvedanasya bādhaḥ sambhavati, yena bhrāntatā bhaved iti vakṣyāmaḥ*; the present passage is the only one to which he could be referring with *iti vakṣyāmaḥ.* (3) In the parallels given in the next footnote, *nāpi bādhaḥ* and *bhrāntyabhāvāc ca* both refer to the impossibility of error in self-awareness. See also *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:5, p. 16,12–13: *na ca svasaṃvedanasya tathātve bādhaḥ sambhavati* and, in section 3.11.5.2 of this text, *svasaṃvittau bhramābhāvāt.*

See WATSON (2010a: 299, 302 and 308) for more on why self-awareness is necessarily accurate.

[792]Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:5, p. 16: *bhrāntyabhāvac ca.. bhrāntam api hi vijñānaṃ sarvam ālambane bhrāntaṃ na svātmani*; and *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 6:34c–35a: *nāpi bādhaḥ* [*nāpi bādhaḥ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; omitted in the other mss and in ed.], *sarvam ālambane* [*ālambane* 4 (non-Kashmirian) mss; *ālambanaṃ* ed.] *bhrāntaṃ* [*bhrāntaṃ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *bhrāntir* ed.] *na svātmani yataḥ* [*yataḥ* Ū, Ṛ, Ṝ; *kadācana iti* ed.].

For examples of this view in Buddhist texts, see WATSON (2010a: 302, note 11).

This entire section (3.15.2.4) of our text is cited by Jñānaprakāśa in the *Śivajñānabodhavṛtti.* The citation, which we have given in full in an apparatus to the edition, is introduced with the words, *tad uktam—sarvam ālambane bhrāntaṃ na svātmani kathaṃcaneti. prapañcitaṃ ca paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛttau, tatra kiṃcil likhyate.* It seems then that *sarvam ālambane bhrāntaṃ na svātmani kathaṃcana*, which is metrical, is a half-

externally [in one way, but is] perceived in another way, that becomes the object of error. But a thing that has consciousness as its single nature is really existent in precisely the way that it appears, because something that is not self-experienced could not have that (viz. consciousness) as its nature. And (*vā*) if something has that (viz. consciousness) as its nature, it must be self-experienced.[793] Thus, since there is no possibility of error with respect

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verse that Rāmakaṇṭha is citing and embedding in a larger sentence by adding *bhrāntam api hi svapnādivijñānam* at the beginning. According to the testimony of this citation, Rāmakaṇṭha includes *kathaṃcana*, but according to all the rest of our sources for the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, he ends his sentence with *na svātmani*. In the two parallels in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, one given above and one given in the next footnote, he ends the sentence with *na svātmani*.

See also *Pauṣkaravṛtti* p. 296, *yad uktam—sarvam ālambane bhrāntaṃ na svātmani kathaṃcaneti*; p. 385, *na hi svātmani bhrāntir asti. tad uktaṃ—sarvam ālambane bhrāntaṃ na svātmani kathaṃcaneti*; and the following half-verse cited as a Yogācāra view in a *ṭippaṇi* on the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (given on p. 261 of MALVANIA's edition): *sarvam ālambane bhrāntam muktvā tāthāgataj̃ñānam*.

[793]Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:53, p. 90–91: *bhrāntaṃ hi vijñānaṃ sarvam ālambane bhrāntam, na svātmani. ālambanaṃ hy anyathā bahiḥsthitam anyathā prātīyamānaṃ bhramaviṣayatām āpadyate. yat punar bodhaikasvabhāvaṃ vastu tad yathaiva cakāsti tathaiva sat, atatsvabhāvasyāsvasaṃvedyatvāt* [*-svasaṃvedyatvāt* conj.; *-saṃvedyatvāt* E_K]. *svasaṃvedyatve ca tatsvabhāvatvam iti svaśarīravartina eva sukhādivedanasyābhedaḥ, na tu paraśarīravartino 'numānasiddhasyānumātṛtayaiva tato bhedena saṃvedanād ity ātmabhedaḥ satya evety uktam.* 'For all mistaken cognition is mistaken with respect to some object, not with regard to itself. For an object becomes the object of a mistake when it exists externally in one way and is cognised in a different way. But an object whose single nature is consciousness is really existent in precisely the way that it appears, because something not of that nature is not self-cognised, and if something is self-cognised, then it has that (i.e. consciousness) as its nature. Thus there is non-difference only of the cognition of pleasure and the like that exists in one's own body, not that which exists in other bodies and is established by inference, because one is aware of [one's own cognition] as the inferrer [of cognition in other bodies] and hence as different from it. Thus, as taught above, the plurality of selves is certainly real.' (The emendation to *-svasaṃvedyatvāt* is suggested by the parallel in our text.)

In the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* the reason given for something of the nature of consciousness existing as it appears is: (a) if something is not of the nature of consciousness it is not self-cognised; and (b) the contrapositive of that, namely that if something is self-cognised it must be of the nature of consciousness. The *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*'s first reason is: if something is not self-cognised it is not of the nature of consciousness. But for the second reason we could accept either that given in the majority of witnesses, that if something is of the nature of consciousness it is self-cognised, or that given in M_1, that if something is not of the nature of consciousness it is not self-cognised (*atatsvabhāvatve na svasaṃvedyam*). Finally, the reasons according to the citation of our passage by

to self-awareness, the difference of selves from each other (*ātmabheda*) is certainly real, being established in each individual by self-awareness [which the selves have of themselves] as the inferrers of other selves.[794] Even [your

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Jñānaprakāśa are: (a) if something is self-cognised it must be of the nature of consciousness; and (b) if something is of the nature of consciousness it must be self-cognised. Thus we have four different pairs of reasons: (1) those given in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*; (2) those in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* taking the second from the majority of witnesses; (3) those in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* taking the second from M_1; (4) those given in Jñānaprakāśa's citation.

3 and 4 amount to an assertion of the complete identity of those things that are of the nature of consciousness and those things that are self-cognised. Anything that is one must also be the other. 1 and 2 give only one-sided identities, since in both cases their two reasons are simply the contrapositive of each other. 1 amounts to the assertion that whatever is self-cognised is of the nature of consiousness; 2 amounts to the assertion that whatever is of the nature of consciousness is self-cognised.

Unfortunately we are left with the problem that it is difficult to see how any of these four pairs of reasons justify the preceding assertion that something of the nature of consciousness exists in precisely the way that it appears! That whatever is self-cognised is of the nature of consciousness seems irrelevant. That whatever is of the nature of consciousness is self-cognised is only relevant if we assume the validity of self-cognition, but that is precisely what is in question.

A possible solution is to end the sentence with *tad yathaiva cakāsti tathaiva sat* and understand it as an unargued for assertion. The following two reasons, one marked by the ablative *-ayogāt*, and the other by *iti* taken as *iti hetau* could then give a reason for *svasaṃvedane bhrāntyasambhavaḥ*. *Svasaṃvedane bhrāntyasambhavāt* would, as before, give a reason for the assertion that follows it. 'Because something that is not self-experienced could not have that (viz. consciousness) as its nature, and (*vā*) because if something has that (viz. consciousness) as its nature, it must be self-experienced, there can be no error in self-awareness. So ...' The absence of error in self-awareness follows from the combination of the two preceding reasons and the unargued for assertion preceding them: since whatever is of the nature of consciousness exists in the way that it appears, i.e. is *abhrānta* in that form, and since it appears in self-awareness in that form, self-awareness must be *abhrānta*.

But the syntax does not quite suggest this interpretation: why mark one reason with an ablative and one with an *iti*? And why not mark the third more clearly as a reason? Thus we are unable to provide a completely satisfactory interpretation of the text at this point.

[794] Aghoraśiva is clearly basing himself on this passage when he writes *yathā paramātmanaś cidrūpatvena svasaṃvedanātmakatvādikatvaṃ siddham, tathā jīvātmanām api bhinnāt svasaṃvedanād eva bhedaḥ siddhaḥ. yat svasaṃvedanena siddhaṃ tat satyam eva, yathā paramātmana ekatvam. svasaṃvedanasiddhaś cāyaṃ jīvātmabhedaḥ, tataḥ so 'pi satya* ed.] *parātmānumātṛtayā svayam ābhāsate.* (*Mṛgendravṛttidīpikā* ad 2:13c–14).

'Just as the Supreme Self, since it is of the nature of consciousness, is established to

own] revealed scripture states:[795] 'All things shine following Him shining; by His shining this whole universe shines'.[796]

3.15.2.5 Plurality can be established by direct perception [Vedāntin:] Surely since [the grasping of] plurality depends on the establishment of mutual *non-existence*, and since direct perception has as its object [only] the *existence* [of things], how can plurality be amenable to direct perception? This is what has been said [by Maṇḍanamiśra in the citation we gave above]:[797]

> 'They say that direct perception is something that affirms [, never something that denies].'[798]

[Siddhāntin:] Plurality does not depend on mutual non-existence having been established; rather (*kiṃ tarhi*)[799] once plurality has been established,[800] that mutual non-existence is known.[801] For if all things were one, then there

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have such properties as being of the nature of self-awareness, so individual souls too are established to be plural by self-awareness, which is itself plural [occurring separately in each individual]. Whatever is established by self-awareness is definitely real, like the oneness of the Supreme Self. And the plurality of individual souls is established by self-awareness, so that too must be real. Thus non-duality is refuted. And this [self-awareness] is not an unestablished reason, because this individual self shines forth of itself as the inferrer of other selves.'

[795] *Kaṭhopaniṣat* 5:15cd, *Śvetāśvaropaniṣat* 6:14cd, *Muṇḍakopaniṣat* 2.2.11cd.

[796] 'Him' in the Upaniṣadic context refers of course to *brahman*. Rāmakaṇṭha cites the half-verse because he sees 'Him shining' as referring to the way that the self shines of itself, i.e. is established by self-awareness: see *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 1:15, where he cites the same verse as evidence that the self is *anubhavasiddham*. The rest of the half-verse, furthermore, when 'this whole universe' is understood to include specifically other souls, indicates that other souls are illuminated, i.e. known, by something other than themselves (*parasaṃvedya*). Thus the two things that Rāmakaṇṭha gave immediately above the half-verse as indicating the plurality of souls, i.e. the fact that one's own self is established by self-awareness, and other selves are established by an inference on the part of something other than themselves, were probably both seen by Rāmakaṇṭha to be indicated in this quotation.

[797] In section 2.3.

[798] I.e. it can only give us positive information about what exists, and can tell us nothing about what does not exist.

[799] See CARDONA (1998) for the translation of *kiṃ tarhi* as 'rather'.

[800] By self-awareness, as explicated above.

[801] The parallel passage from the *Mṛgendravṛttidīpikā* partly given above in note 794 continues as follows: *nanu bhedasyetaretarābhāvagrahaṇapūrvakatvāt bhāvaviṣayeṇa*

would never be absence of any one thing [such as a pot] in any other thing [such as a cloth] (*kutaścit*), in which case (*iti*) why does someone searching for a pot turn away on seeing a cloth? And there would be no distinction between a means of knowledge and a non-means of knowledge, because all cognitions[802] would be the same in [cognising] mere existence.[803] And thus it is plurality that is established by direct perception; so how can this be disproved simply by proclaiming that it is unreal.

3.15.2.6 *brahman* is the material cause of the world [Vedāntin:] Let [the world] be real; but nevertheless, because of the scriptural passage, 'For this has *brahman* as its material cause',[804] its material cause must be *brahman*.

[Siddhāntin:] In that case [our response is:] (*tarhi*) that is exactly what the author of the commentary[805] said on this point.[806] [So] why did [you]

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pratyakṣeṇa grahaṇaṃ na sambhavaty eva. yad uktam:

āhur vidhātṛ pratyakṣaṃ na niṣeddhṛ vipaścitaḥ | iti.

tad ayuktam, siddhe hi bhede 'sāv itaretarābhāvaḥ. anyathā payo'rthī pāvakam apy anudhāved iti sarvam asamañjasam iti.

Aghoraśiva's *asāv itaretarābhāvaḥ* suggests that he understood Rāmakaṇṭha's *taditaretarābhāva-* as a *karmadhāraya*.

[802]In fact the Vedāntin had mentioned only *pratyakṣa* as having existence alone as its object; Rāmakaṇṭha assumes here that he would hold the same of all cognition (*sarvajñāna*).

[803]Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* 'ad 1:53c'd, p. 91: *nanv itaretarābhāvasavyapekṣatvād bhedasyābhāvāviṣayatvāc ca pratyakṣasya, na bhedaḥ svasaṃvitpratyakṣagamyaḥ. tad uktam:*

āhur vidhātṛ pratyakṣaṃ na niṣeddhṛ vipaścitaḥ | iti.

netaretarābhāvasavyapekṣo bhedaḥ, kiṃ tarhi siddhe bhede taditaretarābhāvasiddhiḥ. sarvaikye hi na kasyacit kutaścid abhāva iti ghaṭārthī paṭadarśanāt kimiti nivartate? pramāṇāpramāṇavibhāgaś ca na syāt sarvasya sattāmātrāvyabhicārāt.

[804]We know of no such Vedic passage. It could be lost; or Rāmakaṇṭha's *iti śrutitaḥ* could mark a paraphrase rather than a quotation: 'because of the scriptural passage to the effect that ...'. As an example of a *śruti* passage that suggests that *brahman* is the material cause of the world, see *Taittirīyopaniṣat* 3.1: *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayanty abhisaṃviśanti, tad vijijñāsasva, tad brahmeti.* 'That from which, verily, these beings arise, that by which, having arisen, they live, that which they dissolve into at death, you should enquire into that: that is *brahman*.'

[805]I.e. Sadyojyotiḥ. The reason for his being referred to in that way is given in section 6 of the Introduction.

[806]In the verse under discussion, when he wrote, 'In Vedānta it is established that the

object?[807] And in regard to this [*pariṇāmavāda* version of Advaitavedānta] (*atra ca*) the fault stated [earlier against the Pāñcarātrika[808] applies]. Thus he says [here]: '[An individual soul] dissolved in a material cause would certainly return, just as before.'[809]

[Vedāntin:] But we also have the scriptural passage, 'Bliss is the nature of *brahman*',[810] and since it is impossible to return from *brahman* in that form, even if [things] return in gross forms, there can be no fault of those who have been merged into *brahman* (*tallīnānām*) returning.[811] [In answer to] this, he

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Supreme Self is the material cause.'

[807]When you said, in your first objection in the commentary to this verse (section 3.15.1.1), that we should not point to faults in the position that *brahman* is the material cause of the world, since you held the world to be unreal.

[808]In the verse preceding the present one (48ab): *upādāneṣu līnānāṃ punarāvartanam.* These words are also found in the present sentence in all our sources, but they make the text very awkward at this point. We have therefore assumed that they were quoted in a marginal aside that was subsequently mistaken for part of the text.

[809]49cd. Sadyojyotiḥ's verses concern *pariṇāmavāda*, yet Rāmakaṇṭha decides to draw on *māyāvāda* in the bulk of both his exposition and refutation of Vedānta, for, as he says at the end of his exposition (section 2.3), *māyāvāda* is taught as the principal Vedāntic teaching by the foremost exponents of the tradition, and it accords better with *śruti*. This, as argued by SANDERSON (1985: 210, note 41 and 2006a: 68–73), presumably reflects the fact that *māyāvāda* had developed and come into prominence during the period that separates the two authors (see note 141), but it leaves Rāmakaṇṭha with the problem of how to justify the fact that the author on which he comments concerns himself with *pariṇāmavāda*, not *māyāvāda*. We take this section to contain an implicit defense of Sadyojyotiḥ's treatment of *pariṇāmavāda*. Insofar as it represents Vedānta as having to retreat from *māyāvāda* to *pariṇāmavāda* in order to save non-dualism in the face of the impossibility of establishing that the world is unreal, it implies that a thorough refutation of Vedānta, even if the latter consists predominantly of *māyāvāda*, should include a refutation of *pariṇāmavāda* (cf. note 142).

[810]We have not found this in a Vedic source, but for other places where it is cited, see the apparatus to the edition.

[811]The sentence allows for different interpretations. The idea could be that although insentient matter may emerge again from *brahman*, that which is dissolved into his blissful nature cannot. Or it could be that even though individual souls may emerge subsequently in gross forms, they cannot be the same individual souls that merged into *brahman*; once merged, they have disappeared forever. Or it could be, as suggested by Prof. MANI DRAVIDA, that once a soul has merged into *brahman* it can never lose its blissful nature, and therefore, even if it is reborn again, there is no further bondage in *saṃsāra* and thus no fault.

Whatever is precisely intended, it is clear that this position (1) accepts *parāvṛtti*, i.e. accepts that *brahman*, being a material cause, will never cease from cyclical emission and resorption of evolutes, that being its nature, but (2) denies that this implies the risk of

states:

> 50) There is certainly (*hi*) no bliss that is pure consciousness, that truly exists (*vastusatyam*) in that (viz. in *brahman* envisaged as a material cause). Material causes, such as threads, O learned men, are not seen to be of such a kind.

[Siddhāntin:] O ***learned men*** (*paṇḍitāḥ = sūrayaḥ*), there is ultimately no consciousness ***in that***, [i.e.] in *brahman*, because it is a material cause, just like the material causes of cloth and such like, [i.e.] threads etc.[812]

[Vedāntin:] How then [do you account for] these revealed statements?[813] [Sadyojyotiḥ] states:

> 51abc') It is certainly (*hi*) possible [to say] that[814] of it (i.e. of *brahman*) metaphorically (*guṇataḥ*) when it has become a world (*bhuvana*);[815]

[Siddhāntin:] ***That***, [i.e.] having consciousness as one's nature, is spoken of [in Vedic scripture] ***metaphorically*** (*guṇataḥ = upacārataḥ*), not literally, ***of it***, [i.e.] of *brahman*, when it has transformed for the sake of [providing] worlds, [i.e.] as a provider of experience, because it is linked to the consciousness of the experiencers located in the world, just as [the expression] 'the beds are crying' [can be used metaphorically because the beds are linked to the consciousness of the children in them].[816] The point is that

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re-entering *saṃsāra*, i.e. the possibility of liberation being merely transitory.

[812]What needs to be rejected, in order to overcome the Vedāntin position that Rāmakaṇṭha outlined before the verse, is that *brahman* has a blissful nature, yet what he rejects is that it has consciousness; he assumes that if it lacks consciousness it cannot have a blissful nature.

[813]I.e. those that attest to *brahman*'s nature being bliss and consciousness: *ānandaṃ brahmaṇo rūpam* has already been mentioned, and *vijñānaṃ brahmaṇo rūpam* will be mentioned after the verse.

[814]'That' = that it has consciousness as its nature.

[815]Literally, 'when it has entered into the state of being a world'.

[816]The Vedāntins would not speak of *brahman* as transforming into *bhuvanas* in order to provide the opportunity of experience (*bhoga*); nor would they justify the attribution of consciousness to *brahman* on the grounds that it is the (material cause of the) locus of experiencers. Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha are taking the Vedāntin, when he speaks of *brahman* as the material cause of the universe, to be speaking of that which the Saiddhāntikas take to be the material cause of the universe, namely *māyā*.

scriptural passages such as 'Consciousness is the nature of *brahman*' are to be explained as metaphorical usage.[817]

> 51c'd) [for] the experiencers who reside in that [world] have [consciousness] in a primary sense.

It is ***experiencers***, [i.e.] selves, who reside ***in that***, [i.e.] in that world—not *brahman*—who have this [consciousness] in a primary sense.[818]

[Vedāntin:] In that case let our liberation be the attaining of[819] a world of that kind (i.e. one evolved from *brahman*).[820] [In answer to] this, he states:

> 52) A world is destructible;[821] owing to its destruction, the experiencers in it[822] will also be [destroyed], because we see [that to be the case].[823] Therefore this is not a lasting destination.

Owing to the destruction of a world we find that the experiencers [in it] are [also] destroyed. So this too[824] is not a lasting liberation.

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[817]We do not know the source of the quotation, which is also cited in Sucaritamiśra's commentary on the *Ślokavārttika*, ad *śūnyavāda* 70 (p.130). If it is a paraphrase rather than a quotation, it could be based on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat* 3.9.28: *vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma*.

[818]We take it that *etat* refers to the same thing as is referred to by *tat* in the verse and the first sentence of the commentary, namely *vijñānarūpatvam*. And we understand *mukhyalakṣaṇam* in the verse and *mukhyarūpam* in the commentary as *bahuvrīhis*.

[819]I.e. being born in.

[820]It seems extremely unlikely that a Vedāntin would assert this; after all our own world is, for the transformationist Vedāntin, evolved from *brahman*.

[821]It is possible that *dṛṣṭatvāt* should be taken as giving a reason for this contention that worlds are destructible, either in the meaning of 'because it is visible', or 'because [that destruction] is seen [in scripture]'. But Rāmakaṇṭha seems to take it with what follows.

[822]We take *tat* in compound with *bhoktṝṇām*; but it could also be a nominative referring to *vināśitvam*.

[823]I.e. we see that when a location is destroyed, the things in that location are also destroyed.

[824]In addition to a liberation consisting of dissolution into *brahman*. That would be impermanent because one would be reborn; a liberation consisting of being born into a world evolved from *brahman* would be impermanent because one would cease to exist when the world ceased.

3.16 Isolation: verses 53–56

So having rejected the view [that liberation consists] of resorption into the Supreme Self in the section that has just ended (*iyatā*),[825] he now rejects [the view of] liberation as Isolation (*kaivalyamokṣam*).

3.16.1 Those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system have not had all of their karma destroyed

3.16.1.1 They still have karma to be experienced above *guṇatattva*

53) And the Isolation [as liberation] of the Sāṅkhyas is certainly indefensible, because there is no destruction of their karma that is to be experienced above the principle of *guṇa*, in as much as it has not been experienced.[826]

That ***Isolation of the Sāṅkhyas***, that consists in the cessation of the state of being an experiencer, [coming about] at liberation from the destruction of karma, is indefensible. He says why: ***because there is no destruction.*** [Those words are to be] construed with ***of the karma that is to be experienced above the principle of guṇa.*** ['Because there is no destruction of the karma that is to be experienced above the principle of *guṇa*' means:] Because (*yataḥ*) even if the state of being an experiencer [of karma] in *guṇa*[*tattva*] [and below] ceases for those liberated in the Sāṅkhya [system], karmas in the region of *tattvas* such as *rāga* and *vidyā* that are not recognised by the Sāṅkhyas, above *guṇatattva*, are not destroyed,[827] so the

[825] On *tad iyatā*, literally 'so ... with this much', see note 79.

[826] The commentary glosses *upalabdhiḥ* with *bhogaḥ*.

This verse is cited in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (A p. 147, B p. 80, C p. 29) *tad uktaṃ paramokṣanirāsakārikāsu*: *guṇatattvordhvabhogyasya karmaṇo 'nupalabdhitaḥ | kaivalyam api sāṅkhyānāṃ naiva yuktam asaṃkṣayāt* ‖.

[827] As explained by GOODALL (1998: li–lv), the Saiddhāntikas inherited from the Sāṅkhyas their scheme of twenty-five *tattvas*, but modified it in two ways: by adding more *tattvas* above, and by identifying the *tattvas* with a hierarchy of worlds through which the soul ascends on its way to liberation. As is made clear by the present argument, ascent requires that the soul use up its karma in each of the levels of the universe in turn.

The order and number of these *tattvas* becomes fixed only at a late stage in the post-scriptural Śaiva Siddhānta of the commentators. Above the twenty-five Sāṅkhya principles come five known as the *kañcukas* (*niyati*, *kāla*, *rāga*, *vidyā*, *kalā*), followed by *māyā*, out of which this whole so-called 'impure universe' (*aśuddhādhvan*) evolves. Above that are the five *tattvas* of the pure universe (*śuddhādhvan*), namely *śuddhavidyā*, *īśvara*, *sadāśiva*,

state of being an experiencer of them[828] certainly does not cease.[829] He says why those past actions are not destroyed then:[830] ***because*** **[*they*] *are not perceived.*** [By] 'perception' is [meant] 'experience'. As has been taught [in scripture],[831] 'The soul's perception (*vedanā*) is its experience (*bhoga*).' The absence of [experience] (*tadabhāvaḥ*) is [what is referred to in the verse as] non-perception (*anupalabdhiḥ*). [The *-tas* suffix in the verse's *anupalabdhitaḥ* means] because of that.[832] The purport [of *anupalabdhitaḥ*] is (*ity*

śakti, *śiva*.

Guṇatattva, mentioned in this sentence, was regarded by some Saiddhāntika scriptures as a separate *tattva* from that of *prakṛti* (also referred to therein as *avyakta* and *pradhāna*), which comes one above it. These scriptures can be subdivided into those (e.g. *Parākhyatantra*, *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha*) that accepted, above this, *puruṣa*, regarded as the principle of the bound soul, and those (e.g. the *Kiraṇatantra*) that teach *prakṛti* and *guṇa* as separate *tattvas*, but seem to accept no *puruṣatattva* (see GOODALL 1998: li–lv).

What is Sadyojyotiḥ's position? One of the scriptures on which he comments, the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha*, does not include a *guṇatattva* in its cosmography (see 4:42; the last verse of the work on which he comments is 4:7, so we do not have his own prose commentary on this verse); but the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* teaches *guṇa*, *avyakta*, and *puruṣa* as separate. We would thus expect Sadyojyotiḥ to do the same in the various parts of his *Rauravavṛtti*, including the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*. That he does is suggested by his mention of *guṇatattva* in this verse and in *Bhogakārikā* 115. Also in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣā*, e.g. 1:69, Sadyojyotiḥ mentions *guṇa* and *prakṛti* as separate *tattvas*. Furthermore, Sadyojyotiḥ also speaks of *guṇa* as a *tattva* in *Tattvasaṅgraha* 9–10 (FILLIOZAT's numeration), even though that text is supposed to follow the ontology of the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha*.

Rāmakaṇṭha follows whatever position is maintained by the text he is commenting on. Thus when commenting on this verse of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, he names *guṇa* and *pradhāna* as separate principles; his commentary on *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 3:80 assumes *guṇa*, *prakṛti*, and *puruṣa* to be three separate *tattvas* (he cites a scriptural verse that holds such a position); as does his *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* (see GOODALL 1998: xxii–xxiv).

[828] I.e. of the undestroyed karmas. Alternatively, in order to make this compound consistent with the word *guṇabhoktṛtvam*, which occurs both earlier in this sentence and later in the passage, we could understand it as *rāgavidyādibhoktṛtvam*, 'the state of being an experiencer [of karmas] in *rāga*, *vidyā* etc.' The sense is the same either way.

[829] This is not a complete sentence, containing a hanging 'because' (*yataḥ*), since it is just elaborating *guṇatattvordhvabhogasya karmaṇo 'saṅkṣayāt*. The function of the 'because' in the wider argument is to give a reason for why the Sāṅkhya's Isolation is indefensible: because *bhoktṛtva* does not cease for them, despite the fact that, as mentioned in the first sentence of the commentary, their Isolation is claimed to be of the nature of the cessation of *bhoktṛtva*.

[830] I.e. at the time of Sāṅkhya 'liberation'.

[831] *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 1:12a.

[832] It is unlikely that Sadyojyotiḥ intended the verse in the way that Rāmakaṇṭha interprets it. Sadyojyotiḥ's *anupalabdhitaḥ* is likely to have meant 'because [the Sāṅkhyas]

arthaḥ): because (*yataḥ*), it being the case that (*iti*) karmas whose loci are *tattvas* ranged above [*guṇatattva*] need to be experienced in due order,[833]

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do not perceive / recognise [the existence of karma in *tattvas* above *guṇa*]'. This makes the verse less circular than Rāmakaṇṭha's interpretation that karma has not yet been destroyed because it has not yet been experienced. Perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha thought that the more obvious interpretation left the verse open to the objection that in order to consume one's past karma it is not necessary to perceive it or to recognise its existence.

Rāmakaṇṭha's father, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, cites this verse of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* in the *Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *vidyāpāda* 2:15ab:

... kalādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ pṛthak pṛthag upalabhyamānaprayojanānāṃ kāraṇabhūtasya jagannidhibhūtasya māyātmano 'navagamāt. uktaṃ ca kvacit—

guṇatattvordhvabhogyasya karmaṇo 'nupalabdhitaḥ |
kaivalyam api sāṅkhyānāṃ naiva yuktam asaṅkṣayāt ||

'[They wrongly hold *prakṛti* to be the highest cause] because they do not accept that which is of the nature of *māyā*, which is the store-house of the universe and a cause of the *tattvas* beginning with *kalā*, whose purposes can be perceived to be distinct from each other. And it has been taught somewhere: ....'

His use of *anavagamāt* ('because they do not accept / know') immediately before the verse could perhaps be taken as evidence that he was understanding *anupalabdhitaḥ* not as Rāmakaṇṭha inteprets it, but as we suggest Sadyojyotiḥ to have intended it.

Having cited this verse of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha argues as follows. Since the Sāṅkhyas' *prakṛti* is not different from the *guṇas* for them, it must be plural (*aneka*). But whatever is both plural and insentient is dependent on a further cause. Hence *prakṛti* cannot be the highest cause.

This argument had already been put by Sadyojyotiḥ at *Bhogakārikā* 88c–89b. See also *Bhogakārikā* 18, *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 1:70 and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary ad loc., where the point is made that this is originally a Sāṅkhya argument used to prove that the *buddhi* and the other principles below all depend on a further cause, namely the *guṇas*. The Śaivas re-apply the same *hetu* to the *guṇas* to show that they depend on a further cause (*avyakta*), then again to this further cause etc., until they arrive at the position that all of the *tattvas* from *avyakta* to *kalā* depend on a further cause, namely *māyā*.

If this argument is capable of establishing that *avyakta* depends on a further (material) cause, why does it not lead to the unwanted consequence that *māyā* depends on a further (material) cause? Rāmakaṇṭha seems to have been aware of this problem, for he describes the *tattvas* from *avyakta* to *kalā* as different in each person (*pratipuruṣaṃ bhinnānām Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:70). The point of this qualification is presumably to imply that *anekatva* is a characteristic of these *tattvas*, making the argument applicable to them, but not a characteristic of *māyā*.

[833]What does it mean to have as yet unexperienced karma located in a certain *tattva*? Is this karma the result of past actions performed in that *tattva*? No, it results from actions performed here in *pṛthivītattva*; for an account of which kinds of actions here on earth have effects that must be enjoyed at which levels of the universe, see *Mṛgendratantra*, *kriyāpāda* 8:76–79 and Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's commentary ad loc. Actions are there said to be of five kinds (see the commentary to 8:76, and 8:78 of the Tantra itself), *laukika*, *vaidika*,

they have not yet (*tāvat*) been experienced by those [liberated according to the Sāṅkhyas].[834]

[Objection:] But since 'The fire that is knowledge reduces all karmas to ash',[835] how can those [karmas] be said not to be destroyed by the knowledge of the Sāṅkhyas?

[Response:] The knowledge of the Sāṅkhyas has as its only fruit the discernment of the difference between the *guṇas* and the soul, so what chance is there of the destruction of karmas above that?[836]

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adhyātmika, *atimārga* and *śaiva*, each kind bearing fruit at a higher level of the universe than the previous.

[834]This is an extended 'because' clause, not a complete sentence, since it is simply padding out the word *anupalabdhitaḥ*; the function of the 'because' in the wider argument is to give a reason for why these karmas are not destroyed.

Since this is now the end of the close analysis of the verse, it is possible that *ity arthaḥ* refers not just to this sentence, but to the whole of the commentary up to this point.

[835]*Mahābhārata* 6.26:37ab (*Bhagavadgītā*).

[836]Since Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha are accepting a *prakṛtitattva* above *guṇatattva* and below *puruṣatattva* (see note 827), and since the liberation of the Sāṅkhyas consists in discerning the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, why are Sāṅkhyas said here to discern the difference only between the *guṇas* and the soul, not *prakṛti* and the soul?

(1) Since *prakṛti* is of the very nature of the three *guṇas* for Sāṅkhya, and so is in no sense different from them (as Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha argues immediately after citing this verse; see note 832), the idea may be that the *prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhyas is no different from the *guṇatattva* of the Śaivas.

(2) *Yogasūtra* 3:35, which was used to elucidate the Sāṅkhya position in the commentary to verse 2a, identifies the non-discernment characteristic of *saṃsāra* as being a failure to distinguish between the soul and *sattva*, i.e. between the soul and one of the *guṇas*.

(3) That the Sāṅkhyas are incapable of liberating themselves from anything above *guṇatattva* is stated in Saiddhāntika scripture, so Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha may be being guided here by that. See for example *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* ad 3:80:

> *yac chrūyate*:
> '*buddhitattve sthitā bauddhā guṇeṣu tv ārhatāḥ sthitāḥ* |
> *guṇamūrdhni sthitāḥ sāṅkhyā avyakte pāñcarātrikāḥ* ‖
> *sthitā vedavidaḥ puṃsi*.'

'As is stated in scripture: "The Buddhists remain in *buddhitattva*, while the Jains remain in the *guṇas*. The Sāṅkhyas remain at the top of *guṇa*[*tattva*], the Pāñcarātrikas in *prakṛti* (*avyakte*). Those learned in the Vedas remain in *puruṣa*[*tattva*] (*puṃsi*)".' The original source of this frequently cited verse seems to be lost; the *Sarvajñānottara* contains similar statements (see note 235), but this precise verse does not occur in any of the surving Saiddhāntika scriptures. Some of the places where it, or part of it, is cited are: *Mṛgendra-vṛttidīpikā* (ad *vidyāpāda* 2:11), *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (A p.149, B p.82, C p.30) and *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* (first half only, ad 148c–150b).

[Objection:] Surely by the cessation of the *guṇas* alone, the faculties headed by the intellect (*buddhyādikaraṇānām*) will also cease, so how could there be experience of [past actions] (*teṣām*)[837] without faculties [in levels of the universe above *guṇatattva*]?

[Response:] But the activity of the *guṇas* is not what causes selves to become connected with faculties, rather it is past actions, on condition that [the self] has Impurity.

As has been taught [in the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha*]:[838]

From past action come bodies, sense objects, and sense faculties.

Now (*ca...tāvat*) the past actions in question exist for those ['liberated' in the Sāṅkhya system], so (*iti*) their faculties too cannot have ceased.[839]

[837]Or *teṣām* = *sāṅkhyamuktānām*.

[838]1:13ab.

[839]How can such a soul have faculties despite not having any of the constituents of the universe from *guṇa* down? Surely his faculties cannot be the sense faculties (*buddhīndriya*), the faculties of action (*karmendriya*), the *manas*, *ahaṅkāra* and the *buddhi*? Our early scriptural and commentarial literature is not very clear on this point. The old notion of a *puryaṣṭaka*, a subtle transmigratory body made out of the five *tanmātras* with *manas*, *ahaṅkāra* and the *buddhi*, is attested in *Sārdhatriśatikālottara* 17:4–5. But this was updated by Sadyojyotiḥ, who teaches a transmigratory body composed of all the *tattvas* derived from *māyā* in *Tattvasaṅgraha* 26c–27b (ed. FILLIOZAT):

vasudhādyas tattvagaṇaḥ pratipuṃniyataḥ kalānto 'yam ||
paryaṭati karmavaśato bhuvanajadeheṣv ayaṃ ca sarveṣu |

'This group of *tattvas* beginning with earth and ending with *kalātattva* is assigned to each soul [in the form of a subtle body]. And this transmigrates, in accordance with the retributive force of past actions, in all bodies born in [all the various] worlds.' (This view is reproduced in *vidyāpāda* 12:32c–33b of the *Mṛgendratantra*.) For some reason (which, as GENGNAGEL remarks [1995: 105–106, note 95], merits further investigation), Rāmakaṇṭha further revises the doctrine in his *Sārdhatriśatikālottaravṛtti* ad 17:4–5 by adding *māyā* and *śuddhavidyā*, the latter taking the form of *vāk*.

We may note that Sadyojyotiḥ's formulation implies, but does not make explicit, that this subtle body moved through all the various worlds beneath *māyā*. Commentarial attention, however, has focussed on the composition of the subtle body, and no old discussion on the above-mentioned passages seems to talk about whether the subtle body can move into levels of the universe that are higher than those made of the lowest entity among the body's components. Does the subtle body shed the lowest elements as it moves up the universe? If so, this might account for Rāmakaṇṭha wishing to include *śuddhavidyā*, since bodies in the pure universe (*śuddhādhvan*) are held to be made of (various forms of) this subtle sonic matter. The implication of *Tattvaprakāśa* 11, however, is that the subtle body

Therefore, since [their] condition of being an experiencer in the [*tattvas* above *guṇa*] still remains, this is a merely imaginary Isolation (*śaṅkākevalatā*).[840]

[Objection:] What then is it that ceases for them as a result of their realisation of Sāṅkhya [teaching]?

[Response:] What else should there be that is caused to cease? There is only cessation of the condition of being an experiencer [up to the level] of *guṇa*.

3.16.1.2 Sāṅkhya response: all karma produces just one life At this point the opponent, by [following] the view of particular Sāṅkhyas, shows how all of the karma of those [liberated in the Sāṅkhya system] can be destroyed through experience.

54a) All karmic action produces a single birth.

The collection of good and bad ***karmic action*** performed in this world between birth and death, ***all*** lumped together (*sammūrchitam*),[841] existing

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is immutably attached to one soul from the end of one period of cosmic resorption (*pralaya*) to the beginning of the next, for that verse states that *pralayākalas* whose bonds of karma and *mala* are not yet ripe are attached (at the beginning of a new phase of creation) to subtle bodies and then born in all their various births (*puryaṣṭakadehayutā yoniṣu nikhilāsu karmavaśāt*, *Tattvaprakāśa* 11cd). This implication is not drawn out by Aghoraśiva, but the probably later commentator Śrīkumāra, who, unlike Aghoraśiva, does not attempt closely to follow Rāmakaṇṭha's theology, does make this explicit at the top of his introduction to *Tattvaprakāśa* 14 (p. 31): *tatra puryaṣṭakaṃ nāma pratipuruṣaṃ niyataḥ sargād ārabhya kalpāntaṃ mokṣāntaṃ vāvasthitaḥ pṛthivyādikalāntatriṃśattattvātmako 'sādhāraṇarūpaḥ sūkṣmadehaḥ.* 'Here what is called the *puryaṣṭaka* refers to the subtle body composed of the thirty *tattvas* from earth to *kalātattva* that is distinct for each soul and that endures from creation up to the end of the *kalpa* or until liberation.'

So our answer is equivocal: if what Śrīkumāra supposes was really what Sadyojyotiḥ and his school intended, then the whole subtle body presumably accompanied the soul up to and beyond *guṇatattva*; if not, perhaps it accompanied the soul but shed its lower elements as it moved up through the cosmos.

[840]We have supposed that *śaṅkākevalatā* is parallel to, if not actually calqued upon, the expression *śaṅkāviṣa*, 'imagined poison', which might take effect, for instance, 'when someone is bitten at night by a harmless snake and believes so strongly that they have been envenomed that they actually exhibit symptoms of envenomation'. Thus SLOUBER (2012: 32), commenting on the term when it appears in *cikitsāsthāna* 6.23:221ff in the *Carakasaṃhitā*. (It is also mentioned in MEULENBELD's summary of the chapter (1999, volume 1A, p. 70).) The term occurs in this sense in non-medical literature too, for instance in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. 2, p. 475), where Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is nonetheless plainly referring to medical literature.

[841]We have emended *samucchritam* to *sammūrchitam* on the evidence of the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* and *Yogabhāṣya* parallel passages (see note 844).

in a [hierarchical] relation of primary and subsidiary,[842] produces ***a single birth*** only, in just one moment, when it becomes manifested[843] by death.[844]

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[842] *Pradhānopasarjanabhāvenāvasthitam* reflects *pradhānopasarjanabhāvenāvasthitaḥ* in the *Yogabhāṣya* passage given below. See also in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, in the course of the parallel passage given below in footnote 863: *tato na sarveṣāṃ pradhānopasarjanabhāvenaikajanmakaraṇakalpanopapadyate.* 'Therefore it is not possible to postulate that all [action] produces a single birth by being related as principal and subsidiary.' This is the conclusion of Rāmakaṇṭha's own position, namely that actions with contradictory fruits, such as heaven and hell, simply cannot be hierarchised as stronger and weaker in such a way as to enable them to give their fruits in a single life.

[843] Becoming manifested here means changing from a latent state to one in which it is able to give its result.

[844] See the following parallel passage from the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 3:89, p. 213: *etajjanmaprāyaṇa-*[*-prāyaṇa-* conj.; *-prayāṇa-* E_K]*-madhyakṛtaṃ sarvam eva śubhāśubhaṃ karma pradhānopasarjanabhāvena saṃmūrchitaṃ yugapad ekam eva janma kariṣyatīty evam anekabhavabhogyānāṃ karmaṇām asambhavakalpanayā na proktadoṣo 'tra bhaviṣyatīti.*

'[Opponent:] All good and bad karma, produced in between this birth and death, being lumped together in a relation of predominant and subsidiary [between the various individual karmas] will produce in one moment just one [future] life. Thus because one cannot postulate karmas to be experienced in a plurality of [future] lives, the above-stated fault will not occur in this [position of ours].'

Rāmakaṇṭha is clearly basing himself both there and in our text on the following sentence in the *Yogabhāṣya* ad 2:13: *tasmāj janmaprāyaṇāntare kṛtaḥ puṇyāpuṇyakarmāśayapracayo vicitraḥ pradhānopasarjanabhāvenāvasthitaḥ prāyaṇābhivyakta ekapraghaṭṭakena maraṇaṃ prasādhya sammūrcchita ekam eva janma karoti.*

Our translation of *prāyaṇābhivyaktaḥ* in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* sentence as 'manifested by death' accords with the way the compound in the *Yogabhāṣya* is interpreted by the *Tattvavaiśāradī*, the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* and the *Bhāsvatī*. The *Yogavārttika* however takes *prāyaṇa-* as *maraṇakāle.* An instrumental *tatpuruṣa* interpretation is perhaps suggested by the following sentence later in the *Yogabhāṣya*'s commentary to the same *sūtra*: *adṛṣṭajanmavedanīyasyaiva niyatavipākasya karmanaḥ samānaṃ maraṇam abhivyaktikāraṇam uktam*, 'Death is taught to be the common cause of manifestation of that karma which is to be experienced in an unseen life and whose maturation is fixed'.

A puzzling feature of the *Yogabhāṣya* sentence that Rāmakaṇṭha draws on is that karma seems to be claimed both to bring about death (see *maraṇaṃ prasādhya*), yet also to require death as its manifestor. Another awkwardness resulting from the inclusion of the words *maraṇaṃ prasādhya* is that they come in between *ekapraghaṭṭakena* and *sammūrcchita* which construe well together: 'congealed in one lump'. *Maraṇaṃ prasādhya* is not reflected in any of the following three sub-commentaries, the *Vivaraṇa*, the *Tattvavaiśāradī* and the *Bhāsvatī*, nor in Rāmakaṇṭha's two sentences—that in our text and that in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*. So it may be a secondary insertion. The words *maraṇaṃ prasādhya* do appear, however, in the *Yogavārttika*'s commentary on this sentence—but they are not glossed, so it is conceivable that they entered the transmission of the *Yogabhāṣya*

It does not however get left over (*avaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati*), [i.e.] wait (*pratipālayati*),[845] in order to give fruit in another birth. Since karma is of the nature of action (*kriyā*), it is not possible for there to be [karma] whose fruit has not begun to take effect[846]—so say those who hold that action produces only one life (*ekabhavikakarmavādinaḥ*).[847]

And therefore all of their[848] previous karma is inferred to be destroyed by their present birth alone; and the destruction of [their] new karma is brought about by knowledge and such like.[849] So how could karma that is to be experienced above [*guṇatattva*] exist [for those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system]?[850]

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from there.

[845]The phrase *avaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati pratipālayati* would be quite natural if *avaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati* occurred in the verse under comment and were being glossed, but since that is not the case it is a little surprising.

[846]The implication seems to be that karma, being a process, cannot wait or remain latent, but must begin to unfold and bring its fruit into being as soon as it is performed. It is not clear how the Ekabhavikakarmavādin accounts for the time-gap between the performance of action and death, when that action's karma becomes manifest and produces its fruit.

[847]The *Yogabhāṣya* (ad 2:13) gives four possible positions before refuting the first three: (1) A single action gives rise to one birth; (2) A single action gives rise to many births; (3) Many actions give rise to many births; (4) Many actions give rise to one birth. The fourth of these, the *siddhānta*, which is then expounded beginning with the sentence given above (note 844), is summarised as: *ekabhavikaḥ karmāśayaḥ*, 'the repository of karma produces only one life'.

Depending on whether one reads *aikabhavika* or *ekabhavika* (the commentaries on the *Yogabhāṣya* reflect uncertainty in the transmission on this point), the suffix could express 'existing in' (governed by *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.3.53, *tatra bhavaḥ*) or 'possessing' (governed by *anuvṛtti* of part of 5.2.94, *tad asyāstīty asmin iti matup*). But the intended sense of *ekabhavikakarmavāda* seems to be 'the view that [all] karma has one life [for its result]'. This accords with, for example: (1) the way that the view is summarised (in the *Yogabhāṣya* and in this text) as that karma '*ekam eva janma karoti*'; (2) the rejection of the view in this text with the words *ekajanmakaraṇāsambhavāt*; (3) the rejection of the view in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* with the words *na ... ekajanmakaraṇakalpanopapadyate* (see note 863).

[848]I.e. those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system.

[849]'And such like' probably refers to Yoga: see, in the exposition of the Sāṅkhya position (section 2.1), *ātmajñānād yogād vā*.

[850]All actions that the Sāṅkhya may have performed in previous lives, including those that have fruits in the *tattvas* above *guṇa*, will have been exhausted by the time of the present birth. *Ekabhavikakarmavāda* is thus of help to the opponent to that extent. But how about those actions performed in the present life that have fruits in the *tattvas* above *guṇa*? Sāṅkhya knowledge will not touch those, as it is only capable of burning karma up

3.16.1.3 No: karma produces more than one future life [Sadyojyotiḥ] refutes this:

54b') No.

There is no such restriction;[851] it is rather the case that there exist also some actions that produce second and further births.

He explains why:

54b') Because scripture testifies that [karmas] are resorbed into the material cause.

Because it is stated in scripture [in the following verse] that karmas are ***resorbed into the material cause***, [i.e.] persist in the form of traces in *prakṛti*:[852]

All karma resides as traces in *prakṛti*,[853] then, once the time is reached for its ripening, it again produces experience for us.[854]

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to *guṇatattva*. Thus *ekabhavikakarmavāda* seems ultimately unable to rescue the Sāṅkhya from the problem the Siddhāntin has put to him.

Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha do not argue along these lines in their response however. They focus exclusively on refuting *ekabhavikakarmavāda*.

[851]I.e. there is no such rule determining that all karma produces only one life. The word *niyama* here refers to the way that the Ekabhavikakarmavādin maintained *tat sarvam ... ekam eva janma karoti*. In the source passage (*Yogabhāṣya* ad 2:13), *niyama* and *niyata* are similarly used to refer to rules governing the way in which karmic actions give rise to their fruits: see *phalakramāniyamāt*, *niyatavipākaḥ* and *aniyatavipākaḥ*.

[852]We have not been able to trace the source of the following verse. Its form is uncertain, being garbled in all witnesses. The editions print it as prose; the readings of some witnesses are unmetrical.

[853]Saiddhāntikas frequently assert (against the Naiyāyikas for example) that *saṃskāras* are located not in the *ātman* but in *prakṛti*, specifically in the *buddhi*: see *Tattvaprakāśa* 39 and Aghoraśiva ad loc., *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 2:30c–32b, *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 3:8 and 6:21, *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad 17:2, and Rāmakaṇṭha's remark after the next half-verse of this text that all action leaves a trace in *prakṛti*.

One might wonder how the Saiddhāntikas explain that a soul continues to be subject to karma after it has ascended above *prakṛtitattva*, given that karma is stored in *prakṛti*. The answer is probably that at higher levels it gets stored in *māyā*: for a scriptural statement that karma is stored in *māyā* at a time of *pralaya*, see *Mṛgendra vidyāpāda* 8:5.

[854]Two points need to be considered here. How does this response of the Siddhāntin refute *ekabhavikakarmavāda*? Is Rāmakaṇṭha interpreting Sadyojyotiḥ's response correctly?

Regarding the first question, one possibility is that the Siddhāntin is responding specifically to the question that ended the Ekabhavikakarmavādin's speech: 'So how could karma

[Sadyojyotiḥ] says that it is not only in this system that such[855] karma[856] is scripturally supported, but in the Veda too.[857]

54cd) [Actions] which have as their fruit being born as Indra and such like are taught in the Veda too; they [produce births] separately from each other.

Being born as Indra is the meaning of 'sovereignty over heaven' in [the Vedic injunction] 'He who desires sovereignty over heaven should sacrifice with the Vājapeya'.[858] The [sacrificial] action which has that ***as its fruit***—[and, as indicated] by the use of ***and such like*** (*ādigrahaṇāt*) [in the verse], the Jyotiṣṭoma and other [meritorious actions] (*jyotiṣṭomādi*),[859]

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that is to be experienced above [*guṇatattva*] exist [for those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system]?' The response asserts that such karma exists because it is dissolved into *prakṛti*; it remains there because Sāṅkhya knowledge is only capable of burning karma up to the level of *guṇa*. But this is not the way that Rāmakaṇṭha interprets the verse, because the scripture he cites makes no mention of the karma of those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system. Neither does Sadyojyotiḥ seem to intend this meaning, for two reasons: (1) He says that dissolution into (the *tattva* of?) the material cause is attested in scripture. While it is the case that there were Śaiva scriptural passages to the effect that those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system reach only *guṇatattva* (see note 836), we find it unlikely that there was a Śaiva scriptural passage making such a specific assertion as that the karma of those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system remains dissolved into the material cause (whether what is meant by that is *pradhānatattva* or *māyātattva*). (2) This *pāda* of his verse follows a *pāda* claiming that all karma produces one life, so it is most likely responding to that.

We take it that both Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha are talking here not specifically about the karma of those liberated in the Sāṅkhya system, but about karma in general. Sadyojyotiḥ's statement is too brief for us to be certain about his intention. But Rāmakaṇṭha seems to be responding specifically to two parts of the opponent's argument: that karma gives its fruit at death and cannot wait longer than that (*na pratipālayati*); that karma is of the nature of action (*kriyārūpa*) and hence starts to give its effect immediately. His response maintains, against the first, that karma rests in *prakṛti* and waits there until the time is ripe, whether that is the birth after next or subsequently (*dvitīyādijanma*). He implies, further, that karma is not always of the nature of action by stating that it is sometimes *saṃskārarūpa*.

[855] *Ex conj.*

[856] I.e. karma which refutes *ekabhavikakarmavāda*.

[857] On the construction *na kevalam X, yāvat Y api*, see note 408.

[858] We have not been able to locate the Vedic source of this quotation, but we note that it is quoted by other authors, for example by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (*Nyāyamañjarī*, volume 1, p. 687,5) as *śruti*.

[859] We have supplied this word, which occurs at this point of the sentence in the parallel passage in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (see note 863), since the reading of our sources

having heaven and other [meritorious rewards] as fruit, and the killing of a Brahmin and other forbidden [actions], having hell as fruit—are [all] taught in [Vedic] scripture.[860] The words [in the verse] *tat pṛthak pṛthag* (***those separately from each other***) are to be related [with the understood words] 'produce future lives'. [They produce future lives separately from each other] because [actions] whose fruits are mutually contradictory cannot produce a single birth at one time.[861] And actions [once performed] cannot be destroyed [before giving their fruit].[862] Thus it must necessarily be accepted that [some of] them (*tāni*) wait to give their fruits in lives after [the immediately following one]. Therefore the view that [all] karma produces one [future] life is quite impossible.[863]

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without it seems implausibly awkward, and the corruption could have been prompted by the presence of two contiguous words ending in *-ādi*.

[860] *Śrūyate* glosses *vede ... ucyate*; *indratvādiphalam* is taken up by the part of the sentence that runs from *tatphalam karma* to *narakaphalam ca*.

[861] A person who has killed a Brahmin and performed a Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice will clearly need more than one future life to experience the fruits of those actions: one in heaven and one in hell.

Could one of the two actions somehow be cancelled such that only one future life is required? He answers that question in the next sentence.

[862] *Na ca nāśo 'sti karmaṇaḥ* could be an even-numbered *pāda* of a verse.

[863] See *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 3:89 and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary ad loc.:

> *indratvādiphalaṃ veda ucyate tat pṛthak pṛthak |*
> *ājanmajanitebhyo 'pi naikaṃ janma bhavaty ataḥ ||*
>
> *vājapeyena svārājyakāmo yajeteti svārājyam indratvam eva, tatphalaṃ karma. ādigrahaṇāt svargādiphalaṃ jyotiṣṭomādi, brahmahatyādi ca narakaphalaṃ gṛhyate. tat pṛthak pṛthag janma karotīty adhyāhāraḥ, parasparānapekṣayaiva śruter viruddhaphalatvāc ca. tato na sarveṣāṃ pradhānopasarjanabhāvenaikajanmakaraṇakalpanopapadyate śrutivirodhād iti.*
>
> 3:89) In the Veda [actions] that have fruits such as being Indra are taught; those [actions produce future lives] separately from each other. Therefore even [just] from [actions] produced from birth onwards, there is not [just] one life [but many].

'It is being Indra (*indratvam eva*) that is the meaning of 'sovereignty over heaven' in the [Vedic injunction] 'He who desires sovereignty over heaven should sacrifice with the Vājapeya'. [*indratvādiphalam* means] action that has that as its fruit. From the mention of 'such as' (*ādi*), the Jyotiṣṭoma and other [meritorious actions], having heaven and other [meritorious rewards] as fruit, and the killing of a Brahmin and other [sinful actions], having hell as fruit, are understood. To the words [in the verse] *tat pṛthak pṛthak* ('those separately from each other') have to be added 'produce future lives'. [They produce future lives separately from each other] because we know from scripture that [actions] are not mutually dependent,* and they have contradictory fruits. Therefore it is not possible to postulate that, as a result of all [actions] being related as principal and subsidiary,* a

That has been taught [by Kumārila]:[864]

> If, on a certain occasion, not all those [relevant past actions] (*sarvaṃ tat*) bear fruit at that particular time (*tadaiva*),[865] then some other as yet unexperienced karma that is identified by scripture (*śāstrīyam*) [as having retributive force] must certainly be remaining.[866]

[Ekabhavikakarmavādin:] But we have stated that precisely that karma whose effects have not yet begun to take effect is impossible [and you have

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single birth is produced, because it is contradicted by scripture.'

* If they were 'mutually dependent', and if they could be 'related as principal and subsidiary' how precisely could contradictory fruits be experienced in one life? The *Yogabhāṣya* (ad 2:13) mentions three ways in which karmas can interact with each other: (1) One karma can destroy another one before the latter gives its fruit, as when a black (i.e. sinful) karma can be destroyed by a white (i.e. virtuous) one (*śuklakarmodayād ihaiva nāśaḥ kṛṣṇasya*). (2) A subordinate karma can merge into a predominant one (*pradhānakarmaṇy avāpagamanam*). Certain rites, for example the Jyotiṣṭoma, require one to kill animals. The sin (*pāpa*) arising from this killing will not give a separate fruit from the rite itself; rather the merit arising from the rite will be flavoured by this subordinate sin. (3) A subordinate action can remain for a long time suppressed by the predominant one, whose maturation is fixed (*niyatavipākapradhānakarmaṇābhibhūtasya vā ciram avasthānam*). The first two of these three could account for how contradictory fruits do not require more than one life to be experienced. The third is not such a good candidate, for there the subordinate action is only temporarily suppressed, but must at some time give its result.

[864] *Ślokavārttika citrākṣepaparihāra* 26cd.

[865] We are following E_V's (silent) emendation of *tad eva* to *tadaiva*, which is the reading of the *Ślokavārttika*. (The metre is *mālinī*.)

[866] The point is that there are some actions whose fruits one expects in the same life as that in which the actions were performed (Pārthasārathi's commentary on this verse gives the example of a ritual to produce rain), and their not arising means that some other previous action must be blocking the effect.

The *Nyāyamañjarī* cites this verse, introducing it with the words (vol. 1, p. 654,5–7): *yatra punaḥ aviguṇe 'pi karmaṇi prayujyamāne kālāntare 'pi putrapaśvādiphalaṃ na dṛśyate, tatra tīvraṃ kim api prāktanaṃ karma pratibandhakaṃ kalpanīyam.* 'But in cases where—a ritual action having been carried out without even a single defect—its fruit, such as a son or cattle, is not seen even after quite some time (*kālāntare 'pi*), then some powerful prior action must be postulated that is blocking [the fruit].'

Rāmakaṇṭha uses the verse here because it implies that the blocking action must have waited to give its fruit, and that the blocked action will now also have to wait. It also supports Rāmakaṇṭha's contention before the verse that karma cannot be destroyed: the blocked action is not cancelled but simply delayed.

ignored that point].[867]

[Siddhāntin:] But who says otherwise?[868] Rather all good and bad actions of a person must make a trace in *prakṛti* that is commensurate with their fruit, since that is what we experience in human undertakings such as agriculture too. As for that [trace, which is the effect], it is indeed begun by that [action] too.[869] But[870] this trace gives the result of its [action], like a deposit, to a soul at some time in a particular birth depending on its own degree of maturity—[which in turn] depends on the destruction of intensely powerful actions (*-karma-*) that block it, by experience of the fruits of [those actions], and sometimes on the destruction [of yet other karma] by experience in particular worlds—alone or together with a co-operating factor in the

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[867]The opponent made this point in the commentary to 54a, supporting it by claiming that karma is of the nature of an active process (*kriyārūpatvāt karmaṇo 'nārabdhakāryasyānupapattiḥ*).

This is not the first time in the text that after the opponent has stated his position and Rāmakaṇṭha has replied, the opponent simply repeats one of this earlier claims and follows this with *ity uktam*. See *ity uktam* in sections 3.1.1 and 3.11.5.3 (and *nanūktam ... iti* in section 3.4.1.1). It seems to be partly a device of Rāmakaṇṭha's to enable the reader to see exactly what part of the opponent's position the Siddhāntin is about to respond to.

[868]Literally, 'who states this [matter] in any other way?'

[869]It is not easy to give force to the *api*; we suggest that it may mean, 'by that kind of action which is usually considered to be *anārabdhakārya* as well as by that kind which is accepted to be *ārabdhakārya*'.

The main point of the sentence is that there is no action whose effect has not begun (*anārabdhakārya*), since its effect begins, in the form of a trace, immediately that the action is performed. The Siddhāntin gives the appearance of complete agreement with the Ekabhavikakarmavādin on this point. But although it may be true for both of them that there can be no karma whose effect has not begun to take effect, the relevant effect for the Siddhāntin is a trace, whereas the relevant effect for the Ekabhavikakarmavādin is the next life.

All karma gives its result at death for the Ekabhavikakarmavādin; whereas the Siddhāntin distinguishes between some that influences the next life and some that waits to give its effect until future lives. In this sentence the Siddhāntin lumps these two together as *ārabdhakāryakarma*, in the sense that all of their effects, i.e. their traces, begin from the time of the action. But as we shall see in the next sentence, there are factors which entail that some traces may have to wait many lifetimes for their maturation.

[870]It having been stated that there is no karma which does not start to give its effect immediately, the force of this 'but' is to introduce an explanation of why there is an apparent difference between karma that gives its fruit in the next life and karma that waits until lives after that.

form of the fruit of [some other] action that is not opposed to it.[871] Thus non-omniscient beings [such as ourselves] cannot determine the variety of [the manner and pace of] the maturation of actions, and so, because of the possibility of there being actions that give their fruit in other lives, those liberated according to the Sāṅkhyas have not attained [proper] Isolation (*akevalitaiva*), as has been said above.[872]

3.16.2 The Isolation of the *vijñānakevalin* is not the same as your Sāṅkhya Isolation

[Sāṅkhya:] Surely even your scriptures teach that the soul can become a *kevalin*[873] through the destruction of karma; how can that be?[874]

[Sadyojyotiḥ] states:

55) Isolation is possible of the bound soul in the world of Aṅguṣṭhamātra by the destruction of karma through knowledge,

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[871]Thus although a trace is *ārabdha* from the time of the action that produces it, its full maturity may not be reached until other obstructing karma gives its fruit, until lives in certain *bhuvana*s have been experienced, and until the maturity of other compatible fruits whose co-operation is needed for the production of its own fruit.

For another refutation of *ekabhavikakarmavāda*, see *Brahmasiddhi* p. 22,4–7: *naikabhavikaḥ karmāśayaḥ* ...

[872]See verse 53cd: *kaivalyam api sāṅkhyānāṃ naiva yuktam.*

Regarding the expression *uktavat*, see note 497.

[873]I.e. can achieve *kaivalya.*

[874]The Siddhāntin has just argued that the Sāṅkhya cannot achieve Isolation through destruction of karma, because there is always the possibility of more karma waiting to bear fruit in future lives or other *bhuvana*s. How is it then, asks the Sāṅkhya, that Saiddhāntika scripture teaches Isolation to be possible through destruction of karma?

The Sāṅkhya is here referring to the Śaiva view that certain souls, termed *vijñānakevalin*s, or *vijñānākala*s, have freed themselves from the bonds of karma and *māyā* and attained Isolation (though this is not the same as liberation for the Śaivas) as a result of their knowledge—knowledge capable of discriminating between the soul and *māyā*. See *karmakṣayāc ca vijñānakevalitaiva teṣām iti*, cited by Rāmakaṇṭha in the *Mokṣakārikāvṛtti* ad 69c–70b; SANDERSON (1986: 191); GOODALL (1998: 184, note 71); VASUDEVA (2004: 158ff); and BANSAT-BOUDON and TRIPATHI (2011: 332–333).

The category of the *vijñānakevalin*, which is so important in the post-scriptural Śaiva Siddhānta, seems to be taught in only two early scriptures, the Ur-*Pauṣkara* (see GOODALL 2004: xliii) and the *Mataṅgapārameśvara* (*yogapāda* 5:63). The latter refers to *jñānakevalin*s in a passage noticed recently by GOODALL (and therefore not mentioned in earlier publications), for which see *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa* III s.v. *pralayakevala.*

yoga, renunciation (*sannyāsa*) or consumption.[875]

['In the world of Aṅguṣṭhamātra' (*aṅguṣṭhamātrabhuvane*) means:] in the world of *kalā*, [i.e.] the place of residence of those having such names as Aṅguṣṭhamātra.[876] [*Vijñānayogasannyāsair bhogād vā* means:] ***through***

[875]The second half of the verse occurs in the (South Indian) *Pauṣkara* (2:51ab); GOODALL (1998: xlv, note 102) argues that the direction of borrowing is from this text to there.

The same half-verse is quoted by Rāmakaṇṭha together with another line in the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* ad 11ab: *vijñānayogasannyāsair bhogād vā karmaṇaḥ kṣayāt | vijñānakevalās tatra proktāḥ sambhavinas tataḥ ‖ iti.*

It seems then that either the verse cited in the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* borrowed the half-verse from this text, or that the verse in this text borrowed the half-verse from the text cited in the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* which could have been the very scripture referred to here by Rāmakaṇṭha with *yuṣmadāgame ... śrūyate*. Even if the former is the case, the verse cited in the *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* may still be a scripture, just one composed after, and drawing upon, Sadyojyotiḥ's œuvre.

Rāmakaṇṭha cites the half-verse alone (giving no indication as to whether he is citing it from the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* or from another text) in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 3:91cd. He explains there that when karma is destroyed through these four means, the soul becomes a *vijñānakevalin*, and is thus not liberated, since *vijñānakevalins* are still subject to the bond of *mala* and are still under the command of the Lord (*īśvaraprerya*) (see GOODALL et al. 2008: 358, note 67).

[876]Since those *vijñānakevalins* who have achieved the *kaivalya* spoken of in the verse have freed themselves not only from karma but also from *māyā*, we would expect them to be placed at the very top of *māyā*, i.e. of the impure universe. Indeed Rāmakaṇṭha places them there twice in the *Kiraṇavṛtti* (see *māyāprānte tanmastake tu vijñānakevalī* ad 1:15; and *māyordhvavartitvam api vijñānakevalinaḥ* ad 2:10).

One might expect Sadyojyotiḥ to have understood *aṅguṣṭhamātrabhuvana* to be located there, not only because of the evidence of this verse, but also because the two scriptures which he definitely knew both place it there: the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* (4:20–21) places Aṅguṣṭhamātra and seven other *mahādevas* above all the thirty *tattvas* that it teaches; the *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* (4:25) places the group of eight at the top of the impure universe in *māyātattva*.

Thus it might seem surprising that Rāmakaṇṭha should here place *aṅguṣṭhamātrabhuvana* as low as *kalātattva*. Indeed he himself seems to place it at the top of the impure universe in his *Tattvatrayanirṇayavivṛti* ad v. 1; he there mentions embodiments from Kālāgnibhuvana (at the bottom) to Aṅguṣṭhamātrabhuvana (at the top) as being regulated by karma. Could it be that he was reluctant to place it so high here given that the *Kiraṇatantra* (8:123–4), the *Sarvajñānottara* (9:109) and the *Mataṅgapārameśvara* (*vidyāpāda* 11:38) place it in *rāga*? But if he was being influenced by them, why not assign it to *rāga* rather than *kalā*? A possible solution is that his influence here is the *Mṛgendratantra* (*vidyāpāda* 13:151–2), for it places Aṅguṣṭhamātra in *kalātattva*, which it sees as enveloping *rāga* and *vidyā* (*rāgavidyāgarbhe kalāpade*). When Rāmakaṇṭha wrote *kalābhuvane* in

knowledge, whose content is the discrimination of the soul from Primal Matter, ***through yoga*** consisting in the conquest of the mind, effected by the [six] consituent parts [of *yoga*] beginning with withdrawal of the senses

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our text, he may have been influenced by his father's commentary on the just mentioned passage, which glosses *kalāpade* with *kalābhuvane*.

Now this placement may still seem odd given that *vijñānakevalin*s have freed themselves from the bonds of *māyā*; but *kalātattva* is, in this view, the very highest of the evolutes of matter, and so a world placed at the top of *kalātattva* must in fact be beyond material bondage. And indeed we find that Rāmakaṇṭha cites this verse of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* at *Sārdhatriśatikālottaravṛtti* ad 1:5cd, but with the reading *kalātattvordhvabhuvane* for *aṅguṣṭhamātrabhuvane* (see note 880), and so, whereas he here takes Aṅguṣṭhamātra to be located in *kalābhuvana*, if we read our passage together with that quotation, we may say that Rāmakaṇṭha seems implicitly to locate him above, or at the top of, *kalā*. Moreover, a remark in the *Kiraṇavṛtti* at the end of the commentary on 2:10 suggests that the exact positioning of the *vijñānakevalin* was not of great importance to Rāmakaṇṭha since, being without a subtle transmigratory body, a *vijñānakevalin* is all-pervading and so cannot literally be said to be located anywhere in particular (see GOODALL 1998: 234–5).

Although our verse refers only to the *bhuvana* of Aṅguṣṭhamātra, Rāmakaṇṭha talks of the abodes of Aṅguṣṭhamātra and others (*aṅguṣṭhamātrādisaṃjñakanivāsa-*). This is because Aṅguṣṭhamātra belongs, as we have seen, to a set of eight Rudras, called Maṇḍaleśāna (*Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha*) or Maṇḍalādhipatis (*Mṛgendratantra*), each of whom is the regent of a world situated in one of the cardinal or intermediate directions on that plane of the universe. Aṅguṣṭhamātra, however, is presented as their head in *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* 4:25–6:

> *tatrāṣṭau maṇḍaleśānāḥ kramaśaḥ pūrvataḥ sthitāḥ* |
> *teṣām Aṅguṣṭhamātro* (1) *'gre Bhuvaneśaḥ* (2) *sthitaḥ paraḥ* ‖ 25 ‖
> *Iśānaś* (3) *ca-Ekapiṅgaś* (4) *ca tatas tu-Udbhava* (5) *eva ca* |
> *Bhavaś* (6) *ca Vāmadevaś* (7) *ca Mahātejās* (8) *tataḥ paraḥ* ‖ 26 ‖
>
> There [in *māyātattva*] are situated the eight Maṇḍaleśānas, [namely,] in due order starting from the East, Aṅguṣṭhamātra at their head, Bhuvaneśa is the next [in the South East], then Iśāna, Ekapiṅga, Udbhava, Bhava, Vāmadeva, and after him Mahātejas.

Given that Aṅguṣṭhamātra may be referred to as a Maṇḍaleśāna, it is arguably confirmed by *Bhogakārikā* 116ab that Sadyojyotiḥ would have placed him in *kalātattva*, for that half-verse should probably be restored to read: *maṇḍalāni tu nāmāṣṭau kalātattve sthitāni tu*, which we might interpret to mean 'The eight [worlds] called Maṇḍalas are located in *kalātattva*'. (In place of *nāmāṣṭau*, E_V reads, nonsensically, *vāmāṣṭau*, but M^Y [f. 39r, line 5], after a small gap, has a cancelled *vā*, followed by *nāmaṣṭau*.) It is therefore probably this line of the *Bhogakārikā* that Rāmakaṇṭha chose to follow here.

For more on the location of Aṅguṣṭhamātra, see GOODALL et al. (2008: 341, note 18), the source of some of the information in this note.

(*pratyāhārādyaṅgopakṛtena*),[877] or[878] ***through renunciation*** of action in which all action is offered to the Lord[879] [with the words] 'All this is for the Lord', which results in discrimination [of the soul] from Primal Matter, ***or*** simply ***through consumption*** of the fruits of the [karma] (*tatphalaviṣayeṇa bhogenaiva vā*). There alone [i.e. at that level of the universe], as a result of the destruction of all actions [by one of these four means], Isolation which produces a complete cessation of the state of being an experiencer is possible, but not in your 'liberation'.[880]

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[877]That the first listed *aṅga* is *pratyāhāra* rather than *niyama* suggests six rather than eight *aṅgas*. For a discussion of the six *aṅgas* of Śaiva yoga, see VASUDEVA (2004: 367–436).

[878]This first of the two *vā*s explains the relationship between the three members of the *dvandva* in the verse; the second one is brought down from the verse, its function being to correlate *bhogāt* with the three members of the compound.

[879]We take *īśvarārpitasarvakarmaṇā* as agreeing with *sannyāsena*. It is also possible that the two instrumentals are *vyadhikaraṇa*: 'renunciation by one who has offered all action to the Lord'.

[880]Rāmakaṇṭha cites both this verse (with a different first *pāda*) and the verse before last in the *Sārdhatriśatikālottaravṛtti* ad 1:5cd, pp. 12,15–13,5:

tasmin vidite, paramā muktiḥ, tadānīṃ malanivṛttyavināmbhūtasya mahāmāyāpuruṣavivekasyāpy udayāt. māyāpuruṣavivekodayāt tu karmanivṛttyavinābhūtād vijñānakevalatvam eva malānivṛtter [*em.*; *malanivṛtter* ed.] *ity uktaṃ gurubhiḥ*:

> *kalātattvordhvabhuvane kaivalyaṃ sambhavet paśoḥ |*
> *vijñānayogasannyāsair bhogād vā karmaṇaḥ kṣayāt || iti*

prakṛtivivekodayāt tu na tad api, tadūrdhvabhogyānāṃ [*em.*; *-bhogānāṃ* ed.] *karmaṇām aparikṣayād ity uktam*:

> *guṇatattvordhvabhogyasya karmaṇo 'nupalabdhitaḥ |*
> *kaivalyam api sāṅkhyānāṃ naiva yuktam asaṅkṣayāt || iti*

Thus he introduces the present verse in our text with the words: 'When that [teaching] is understood, the highest liberation [comes about] because of the rise also* of knowledge capable of discriminating between the soul and *mahāmāya*, which is invariably concomitant with the cessation of Impurity. But from the rise of knowledge capable of discriminating between the soul and *māyā*, which is invariably concomitant with the cessation of karma, only the state of *vijñānakevalatva* [comes about], because Impurity has not ceased, as the Guru [Sadyojyotiḥ] has said.'

* Also = as well as the cessation of Impurity

So he makes a clear distinction between liberation and *vijñānakevalatva*, which he sees as the subject of our verse. And then he makes a clear distinction between *vijñānakevalatva* and the *kaivalya* of the Sāṅkhyas, by introducing verse 53 of our text with the words: 'But from the rise of knowledge capable of discriminating [the soul] from *prakṛti*, that *vijñānakevalatva* does not also [come about], because karma that needs to be experienced above *prakṛti* (*tadūrdhva-*) is not destroyed [by that kind of discrimination].'

3.16.3 Isolation is not Liberation

[Objection:] Surely that very Isolation [which you have just described] is our liberation?

[Sadyojyotiḥ] replies:

56) And that [Isolation], which when it arises [from destruction of karma] is full of Impurity (*tamobhūri*),[881] proclaimed [by you] as the [ultimate] fruit, is [in fact] destruction of the self, because of the destruction of the qualities of knowledge and action [in that state]. For (*yataḥ*) there is thus (*evam*)[882] rather (*tu*)[883] resorption into a material cause for you (*bhavatām*), so [you] make this same great mistake [as the Vedāntins and the Pāñcarātrikas in the preceding two sections].[884]

Sāṅkhya *kaivalya* is less exalted than *vijñānakevalatva*, because in the former state the soul is still subject to karma. *Vijñānakevalatva* is less exalted than liberation, because as a *vijñānakevalin* the soul is still subject to Impurity.

[881]Literally, 'is abundant with *tamas*'. Rāmakaṇṭha seems to understand *tamas* here as *mala* (see *malasadbhāvāt* in the commentary) and this seems reasonable given that (1) *tamas* is given in a list of synonyms of *mala* at *Kiraṇatantra* 2:19c–20; (2) *tamas* is unlikely to be used here to refer to one of the *guṇas*, since *vijñānakevalins* are not subject to *māyā*; (3) *vijñānakevalins* are still subject to *mala*.

[882]'Thus' = if karma is destroyed, but *mala* still left intact.

[883]'Rather' = rather than liberation.

[884]This is not a natural way of understanding the verse. To take *dṛkkriyāguṇasaṅkṣayāt* as giving a reason for *gītam ātmavadhaḥ phalam* rather than for *upādānalayas tv evam* does not respect the word order, and neither does taking *bhavatāṃ yataḥ* with *upādānalayaḥ* rather than with the rest of *pāda*s ef. But our construal is an attempt to interpret the verse in line with the commentary, on the assumption that *bhavatām yataḥ* in the verse is reflected by *bhavatām yataḥ* in the commentary, and *dṛkkriyāguṇasaṅkṣayāt* by *kiñcijjñatvakartṛtvayor abhāvāt*.

Sadyojyotiḥ may instead have intended: 'For rather resorption into a material cause [the fruit dealt with in the last two sections] is no different (*evaṃ*) [from this Isolation], since [in both cases] there is destruction of the qualities of knowledge and action. So you make this same great mistake [as the previous two opponents of positing as the fruit something that amounts to destruction of the self].' In other words he may not have intended to claim that the liberation of the Sāṅkhyas is resorption into a material cause, but rather just that Sāṅkhya liberation is akin to it in that both amount to destruction of the self.

It is not certain that Rāmakaṇṭha understood the verse in the way that we suggest, for it is possible that his *bhavatām yataḥ* was not intended to reflect the *bhavatām yataḥ* in the verse. It is even possible that he did not read the final two *pāda*s in the verse. The only evidence for him having read it is his *bhavatām yataḥ*, the rest being certainly unreflected in the commentary. We have four sources for the constitution of the verses, and one of them does not have it, namely the editions (one of which is copied from the other).

Whatever kind of Isolation [you] propose as liberation, that too[885] [taken as] the fruit (*phalam*)[886] is clearly (*hi*), on the contrary (*pratyuta*),[887] simply destruction of the self (*ātmanāśa eva*), because, since Impurity [still] exists for selves [in that state], there is not even partial knowledge and power to act, as in the state of one devoid of all faculties (*akalāvasthāvat*).[888] For (*yataḥ*) liberation for you too [as well as for Pāñcarātrikas and Vedāntins] is [effectively] resorption into *avyakta*, which is the material cause of the *guṇas*.[889]

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[885]The sense conveyed by the *api* is: even if you substitute the higher *kaivalya* that is taught to be possible in our religion for your lower *kaivalya*, that *too* amounts to destruction of the self.

[886]We translate with this expression 'taken as the fruit' for two reasons. Rāmakaṇṭha would not hold that *vijñānakevalatva* amounts to destruction of the self, and we want this sentence to hold true both for Sāṅkhya *kaivalya* and for *vijñānakevalatva*. Secondly, the positioning of the word *phalam* seems to indicate that the sentence does not just mean 'that fruit amounts to destruction of the self'. As an attempt at an interpretation that takes both of these into account, we propose the idea to be that if either of the two kinds of Isolation is taken as the final goal, it amounts to destruction of the self, for then the isolated soul would never emerge from his inactive and cognitionless state, and since cognition and action are inseparable from the self, it is as though his self would never emerge again.

[887]I.e. far from being liberation.

[888]Impurity (*mala*) precludes the possibility of cognition and action unless *kalā* and the other faculties are present. These evolutes of *māyā* can split apart the Impurity surrounding the soul and thus allow the partial manifestation of its powers of cognition and action (see, e.g., *Parākhyatantra* 4:25, *Kiraṇatantra* 1:16c–17 and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary ad loc.). But *akala* souls, i.e. *pralayākalas* and *vijñānākalas* (for this usage of *akala*, see *Kiraṇatantra* 1:23ab and Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary ad loc.), are no longer subject to the bond of *māyā*, having none of her evolutes, and thus they are stranded in a cognitionless and inactive state.

Kalā in the compound *akala* can have three meanings: *kalātattva*, all of the *tattvas* that are parts (*kalā*) of *māyā*, or 'power to act' (i.e. a synonym of *śakti*) (see GOODALL 1998: 222 and *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa* III s.v. *pralayakevala*).

[889]The Sāṅkhyas do not of course consider their liberation to involve resorption into the material cause of the *guṇas*, but rather to involve complete separation from it. So why does Rāmakaṇṭha feel justified in making this claim? We are unable to provide a completely satisfactory answer to this question. The point may be that if the Sāṅkhyas were able to achieve a higher Isolation through the destruction of karma, they would remain stranded there without ever again receiving a body and taking birth, without cognition and action since their faculties have been dissolved, and hence this fate of non-emergence could be regarded as a state of dissolution into a material cause. Or it may be that, as argued earlier, the Sāṅkhya discrimination between the soul and the *guṇas* is able to free them only from the levels of the universe from the *guṇas* down, so that they get stuck in, i.e. resorbed into, the material cause of the *guṇas*, i.e. *avyakta*. But note that when Rāmakaṇṭha assigns

4 Conclusion: verses 57–59

Thus having shown the Sāṅkhyas' view also to be flawed, in order to conclude, he addresses all [disputants].

4.1 To aim for the annihilation of the self is the ultimate in foolishness

57ab) The greatest heavyweights among the fools are those for whom one's own self is destroyed [in liberation].[890]

All those disputants for whom the destruction of the self, or some similar [goal][891] that is not the [highest] good, is conceived of as the highest good, are the foremost of fools,[892] to be held at a great distance by seekers of what is good.[893] The meaning is that liberation for all [such disputants] is something that is not one of the aims of the soul (*apuruṣārthabhūtaḥ*).[894] For to explain:

> For all disputants outside [our own view of] the manifestation of [the soul's innate] [omni-]science (*jñatvavyakteḥ paratra*), because of the absence [in their views] of the cogniser, of the object

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the liberated souls of rival traditions to particular *tattvas*, regarded as the levels of the universe that they can achieve through their particular teachings, he locates the Sāṅkhyas not precisely in *avyaktatattva*, but at the top of/on top of *guṇa* (*guṇapṛṣṭhe*) (see v. 6 of the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa*, edited and translated by GOODALL 1998: xxii–xxv). Similarly, the scriptural source he cites on this point in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (see note 836) assigns them to the 'crest of *guṇa*' (*guṇamūrdhni*). *Avyakta* is said in both places to be the locus of the Pāñcarātrikas.

[890] Rāmakaṇṭha has cited this half-verse twice earlier in his commentary (ad 11cd and 48cd), and he cites it in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:67cd.

[891] In view of the verse that Rāmakaṇṭha is about to quote, perhaps by 'some similar goal' he has in mind those that involve the cessation of cognition or of the objects of cognition.

[892] *Pradhāna* is usually used as a neuter noun. But rather than trying to interpret this compound as a *bahuvrīhi*, we prefer to see it as including a rare adjectival use of *pradhāna*.

[893] Who precisely are these foremost of fools who teach a liberation that consists in the destruction of the self? As is clear both from the verse that Rāmakaṇṭha is about to give, and from the following comment in the *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad 5:60c–61—*āgamavyatiriktānāṃ sarveṣām eva darśanānām ātmanāśa eva mokṣaḥ*, they are the adherents of all traditions except Rāmakaṇṭha's own āgamic one.

[894] The *a-* prefix here may have the stronger meaning of 'contrary to' (as in *adharma*): liberation for them is something quite contrary to all of the aims of the soul.

of cognition, or of cognition, their liberation is tantamount to the destruction of the self.[895]

[895]The verse seems to have been composed by Rāmakaṇṭha, for he introduces it as his own (*tathoktam asmābhir anyatra*) at *Mataṅgavṛtti* ad 5:60c–61. Jñānaprakāśa introduces his citation of the verse with *tad uktaṃ mantravārttikaṭīkāyām* (the *Mantravārttikaṭīkā* is a lost work of Rāmakaṇṭha: see section 6 in the Introduction and GOODALL 1998: xx).

The absence of objects of cognition in liberation is a tenet of almost all of the non-theistic traditions, but perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha has Yogācāra Buddhism primarily in mind, given that the denial of the reality of objects of cognition is such a prominent feature of their teaching and one that he refutes at length in several of his texts. For those who teach a liberation devoid of cognition, perhaps Rāmakaṇṭha has the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas primarily in mind, but it is likely (from the evidence of verse 56 and its commentary) that Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha would also include here the Transformationist Vedāntins, the Pāñcarātrikas and the Sāṅkhyas. The obvious candidates for those whose liberation involves absence of a cogniser are the Buddhists and the Cārvākas.

When this verse is cited by Jñānaprakāśa in the sixteenth century, he comments *jñātur abhāvo bauddhalokāyatādīnām, jñeyasyābhāvo bauddhaviśeṣaśūnyavādivedāntyādīnām, jñapter abhāvo naiyāyikavaiśeṣikādīnām iti vivekaḥ* (*Śivayogasāra*, p. 33).

Why does absence of cognition or absence of objects of cognition amount to annihilation of the self? The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, for example, would certainly deny that the self is annihilated at liberation despite maintaining the absence in it of cognition. The answer is that for Rāmakaṇṭha the self is by nature a cogniser (*jñātṛ*), so if its nature as cogniser ceases, i.e. if it ceases to cognise, then it itself must cease: see, in section 3.5, *jñātṛsvabhāvatvād evātmanas tadanubhyupagame tannāśadoṣa eva*. For more on why annihilation of the self results for the Transformationist Vedāntins and the Pāñcarātrikas, see *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1:67cd and section 3.13.2 of this text.

The last two words of the reading we have adopted in the last *pāda*—*paratra tu*—is supported by all of our sources, and it is the reading in Jñānaprakāśa's citation and in the edition of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*. But it is awkward for two reasons. (1) It is not certain that *paratra* + ablative ('in another place than', 'elsewhere than') can actually yield this sense of 'outside of', 'other than', which would usually be expressed by, for example, *muktvā*, *hitvā* or *ṛte*. (2) On this reading, where we have to take all four *pāda*s as constituting one sentence, it is not possible to give any force to the *tu* in the last *pāda*.

The Kashmirian manuscripts of the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, collated by BHAṬṬ, read *jñatvavyaktau paraṃ na tu*: 'but this is not so in [our own view of] the manifestation of [the soul's innate] [omni-]science'. In Northern scripts, confusion between *tra* and *nna* is common. Since it is well-known to anyone who has worked on the *Mataṅgavṛtti* that the Kashmirian sources are regularly to be preferred, this reading is to be seriously considered not only for the *Mataṅgavṛtti*, but also for here, given that it is unlikely that Rāmakaṇṭha would have cited his own verse there with a different last *pāda*. For this reading to be correct we have to make the bold assumption that the corruption (*paranna* → *paratra*) occurred independently in three different texts (assuming that Jñānaprakāśa's attribution of the verse to the *Mantravārttikaṭīkā* is correct), or that it spread through cross-contamination not just to other manuscripts of the same text, but to two other texts. But this may

[Objection:] Surely for the Saṅkrāntivādins the self is not destroyed in liberation.

[Sadyojyotiḥ] replies:

> 57cd) Amongst knowers (*jñātṝṇām*), the Śikhāsaṅkrāntivādins[896] [wrongly] fancy themselves as clever.[897]

Śikhā[898] [means here] power (*śakti*). Those who teach transference of that (*tatsaṅkrāntivādinaḥ*) are in fact unwise in [the matter of] liberation, because [Sadyojyotiḥ] taught [earlier in this text] that they are not released from this unwanted consequence:

> For there too [i.e. in the doctrine of Saṅkrāntivāda] it is Śambhu alone who knows and does everything [through his own qualities, not the perfected soul].[899]

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not be impossible: for four examples of the same corruption in more than one text of Rāmakaṇṭha's, see WATSON (2006: 237, note 82), and for another likely case, see note 631.

[896]Rāmakaṇṭha used this label to identify the opponents when *saṅkrāntivāda* first came up in section 2.18.2.

[897]The general structure of the verses here seems to be that 56 concludes the refutation of the liberation of the Sāṅkhyas, and hence the refutation of all the positions that were listed by Sadyojyotiḥ in verses 2–7 and expounded by Rāmakaṇṭha in his commentary ad loc. Verse 57 is not a refutation of opponents, but rather a comment on their psychology: the foolishness of those whose liberation entails the destruction of the self is asserted in the first half; and the conceitedness of the Saṅkrāntivādins in the second. There is a contrast between *mūḍhānām* in the first half of the verse and *jñātṝṇām* in the second. Probably *jñātṝṇām* refers here to the Āveśavādins, Utpattivādins and Saṅkrāntivādins, whom Sadyojyotiḥ separates off from the other opponents (in verses 6 and 7), grouping their views together with his own as all holding that liberation consists in becoming equal to the Lord (*īśvarasamatā*). Thus they may well not be included among the fools referred to in the first half of the verse.

Against this interpretation of *jñātṝṇām* it could be pointed out that when *jñātāraḥ* is used below in 58d, it appears to mean no more than *vādinaḥ*. But in this verse at least, a clear contrast seems to be intended between *mūḍhānām* and *jñātṝṇām*.

Why does Sadyojyotiḥ dismiss only the Saṅkrāntivādins here and not the Āveśavādins or Utpattivādins? Perhaps this simply reflects that the Saṅkrāntivādins were more important opponents for him (twenty-nine and a half verses being devoted to their refutation as opposed to a quarter of a verse each for the other two). All three have been refuted, so there is no need for them all to be mentioned again; he just decides to have one more dig at the Saṅkrāntivādins.

[898]The word more usually means flame, crest or topknot: cf. note 236.

[899]So the Saṅkrāntivādins too, despite their conceit, fall into the same trap of teaching

4.2 The value of the teachings of other traditions

[Objection:] If that is the case, then since absolutely all of the traditional teachings (*śāstra*) regarding liberation are, as has been taught above (*uktavat*),[900] refuted [by valid means of knowledge] and mutually contradictory, are they simply (*eva*) invalid?

[Sadyojyotiḥ] says not:

58a) Other [traditions apart from Śaiva Siddhānta] are deficient in [their ability to see all] reality.[901]

For not every means of knowledge need reveal everything.[902] Thus other [teachings (*śāstras*)] too are certainly means of knowledge, in that they reveal a small [range of] objects, just as direct perception etc. [are means of knowledge despite revealing only a small range of objects].[903] [Sadyojyotiḥ] says why they reveal [only] a very small [range] of objects:

58b) Because they do not teach higher [levels of the universe], [namely] *rāga* and the like.[904]

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a liberation in which the self is effectively destroyed.

The citation is of v. 29ab of this text.

[900]Regarding the expression *uktavat* see note 497.

[901]*Vastunyūnatvam* is reflected by *nyūnadarśitvam* in the commentary.

[902]Literally, 'need have everything as its object'.

[903]Perception can only reveal to us perceptible objects; it can tell us nothing about whether the Lord created the universe, for example, for which we rely on inference and scripture. The sub-categories of perception are restricted to an even smaller range of objects: visual perception cannot reveal tastes to us; but we still accept it as showing us something valid. Likewise with the non-Saiddhāntika teachings about liberation.

Rāmakaṇṭha takes *vastunyūnatvam anyeṣām*, which seems to be a condemnation of others, to be giving a reason for why their traditions are means of knowledge in their own spheres. This view is kinder to non-Saiddhāntikas than Sadyojyotiḥ may have intended.

[904]It may look as though *rāgādyūrdhvam* were intended as a *tatpuruṣa*, '[levels of the universe] higher than *rāga* and the like', but Rāmakaṇṭha takes it as a *karmadhāraya*, as can be seen from the first sentence of his commentary.

What is the likely motive for the *karmadhāraya* interpretation? It may just be that if the compound is taken as a *tatpuruṣa*, so that the meaning is 'because they do not teach [levels of the universe] higher than *rāga* and the like', then it could be implied that they do teach *rāga* and the like.

A problem with the translation of the verse as it stands is that it takes the accusative, *rāgādyūrdhvam*, as though it were a genitive. If *rāgādyūrdhva-* is interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa*, then the accusative can be easily accounted for as denoting an adverb: 'Because they do not

[The compound *rāgādyūrdhvam* refers to] something which is both (*ca tat ... ca tat*) a group of *tattvas*, [namely] *rāga*, *vidyā* and so forth, and higher, [which is to say] higher than *guṇa* and the others [below it] in terms of the cosmography.[905] This word 'higher' [in the verse] has a meaning similar [but

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teach above *rāga* and the like', i.e. because they do not teach about levels of the universe above *rāga* and the like. We think this is most likely to be Sadyojyotiḥ's intention. We presume he expressed himself loosely, intending 'above *rāga* and the like' to mean '*rāga* and the like upwards'.

But Rāmakaṇṭha interprets *rāgādyūrdhva-* as a *karmadhāraya*, and it seems odd to us that an adverb *rāgādyūrdhvam* should be formed from such a compound. Furthermore in his commentary he gives no sign of an adverbial interpretation. *Rāgādyūrdhvam abhāṣaṇāt* is reflected in his commentary with *rāgādyūrdhvasamastatattvajātasyānukteḥ* (this at least seems to be the best reading, though it is not that of the editions or A_1). In other words the compound that glosses *rāgādyūrdhvam* ends in a genitive.

We see only two possibilities. (1) Rāmakaṇṭha interpreted the accusative as though it were a genitive. (2) He really did understand *rāgādyūrdhvaṃ* to be an adverb formed from the *karmadhāraya*: 'Because they do not teach in a way in which *rāga* and the like are higher'. Such an interpretation would normally be indicated in a commentary by something like *rāgādy ūrdhvam yathā bhavati tathābhāṣaṇāt*, where *yathā bhavati tathā* would indicate the transformation of the *karmadhāraya* into an adverb. But it is conceivable that Rāmakaṇṭha had such an interpretation in mind without bothering to formulate it in his commentary.

[905] *Prakriyā* seems here to be used in the sense of *bhuvanakrama*, the cosmographical sequence of the levels of the universe (see *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa* III s.v. *prakriyā* for this usage).

Between *guṇa* and *rāga*, *vidyā* etc. come *prakṛti* (otherwise known as *avyakta* or *pradhāna*) and *puruṣa*. Surely these are taught by the Sāṅkhyas. So why does Rāmakaṇṭha not write here 'higher than *puruṣa*', instead of 'higher than *guṇa*?

What he writes here is consistent with *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* 1:69: *bandhanāni guṇāntāni sāṅkhyādyair bhāṣitāny atha | pradhānādīni cānyāni śaivair evoditāni tu* ‖ 'The Sāṅkhyas and others have taught bonds up to the *guṇas*. Then the Śaivas alone however (*tu*) have taught others beginning with *pradhāna* also (*ca*).' See also v. 53 of this text and his commentary on it. It seems, then, that for Sadyojyotiḥ and Rāmakaṇṭha the Sāṅkhyas only recognise the levels of the universe up to and including *guṇatattva*. Quite how they would have justified this is not clear. For possible reasons for their related claim that the Sāṅkhyas can only liberate themselves from the bonds up to and including *guṇatattva*, see note 836.

not identical] to the word 'higher'.[906] Because these [other traditions][907] do not teach this whole collection of *tattva*s that are higher, and that consist of *rāga* and the like, their ability to see is deficient.

4·3 The result of following other traditions

In that case what can be attained through [following] other scriptures? He answers:

> 58cd) Thus the adepts [of those traditions][908] come to rest in places [within the impure universe],[909] because they do not go beyond *māyā*.

Thus, [i.e.] because they do not see the higher [levels of the universe], namely *rāga* and the like, those ***adepts*** 'liberated' by means of other systems become dissolved into regions (*-skandheṣu*),[910] [namely] *tattva*s and *bhuvana*s, below *māyātattva*. If [you ask] which [traditions] are dissolved into which [*tattva*s and *bhuvana*s], [I] have shown precisely that by means of the *Āgama-prāmāṇyopanyāsa*[911] [which comments] on the section [of the *Raurava*] that

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[906] In other words, Rāmakaṇṭha is taking *ūrdhva* as metaphorical. *Mālinīvijayottara* 2:60ab does the same: *yo hi yasmād guṇotkṛṣṭaḥ sa tasmād ūrdhva ucyate.* 'A thing which is in quality superior to another thing may be said to be higher than it'. Rāmakaṇṭha is very likely to have read this as Sadyojyotiḥ quotes it in his *Svāyambhuvavṛtti*. It is in fact the only quotation that has been identified in Sadyojyotiḥ's writings (see GOODALL 2004: 318, note 635). The *Svāyambhuvavṛtti* edition reads *ūrdhvam iti* in place of *ūrdhva ucyate*, which is perhaps a corruption as it seems unlikely that the first twelve syllables of the verse be quoted exactly, followed by something unmetrical for the last *pāda*.

Rāmakaṇṭha's intention in the present sentence may be that the *tattva*s do not exist literally one above another, but in a hierarchy of increasing subtlety.

[907] *Teṣām* reflects *anyeṣām* in the verse.

[908] *Jñātāraḥ* construes with *anyeṣām* in 58a.

[909] We have inserted the contents of the square brackets because it seems empty to merely assert that they 'come to rest in places'. But it is possible that behind such a statement is the assumption that coming to rest in any particular place is a lowly fate, indicating the non-realisation of one's all-pervading nature.

[910] For *skandha* in this meaning of a cosmographical region, cf. *Bhogakārikā* 111 and *Parākhyatantra* 5:145ff.

[911] Or alternatively 'by setting down the [extent of the] validity of the scriptures [of other traditions].' It is known, however, that this is the name of a (lost) text. As GOODALL has shown (1998: xix–xxi) it formed part of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Rauravavṛttiviveka* and is likely to have been a commentary on a lost work by Sadyojyotiḥ entitled *Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*,

deals with doctrine (*jñānakāṇḍe*).[912]

4.4 The purpose of the exposition of other traditions

In order to conclude, he says:

> 59) The fruits proclaimed by the disputants [of other systems] have been expounded in brief[913] in the above manner with the purpose of preventing [sincere] seekers [of liberation] from acting to bring about those [fruits].

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itself part of the latter's commentary on the *Raurava* (see section 6 of the Introduction). Although no manuscripts of the *Āgamaprāmāṇyopanyāsa* have come to light, GOODALL has reproduced and translated (1998: xxii–xxv) eleven verses of it that are quoted by later authors. A further twelve verses of it are cited in the *Siddhāntasamuccaya* (T. 284 pp. 151ff; T. 206 pp. 84ff; and Madras, GOML R 14394, pp. 32ff).

[912]This implies that the part of the *Raurava* on which the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* and the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* comment is not in the *jñānakāṇḍa*; see also notes 766 and 917 for further evidence. This may seem surprising. But we know from the opening sentence of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* that the section of Sadyojyotiḥ's *Rauravavṛtti* that precedes the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* dealt with that part of Śaiva initiation known as *śivahasta*; and, as argued in section 6 of the Introduction, there is evidence that the part following the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* was the *Mantravārttika*. Since it is unlikely that either of these two would have been commenting on the section of the *Raurava* that deals with *jñāna*, perhaps the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* was composed not as a commentary on any part of the *jñānakāṇḍa*, but as a digression within the commentary on a ritual section. This digression, then, would have been triggered by the inclusion, within a ritual section of the *Raurava*, of the two and a half verses that are cited by Rāmakaṇṭha at the very beginning of the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*.

The inclusion of these two and a half verses in a ritual section of the *Raurava*, not in its *jñānakāṇḍa*, may explain their non-occurrence in the surviving *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha*. The text of the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* as it appears in BHATT's edition is almost certainly incomplete, as GOODALL argues (1998: xl, note 92 and 2004: xcvii). Moreover, the scribe of the Mysore manuscript in which the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* appears (described at length by GOODALL 2004: xcv–ci) has evidently selected for copying passages concerning doctrine and yoga from the tantras that he transcribed. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that whatever else is now missing from the *Rauravasūtrasaṅgraha* as transmitted to us, its presentation of some rituals has been lost, which may or may not have been grouped together in a block of chapters. Its account of *mudrās*, however, survives (chapter "5"), as do accounts of the division of the *brahmamantras* into *kalās* (chapter "6") and of the eighty-one-word VYOMAVYĀPI-MANTRA; the treatment of other mantras has not survived.

[913]This is how Rāmakaṇṭha takes *leśataḥ*, glossing it as *saṅkṣepeṇa*, which is certainly possible. It is also possible, however, that Sadyojyotiḥ intended the other meaning of *leśataḥ*, namely 'variously', since he used *leśāt* earlier (see note 282) in that sense, where it was quite clear that it could not mean 'in brief'.

The fruits, established by all [non-Saiddhāntika] ***disputants***, which are their very definitions of the liberated state ***have been expounded*** in brief. If [you ask] for what purpose[914] they were expounded, we reply as follows. [They were expounded] because (*iti*) without determining [which] tradition brings about the [ultimate] fruit,[915] [people] act for the sake of the lower fruits [that are all other traditions can bestow]. [Whereas] those who really desire the ultimate good should act within this [tradition] alone (*eva*), excluding non-connection and excluding connection with any other.[916] For from this [tradition] the highest good is achieved.

> Since, it would seem (*kila yataḥ*), these verses, which the commentator on the *Raurava* wrote [while commenting] on the sequence of [rites that make up] initiation,[917] [and] which are concerned with the rejection of the liberations of all other traditions, have not been plumbed by those of little wit because of their profundity, therefore (*tat*) Rāmakaṇṭha, the son of the illustrious Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, composed this clear exposition of them.

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[914] We conjecture *kam artham prati* for *kimartham prati*. The latter is grammatically incorrect, unless we take *prati* not as a postposition but as a verbal prefix going with *uktāni*. That is less plausible, because *prati* is likely to be reflecting *prati* in the verse; and *uktāni* is likely to be picking up on *uktāni* in the verse and in the previous sentence of the commentary.

[915] Or 'without determining that [our] tradition brings about the [ultimate] fruit'. How has the exposition in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* allowed the reader to determine which tradition brings about the ultimate fruit? Presumably the idea is that by pointing out the faults in all of the non-Saiddhāntika traditions, the Śaiva Siddhānta is left as the only one capable of bringing about full liberation.

The variant reading *avadhārya* for *anavadhārya* gives good sense: 'determining that [another] tradition yields a fruit'. But the fact that it is supported only by A_1 and M_2, which commonly agree in error, gives us a reason for marginally preferring *anavadhārya*.

[916] *Eva* is said to have three possible meanings: *ayogavyavaccheda*, *anyayogavyavaccheda* and *atyantāyogavyavaccheda* (see note 93). The *eva* that qualifies the *atra* is clarified here as having the former two meanings: excluding non-connection [with Śaiva Siddhānta], and excluding connection with any other [tradition].

[917] This compound *dikṣākrame* further suggests that the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* comments on a part of the *Raurava* dealing with ritual, not with *jñāna* (see note 912).

ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

Abbreviations for manuscripts or editions of particular texts appear under the bibliographic entries for those texts below. For further symbols used primarily in our edition, see 'Conventions in the Apparatus' on pp. 99f above.

BORI Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

DK [edition from] Devakoṭṭai.

EFEO Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient.

GOML Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.

IFI Institut Français d'Indologie.

IFP Institut Français de Pondichéry / French Institute of Pondicherry.

KP *kriyāpāda.*

KSTS [edition of the] Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.

NAK National Archives, Kathmandu.

ms, mss manuscript, manuscripts.

NGMPP Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project.

T Transcript.

vl *varia lectio* (marks a variant recorded by the editors of the text being cited).

VP *vidyāpāda.*

WZKS *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.*

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ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ. See FRAUWALLNER (1930) and SASTRI (1980).

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KṢAṆABHAṄGASIDDHI. See FRAUWALLNER (1935).

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TATTVAVAIŚĀRADĪ. See YOGASŪTRA.

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See also AṢṬAPRAKARAṆA, ed. DVIVEDI. Unless otherwise stated, we follow the verse numeration of FILLIOZAT.

TATTVASAṄGRAHAPAÑJIKĀ. In TATTVASAṄGRAHA of Śāntarakṣita.

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See also OLIVELLE (1998).

TRIṂŚIKĀVIJÑAPTIMĀTRATĀSIDDHIBHĀṢYA. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ [Prakaraṇadvayam] of Ācārya Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā With an Auto-Commentary and Triṃśikā With the Commentary (Bhāṣya) of Sthiramati*, ed. Rāmaśāṅkara TRIPĀṬHĪ. Varanasi: 1992.

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E_K = KSTS edition: *The Nareshvarapariksha of Sadyojyotih with Commentary by Ramakantha*, ed. Madhusūdan Kaul SHASTRI. KSTS 45. Srinagar, The Research Department Jammu and Kashmir State, 1926.

E_P = Pandit Edition: 'Nareśvaraparīkṣā' in *Pandit* 2. Benaras, 1867–1868. 1st kāṇḍa: pp. 72–78, 93–101, 119–126, 141–144. The rest of the text begins on p. 145 and ends on p. 221, roughly half of the intervening pages being devoted to other texts.

See also WATSON (2006: 389–415).

We occasionally report readings of the following manuscripts: B (paper, Śāradā, from Baroda; see WATSON 2006: 105–6), P (paper, Śāradā, from Pune; see WATSON 2006: 108–110) and C (paper, Bengali, from Calcutta; see WATSON 2006: 110).

NĀDAKĀRIKĀ of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha with the commentary of Aghoraśivācārya. In AṢṬAPRAKARAṆA.

See also FILLIOZAT (1984).

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NYĀYASŪTRA. In NYĀYABHĀṢYA.

NYĀYĀGAMĀNUSĀRIṆĪ. In NAYACAKRA.

PAÑCĀRTHABHĀṢYA. See PĀŚUPATASŪTRA and BISSCHOP (2005).

PADĀRTHADHARMASAṄGRAHA. See PRAŚASTAPĀDABHĀṢYA.

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See also BANSAT-BOUDON & TRIPATHI (2011).

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E_D = Devakoṭṭai edition of AṢṬAPRAKARAṆA

E_V = Varaṅasi edition of AṢṬAPRAKARAṆA

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PAUṢKARABHĀṢYA. See PAUṢKARĀGAMA.

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PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYA. *Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1. A hypothetical reconstruction with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi's Ṭīkā*, ed. Ernst STEINKELLNER.
URL: http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf

PRAMEYARATNAMĀLĀ. *Prameyaratnamālā of Laghu Anantavīrya. A Commentary on Parīkṣāmukhasūtra of Māṇikyanandī*, ed. Hira Lal JAIN. Vidyabhawan Sanskrit Granthamala 107. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, 1964.

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BĀLABODHINĪ. See KĀVYAPRAKĀŚA.

BṚHADĀRAṆYAKOPANIṢAT. See LIMAYE and VADEKAR (1958).

BRAHMAPURĀṆA. See SCHREINER and SÖHNEN (1987).

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YOGAVĀRTTIKA. See YOGASŪTRA.

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